UNION SQUARE SUBWAY CRASH:
Photo by Richard Symon.
The New York City subway system carries approximately 3.3 million passengers daily along more than 722 miles of track that runs above and below the city streets. The City of New York Fire Department is responsible for providing fire protection for this system. On average, the department responds to approximately 5,050 calls for assistance a year, ranging from odors of smoke and trash fires to electrical emergencies and people struck by trains. Most of these responses are considered routine and usually are handled by an engine and truck company.
Late in the evening on August 27, 1991, an 1RT #4 train left the Woodlawn station in the Bronx and started on its route down the Lexington Avenue subway line. As the train moved southbound, it passed beneath the East River and into the borough of Manhattan. Just past midnight, the 10car train approached the 14th StreetUnion Square station. It carried approximately 500 people and w as traveling an estimated 40-45 mph on a section of track limited to 10 mph. Just north of the station, the rear wheels of the lead, 37-ton, R-52 car left the tracks while the train was switching from the express to the local tracks. Lilting sideways, the car struck a row of steel girders, which sheared it in half. The front half continued down the tracks approximately 1 20 feet; the rear section of the first car separated from the remainder of the track on impact with the girders. It then was struck by the next three cars of the train as they, too, derailed. The entire mass then continued toward the Union Square station, shearing steel girders from their concrete supports. More than 20 of these supports were sheared off and added to the debris. Cars five through 10 remained on the tracks. The time was 0010 hours.
At approximately 0022 hours Manhattan Box 556 was transmitted for a report of a train crash in the tunnel at Union Square. At the same time units from the New York Police Department, Transit Police, and EMS ambulances also were notified and responded to the scene.
On arrival at Union Square, rescuers were met by a steady stream of “walking wounded.” As rescuers descended into the tunnel, the people they encountered were more seriously injured. EMS workers quickly established a triage post on the station platform on the same level as the train crash. (The Union Square station is a major transfer point for subway riders. The crash occurred on the second track level below the street.) Not until emergency personnel moved south down the tunnel, past the station, was the massive destruction apparent.
Rescuers immediately requested that electric power to northbound and southbound tracks be shut off. This was confirmed by Transit Authority personnel. More help was summoned: With scores of wounded civilians scattered about the track tunnel area and lower platform, and with victims possibly trapped in the wreckage, the human resources needed to perform medical treatment, remove victims from the subway, deliver equipment, and maintain search and rescue operations would be staggering.
30 TONS OF DEBRIS
Within the first hour of operations, the interagency forces had succeeded in moving more than 200 victims out of the hole—providing medical assistance to and transporting the injured to medical facilities—and confirmed that there were no other passengers in and around cars three through 10. Five civilians had succumbed to their injuries. The search for victims continued.
Several units—three rescue companies, three truck companies, two engine companies, six police units, and paramedics—searched, among other areas, what had been the rear of the first subway car. A 14-foot-high, 30ton pile of debris filled the space between the express and local tracks—a mess of fiberglass seats, glass, aluminum “skin,” and plyd from the train car; and steel columns and blocks of concrete from the supports and from the tunnel itself. All of this was intertwined with electrical wires and cables from the train and tunnel.
Meanwhile, rescue equipment was being brought down from the street. Cutting torches, hydraulic spreaders and cutters with accessories, power saws with metal cutting blades, spare blades and gas mix, air bags and air cylinders, search ropes, bolt cutters, hand tools, and generators and lighting equipment all were being transported to the site. All equipment had to be brought from apparatus parked in the street to the subway entrance and carried down a flight of stairs. From there all tools were carried or wheeled 300 feet across the first platform, down another flight of stairs, and an additional 200 feet to the end of the platform. Exhausting as this w as. everything then had to be carried into the tunnel, over the railroad ties and rails, to the actual operation site another 150 to 200 feet into the tunnel —all in poor to no light.
In addition to logistical support, command addressed two important tunnel safety concerns: structural stability and air quality. With so many support columns ripped out or otherwise damaged by the collision, transit engineers w ere requested to monitor the structural stability of the tunnel. Command ordered that all apparatus on the street directly above the operation be removed to reduce the weight pressing on the damaged and missing supports. All train movement was ordered stopped on tracks above and near the crash site.
