BY DENNIS R. MATTY
At 1523 HOURS on April 1, 2003, the City of Miramar (FL) Fire Rescue Department’s Dive Rescue Team (DRT) responded to a report of a car in a canal along the Florida Turnpike in the area where the turnpike intersects with I-75. The turnpike at this location is also the dividing point between Dade and Broward counties. The direction of travel at the point of the accident was westbound.
The City of Miramar encompasses approximately 31 square miles and is located north of Miami in Broward County. The department has four stations and approximately 110 line personnel, who work a traditional 24/48 schedule. All engines/ladder and rescue crews are ALS certified, as is the crew of the support air/lighting vehicle. All line personnel are dual certified as firefighter paramedics or EMTs. The department currently has two engines and two rescues equipped for dive rescue response; we plan to outfit three more vehicles in the near future.
The DRT was formed in 1993 in response to an incident that resulted in the death of three vehicle accident victims who were pinned in their vehicle and trapped below the surface of a roadside canal. The team consists of 50 divers, all Dive Rescue International certified.
All other personnel are trained as line tenders and in other support functions. The DRT uses state-of-the-art equipment, including custom wet suits and scuba and underwater communication full-face masks. Escape bottles provide a contingency air supply, and the divers carry knives, scissors, a seat belt cutter, and center punches.
Training is ongoing; the summer months of June, July, and August are dedicated to introducing new equipment, training, and recertification of all divers.
The department has two dive rescue certified instructors and conducts its own rescue diver certification classes. These classes are also extended to other area fire-rescue departments.
Mutual aid on this accident was provided by a number of agencies. Miami Dade Fire Rescue and Broward County Fire Rescue provided helicopter air support and additional personnel, including divers. Three helicopters and 14 types of fire rescue vehicles responded to the scene. The City of Miramar Police Department, the Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Department of Transportation, and the City of Pembroke Pines Fire Rescue also provided support.
Several witnesses, including a news reporter and a Florida Highway Patrol officer, attempted to free dive and rescue victims, but they were unsuccessful. Their efforts, however, gave the divers a detailed last-seen point and valuable information relating to the position of the vehicle. The last-seen point is important to divers when trying to locate a victim or object that is underwater. The witness is taken to approximately the same place he was standing prior to losing sight of the victim or object and asked to estimate the distance and direction from that position.
Other witness accounts stated the car had anywhere from four to six occupants, with one witness insisting that he saw one of the occupants desperately trying to push a child or infant out of the vehicle’s rear window. This witness information proved to be unreliable but had a major impact on the overall operation.
THE CALL AND INITIAL RESPONSE
The Miramar Fire Rescue Dispatch Center received the call for assistance at 1523 hours. The first unit arrived on-scene at 1531 hours. The first diver entered the water within one minute of arrival. Other units and divers arrived during the next two to three minutes. In all, six divers, three at a time, entered the water during the operation.
Miramar Battalion Captain Rocky Gurdak arrived at 1531 hours, along with Engine 84 and Rescue 84. Gurdak established command immediately—gathering resources, conducting witness interviews, containing onlookers, communicating with incoming units, performing the duties of dive coordinator, and directing the setup of triage and treatment areas. Since little help was available initially, forecasting the need for additional support units such as air rescue and ground vehicles became critical. The department’s air and lighting support unit arrived with additional paramedic/divers’ spare dive gear and air cylinders.
A unified command included Miami Dade Fire Rescue, the Florida Highway Patrol, and the Miramar Fire Department. The operation plan was developed in accordance with our department’s standard operating procedures and was adjusted on-scene by the dive coordinator.
THE OPERATION
A Ford Escort station wagon (hatchback) sank after sliding down a slight embankment and had come to rest upside down approximately 25 feet from shore. Witness accounts varied concerning whether the car went straight into the water or rolled over before entering the water.
Before entering the water, each diver was placed on a separate tether. A tender was assigned to monitor each diver in the water. The tender was responsible for monitoring the amount of air the diver had on entering the water and the diver’s activities, as well as entry time. All information was reported to the dive team coordinator and logged. Since the car was located immediately and marked, no search patterns were run until after all victims had been removed from the car.
Firefighter Kevin Neugent, the first diver to locate the vehicle, did not recall if he found the vehicle with his hands or bumped it with his fins. Visibility was near zero as soon as divers entered the water. There were complete blackout conditions as soon as the divers’ activities stirred up the water’s bottom. Neugent, who made repeated dives into the vehicle, pulled three of the five victims to the shore. “Things started happening pretty fast. I pulled open the rear passenger door and, since I was able to orient myself to the victim’s position inside the car, was able to work the seat belt and pull her out. The hardest part was keeping myself calmed down,” Neugent said.
