WARRINGTON COURT APARTMENTS FIRE, PHILADELPHIA
In the early morning hours of July 10, 1992, the Philadelphia Fire Communications Center received a call from the occupant of Apartment 404 in the Warrington Court Apartments at 816 S. 47th Street. The caller stated that the building was on fire and he was trapped in his apartment. At 0459 hours, the communications center dispatched a full box alarm assignment—four engine companies, two ladder companies, and two battalion chiefs—and medic unit to this location. What followed was a difficult operation that reinforced numerous lessons
THE FIRE BUILDING
The Warrington Court Apartment building is a Ii-story. 44-unit, 110by 140-foot, L-shaped building of ordinary construction. Its floors are constructed of wood and its roof is of wood rafters with wood sheathing and asphalt roofing material. There is one open, interior stairshaft in the building, located 75 feet from the front entrance on 47th Street. Two fire towers—one at the north end of the building, the other at its southwest corner—also provided means of egress for occupants; these towers are separated from the rest of the building by a fire wall and open balconies, accessible via exterior, on each floor. A multiple-station (hot-wired) smoke detector system was installed in the building. There were two local fire alarm pull stations on each floor.
The front of the building (east side) extended for approximately 40 feet along f^th Street. The south wall of the building ran for 110 feet along Warrington Avenue. T he back of the building (west side) faced a parking lot and extended 140 feet north from Warrington Avenue. From there it extended east on a diagonal for 45 feet and south for 80 feet, completing the “L” shape and forming a rectangular-shaped courtyard that looked out on a row of three-story apartments attached to the Warrington Court Apartments building on the 47th Street side. An alley between the north side of the Warrington Court Apartments and three-story multiple-occupancy dwellings on Baltimore Avenue provided the only exterior access to this courtyard. (See illustration on p. 80.)
JUMPERS
Battalion 7 arrived at 0501 hours, assumed command, and established a command post on the southeast corner of 47th Street and Warrington Avenue, catty-comer to the fire building. Smoke was showing at fourthfloor windows and from one thirdfloor apartment adjacent to the interior stairs. A cloud of heavy black smoke hung over the roof of the building. Less than one minute after arrival, numerous occupants in distress appeared at apartment windows.
Battalion 11 assumed command of the rear sector (west and north sides of the building) and reported conditions to the incident commander: On the west side, heavy smoke was venting from almost every window and along the entire cornice, with fire showing at the fourth-floor fire tower door. Smoke also was showing at the fourth-floor windows of the apartments facing the courtyard. The rear sector commander reported trapped occupants at the windows.
The incident commander immediately requested a second alarm, specifying, in addition to the normal complement, a tower ladder and a largediameter hose company. The second alarm was dispatched at 0506 hours. He instructed the two on-scene ladder companies to prepare for exterior rescue of trapped occupants on the third and fourth floors and then told engine crews to mount a handline attack on the upper-floor fire through the open interior stairs. Anticipating the potential for multiple casualties, he requested three additional medic units.
Ladder 13 was positioned on Warrington Avenue. As members raised their 100-foot aerial ladder to the fourth floor, three occupants jumped. Medic 3 transported the most seriously injured to the hospital. Medic 9 and Medic 19, now on the scene, were assigned the responsibility of triage on the west/north sides and east/south sides of the fire building, respectively. More trapped occupants were preparing to jump.
Within seconds, five additional people jumped from the third and fourth floors. All were critically injured, several with open leg fractures and severe head trauma. At this time, the third-floor exterior landing of the north fire tower collapsed, and a woman fell to her death. Still, there were more trapped occupants at the windows. A baby was dropped —safely — from the fourth floor to rescuers on the ground.
Responding to the rear sector chiefs report of additional people at the thirdand fourth-floor windows, firefighters from Ladder 13 proceeded to the parking lot with a 35-foot portable ladder. Three people were rescued via this ladder. Members then set up a 50-foot and an additional 35fool portable ladder at this sector to reach others in distress on the third and fourth floors.
ladder 6, positioned on 47th Street, raised its aerial to the fourth floor and rescued seven occupants, ladder 6 firefighters, responding to reports from the rear sector chief, brought a 35-foot portable ladder to the courtyard and rescued an adult male from the fourth-floor at that location.
FIRE ATTACK
Meanwhile, engine companies, with 1 3/4-inch handlines, were trying to move in on the well-advanced fire from both the open interior stairs and the fire tower at the building’s southwest corner. Engine 68 reported fire in the stairwell between the second and third floors. Members quickly gained control of this section, then teamed up with Engine 60 to work on the third floor.
