Pre-Plan Helps Volunteers Confine Fire Threatening Old Business Area
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photos by James Showalter, Jr.
Implementation of a pre-fire plan that stressed the need for extensive mutual aid and noted water supply limitations made it possible for volunteer fire fighters to contain an extensive fire that threatened to wipe out the old business section of New Milford, Conn.
The town’s largest fire in 50 years started in a three and four-story, 45 X 180-foot, brick warehouse with wood beams and floors last Aug. 27. Eight other buildings were involved in the fire in various degrees. A 73-foot-long wood; frame building used for offices by structural engineers and draftsmen (building 6) was gutted but is being rebuilt, while a two-car garage (building 5) that had been given an exterior coat of fire-retardant paint was scorched without any heavy charring despite its proximity to two heavily damaged structures.
Heavy smoke was coming from the warehouse (building 2) when members of Water Witch Hose Company No. 2 responded to the alarm at 4:27 p.m.
Plan activated
Chief Ralph Leavenworth of the Water Witch Hose Company recalled the pre-fire plan as he developed his strategy for attacking the fire. Engine 19, responding from the Water Witch firehouse only three blocks away, confirmed a working fire and also requested activation of the pre-fire plan. Following the plan, Engine 19 stretched a 2 1/2-inch supply line from a moderate gallonage hydrant on Bridge St. south on Middle St. to a spot northeast of the warehouse and near building 6. The initial attack by Engine 19 consisted of two preconnected 1 1/2 -inch lines to protect a house (building 2) and a barn (building 4), and a 2 1/2-inch hand line to operate on the warehouse. At the same time, lines were being connected to a deluge gun atop Engine 19.
Radiant heat from the now fully involved warehouse caused critical exposure problems for the house and barn previously mentioned and a second house (building 3). A primary concern was the evacuation of occupants of the houses under the protection of hand lines.
Fire fighters encountered difficulty in removing occupants from one house (building 2), where a frightened and disoriented mother failed to cooperate in the evacuation. Fire fighters quickly remedied this situation by first carrying out her children—with the mother in close pursuit.
At this point, ignition of buildings 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 was evident, coinciding with the balance of arriving New Milford apparatus taking up preassigned positions. Consequently, Leavenworth requested assistance from the Northville and Gaylordsville Fire Companies in New Milford and the neighboring Bridgewater Fire Department.
The chief then set up exposure sector assignments with Assistant Chiefs Alan Tiebot and Robert Moore in charge of exposure 1, 1st Lieutenant Walter Johnson commanding exposure 2 area, Leavenworth taking exposure 3, and Captain Ken Baily handling exposure 4.
A serious problem arose within the first 20 minutes of the fire when the roof of building 6 began to show signs of fire. This problem, along with the heavy involvement of those buildings adjacent to the original fire building, necessitated a request for additional companies. Knowing that the hydrant supply was limited to less than 2000 gpm, a call for additional mutual aid was made with special requests to Litchfield and Woodbury for large-diameter hose and to Bethel for an 85-foot elevating platform. Deluge gun operations were initiated in exposure areas 3 and 4, and major interior attacks were made in buildings 3, 6, 7 and 9.
As mutual aid companies arrived, they were assigned to specific exposure areas. Companies from Washington, Roxbury, Litchfield, Woodbury, Bethel and Stony Hill in Bethel, were directed to exposure 3 on South Main St. to cut off the fire from a densely populated residential area.
Engines from Bridgewater, Northville and Sherman augmented Water Witch units handling exposures 1 and 2.
As this influx of apparatus was taking place, 13 other pieces of apparatus in Cornwall, Warren, Kent, Brookfield, Candlewood Shores (in Brookfield), Washington, Southbury and Middlebury were either relocated or put on standby, bringing the total number of apparatus involved to 35.
2800-foot lay from river
The main line of defense on the exposure 3 was provided by the Bethel elevating platform operating its twin turrets. It was supplied primarily by a 2800-foot lay of 5-inch hose from the Housatonic River. Aggressive interior and exterior attacks were being maintained at buildings 6 and 3 by fire fighters from Roxbury, Washington, Woodbury and New Milford. In anticipation of the fire spreading across South Main St., Woodbury Engine 17 with large-diameter hose was placed on standby on South Main St. to provide an additional water supply if necessary.
