BY JOHN (JACK) F. FLYNN AND JERRY KNAPP
Editor’s note: This river-rescue-turned-recovery operation contains numerous valuable lessons learned. As you read the details of this operation, look for critical points; leadership/experience nuggets; and the ways in which use of the incident command system, planning, and experience increased responder safety and efficiency. The incident was commanded by Jack Flynn; the Lessons Learned are provided by Jerry Knapp.
As I was nearing my residence, at approximately 4:30 p.m. on the afternoon of Wednesday, February 15, 2006, the pager sounded for my fire company at the Sparrowbush (NY) Engine Company (SEC), to respond to a water rescue in the Delaware River. The location was reported as the Eddy Farm Resort. Despite it being an unseasonably warm day, it still was February, and I wondered if I had really heard the message correctly. As luck would have it, I was within a quarter mile of the entrance to Eddy Farm and quickly was on the scene.
As I scanned the rapidly flowing Delaware River, it looked dark and ominous. I prayed that it all was a mistake, as I feared for anyone who might be in the river. The original report was that two young men (without life jackets) had overturned in a canoe. As I neared the hotel, I saw no one in the river, which could be a good or a bad sign. As I prepared to turn around and head down along the river for another pass, I heard someone shout to me. It was the owner of the hotel. He was motioning and shouting for me to come to the hotel. As I entered the hotel lobby, there was a young 21-year-old male lying on the floor, wrapped in a blanket and suffering from hypothermia.
I established command, radioed for advanced life support, and then attempted to get whatever factual information I could from him to determine beyond a doubt if someone had accompanied him. To my distress, he confirmed that a 19-year-old friend had started the journey with him, a scant quarter mile upriver. He reported that their canoe overturned shortly after entering the river. Neither young man had been wearing a life jacket, which most likely would have saved their lives. The other now-lost individual was floating downriver when last seen by his companion; he was fighting for his life and yelling desperately for help.
I directed our rescue air boat to our launch site, approximately a quarter mile downriver, and directed incoming firefighters to initiate a search along the river. When Chief Carl Van Horn from the SEC arrived on the scene, I gave him a quick update and switched to Operations (Ops). He took over as incident commander (IC).
LESSON 1. Initial rescue actions must be set up quickly and effectively. Waterborne and shoreline searches were started as soon as possible to give the victim the best chance of being rescued. These decisions are based on aggressive information gathering, analysis, and deployment of resources. This is command at its best. Anyone can arrive on-scene and “establish command.” Effective leaders produce an effective incident action plan (IAP) quickly, efficiently, and effectively.
Passing command was effortless because the leaders were well-trained and practiced in the system. Passing command is one of the most important skills. It includes providing a quick update to the IC, which includes the circumstances, what you have done so far, what the plan is so far, and what you think you need (What have you got? What are you doing? What do you need?). The new IC can choose to stay with the initial plan, add to it, or change it as necessary.
TIME A MAJOR CONCERN
With initial actions in progress, our primary concern now was time. In rare cases, victims of cold water drowning have been known to be resuscitated; and in even rarer incidents, some victims have regained consciousness and lived meaningful lives. The clock was ticking for the victim, and nightfall was closing in on us. Divers from neighboring communities who had been called to the scene through mutual aid were assembling.
Command directed me, as Ops, to limit each cycle of diving to 10 minutes of dive time to ensure rescuers’ safety. As divers and equipment handlers were trudging down the hill from the road to the small rock-strewn beach on the shoreline, I informed Dive Ops of the time limits and continued to oversee the signing in (accountability) of all boat and dive personnel. The IC requested additional light towers through an on-scene deputy fire coordinator from Orange County, to prepare for night operations.
As darkness fell, the warm sun of the afternoon faded. You could feel the cold dampness settling in, reminding you that it still surely was winter. At this point, initial dives were finishing, searches of the shoreline were in progress, and visual searches of the area in which the victim was last seen were in progress by air boats from Sparrowbush and jet boats from Port Jervis, Matamoras, and Westfall. All search efforts were negative.
I requested that Command reallocate some of our light tower assets to assist divers in changing air supplies and buoyancy compensators, but by now the victim’s “Golden Hour” was well past. I suggested to the IC that he consider moving from rescue to recovery mode and start marshaling our assets for tomorrow.
