Video credit: Kadin Williams
The house in the above video from May 5, 2022, appears to be a two-story, lightweight wood frame, single-family dwelling. It shows two levels at the front and what appears to be three levels at the rear, which could account for a basement level. This house fire occurred at 1034 Autumn Drive at 07:07 a.m. in the Town of Union, Endwell, New York. The responding chief requested a second alarm en route due to the heavy column of smoke that was visible. Upon arrival, the chief confirmed heavy fire conditions from the Charlie side. Crews initially launched an offensive fire attack with 1¾-inch handlines on the Charlie side. Fire rapidly spread to the attic and throughout the house on all floors. Given the fire’s extended control and degradation of structural stability, the operational strategy shifted from an offensive attack to a defensive attack mode.
Analysis
It was a good call from the responding chief to request the second alarm en route, to start additional resources early, as the column of smoke indicated a working fire. Confirming heavy fire conditions from the rear, he instructed the first-due engine, which was a quint, to advance a line to the rear for fire attack. The rescue squad arrived behind the quint and pulled a second handline to assist the fire attack crew near the Charlie/Delta corner. The second engine to arrive provided a supply line and water to the quint.
It appears the fire began internally or externally on the Charlie side (need to rule out basement fire) of the house and quickly autoexposed to the floors above, the soffit, and the attic. While we see some initial signs of steam conversion from the attack lines, it appears clear the fire is rapidly spreading, and handlines are not gaining control fast enough to overcome the fire. It is unclear what factors allowed the fire to remain in control during the offensive attack strategy, but consideration is given to available staffing, training and experience, water supply, hoseline selection, and speed of the operation to effectively execute the tactics. These considerations are not intended to be critical of the crews or fire department, but often influence the level of firefighter success.
Strategic/Tactical Considerations
Beginning in an offensive strategy and calling for additional resources early was the logical choice given the time of day and what appears to be an offensive strategy fire upon arrival. While I agree the 1¾-inch handline can put out a lot of fire, it must also be capable of achieving this goal quickly. When we hear, “heavy fire conditions” from an experienced chief, in my opinion, it may be suggestive of a bigger line to start with, such as a 2½-inch handline or a rapid attack monitor, or even a deck gun, when applicable. Many tend to want to prove the abilities of a smaller attack line, but when seconds count and fire is controlling, sometimes we need to pull the larger line from the start to achieve a rapid knock down and gain fire control. The decision on which line to initially pull has to be weighed against the amount of available tank water, how quickly water supply can be established, and the best way to gain a substantial and sustained fire knock down.
If using one or even two 1¾-inch handlines, the lines have to work quickly and together to make use of the additional water. Sometimes, the water volume from the 1¾-inch handline is just not sufficient to overwhelm and subdue the fire conditions. The larger lines provide higher gpm, reach, and penetration.
Within our strategy and tactics, we must consider the factors mentioned previously: Was water supply an issue that may have prevented the use of a larger line from the onset? Would a larger line selection have been a better choice than two 1¾-inch handlines? Were the crews well trained and experienced, and was there sufficient personnel on hand to effectively execute the tactics? These are questions that each department has to consider for each fire, and hopefully they are conducting postincident analysis to determine if they are meeting the goals of each fire incident and identifying and making necessary changes to heed lessons learned and reinforce things done well.
It is highly recommended that outside-in fires, and fires rapidly autoexposing from ground level along the exterior of the structure to floors, the soffit, and attic above, be addressed first, or simultaneously, when resources are available. This limits fire and smoke’s ability to rapidly spread and helps to keep fire controlled so it does not work against firefighters going to the interior to search and extinguish interior fire.
When shifting from offensive to defensive strategy, ensure personnel accountability, establish collapse zones, and corner safe work areas to safely operate from. As fire attacks the structural stability and water weight increases, so does the potential for structural collapse. When putting master streams in operation, consider directing streams effectively to surface cool and to get water into spaces to make a positive difference rather than dumping thousands of gallons into areas that do not indicate effective water conversion, because the water is not effectively hitting its target. Consider getting water into easily accessible areas showing fire like windows, doors, and eaves when there is still a chance to wet surfaces and the underside of the roof.
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Firefighter effectiveness begins with building a foundation of knowledge and understanding through effective training and experience. We must know how and when (and how fast) to use the tools and appliances available to us to gain a quick fire knockdown to gain control of fire. Firefighters should consider addressing outside-in fires first and stop auto-exposure so it does not work against firefighters by advancing fire around them or by creating opportunities for trigger events like flashover, backdraft, smoke explosion, or structural collapse. We must also factor that hoselines may be vulnerable to burn through if we do not address outside fire that may be threatening our attack lines.
NICK J. SALAMEH is a 36 year veteran of the fire service. He was a Fire/Emergency Medical Services Captain II and previous Training Program Manager for the Arlington County (VA) Fire Department, where he served 31 years. He is a former Chair of the Northern Virginia Fire Departments Training Committee. Nick is also a contributor to Fire Engineering and Stop Believing Start Knowing (SBSK).
