Response to a Chemical Incident

By CHRIS WHITBY

A morning conversation at the firehouse goes something like this:

Dan: “Good morning, Jim.”
Jim: “Morning, Dan. How are the kids doing?”
Dan: “They’re fine, Dan. How’s the new girlfriend?”
Beep…beep…beep. “Attention, Department 27. Respond to multiple subjects with breathing difficulties at a large, four-story chain hotel.”

THE MIND-SET

While en route to the call, the dispatcher advises you that the hotel staff is currently evacuating the hotel guests. Whether you’ve just started your tour or you’re a volunteer on duty at the station, what are you thinking about while you’re preparing the rigs? A chemical release? Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)? A radiation dispersal device? Ventilation system dust burning on the heating coil (again)?

THE INCIDENT

Although this story seems fictional, it is not. On a very cold post-Thanksgiving Day in 2008, the Mechanicstown (NY) Volunteer Fire District was dispatched to an incident with approximately 20 people complaining of breathing difficulties.

Once on-scene, we learned that a cleaning woman had found orange marks sprayed on the center fire stairwell door leading to the third floor. When she tried to use a citrus cleaner on what she thought was paint, she became overcome by fumes and could not breathe. Several occupants evacuating through the center stairwell were also overcome by fumes.

After arriving on-scene, the initial fire department units were overwhelmed by evacuating occupants who fled to adjacent hotels and restaurants. This caused some concern; if this was a chemical or WMD incident, the hot zone would grow exponentially.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

During the time of this incident, many headlines read, “Hotels seized by gunmen in Mumbai, India.” This was the busiest travel weekend in the country, with millions of Americans traveling and staying in hotels. It was also Black Friday, the start of the year’s biggest shopping weekend. A hotel such as this one could be considered a target. In such an incident, consider the bigger picture.

ACTIONS TAKEN

A unified incident command consisting of police, fire, and EMS was quickly established. Unsure of the nature of the substance involved, the incident commander (IC) quickly requested the county’s hazardous materials response team on-scene. An immediate hot zone was set up, consisting of the entire hotel interior. The warm zone was set up in about 15 minutes around the hotel’s perimeter.

The IC employed three crews in full personal protective equipment and SCBAs. He sent one crew each to the initial complaint floor and the floors above and below. The crews conducted metering to ensure that all rooms were vacated and looked for any suspicious items. One problem they encountered was that the electronic emergency card access keys the hotel staff provided did not work. This greatly hampered the search efforts.

An EMS worker treating the wounded stated that the only known symptom presenting was a burning of the eyes and throat. EMS personnel were well trained in WMD operations; several personnel quickly determined that the respiratory irritant in question had the same characteristics as pepper spray.

Hazmat units arrived on-scene and deployed a WMD detector. Using the “irritant” setting, units determined that a type of chemical irritant was sprayed on the handles of the doors leading to the second and third floors. It was theorized that the orange marks, combined with the symptoms, were a type of pepper spray that the citrus cleaner reactivated and stirred up. Crews conducted an area survey to rule out other types of chemicals and irritants, all of which came up negative.

LESSONS LEARNED

The first lesson learned concerned the hotel residents’ accountability. During the evacuation, many residents went to neighboring hotels and various restaurants. A few residents left through the affected stairwell. Although these residents had only minor chemical exposure, it added to the initial casualties. Thankfully, this was a minor incident with very minor cross contamination hazards. Had this been a true WMD or chemical release, the cross contamination issues could have been tragic.

Second, know the limitations of your equipment. Initial crews were deployed with only four gas meters. Although this is a great tool for most gas calls, four gas meters are not normally set up for chemical or WMD incidents. In this case, after assessing the threat and believing this may have been a WMD incident, additional meter resources were needed.

Third, the hotel emergency keys were outdated. The access card system the hotel used required an imposed time limit on all access cards; management knew this but placed it on the back burner. Alleviate this issue by meeting with managers annually through your code enforcement office. Most states require an annual or semiannual inspection of these occupancy types. During the inspection, deploy and test these cards. By informing hotels of the alternative—taking the doors by force—they will be motivated to ensure these emergency measures are up-to-date.

Fourth, the presence of cross-trained personnel on-scene greatly helped at this incident. Several fire department personnel also volunteered for the county hazmat unit. This allowed immediate access to qualified assistance from technically trained personnel who could offer immediate hot zone response. Also, EMS personnel were trained in WMD awareness and operations, allowing for rapid on-scene symptom assessment.

Last, an issue responders do not usually consider is the families’ reactions; they only knew that they were ordered out of their hotel rooms, literally forcing them out into the cold. They then witnessed several emergency personnel entering the hotel wearing respirators. Once the incident was under control and the apparatus were sent back to headquarters, several families were apprehensive to reenter the hotel. Apparently, many of the guests were thinking of recent world events during this incident. To alleviate the mental stress the families felt, the IC held a meeting in the hotel lobby to inform the families on the incident and to assure them that every precaution was taken to ensure the hotel was safe to stay in that night.

Responders must be mindful of national and world events. Don’t assume that it is just dust in the heating system or that it is just pepper spray deployed by pranksters, because in the post-9/11 world, you never know. Do not forget past incidents of chemical attacks, such as the Tokyo subway incident in 1995. A sarin release killed 13 and injured 5,500, including 135 firefighters and 35 EMS professionals, most of whom were affected through cross contamination.1 Err on the side of caution.

Reference

1. New York State WMD Awareness Program, Instructor’s Manual.

CHRIS WHITBY is a 20-plus-year veteran of the fire service and a fire protection specialist with the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control. He is also a captain for the Mechanicstown Volunteer Fire Department in Wallkill, New York; an assistant chief of operations for the Orange County (NY) Hazardous Materials Response Team; and a county fire instructor for the Rockland County Fire Training Center in Pomona, New York.

Hand entrapped in rope gripper

Elevator Rescue: Rope Gripper Entrapment

Mike Dragonetti discusses operating safely while around a Rope Gripper and two methods of mitigating an entrapment situation.
Delta explosion

Two Workers Killed, Another Injured in Explosion at Atlanta Delta Air Lines Facility

Two workers were killed and another seriously injured in an explosion Tuesday at a Delta Air Lines maintenance facility near the Atlanta airport.