BY JAMES M. FOLEY
At 10:40 a.m. On October 30, 2004, the top floors of the 10-story Tropicana Parking Garage in Atlantic City, New Jersey, collapsed. The garage was currently under construction as part of “The Quarter” casino expansion project of the Tropicana Casino Hotel. Workers were finishing the 10th-floor deck when the collapse occurred. In a matter of seconds, five stories of the garage collapsed in a pancake and lean-to configuration, trapping more than 24 construction workers in the rubble.
Atlantic City Fire Department (ACFD) units responded immediately from throughout the city and arrived on-scene within minutes. The firefighters immediately went to work and assisted construction workers on the scene in extricating trapped and injured workers. ACFD removed 21 workers, several in critical condition. The firefighters worked quickly and at great peril within the collapse zone; the severely damaged structure posed the risk of additional structural collapse. Fire Chief John Bereheiko and Incident Commander (IC) Deputy Chief Lewis Janes, realizing immediately that workers were likely to be entombed in the rubble, initiated a call to the New Jersey State Police and requested that New Jersey Task Force 1 (NJ-TF1), the state’s urban search and rescue task force, be activated (see “New Jersey USAR Program” on page 90).
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THE BUILDING COLLAPSE
The Tropicana Casino Hotel takes in four city blocks from the Boardwalk across Pacific to Atlantic Avenues northward and from Iowa Avenue through Brighton and Stenton Avenues to Morris Avenue to the west. The “Quarter Project” is located between Iowa and Brighton Avenues and between Pacific and Atlantic Avenues and extends an entire city block. The current project includes a two-story overbuild of Brighton Avenue, which connects to the hotel’s West Tower and parking area; the 10-story parking mercantile structure that collapsed; and a 25-story high-rise hotel attached to the collapsed parking structure on the east side.
The parking garage was a partially precast, pour-in-place reinforced concrete structure. The filigree wide slab construction method used in the garage has been used in more than 12 buildings in Atlantic City. The construction uses an approximately 21/2-inch-thick precast concrete panel reinforced with metal wire trusses. The panels are erected on shoring and false work, including beams and columns. Styrofoam™ blocks are used to create void spaces in the concrete, to eliminate unnecessary concrete weight. When the panels are installed, additional reinforcing grids are interlocked over the slabs and beams, and the floors are poured with an additional eight inches of concrete. Once cured, the floor and beams are basically a monolithic pour of concrete.
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At the time of the collapse, construction workers were pouring the 10th-floor parking level. The floors are assembled one 44-foot bay at a time, starting on the outside wall of Brighton Avenue and working back to the beam forms for the entire length of the building, approximately 300-plus feet. The beam form and floors had been poured up to the center of the building on Brighton Avenue when a catastrophic failure occurred somewhere between the outer wall and the wide slab panels. A column failed at some point either at or below the floor being poured. As weight in the building transferred, the remaining column and floor connections sheared on the outer wall, causing a lean-to collapse pattern between the first and second bays. Construction workers on the top floor rode the collapse down as the five slabs pancaked. The workers who died were all located in the collapse zone on the floors below. The collapse stopped at the fifth floor; shear walls located below that level absorbed the force of the collapse and stopped it from continuing to grade.
NJ-TF1 RESPONSE
NJ-TF1 arrived on-scene within two hours of notification. On arrival, as the task force leader (TFL), I met with ACFD’s Acting Fire Chief John Bereheiko and IC Deputy Chief Lew Janes. I was briefed on the incident’s status and a mission assignment for NJ-TF1, which was to further assess the site and locate the remaining missing workers. The IC had by that time removed the majority of ACFD forces from the collapse zone, as all of the surface victims had been removed successfully. ACFD technical rescue specialists from Ladder 2 and Engine 2 assisted NJ-TF1 search and rescue managers with recon of the site.
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Source: Filigree Internet.
The Keeting Construction Company, the prime contractor on The Quarter Project, was in the process of getting accountability reports on the workers on the job and identification of those who were missing. At that time it was believed that five or six workers might be trapped or entombed.