Air quality had become a problem. Almost all ventilation in the tunnels is provided by the movement of the trains. As the train moves through the tunnel, it pushes enormous quantities of air in front of it. With train movement stopped, ventilation was nil. The temperature, now above 90°F with high humidity, continued to rise. Although the electricity to the rails already had been shut off, the electric motors used to power the trains still were throwing off a great amount of heat. In an attempt to improve air quality, command directed that 2½inch handlines with fog nozzles be stretched through the tunnel and placed in operation. Exhaust fans were set up and used. Later a portable monitor also was used to inject a fog spray into the tunnel. These efforts did not have an overwhelming effect on improving tunnel conditions, but the air quality remained status quo instead of worsening.
TRAPPED VICTIMS FOUND
Victim search of the wreckage in and around the front half of the sheared first car proved negative. However, from the top of the wreckage pile, rescuers located two victims: The head and shoulder of one victim and the shoulder of the other were barely visible. Both men were pinned in the remains of the subway car in an upright position and covered with a variety of debris. By removing small pieces of debris by hand and with limited use of hydraulic cutters, a pocket was made around the victims. A train door was removed, and access became available to a void under the second victim, about midway down into the rubble pile. It was from this position that a third pair of feet was discovered.
While rescuers worked from above to free the two passengers trapped near the top of the pile, other personnel searched for additional victims from voids under the debris. From track level, a two-foot by two-foot space in the wreckage provided access to the underside of the second subway car and the bottom of the pile. The underside of the second car afforded rescuers access to the length of the wreckage. From this position, numerous voids were found and searched. By reaching up between the debris pile and the second car, a rescuer made contact with a hand found protruding from the wreck. He confirmed a pulse. A check with members on top of the pile determined that this was one of the two “top” victims. Due to the progress being made by extricating from the top, no work was attempted from under this man.
A rescuer, shining his light up into another void, discovered the torso and arm of a victim. It was unknown at this time whether this was the third or a fourth victim. As the light reflected in the void off the aluminum “skin” of the subway car, the victim, thought to be deceased due to the position of the body and the small space it occupied, reached out for the light. After reassuring him that lie had been seen and that help was on the way, the rescuer managed to get up into the void space—about seven to eight feet high but only 14 inches wide—and made his way up through the debris. Although the void was so narrow, this rescuer gained enough access to ascertain how the victim was pinned.
This victim was by far the most seriously trapped. His head was pushed forward with his chin pressed to his chest. A piece of sheet aluminum was pressing against his carotid artery and an angle iron from the conductor’s seat pressed into his stomach. Aluminum, steel, and concrete rubble, including a piece of concrete weighing several hundred pounds, buried his legs. The victim, although totally engulfed by debris, was breathing on his own and responsive. Because the extent of his injuries could not be determined, a precautionary IV was started in the arm that protruded from the wreck.
Meanw hile, extrication of the two top victims was progressing favorably. As the room around the victims became greater, a hydraulic spreader was used to slowly spread the concrete and metal surrounding both men. By removing one victim’s pants, which were snagged on the metal, and both victims’ shoes, because metal was wrapped around them, rescuers were able to lift the men from the wreckage. The victims were turned over to waiting EMS personnel for treatment and transport to a local hospital.
Generators for lights and power tools added to the high heat and humidity and, to an extent, depleted oxygen levels in the tunnel. Because of the gasoline-powered equipment in operation and the lack of ventilation, a carbon monoxide meter was called for to monitor the accumulating levels of CO. These readings would be taken continually for the duration of the incident. The highest CO concentrations of 47 to 50 ppm were not high enough to require that SCBA be worn. Plenty of drinking water was brought into the tunnel to prevent dehydration of emergency personnel.
Power tools also caused the noise level to be extremely high, hampering portable radio and even close personto-person communications. Personnel were designated to personally relay communications with incident command.
THREE SIDES OF RESCUE
From the outside of the pile, operations were well underway to try to reach the third victim — and possibly others—from alternative voids. Because of the size of the debris pile and the difficulty in communicating with all sectors of the operating forces, at this time it was hard to determine how many victims the three “fronts” —top, side, and underneath — were working to remove.
A small air bag was passed into the void to the rescuer underneath the victim in an attempt to enlarge the work area. The controls were left on the outside, and communications w ere made by verbal relay Room to maneuver within the wreck was so tight that the rescuer had to leave the void and reenter facing the opposite direction to change the hand with which he was working. Inflation of the air bag alongside the victim’s head brought some relief; however, as the bag continued to be inflated, the sheet metal around the victim’s head started to collapse back on itself and pinch the victim’s neck. This operation was abandoned, but the air bag was left in place slightly inflated, as it provided some degree of relief to the victim.
