BY JEFF SHUPE
Envision this situation: Your city covers about 10 square miles and has a population of approximately 38,000. The daytime population skyrockets to more than 125,000 daily because of the amount of commerce located in the city. Your city has all kinds and types of buildings and occupancies, ranging from small one-story taxpayers to residential high-rise structures, some reaching 20 stories or more.
- Fire Alarm Control Panel Systems and Firefighting Operations
- High-Rise Building Fires: What’s the Challenge?
- Big City Tactics for Small Town Fire Departments: Have a Plan!
- Big City Tactics for Small Town Fire Departments: The Fire Academy
Your fire department has 40 career members and operates from two fire stations with minimum staffing of 10 firefighters on duty at all times. Placement is five members on duty per station. Like many suburban fire departments, EMS and other service-related incidents make up the largest percentage of calls. Since structure fires don’t occur regularly, there is not a great deal of emphasis on fire service training-it is especially noticeable by the amount of money allocated for it in the fire department budget. Your firefighters want to train on fire related topics because they know they need it and that someday that “big one” will come. Paramedic recertification and other nonfire training programs have the spotlight.
Your department doesn’t have a dedicated ladder company. The on-duty personnel staff two engines, a 75-foot quint and a standard triple combination apparatus, and two medic units. The number of firefighters on the fire suppression units is well below what it should be.
SCENARIO
You are the shift commander. At approximately 3:25 a.m., the dispatch center (which is shared with police) receives a call for “smoke in the hall on the 14th floor of a 19-story residential high-rise structure” about one and a half miles from the closest fire station. Turnout time is usually good; however, the medic unit from the other fire station is tending to someone with “difficulty in breathing.” Three firefighters answered that call, leaving only two firefighters to respond with the engine from that station. You’re down to seven people now.
As you travel the short distance, your dispatch operator informs you that the center received a couple of more calls reporting heavy smoke in the hallways. You think to yourself that civilians don’t really know heavy smoke conditions and that it’s probably burned food on the stove. As you arrive at the front side of the building, there isn’t much to see and no real excitement. You radio to dispatch: “We’re on the scene of a 19-story residential high-rise. Nothing showing. We’ll be investigating.” You and your station members are heading into the building when the second-due engine, responding by way of the rear of the building, excitedly announces on the radio that there is a “working fire” and people at the windows!
Using your portable radio, you ask the second-due engine officer to repeat his transmission, thinking you didn’t really hear what you thought he said. He repeats it, this time with more urgency.
You are now thinking about what needs to be done. You begin to mentally revise your initial size-up. It’s more than food on the stove! Things like size and type of building, occupancy, and resources are flooding your mind along with time of evening. (If it isn’t flooded, it should be!) On what floor did he say the fire was? He didn’t.
In the main lobby, the fire alarm panel shows activation of smoke detectors on several floors. When this building was constructed, sprinklers were not required, but standpipes are located in the stairwells. This is a Type 1 Fire Resistive structure, so you think that this building will help to keep the fire in check.
Within the past year, the communities in your area decided it was time to work together to develop an automatic response system that would increase the resources available for these types of situations. However, it is not a true automatic response system; it is more like an organized mutual-aid system in which assistance still must be requested by the on-scene incident commander (IC). Before that, fire departments would have had their dispatchers call other communities for help, and they would send whatever they had available. The ICs had no idea of what was available, how long it would take for the resources to arrive, or how those responding units would fit into the fire attack plan, especially with no prior training or operating plan among any of the units.
THE FIRE BUILDING
This high-rise apartment building is located in a smaller suburban city setting, but it would be considered big even by “big-city” standards. There are no laws on the books or codes or ordinances in this town that say we won’t see another building built just like it in the future. When built properly and with full fire protection systems, these giants are not bad things. On the contrary, they can be very good to a city. They can define growth or other positive aspects about a town, plus bring in tax dollars to the local government coffers.
Dimensions and statistics for this structure are as follows. There are 19 stories. Each story has a floor-to-ceiling height of eight feet. Total height of the building is close to 213 feet. There are 300 single-family apartments on 18 floors, and the roof penthouse. The overall length of the building is 340 feet; the width is 105 feet. The apartments range from one to three bedrooms. Suites with one bedroom contain about 700 square feet of livable space; the two-bedroom suites have approximately 950 square feet of floor area. The three-bedroom suites contain at least 1,250 square feet of area. There are 20,000 square feet of livable area on each floor. A bank of three elevators is in the center “core” of the building. All floors are serviced from a common shaft. Stairways are in the core and at the ends of the hallways, hidden at right angles. Ceilings in the public hallways are suspended and have cables and other kinds of wiring running through them.