 (3) Looking into the collapse zone from Pacific Avenue. |
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 (4) Six minutes after the collapse. (Photo courtesy of Griffin-Graflex.Com. Published with permission.) |
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 (5) The “tub” cable tieback system at the edge of the collapsed 10th floor. |
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The IC had the construction plans available, and the engineers who designed the building were at the ACFD command post. NJ-TF1 recon teams were assembled to begin preliminary search while the task force leader, team safety manager, ACFD safety officer, and project engineers conducted a quick site survey of the collapse area from the tower crane basket. The crane operator was able to move the basket over and around the collapse zone so we could get a good look at the overhead hazards and assess the potential for further structural collapse. The survey identified four immediate problems that would become priorities:
- The workers were in the process of pouring a concrete beam to form the support for the 10th floor. The “tub,” as it was termed, was approximately eight feet wide by the length of the building (approximately 300 feet). Temporary floor jacks and false work were supporting the tub, which was full of #3 and #4 rebar and wet fluid concrete. The outer rows of floor jack supports were currently resting on the collapsed face of the 10th floor. The footpads had grabbed into the broken concrete and were bearing in some cases by less than an inch. The engineers estimated the weight of this beam to be 200 pounds per cubic foot. If the tub were to roll from vibration, it would impact the lean-to collapse and most likely displace the inner columns and cause a secondary collapse of the next bay. The bays were 44 feet between beams and column lines. The engineers and the TFL identified this as a top priority for stabilizing the building and reducing the potential for a secondary collapse.
- When the building collapsed, the floor systems broke away from the shear wall at the Atlantic and Brighton Avenue corner of the building. The shear wall was approximately 30 feet wide by 100 feet free standing. The wall was leaning slightly toward Brighton Av-enue. Building engineers estimated that this wall could fail in as little as a 15-mile-per-hour wind. (This information later proved incorrect during demolition.) The day of the incident the wind was unusually still, which made wind loading a nonfactor throughout the rescue operation. However, if operations had to continue for a long period, this wall would have had to be secured.
- Two columns on the Brighton Avenue side, south of the shear wall, were also free standing and moving. The one column moved at least 10 to 12 degrees from the time of the initial collapse until movement stopped. These columns were fractured in two sections at the base, and it was feared that if the column collapsed outward toward Brighton Avenue, a 20-foot section could kick back into the lean-to collapse zone and cause additional collapse.
- The column and beam line holding the rear of the lean-to collapse were severely damaged and needed shoring. Any movement or extreme vibration could have led to further collapse of the second bay, as the column supporting the tub above was compromised.
As the task force began to develop clear priorities, search and recon teams and ACFD personnel performed a quick search and were able to locate two of the remaining three victims. Rescue manager Phil Morris and ACFD Captain Scott Evans (also a rescue manager with NJ-TF1) reported to me that these victims appeared to be only slightly entangled and could be extricated quickly by employing some dead shores and cribbing to support the floor. This operation proceeded with the assistance of union carpenters and ACFD fire personnel. The carpenters assisted in placing mechanical shores every eight feet along the second bay and under the rear support beam of the lean-to collapse. This work continued until the teams on the top floor were ready to begin tying back the tub. At that time all search and rescue personnel were pulled back until the securing operation was completed.
The tub tieback was engineered by building designers and NJ-TF1 engineers and required six steel cable tiebacks to be strategically placed along the tub. The cables were then secured to stable column lines in the structure, and the slack was removed. NJ-TF1 crews were careful not to pull on the tub or cause movement. The goal was to eliminate further slippage of the footpads down the face of the collapse. As soon as the tub was stabilized, crews went back to search and rescue operations.