The use of a power saw from the outside to cut sheet metal quickly was discontinued due to the fact that the cuts would have to be made close to the unseen victim and the rescuers. An attempt to pass a set of hydraulic cutters into the void also failed because they could not be maneuvered or operated in the close confines of the 14-inch-wide void. A smaller cutting tool was passed in, and, operated by a hand pump, a series of cuts were made and the angle iron removed from the victim’s stomach. The hand pump was used to cut down on noise, which enabled better communications, and to ensure a slow, steady tool operation. Removing the angle iron made the sheet metal around the trapped man’s neck more easily accessible.
At approximately the same time, rescuers determined that this was the only victim still trapped. The side team was able, with the help of a hydraulic ram used to hold up an Ibeam, to gain access to the void. From this position they diligently cut away small bits of metal that covered the victim. This freed his face and upper torso. The operation was like a puzzle, and progress was slow.
The team attempting to access the victim from the top was not as successful After clearing debris by hand to the victim’s legs, rescuers were confronted with a huge slab of concrete they could not move. The use of hydraulic spreaders only caused the slab to apply more pressure to the man’s legs. The lack of a stable point from which to operate tools was a common problem.
TIME RUNNING SHORT
The operation now was nearly three hours long. The heat and fumes were taking their toll. Fresh members were rotated in, but the original rescuers stayed and worked at their side. Too much was invested for them to leave now, and progress was being made. Water was passed to members working under the train and debris pile. Oxygen also was used to combat the effects of the foul atmosphere.
After consultation with EMS personnel at the scene, rescuers determined that time w as running short for the victim. Efforts to enlarge the hole made by the “side” team were intensified. The “top” team, instead of trying to move the slab of concrete, tunneled below it to be able to “pass” the victim’s legs by it. The team under the train used a hydraulic ram to lift the debris slightly. Only a two-inch lift was needed to slide this last victim free. After almost four hours of dangerous and difficult work under extreme conditions, the last of the three victims was removed alive. He was admitted to the hospital in critical condition with a collapsed lung, two fractured legs, and a fractured arm.
Five people were pronounced dead at the scene and more than 135 were transported to area hospitals for treatment. More than 300 rescue personnel worked side by side to effect the removal of hundreds of passengers from the train and tunnel. Cleanup and repair of the train and tunnel took transit workers seven days of working around the clock before service at this station was restored.
SOME LESSONS REINFORCED
- Successful rescue work demands an intimate knowledge of various tools and their limitations. Know’ what tool to try if one doesn’t work. Be comfortable with your tools. Frequent training drills are essential. When drilling, use tools in as many different applications as possible.
- At large-scale, multiagency operations such as this one, it is extremely difficult to maintain sector control, livery responder will want to contribute to rescue efforts, and one group may not take kindly to orders given by another group. Sector commanders must be accountable for those under their control. Cooperation with members of other agencies must be stressed to bring operations to a successful conclusion.
- Voids may provide only a limited point of reference. Attempt access from numerous directions. Close coordination among the various “fronts” is essential. Rescuers in different void spaces may not be able to make visual or verbal contact. Make contact through the sector commander/safety officer. Use the utmost caution in using tools, and obtain a verbal confirmation of safety before using them.
- Stage medical personnel/advisers near the scene, begin medical treatment of trapped victims as soon as possible.
- With ventilation reduced, the subway tunnel and wreckage area operations became, in effect, confined space operations Monitor the atmosphere frequently and take steps to increase air quality.
- Operating equipment in tunnel incidents will produce an extreme amount of noise. Communications will be a major effort. Maintain contact with the command post via messengers if necessary.
- 1’xtended operations will take their toll on rescuers, particularly in high heat and humid conditions. Assign and stage backup personnel. Rotate members. Rest and rehab are important.
- Use your rescue experiences to build on your company’s and department’s collective knowledge. Conduct critiques. Discuss what worked, what didn’t, and what you might try in the future should such an incident occur.
- Be creative and flexible —in many rescues you will be limited by your environment. As in this incident, there may be times when you do not
- have stable points from which to operate tools, or you can’t use a crane to remove a concrete slab. Improvise.
There is no substitute for extensive, creative training.