IN THE LOBBY
As the elevators are captured by the operation of the smoke detectors, you get the distinct aroma of smoke. It’s not the “food on the stove” kind, either! You’re thinking about the occupants and how many might be in immediate danger. In the lobby, a couple of occupants who made it downstairs report that the fire is on the 14th or 15th floor and there’s a lot of smoke in the hallways. Because of this information, you want your initial attack crew to go two floors below the lowest reported floor and walk up from there. They have an elevator under fire control and will take their standpipe kit and tools with them. Only four firefighters are available for fire control efforts in this big, occupied building. The two engine pump operators, who are securing a water supply and stretching hoselines to the siamese connections for water pressure and volume, and you constitute the seven initial arriving firefighters. You need help NOW!
Since there are no sprinklers in this building, quickly placing an attack hoseline is imperative and most likely would be your best strategy, because there is no other method of fire control. By assigning your only available firefighters to take a hoseline up now and to get it in place, the initial fire attack team can start to address simultaneously fire attack and rescue on the fire floor. The attack team will need help as soon as possible, and that must come from the next group of firefighters to arrive. They must be assigned to help with the attack line. This is called “pairing” companies. The safety of occupants and firefighters will be enhanced by getting fire control efforts underway.
WHAT DO YOU DO NEXT?
You now have a big-city fire problem on your hands: a residential suite heavily involved and extending in this occupied high-rise structure. What do you do next? Your on-scene resources are all working. Even if you had all of your shift members available on arrival, there wouldn’t be enough of them for the tasks that need to be addressed. You quickly think to yourself about high-rise fires in other cities that have employed 50, 60, 70, and more firefighters, because of extreme fire conditions and complexities. Where are you going to get those numbers in a hurry?
You call your dispatcher to strike a MABAS (Mutual Aid Box Alarm System) to bring more fire crews and equipment to the scene. It will be several minutes before any help arrives, and some communities will need about 12 to 15 minutes to respond. Dispatch now notifies you that it is receiving numerous phone calls from occupants describing conditions on their floors: heavy smoke in the halls and they are trapped and can’t get out of their apartments.
Size, building construction, occupancy, time of incident, and fire location have already told you this is going to be a labor-intensive operation. However, simply calling for more people is not going to guarantee satisfactory results.
THE “MUSTS”
There must be a fire attack plan for this incident under which all resources will work.
Your fire department must have a high-rise firefighting standard operating procedure (SOP) or plan if it doesn’t already have one.
Your fire department must have preplans for structures like this-with high life hazard and threat potential. To expand on this point, each fire department that participates in your MABAS/auto response system must have the same SOPs or standard operating guidelines.
Each fire department in your MABAS/auto response system must have been trained on it before this incident.
The incident commander must run a disciplined fireground. Everything must go through command. This is accomplished by having all fire departments in the MABAS/auto response system use one command system and one system of accountability. (Luckily, in this case, these departments have worked together on smaller incidents before and have done some limited training together also. Everyone here understands the severity of the incident and knows that the plan must be followed accordingly.)
If you do not have things in place and you have not trained and worked together before an incident, things aren’t going to work when the real show happens.
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
In putting your strategy together, think of all the variables and “what ifs” of a high-rise fire incident. Elevator usage would be a concern. If the elevators fail, your firefighters would have to walk up the stairs, and you know what that can lead to. If an elevator fails with firefighters in the car, you would have a real complex problem.
There are many ways and ideas for formulating an incident strategy. Some fire service authors have come up with techniques fire officers have been following for quite some time, and with good success. Let’s look at a few of those ideas:
• William E. Clark, in his book Firefighting Principles and Practices, 2nd edition, defines fire service strategy as the overall plan developed for an incident by the incident commander. Clark said a general plan can be developed by considering basic factors and asking three questions: (1) What is to be done? (2) What is needed to do it? (3) Who is to do it?
• Noted former Parkersburg (WV) Chief Lloyd Layman developed a way to gather information for a fireground strategy by listing and following the basic steps of firefighting, which yielded the acronym RECEO VS, with which the majority of the fire service has become quite familiar: R – Rescue; E – Exposures; C – Confinement; E – Extinguishment; O – Overhaul; V – Ventilation; S – Salvage. The first five steps follow a general order of the things considered at a fire. Ventilation and salvage can begin anywhere within the priorities of the incident-generally early on. These steps have been used by the American Fire Service for years to help determine an orderly flow of events on the fireground while protecting lives and property regardless of how big or small the department is.