Captain Frank Vrklan and Firefighter Alex Perez removed victims from the driver and passenger front seats. While Vrklan worked through a window, Perez fought against the driver’s door, struggling against the muddy bottom to force the door open far enough to reach the victim. Additional crews consisting of Miramar and Miami Dade firefighters quickly set up three large salvage covers as treatment areas. Five teams of firefighter paramedics worked to resuscitate the victims as they arrived on shore. Three patients were transported by air, and one was transported by ground; the fifth victim was pronounced dead at the scene. Unfortunately, none of the victims survived.
A critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) team was made available to all responders. Once the final victim was removed, divers moved back in to sweep the vehicle and perform several searches of the surrounding area looking for the sixth victim, who was reported to be a child. In fact, there was no sixth victim.
Safety divers relieved the primary divers. These divers also conducted most of the search effort for the child. After an hour of search crews walking the shoreline, divers in the water, and a helicopter providing overhead reconnaissance, the decision was made to terminate the dive rescue/recovery efforts.
Another potential hazard that had to be factored into the search effort was the possibility of encountering alligators or water moccasins, since the waterway had direct access to the Everglades. Police sharpshooters often are on shore during dive operations in this area watching for alligators. Water moccasins could be lurking in the saw grass.
 (1) Safety divers in the water exchange information with the dive coordinator, incident commander, and other members of the unified command on shore. (Photos by Trevor Gayle.) |
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 (2) The dive coordinator sends a diver in for one last sweep of the water. |
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POST-INCIDENT ANALYSIS
For the post-incident analysis (PIA) conducted several days after the incident, we obtained video from a local news station so we could have a more complete look at the overall operation. Some of the lessons learned and reinforced that were discussed follow.
- A good working relationship with neighboring departments is critical to the smooth integration of two or three departments working the same call. The City of Miramar and Miami Dade Fire Rescue departments often show up simultaneously at incidents on the Florida Turnpike. This has enabled both departments to become familiar with each other’s capabilities and to establish procedures.
- Even though fire officers from two jurisdictions arrived at approximately the same time, there was no power struggle. The officers knew what needed to be done and did not wait to request additional units or resources or set up landing zones.
- The dive rescue personnel were able to deploy into the water rapidly once on-scene.
- A preplanned method for setting up for multiple casualties has been used in the region for several years. Firefighters were able to set up, receive, treat, and transport victims quickly and without confusion. A level one mass-casualty incident was called as soon as divers indicated that possibly numerous people were in the car.
- The City of Miramar Dive Rescue Team controlled the dive operation. The team leaders have a policy that discourages integration of divers from multiple teams. The team leaders had experienced problems with differences in procedures and equipment on past calls. From a safety standpoint, knowing your diver, his capabilities, and communication process are key to ensuring the diver’s safety.
- Training for divers should include placing water-filled dummies in positions similar to those in which victims might be found. As an example, divers noted that the weight of the victims pulling against the seat belt made the belt difficult to release. Also, the body was positioned so that the entire waist area of the belt was inaccessible. (Think about the position of a belted person in a seat that is upside down.) Even though the department trains for vehicles in the water, this element needs to be added.
- Divers reported difficulty in cutting seat belts with knives because of poor visibility. Trauma shears are carried in all dive vests but proved difficult to remove when needed.
- A lack of experience in entering a hatchback-type vehicle proved to be of concern to divers because two divers at separate times had difficulty in maneuvering far enough into the vehicle to search without getting stuck.
- The dive rescue communication land-based unit was not deployed with the dive coordinator. Divers could communicate with each other but had to rely on hand signals to communicate with shore.
- Multiple print and electronic media arrived on-scene; this led to numerous reporters and camera crews trampling the area where the vehicles collided and the entry path. Several public information officers arrived over a period of time; each established his own work area. This geographical difference enticed reporters to move back and forth to gather information. A plan is being developed to better contain the media while still allowing them access to the scene. This plan may involve setting up a portable tent with “Media” printed on all four sides.
- The risk-benefit analysis for this call indicated that there was a high probability of a successful rescue. Even so, some divers felt that the pace of the operation needed to be slowed down just a bit to ensure their backup diver, air check, and all safety provisions were in effect before entering the water.
- Rapid entry training should be explored; the emphasis should be on diver safety.
- Interagency dive training should be considered so that both teams become more familiar with each other’s methods of operation.
DENNIS R. MATTY, a 27-year veteran of the fire service, is division chief of operations for the City of Miramar (FL) Fire Rescue Department.