 (6) ACFD firefighters and construction workers remove two of the 20 rescued workers six minutes into the collapse. (Photo courtesy of Griffin-Graflex.Com. Published with permission.) |
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 (7) Cribbing operation on the P-2 level. |
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 (8) ACFD technical rescue crews from Ladder 2 and Engine 2 working with NJ-TF1 squads on cribbing systems. |
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Two victims were recovered on P-2 and P-3. The search continued for the final victim. ACFD and laborers reported that the ironworkers had been in the area of the stairwell on P-4 level, where they were installing stair pans. This stairwell was directly behind the now unsupported shear wall. The worker’s tools were located on P-4 at the head of the stair opening, but the collapse debris and wet concrete from the 10th floor had flooded the stairwell and collapsed most of it to the lower levels of P-2.
Canine search had given some nonconclusive alerts on P-2 at the base of the stair. Rescue squads were assigned here to perform selected small debris removal and search any available void spaces for the victim. Additional rescue and search squads, with ACFD teams, searched the P-4 level in the area of the victim’s tools. If the victim could not be located at the interior boundary of the collapse zone, we knew we would have to enter the spaces between the slabs from the topside; this would have been a long-duration activity. Planning for such an operation would have had to include some method of stabilizing the shear wall to ensure rescuer safety.
Engineers developed the option of passing steel cables through openings in the wall and securing them to the rear columns of the collapsed garage and to the columns of the West Tower garage across Brighton Avenue. The task force had requested a 650-ton crane at the beginning of the operation in case slabs or columns had to be lifted. This crane was positioned on Brighton Avenue to conduct the cabling operation, if necessary, in conjunction with the existing tower crane. The crane was brought up from the remote staging area at Bader Field Airport to a forward staging area on Atlantic Avenue. As we began to have engineering evaluate the systems we would need to accomplish this task, rescue squads reported at 3:00 a.m. that they thought they may have found the last victim.
Rescue squads reported detecting fluids in a small void space in the P-4 area. Haz-mat technicians obtained a sample, which was examined by the medical manager and police forensic technicians. The fluid was determined to be blood. Engineering evaluated the area and determined that this recovery operation could move forward using small tools and with limited disturbance of debris. It was determined that the shear wall did not have to be secured as long as the victim was found on the stable side of the collapse. Rescue squads and ACFD units continued to dig in this area until they uncovered the final victim. The last extrication was difficult: The victim was between the floor slabs and the stair pans. The void space was confined; only two rescuers at a time could work with small hand tools, torches, rebar cutters, and light chippers. The last victim was removed at approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 31.
Since all victims had been recovered, ACFD command released NJ-TF1, which began to demobilize. The team repacked all of the task force equipment and left Atlantic City for Lakehurst by 11:30 a.m. On final count, ACFD and construction workers removed 21 victims, one of whom died at the hospital. NJ-TF1 assisted the ACFD in removing the final three victims.
 (9) NJ-TF1 victim location marking system. |
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 (10) ACFD members remove the last victim from the scene. |
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 (11) Interior collapsed stairway where the final victim was found. |
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 (12) NJ-TF1 rescue squads extricating the last victim to be located. A haz-mat technician monitors the atmosphere. |
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 (13) NJ-TF1 members enter the shored area to recover a victim. |
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LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Members of the ACFD and NJ-TF1 learned the following lessons from this incident:
- It is critical that the IC request outside resources such as an urban search and rescue team, based on his risk assessment, at the beginning of the incident. In this case, the IC realized there was a very real potential for secondary collapse that could entrap additional workers and ACFD members. The early request for USAR provided a secondary line of defense should something unexpected have happened during the initial surface rescues.
- NJ-TF1 built its “Mobilization Plan” to be user friendly with a maximum deployment window of two hours for in-state structural collapse incidents. In this case, NJ-TF1 members were on-scene and assisting the ACFD within one and half hours of notification. This rapid response window is achieved through regional deployment sites for our closest team members and a memorandum of agreement with other state-owned assets, including Department of Transportation heavy equipment and New Jersey Transit buses. The USAR team has a highly mobile equipment cache that is always ready to respond on preloaded vehicles.