• If you have been a student of the National Fire Academy Outreach Field Programs such as the Managing Company Tactical Operations (MCTO) series and Incident Command System (ICS) courses, the basic steps of putting a plan together are discussed in detail. For example, students review steps for developing size-up information, analyzing the incident priorities, and setting goals for the incident:
- 1. Life safety,
- 2. Incident stabilization, and
- 3. Property conservation.
The sequence of thought should flow something like this:
Size Up + Incident Priorities = GOALS, OBJECTIVES
(that is, Strategy or Incident Action Plan-what needs to be done).
From there, we come up with Tactics, and then Tasks (who is to do it?).
This thought process follows a general progression from information gathering to the actual “doing,” firefighting.
In each of these three steps, the strategy is the overall plan for the incident, which must be developed first. Tactics and tasks are then to be assigned in order of priority for the incident and are to accomplish the strategy. The common denominator is having enough personnel on the scene to address the tactics and tasks that need to be done.
Regardless of whether the incident is taking place in a suburban or rural setting or a dense urban neighborhood, if enough firefighters are not on hand for the job, of course, strategic decisions will be made regarding the safety of personnel and citizens as priorities. Without the right number of firefighters to do certain jobs, the IC must decide which tactics will receive priority based on the safety of the operating members.
APPLICATION OF CLARK’S QUESTIONS TO THIS SCENARIO
Let’s follow Clark’s questions for developing strategy and personnel requirements and see how closely they parallel Layman’s work and the National Fire Academy’s course material:
1. What is to be done?
- A. Extinguishment of the out-of-control fire.
- B. Rescue of the trapped occupants.
- C. Confinement of the fire to the point of origin or to stop its extension.
2. What is needed to do it?
- A. Rescue: one search and rescue crew per affected floor.
- B. Extinguishment: one attack line for fire floor, maybe two lines if necessary.
-
C. Confinement: one attack line to the floor above, for extension.
3. Who is to do it?
- A. Rescue: three firefighters per crew, one crew per affected floor.
- B. Extinguishment: six firefighters per attack line, one hoseline to fire floor.
- C. Confinement: six firefighters per attack line, one line above fire floor.
- D. Salvage: two crews-one to fire floor, one to floor below.
- E. Logistics: four firefighters.
- F. Operations: one fire operations officer to direct fire attack.
- G. Water supply: two pump operators.
- H. RIT/RIC/FAST: four firefighters.
- I. Medical care: four firefighters.
For accountability, Command should use a chart or “command board” for illustrating this incident to show who is on the scene, where they are, and what they are doing.
As you can see from what is being addressed here, you are going to employ between 30 and 40 firefighters for the necessary “basic tasks.” For cities or towns that have limited firefighters available, there needs to be a recall system to supplement the MABAS/auto response system.
SO MUCH TO DO, SO FEW FIREFIGHTERS
We called for a MABAS box that will bring more firefighters and equipment to the scene. Since the communities in this region do not have an automatic response system, there will be a considerable loss of time before enough firefighters arrive, get assignments, take their tools and equipment, and get to their fireground positions.
How many firefighters will eventually be needed for this incident is yet to be seen. Regardless, there must be a system in place to call whatever number of personnel is necessary so that those firefighters already working don’t get overstressed or fatigued or spread too thin for their safety and health. We haven’t mentioned setting up a medical sector for occupants or firefighters, have we? Nor have we talked about relief for the troops. As stated before, we’re addressing the basic needs for this incident right now. As IC, your hope is that the initial suppression efforts will be effective enough for a quick knockdown of the main body of fire. If that can be done, everything else will start to get better.
BEFORE THIS FIRE EVER HAPPENS…
Where do you start? Any fire department with limited resources that has big fire potential in its community cannot afford to sit back and say, “We can’t fight fires like a big city does because we don’t have their resources.” Your department needs to take an aggressive attitude toward research and training for potential incidents like this. (Note: Even bigger fire departments need to look at their operations to determine if any changes have taken place in their capabilities, especially departments that have suffered budget cutbacks that have resulted in fewer companies and people in the street.)
Before anything else, examine the present status of your community and any planned or projected growth. Look at the changes the city administration, zoning, and community development offices are contemplating and how they will impact the department’s resource levels. Survey the community to identify all potential large-scale incidents, especially those that could affect large numbers of people at one time.