Meanwhile fire fighters from Northville, Gaylordsville, Water Witch Hose Co. No. 2, Bridgewater and Sherman continued their attack on the western fringes of exposures 2 and 4 and directly on buildings 7, 8 and 9 on exposure 1.
Fire got into the north end of building 9, and there was extensive damage to the exterior of building 8 on the fire side. There was also heavy exterior damage to building 7.
The New Milford and mutual aid apparatus arrived at average intervals of three minutes. This time spacing allowed good tactical placement of apparatus without the confusion normally associated with large responses arriving simultaneously. Apparatus that relocated also averaged excellent response times. There were 22 pieces of apparatus, three ambulances and a rescue truck on the scene in 60 minutes, from areas as distant as 25 miles.
The fire was declared under control in a little over two hours and companies began to take up a short time later.
The value of pre-fire planning cannot be emphasized enough. Success in this operation was based on the expectation that a conflagration would be controlled in a reasonable period of time through the use of large numbers of men and equipment. Additionally, it was felt that the time of day was favorable in that all the departments responding were volunteer and most of their members were either at home or on their way home from work. The original pre-fire plan expected all the surrounding buildings to burn much more extensively, but the aggressive attack, the immediate request for an adequate amount of mutual aid and good tactical placement resulted in a positive outcome.
Long response distances
Furthermore the knowledge of an inadequate water supply gave impetus to the request for large-diameter hose from surrounding towns. This request was not hampered by the thought that both large-diameter hose trucks were 18 miles away. This was further emphasized by the request for the elevating platform, which responded from 25 miles away.
As a result of these actions, a continuous fire flow of 4550 gpm was achieved. This amount was about 50 percent of the required flow for the degree of involvement.
The pre-fire plan for this area had been reviewed and updated numerous occasions, with the most recent updating only four weeks prior to the fire. It was during this last update that the fire fighters found that building of fire origin contained 750 cases of motor oil, 25 55-gallon drums of motor oil, 125 cases of dry gas 100 cases of starting ether, 300 gallons of antifreeze, and 25 truck tires. Also in this building were large amounts of metal working equipment for repairing bakery equipment.
This is where Fire Marshal Francis Hapke pinpointed the seat of the fire. In and around this equipment repair area were numerous oxygen and acetylene tanks used to repair broken and damaged metal. Parts of these tanks, which narrowly missed residences were found 200 feet from the scene of the fire.
Also it must be noted that modifications to buildings result in uses that far exceed the fire potential of the original occupancy. These changes almost always multiply the fire problem. In this case, the building in which the fire started was originally a tobacco warehouse and at the time of the fire housed large amounts of flammable liquids.
A pre-fire plan is primary to any successful large fire fighting operation. It must be in writing and made available to all active members of the fire department.
Audio-visual aids
After the fire, try to gather as many audio-visuals as possible to give a precise view of what happened. In this particular case, a 15-minute color and sound video tape and a 75-unit color slide show were made by the training division of the Woodbury Volunteer Fire Department. By reviewing such audio-visuals, the pre-fire plan can be evaluated and other pre-fire plans can be improved.
Weather conditions were not as favorable as they might have been. A steady breeze from the west prevailed and carried the combustion products to a larger area than had been expected, as exemplified by the defoliation of the tops of trees in an area some 300 feet out from the center of the fire. These conditions were felt to be the reason for the rapid ignition of building 6.
When a fire of this magnitude exists, provisions must be made for feeding fire fighters, and refueling apparatus. Fortunately the benevolence of local restaurateurs made it possible to feed the 232 fire fighters.
T. William McAllister is the captain-drillmaster of the Woodbury, Conn., Volunteer Fire Department and deputy fire coordinator for Litchfield County. He recently received his associate degree in fire protection technology and administration from Waterbury, Conn., State Technical College to add to his B.A. from Iona College.