Engine 57 reported heavy smoke conditions throughout the rear fire tower and heavy fire on the fourth floor. Engine 5 was ordered to stretch its five-inch line to the rear of the building and then proceed to the fourth floor with an attack line and assist E57.
The first-in second-alarm battalion chief was assigned as logistics officer, and an engine company was dispatched automatically to assist him.
Anticipating the need for additional rescue and ventilation, command directed incoming truck companies to position at the rear of the building. The large-diameter hose company stretched a five-inch supply line to the front of the building, then took an attack line to the fourth floor. The three other second-alarm engine crews were assigned to the thirdand fourth-floor interiors. There were now numerous personnel engaged in fire attack.
The fire had quickly gained control of the entire fourth floor and cockloft. Engines 57 and 5 encountered heavy fire and smoke conditions and battled simply to maintain their position in the hallway, 15 feet from the south fire tower door. Engines 68 and 60 were making better progress on the third floor, where the fire was not nearly as extensive.
At 0511 hours, Deputy Chief James Smith arrived on the fireground. consulted with the incident commander, assessed conditions, and assumed command. Me requested a third alarm, and the Philadelphia Incident Command System was expanded to address the complexity of this incident: Battalion chiefs were assigned to the front, rear, roof, and interior sectors. The IC’s staff included a battalion chief assigned as safety officer, the command fire marshal as liaison, the public information officer, and an additional safety officer. The shift emergency medical supervisor was dispatched to coordinate EMS responsibilities. The fire department’s mobile air unit also was dispatched.
By this time, all occupants at the windows had been removed, and ladder companies now could concentrate on interior search and exterior ventilation. Laddermen moved throughout the floors, checking apartments for occupants who might still be inside. On the exterior, the tower ladder moved across the back of the building, ventilating windows and searching for additional victims. The heavy rescue company was assigned to vertical ventilation on the roof. As ladder companies ventilated, smoke conditions inside improved. The attack teams moving up the center stairs gained control of the third floor and stairwell to the fourth floor. However, there was still heavy fire in the fourth-floor rear hallway and apartment units and in the cockloft.
ROOF COLLAPSE
By now ladder companies had completed a search of floors one, two, and three (and had removed an adult occupant from the second floor), but a complete search of the fourth floor was prevented by fire conditions. The attack teams did not yet have control of the fourth floor and cockloft.
Approximately 30 minutes after firedepartment arrival on the scene, the roof sector, venting ahead of the fourth-floor interior crews, reported that the roof was weakening. The IC ordered firefighters to abandon thereof and fourth floor. Within minutes, a large section of roof in the rear (near the north fire tower) collapsed. All companies were ordered to evacuate the building immediately, and the safety officer was assigned to account for all interior-operating firefighters.
At 0535 hours, as firefighters shifted to defensive operations, the IC requested a fourth alarm. Deputy Commissioner Philip McLaughlin and Commissioner Harold B. Hairston arrived on the scene, and Chief McLaughlin assumed command. The strategy now was to fight the fire from the exterior and protect the adjoining structures on 47th Street and exposed occupancies on Baltimore Avenue, separated from the involved structure by only a narrow alley. Master streams were committed to the rooftops of the surrounding buildings.
At 0556 hours, command requested a fifth alarm. At 0708, command reported that the fire was under control.
After an interior inspection by Unsafely officer, teams were assigned to search the upper floors for victims. Sadly, a mother and daughter were found in the bedroom of a fourth-floor apartment on the Warrington Avenueside. In all, there were three occupant fatalities, eight occupant injuries, and three firefighter injuries. However. 15 occupants were rescued by the firedepartment.
INVESTIGATION
The Philadelphia Fire Marshal’s Office quickly determined that the fire was set intentionally. By late that same afternoon, that office, working with the Philadelphia Police Homicide Unit and the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, anel Fire-arms, had a suspect in custody—a 64-ycar-old, third-floor resident of the Warrington Court Apartments. He confessed that his anger toward occupants of the third and fourth floors had compelled him to disable the building’s fire alarm system, pour flammable liquid throughout the thirdand fourth-floor hallways and down the building’s single interior stairwell, and ignite the liquid, hoping to trap the occupants of the upper floors with no chance of escape.