Next, honestly assess your department and community fire defenses. What this boils down to is that all fire departments have limitations, especially in complex, large-scale operations. No fire department can completely handle by itself any and all incidents that might happen. Department leaders and firefighters must realize that their limitations and abilities will enable them to handle only so much; anything beyond that level will necessitate obtaining help from other departments and outside agencies.
After you have identified the potential problems and your department’s capabilities and limitations, you can now determine what it will take to develop the resources to deal with a possible future crisis.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
When beginning to research your community, use a format that will help you determine potential problems and your department’s ability to handle them. An example of this format can be found in Fire Protection program courses, like those in the Open Learning Fire Service Program at the University of Cincinnati. In the “Disaster and Fire Defense Planning” course, for example, students study potential problems or disasters that may challenge the community’s fire defenses and try to come up with solutions for bolstering them. One area studied is “HICA/MYDP” (Hazard Identification Capability Assessment/Multi-Year Development Plan).
Think about any unusual or complex businesses or occupancies with high life hazards in your jurisdiction. Throw in a problem like the environment or a couple of other potential possibilities and other size-up information, and come up with a realistic scenario. Think about how your own department might fare by itself. Grade the incident potential to see if it is “not likely,” “likely,” or “very likely” to happen. If you think your department is not capable of handling an incident in an efficient, safe manner or it cannot reasonably address occupants’ life safety with its resources, then you most likely will have to come up with a plan to get adequate resources and equipment together for such an incident. This process is not just for anything you can dream up; it is for potential incidents that could “likely” happen in your community.
Many smaller cities and towns have been aware of disasters waiting to happen in their communities for years and have been very proactive in planning and training for such incidents. Automatic responses have also been in place. These response systems are designed to increase the number of resources responding on the initial call. If an incident goes beyond first-alarm capabilities, successive multiple alarms can be struck to increase the number of personnel and equipment as needed. This system is a good approach, especially for the scenario at hand, where the hometown community has a crew of firefighters already handling a routine medical call. It is also good for the safety of the firefighters and the citizens.
On a sad note, there are communities that will not “buy in” to automatic-response systems because the mayor, town manager, or even fire chief doesn’t want the resources leaving the area unprotected by responding to other’s calls. Education is key here; it is imperative that all concerned parties be aware of how a true automatic-response system works.
Another point to address, should it arise, is concern about taking so many resources from different departments for a full first-alarm assignment for an unconfirmed incident. Generally, it should take the hometown’s first-due unit only four or five minutes to respond to the location and to give a clear initial report on the conditions found. If it turns out to be a working incident, then the rest of the assignment will be there shortly, and the IC can plan for their timely arrival. If the incident is minor or false, the hometown will handle it, and the other units can return to service in their own towns.
Today, there is a wealth of information, knowledge, and experience available to use in upgrading fire protection services. In many cases, it just takes a desire to know more and do better. No fire department should be allowed to use the excuse that it was not prepared or it was not familiar with or trained in problems or hazards in their localities. When a fire department identifies a potential incident, it needs to plan for what could become a future reality.
Follow Murphy’s outlook (maybe he was an optimist!): Plan for the worst; if it happens, you won’t be surprised. If it doesn’t happen, you’ll be prepared for it-at least to the best of your ability.
PREINCIDENT INFORMATION
Many of us probably have been at a working incident where we had no information about a particular building, its floor layout, or its contents. And maybe there were some bad conditions-lots of heavy smoke and fire and a whole bunch of noises. Maybe it was an old factory, a multistory commercial structure, or an old rundown, two-story mixed multiple occupancy. As you were going in, I’ll bet you wished you knew more about what was waiting for you. This is where preincident information comes in. It’s probably also safe to say that the more we know about our communities, the better off we’ll be when called to take care of an out-of-control situation. This is an undisputed statement. The knowledge we have before an incident happens can give us the edge in making decisions that may impact our or occupants’ life safety or help us to know what it takes to control an incident and need to do to save whatever we can. These are our incident priorities.
• Preincident information is the first phase of size-up. Its preparation begins with firefighters’ being conscientious about their jurisdiction’s structures, occupancies, neighborhood layouts, water supply, and so forth. Think about what you see as you drive to and from work or when you’re out and about. There might be something unusual about a building or what is inside it that gets your attention. You might be doing business in a store and notice a dangerous feature. It might be something you want to remember for future reference, or you may want to take it to your fire company to make everybody aware of it. Whatever it may be, it could be important in the future.