- Prioritize your problems, but be flexible in your approach as the incident changes. After the initial surface rescues, the IC pulled all personnel out of the structure to afford better risk assessment. The secondary risk assessment established USAR mission priorities that required coordination of rescue workers and the establishment of safe work zones. As the incident unfolded, many mission priorities on the table were halted or adjusted based on new information gathered by the rescue squads. An example was the cabling system for the shear wall. The equipment was brought into the site, and cable systems were readied as a contingency plan if recovery work became more involved than was anticipated or if breaching operations from the top of the collapse pile were needed. The goal is to make changes in strategy seamless.
- Team integration is a critical component of effective task management. Although NJ-TF1 was a resource to the IC, ACFD and NJ-TF1 rescue squads were paired and worked as single teams. This fostered cooperation between the agencies and allowed the local fire department a broader understanding of USAR operations. The result was a unified tactical approach to victim recoveries.
- Nonuniformed resources must be managed to avoid undue interference in rescue operations. As with any construction accident, the workers wanted to be involved in the rescue and recovery of their fellow workers. This is no different from firefighters wanting to bring home their brothers. The command staff must be sensitive to this and use these personnel in a meaningful manner. At this incident, the IC and TFL had the labor union bosses pull all of their personnel to a staging area. They were then used as support to the rescue and recovery operations. Ironworkers assisted in the tub tieback on the 10th floor; union carpenters assisted task force members with shoring operations. These groups operated under the direction of task force managers and safety officers.
- Protocols established for removing victims must be sensitive to the feelings and concerns of families and coworkers. In this incident, NJ-TF1 members performed the victim extrications and turned the victims over to ACFD rescue squads. The ACFD members carried the victims out to the elevator hoist; from there, union members carried the victims to the awaiting ambulance and then consoled family members. This was important to the rescuers and the awaiting families and friends.
- The media must be kept informed. At this incident, many media outlets covered the story. Atlantic County Director of Community Affairs and Traffic Safety Director Michael Sherman coordinated the media and provided updates at a predetermined street corner every two hours. It was critical that the IC and the TFL were brought to the media for questions and answers periodically to give the media current information. This assisted greatly in keeping the media from misr
JAMES M. FOLEY, a 34-year veteran of the fire service, is deputy chief fire official for the Atlantic City (NJ) Fire Department, a leader of the New Jersey Task Force 1 urban search and rescue team, and a certified Fire Instructor II. He teaches in the fire code programs at Rutgers University and Camden County College. He has a bachelor of science degree in fire protection technology and fire administration from the University of Maryland and a bachelor of arts degree in biological science and chemistry from Rowan University.
NEW JERSEY USAR PROGRAM
New Jersey Task Force 1 (NJ-TF1) is a state urban search and rescue task force developed in 1996. It operates under the New Jersey State Police, Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM). NJ-TF1 has been deployed numerous times within New Jersey for structural collapses and has been predeployed in Trenton, Irvington, Bound Brook, and the Republican National Convention and was the first USAR task force in New York City at the World Trade Center disaster on September 11, 2001.
NJ-TF1 is a160-member heavy structural collapse rescue team. It follows all of the FEMA National USAR system requirements. When the team deploys, it brings 66,000 pounds of heavy rescue and technical search equipment to the scene as a resource for local first responders. The task force is headquartered at the Lakehurst (NJ) Naval Air Station and responds with three tractor-trailers, four light vehicles, and two New Jersey Transit buses, which carry the team members.
A USAR team consists of seven components: Command, Search, Rescue, Medical, Hazmat, Planning, and Logistics. A manager coordinates each of the components; the task force leader coordinates the team. The team has a complement of live victim search canines and technical search, coring, boring, cutting, and breaching tools. Its members include doctors, structural engineers, riggers, technical information specialists, hazardous materials technicians, and rescue specialist technicians trained to NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue Incidents, 1999 edition. The task force is a heavy rescue resource designed to add additional capability to the local incident commander and is self-supporting for the first 72 hours of an incident.