The arsonist exhibited no remorse for the crime; rather, he was angry that the fire department had intervened. Subsequently, he was convicted of three counts of murder and arson and 11 counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences for murder and an additional 10 to 20 years for the arson and aggravated assault charges.
LESSONS REINFORCED
- Particularly in this era of budget cutbacks, station closings, and reduced staffing, the importance of quick response times by adequately staffed units cannot be overstated —it is a life-and-death issue. Clearly, a less rapid response by first-in companies at this incident would have resulted in many more serious injuries and possibly in an additional loss of lives.
- The size and irregular shape of large occupancies add to the complexity of incidents and pose a problem for incident commanders in maintaining span of control, assigning units, coordinating multiple-company efforts, accounting for the life hazard, etc. The 1C has certain advantages he/ she should rely on in such cases:
— members’ knowledge of the building through in-company inspections and preplanning. For example, at this incident the IC benefited from members’ knowledge of the courtyard and how to access it. gained through block inspections;
— members’ experience and training—their ability to interpret physical characteristics of the building and fire conditions and translate that information into safe tactics and procedures;
— a communications network on the fireground that allows the 1C to draw on that information as a reference on which to base incident decisions;
— rapid implementation of the incident command system, including the assignment of sector officers (who are the eyes and ears of the incident commander);
—calling for additional help early and throughout the incident.
- Triage at a multiple-injury scene is required to ensure the best care possible for all victims and that those critically injured receive priority attention. Communication between emergency medical personnel and the incident commander on the fire-
- ground frequency (through the ICS) is vitally important at a multicasualty fire. Reinforce the importance of practiced communication at all incidents involving a commitment of fire and EMS personnel.
- Firefighter accountability becomes difficult when a fire attack changes from offensive interior to defensive exterior. The task of personnel accountability can be assigned to the safety officer. A standard procedure for accountability—an accountability system—should be established by the fire department.
- A safety officer should be assigned at all large (second-alarm and greater) responses. The safety officer’s responsibilities are critically important. The complexity of the incident may dictate that the safety officer request assistance and utilize a safety team. The safety officer’s duties at this fire included determining the precise dimensions of the building for the incident commander, accounting for the safety of suppression personnel when the attack switched to defensive, and monitoring the building’s structural integrity and collapse potential throughout the incident.
- Apparatus placement at the scene is crucial when time is of the essence. Experienced officers and driver/engineers are irreplaceable. For example, though operating procedures typically would call for the first-due truck to position at the front of the building. ladder 13, based on knowledge of the building location and access routes and knowing that L6 would be in right behind them, positioned their apparatus on Warrington Avenue to allow L6 swift access to the building—a decision that may have saved lives at this fire. Teamwork, communication, training, and experience are the keys to apparatus placement. just as they are in any fire operation.
- Making a distinction between “rescues” and “removals” was not a major factor in this incident because everyone at the windows was in imminent. life-threatening danger —they all required immediate assistance. Nevertheless, it should be stressed
- that situations involving large fires with numerous people trapped may require officers and firefighters to make a judgment as to whom to remove first. This is no small matter. Consideration will have to be given to knowledge of the building, location of fire, fire and smoke conditions, location of occupants, knowledge of fire behavior, wind direction, available equipment, location of other operating personnel, and which occupants can hold their positions and which cannot—within seconds.
- Communication between the roof ventilation team, sector commander, and incident commander must be maintained at all times. Collapse potential must be monitored constantly. Forces must be withdrawn when there is an indication of collapse.
- At this fire, the third-floor balcony of the north fire tower collapsed, killing a young woman. Exterior fire escapes, towers, and balconies often are poorly maintained and not subject to regular structural inspection and should be used as an avenue of fire attack only as a last resort.
- The maneuverable tower ladder is valuable in such operations for horizontal vent-and-search tactics. At this fire, the bucket operator was able to move from window to window in the rear of the building. He also was able to move quickly to the roof to remove the vent team when the roof weakened.
- Regular, continual, team-oriented training is important. For example, the 50-foot portable ladder is a heavy and cumbersome piece of equipment that requires training and teamwork to use effectively. Only a few weeks prior to this fire, Engine 68 and Ladder 13 trained with their 50-foot ladder—and on the morning of July 10, their efforts were rewarded.
- The heavy black smoke, accelerated fire conditions, and unusual burn patterns on interior stairs and hallways at this incident were reported to the investigating fire marshal during the early stages of the fire. Unusual or suspicious conditions noted by companies on arrival are important clues for a successful fire investigation.