Let’s look at two examples of preincident information concerning our high-rise incident scenario. One is water supply. The municipal water system for this community comes from the “big city.” Even though the big city is old, our suburban city is newer and has a good to excellent water delivery system in practically all neighborhoods. That is not our concern. Our concern is getting water from the hydrants to the building and then to the fire floor. Here’s why.
Our fire building was built in the late 1960s and followed modern, up-to-date codes. However, there was no sprinkler requirement code because at that time it was believed that Fire Resistive construction (Type 1) was superior and would be able to contain a fire, if it developed, to the area of origin. The thinking was that firefighters would just “take a ride up in the elevator, hook up their hoses to the standpipes, and squirt just enough water to put out the burning contents. “It sounds so simple and elementary. So, sprinklers weren’t required back then. This was back in the times when it was believed a little bit of water in a fog pattern would go a long way in controlling a confined fire. All this was perceived under laboratory test conditions for building materials and, of course, with the belief that occupants fleeing their apartments would stop to make sure the door to their suite was closed securely as they ran for their lives.
The problem is that each of the standpipe risers in the stairwells has its own siamese, and the entire system is not interconnected. This is extremely valuable preincident information firefighters must know. Having this problem means that the initial attack crew must first locate the fire, then identify the stairwell to use for attack, and then notify Command and the pump operator(s) of that stairwell so they can pump into the correct siamese. As you well suspect, anything that delays getting water on the fire can lead to fire growth and extension, regardless of whether or not you are dealing with Type 1 construction.
The other preincident information deals with our building size, floor layout, number of suites and their sizes and square footage, and other features. This information is important because it will certainly affect strategic decisions made by the IC, especially when determining the size of the attack. We’ll discuss them in a little bit.
PREPLANS
The examples of preincident information above should be turned into hard copy preplans and kept in notebooks or binders in the cabs of all department apparatus. Further, each fire department participating in the MABAS/auto response system should also have a notebook.
Place in the notebook information about the building-its construction, floor plans or layouts, utilities, street access, and maps or plots. If there are any unusual aspects or suspected hazards or something that could become a hazard under fire conditions, note that information as well. Include the suite locations of occupants who are nonambulatory or handicapped who would pose a special rescue concern for the IC.
Mapping or plots can show the building and its proximity to streets and access information. Hydrant locations can also be indicated and hydrant flows penciled in to let firefighters know what to expect from their water system. Placement of fire apparatus can also be predetermined, to expedite matters.
Dedicate a page or two to brief details such as what certain responding companies should do, the special tools they may need, and the location of utility controls. These data can save time, eliminate guesswork, and make operations more efficient and safer.
Revise preplan information on a regular basis. Review it every six months to see if there were any alterations were made to the building or there were occupancy changes that might endanger firefighters. Preplans should be up-to-date so you can use the information in classroom or on-site drills. You can review them when responding and use them as reference data at the scene of a working incident. Some fire departments have had this type of data readily accessible through mobile data terminals in their fire apparatus cabs and command vehicles.
FIRE ATTACK
Conscientious fire departments do their homework to determine their fire attack capabilities. They look at things like size of attack (hose sizes and nozzles), how much water they can deliver (flow volume in gallons per minute/target flow rates for different size hose lines), and how fast they can start attacking a fire (efficiency, training, and teamwork).
Note: Several years ago, the Columbus (OH) Fire Department was fortunate to be able to conduct live-fire training in an acquired high-rise structure in the downtown area. Every company on each shift was put through scenarios and developed certain data and information. They studied the results and found certain things that needed attention. One was fire attack capabilities for high-rise operations. Because of that training and conversations with other fire departments, they adopted 2 1/2-inch attack lines for high-rise operations.
In our fire scenario, the IC has a crew of four firefighters taking the initial attack line up to get it ready for fire attack. They will stretch the hose from the standpipe on the floor below the fire floor in the public hallway and up the stairs to the landing above the fire floor and back down to the entrance door. Doing it this way will help the firefighters advance the line, because gravity will cause the hose to come down the stairs more easily as they make their push down the hallway. The size of their attack line is 2 1/2 inches and is equipped with a solid bore nozzle that has a 1 1/8-inch tip, a standard U.S. fire stream.
You may be thinking four firefighters cannot handle a 2 1/2-inch hoseline. Although this is not the ideal number for handling the hoseline, the key is to get the standpipe line in place, laid out properly, and charged with water. The IC knows he has to assign newly arriving firefighters to “pair up” with the first team to make this line work. The goal is to have help there when the line is ready to go. Four members can start the line working.
The suite on fire is a three-bedroom unit and is well involved. Its size and volume are equivalent to a medium-sized ranch house. You are going to need a fire stream that delivers a large amount of water for heat reduction and that has the penetrating force to get “into” the seat of the fire.
Think about this perspective: If you are to arrive at a working fire where a house of this size is well involved and you’re going to use handlines for attack, isn’t it prudent to use a large handline to knock down the fire as quickly as possible? And, of course, you have the advantage of being outside when you begin your attack. However, in a high-rise fire, you are going to be in a narrow hallway with no place for the heat or smoke to go. If the fire starts to come out of the suite and into the hallway, you will need all the water you can get from the hoseline for your protection. The nozzle you use should be a low-pressure, high-volume type that will not upset the thermal balance in a radical fashion.
Every fire needs a certain volume of water for aggressive extinguishment-the critical flow rate. Fire departments across the country are accustomed to working with a 1 3/4-inch or, in some cases, a 1 1/2-inch attack line for firefighting. These hoselines are not capable of handling all types and sizes of fires.
Delivery. We have been saying it for years: “Big fire, big water.” That translates into every size hoseline has its limitations, especially when it comes to gallons per minute. Using eight smaller handlines to surround a structure does not add up to big water. Think about your last large defensive operation. Was big water delivered through several 1 3/4-inch handlines surrounding the building or through 2 1/2-inch handlines and larger appliances with greater punch and effectiveness? What about large interior operations that require flows larger than 1 3/4-inch lines can normally deliver? Employing the same tactics here most likely will end up in a defensive operation.
In most cases, and this is for all fire departments, working with 2 1/2-inch attack handlines is a matter of knowing and working with your equipment, training with it, and exercising the discipline of using it on the fireground when the situation calls for it. As Chief David McGrail of the Denver (CO) Fire Department teaches: “When you go into a fire, you should go into it with the intention of overwhelming it.” Simply stated, “Big fire, big water.”
So, when is the right time or what are the right conditions for deploying a large handline-the 2 1/2-inch line with a solid bore nozzle? The late Lieutenant Andy Fredericks of the Fire Department of New York gave us the acronym ADULTS to help us determine when to use this line:
A-Advanced fire conditions on arrival
D-Defensive operations
U-Undetermined location of the fire, especially in larger buildings
L-Large, uncompartmented buildings, like stores or warehouses, or the like
T-Tons of water for extinguishment (big fire)
S-Standpipe Operations, large hoseline with solid bore nozzle
FIRE ATTACK UNDERWAY
The first mutual-aid engine crew to arrive was given the assignment to “pair up” with the initial attack crew. There are three people on the team. That gives you seven firefighters on the initial attack line. They will remember to space themselves along the hoseline, as they were previously trained. Since these fire departments have trained together with this size handline, they know the positions each member should take on the line. For example, they know how to position themselves at the “bend” points and not to crowd behind the nozzleman. They also know what commands to listen for as the nozzleman or officer calls for more hoseline.
As the attack team gets ready to start its attack from the stairway, one firefighter positions himself to open the door. He braces it with his foot at the bottom and then asks the nozzleman if he’s ready. The officer, positioned behind the nozzleman, looks at everyone for a final check and then says, “Let’s go.” The firefighter controlling the door opens it slowly to see if the hallway is involved with fire and if it’s going to need to be washed down from the protection of the stairway, using the door as a barrier. As the door is opened, smoke rolls over the attack team and up the stairwell. Everyone is staying low. The hallway is black. The heat is a medium condition initially, but it seems to be getting hotter as the seconds go by. The order is given to “lighten up” on the line, which means to feed more hose to the nozzleman. This must be a slow, methodical process so the hose doesn’t get pushed to the nozzleman and forced out of his grip. If that happens, he will lose control of the nozzle, and the fire will then have a chance of taking over and burning the firefighters.
A few feet into the hallway, the nozzleman stops and opens the nozzle fully at the ceiling, using it like a big deflector. He rotates the stream in big circles, then in an up-and-down motion around the hallway to wash it down completely. The smoke is blinding; the heat is increasing, but this is a smart, protective move done to protect the firefighters and to reduce the chance of the hallway’s becoming involved in fire.
Note: This tactical move may run counter to what many firefighters have been taught in their careers, especially in basic training classes. However, in the real-world situations of firefighting, it has been learned from experience that when firefighters are in a room or an area where heavy smoke is banked down to the floor, and heat is pushing downward and not allowing firefighters to move in, it is time to open the nozzle fully and to move it in such a way as to cover as much of the area as possible. This is done to reduce the amount of heat and prevent flashover.
After a few seconds go by, the nozzleman moves in a little more. He gives it one more good washdown before coming to the fire apartment. He can’t make the turn and enter because of the amount of heat coming from the suite, so he’s going to let the nozzle stream do its work from the doorway. Here is where the solid stream excels with its ability to penetrate heavy fire. It is a rough position to be in because once attack on the main body of fire is started, it must be continued until the fire is knocked down. Firefighters may need to be relieved on the line, especially at the nozzle and backup positions. This is another reason to have companies “paired” on this line.
While fire attack is underway, you assemble another crew to take the second attack line to the floor above. This crew is primarily responsible for ensuring the success of the first line. In this case, however, the first line is gaining control of the fire, thus allowing for the quick deployment of the second line. The second crew will connect its line to the standpipe outlet one floor below where the initial attack team hooked its line. Because of this, the second crew will need extra hose to make the stretch. Fire departments should keep this in mind for all standpipe operations and mandate that all engine companies have their hose packs and tools with them as they report to command for assignment.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL
As time goes by, more and more resources have arrived so that you now have a small army of firefighters to work. The position of operations officer has been staffed. Command will review his incident action plan with Operations and see what is being done and by whom. It is a continual “sizing-up” process. You must also review what still needs to be done in order of importance. As mentioned, things should follow a priority order. Here, fire attack (incident control) is the main concern, since there are no other fire control systems in the building. Once the fire is knocked down and brought under control, the better off everyone in the building will be.
You have concentrated the efforts of the initial firefighters for attack. In your thinking, it is the logical way to provide for the safety of the occupants and firefighters at the same time. There simply are not enough firefighters available to cover the multitude of things that need attention. Knowing before the incident the layout of the building, the size of the suites, and their characteristics, the decision to use a large handline was made months before in preplanning and training for this fire.
The next available crew of firefighters was assigned to take the attack line to the floor above. This is being done to cover vertical extension as flames are showing out the windows and extending up the side of the building.
Four three-member search and rescue crews are being assembled. The first crew will go to the fire floor. The next crew will be sent to the floor above the fire floor. The third crew will go to the top floor to check for people and mushrooming and ventilation. The fourth crew will check the floors above the 15th floor.
These crews and others assigned to various duties will first report to the operations officer located on the floor below the fire floor. He is the officer directing fire control, search and rescue, ventilation, and other duties necessary at this level. He is responsible for coordinating all the crews and maintaining their accountability. Although these departments have been schooled in incident control in classrooms, this is a completely different situation: People’s lives are involved.
The operations officer must be able to communicate with all the functions being performed and with the IC. Operations monitors the firefighters and sets up a staging and medical area two floors below the fire floor. He then discusses with Command getting extra air bottles and equipment brought up.
YOUR STRATEGIES ARE IN PLACE AND UNDERWAY
Fire attack crews are knocking down the fire in the original fire apartment and the fire directly above. Reports from the operations officer are positive. Attack firefighters have done a great job under rough conditions and will need relief very soon. Command should have planned for relief early and should have assigned firefighters who are waiting in the staging area two floors below the fire floor.
The search and rescue crew on the fire floor had to wait until conditions improved in the hallway and the hoseline moved in before they could search each apartment. This crew started its work at the apartments closest to the fire suite and worked progressively outward. They found no fatalities; there were some smoke inhalation victims because smoke had pushed into their suites around the door jambs. Firefighters vented the suites through the windows as they went along, which helped tremendously.
The search crew above the fire floor reported a medium to heavy smoke condition in the hallway and some apartments. Some occupants tried to make it to the stairwells and also received smoke-inhalation injuries. Other occupants found in their suites were left there. This is known as “rescue in place,” and it can be used for situations like this where not enough rescuers are available to remove people to safer areas, especially when it has been determined that the occupants are safe in their units. The greatest amount of heat on this floor was in the unit directly above the area to which the fire extended. The fire came in through the windows of the room directly above the fire below. The room and its contents were damaged, and smoke was throughout the apartment. The occupants made it out before it got to them.
The fourth search crew had good reports from its area, the intermediate floors. There was some smoke in the halls, but nothing heavy, and there were no reported victims. But the third crew, assigned to the top floor, had a heavy smoke condition and heat buildup on that floor. They knew there were roof hatches on top of the stair shafts; they tried to open them in near-zero visibility from inside the stair shaft but were unsuccessful. To get to the hatches, the firefighters had to climb an access ladder straight up and “feel” for the locking devices. This caused one firefighter to use a large portion of his air supply, reducing the crew’s speed in completing the search. This was transmitted to the operations officer, who dispatched two firefighters for air and relief. Ventilation was then achieved by opening the suites and their windows.
After the fire had been knocked down, there were no other areas of confirmed extension. Fans were used as blowers to clear out as much of the remaining smoke and heat as possible. To clear out such a large floor area would take some time. Firefighters assigned to the support function were assigned to get the equipment upstairs and then coordinate with the operations officer to get the operation underway.
After conferring with your operations officer and other company officers, you declare the fire under control. The firefighters are taking their well-deserved breaks. From this point on, there will be a lot of work involving identifying people, assessing injuries, and estimating the damage. There will be more than 75 people suffering from smoke inhalation. Most will be transported to area hospitals; some will be admitted. Some people will be complaining of chest pains and other medical problems. The strain on fire departments will show in that there are not enough medic units on the scene for quick patient transportation (triage, treatment, transportation).
There will be the investigative process where investigators will ask questions and try to reconstruct things before the fire. The hometown fire department called in its off-duty firefighters because of the amount of pickup and cleanup work ahead and, of course, relief. There will also be the job of identifying the equipment from the different fire departments used for the incident.
This incident was a hypothetical disaster, like a mock disaster drill. Even though it is hypothetical, it could be an actual situation faced by a real community and its firefighters. In fact, this community has a couple of high-rises of this height and several other large-scale structures with high life hazards. The information given about the structure is mostly factual; the fire situation and problems were taken from actual high-rise fires from across the country.
There are hundreds of cities and towns across the country with similar potential incidents like this facing them. For some, it is like a time bomb-they know it’s going to happen; they just don’t have any idea of when, where, or how. If you have this knowledge, preincident preparation is absolutely mandatory if you and your fire department want to reach a successful ending. It must be kept in mind that small fire departments must meet, discuss, and train together before anything takes place. That will be the beginning of the small department’s being able to perform like a bigger department. The strategies and tactics not considered “doable” before may now be achievable with more resources working together as one.
LESSONS LEARNED
• Large-scale incidents require large commitments of personnel and equipment. Small fire departments trying to handle a major incident alone will be quickly overwhelmed and unable to control the incident. It will control them.
• Smaller fire departments in a region or an area need to join together and develop standardized fireground operations and incident command procedures and accountability.
• Experience and training are among the most important things in a firefighter’s career. An incident commander needs to know the personnel’s experience and capabilities when operating at an incident that is large, complex, and out of the norm of daily incidents. When several departments work together at major incidents, it is all the more important that departments train together so they can learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses.
• Standard operating procedures or guidelines should be developed and distributed to all fire departments participating in a regional response system, and all must follow them.
• Don’t let building construction terminology fool you. Even though a building is Type 1 Fire Resistive construction, fire can and will travel, especially if no sprinkler system is on-site. All you need to do is study our country’s history of high-rise fires in residential and office buildings, and you will quickly realize these buildings can create deadly fires that have taken many civilian and firefighter lives.
• Firefighting is a not a science, nor will it ever be. It is a physically demanding job that employs “learned” ways of doing things. Technology will help us, but firefighting will always need firefighters to perform the tasks necessary to save lives and property.
• There are no “big city” strategies and tactics. Strategies and tactics are the same for all fire departments-big or small, career or volunteer. It boils down to resources (and their capabilities) and how many are available for an incident’s needs. Remember, when going into battle, go in and overwhelm the enemy.
References
1. Clark, William E., Firefighting Principles and Practices, (2nd edition), Pennwell Books, 1991.
2. Lloyd Layman, in Managing Company Tactical Operations-Decision Making, National Fire Academy course.
3. Size-Up, Managing Company Tactical Operations-Decision Making, National Fire Academy course.
4. “Lessons Learned from Deadly High-Rise Apartment Fires Involving Elderly: Westview Towers, North Bergen, NJ, and Council Tower Apartments, St Louis, MO,” FEMA Report, Sept. 2003.
5. Fredericks, Andy, “Standpipe System Operations: Engine Company Basics,” Fire Engineering, Feb. 1996.JEFF SHUPE, a career firefighter for more than 31 years, is a member of the Cleveland (OH) Fire Department and has served as a volunteer firefighter. He is a certified fire instructor for the State of Ohio and was training coordinator for volunteer and full-time fire departments. He has an associate’s degree in fire technology from a local community college and attended the University of Cincinnati Fire Protection Engineering program. He is an FDIC H.O.T. team member for Engine Company Operations and an FDIC classroom presenter.