LESSON 2. Continual assessment of the situation is a command responsibility. As soon as the initial operations are in progress, it is time for the IC to begin the evaluation process for the actions he set in motion. In this case, the situation was deteriorating with little chance of success and with high risk to rescuers. Staying with a losing strategy ensures a losing outcome. All initial searches were thorough and negative. Chances of the victim’s surviving underwater at this point, even at these cold temperatures, were zero. If he were on-shore somewhere along the river, search teams most likely would have found him, or civilians might have assisted in his rescue. Darkness made operations very hazardous for rescue personnel. When there is little to gain, there should be little to risk. Planning for the next day’s operation was the prudent consideration. Accountability of rescuers was accomplished and is important for obvious reasons at complex incidents like this one.
FALSE HOPES
Just as we were terminating the operation for the night and putting the rescue boats back on their trailers, we received a 911 report from upstream on the Pennsylvania side of the river that a homeowner had heard someone yelling in the vicinity of a sheer rock cliff, directly adjacent to the Delaware River. Although it did not seem to make sense (the location was well upriver from the general search area), we were determined to check and verify each and every report. Experience has taught me never to discount anything when you are in the initial search mode. Unfortunately, although everyone’s hopes rose a bit, the information proved to be without basis. Little did we know that this 911 report would set in motion a series of events that would cause additional false hope later in the evening.
Since the mutual-aid companies reported back to their stations, Van Horn and I conferred with Deputy Orange County Fire Coordinator Jim Rohner to develop plans for the following day. Since the weather for the next day was forecast to be ideal, I agreed to take the day off and assume the role of IC. There would be only one more day of good weather, and then winter was due to return with a vengeance.
If selected for the IC position, my plan was to bring in all the resources we could for that one day and attempt to make the recovery. Rapid recovery was important because if the boy’s body was not recovered soon in the cold, swift water, he might not ever surface and would be carried downstream, invisible to anyone, and possibly never be recovered. It is difficult enough for a family to lose a loved one; without a recovery, family members tend to hold onto false hopes, with no closure; this can become unbearable. Providing closure for the family (body recovery) is worth the manageable risks of Dive Ops in reasonable conditions.
Family members understandably wished to continue the search through the night. Van Horn explained the necessity of withdrawing our forces because of exhaustion, increased risks of night operations, and the need to prepare for tomorrow. Family members never really can accept that. It is a decision to switch from rescue to recovery mode, and everyone knows it.
Approximately 90 minutes later, Deerpark Police received a call from a family member who said some of the victim’s clothing was near our boat launch site; the fire chief was requested to report to the scene.
In a very important “Lesson Learned” for us, it turned out that as divers from the various responding mutual-aid companies moved upriver from the launch site, they had picked up clothing discarded by both individuals as they had floated downriver fighting for their lives. The divers had collected the articles and placed them near the boat launch site to be picked up later. Unfortunately, when the earlier 911 report of a possible sighting upriver on the Pennsylvania cliffs came in, the clothing was forgotten. To the family members, this was clear proof that the individual had made it to shore and was wandering around aimlessly. Sadly, we knew differently; of course, it was impossible to convey this to the family. Again, for the benefit of the family, a cursory search was resumed in the area, but animosity lingered.
LESSON 3. It is important for the plans section (situation unit leader) to record and seek out (monitoring the radio at the command post is one good way to do this) significant actions that occurred during the operation. In the planning meetings, a reminder may surface that the clothing was recovered but never secured as evidence or clues as to where the victims might be or may have discarded it.
Again, the concept of incident command system (ICS) is that one job is assigned to one person. Several people make up the incident command staff, forming a team that is better than the sum of its parts. As rescuers, we are often focused on the job at hand. However, we must always remember we are in the people business. Our customers in this case are surviving family members and friends. Experience has taught us that someone in authority must keep the family informed and explain all the actions taken and not taken. We understand the reasons for these actions; family members do not. Assign a calm, experienced leader to keep the family informed. It is often a good tactic to assign the family to become involved in the search in some way. These assignments should ensure that they don’t endanger themselves but should contribute in some cursory way. This allows them to become part of the solution and not develop adversarial relationships with rescuers. Above all, remember it is a very trying time for family members whose actions and thought processes may be less than rational and driven by extreme emotions.
NEXT DAY: RECOVERY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL RESPONSE
The next day dawned clear. The tones went off to hundreds of fire members’ pagers throughout the three neighboring states, alerting them to the need for divers and support personnel and requested that they report to the Sparrowbush Fire Department’s Main Street station. I wondered if I would get enough personnel to accomplish our goals. I was truly stunned by the turnout; close to 100 rescuers and support personnel were on-scene or en route as I started the preincident briefing.
Buoyed by this outstanding response and knowing their expertise, experience, and capabilities, I felt we really had an excellent opportunity to make a thorough search and successful recovery. Prior to moving to the river and establishing the command structure, I asked Sparrowbush 1st Assistant Chief Scott Glynn, a dispatcher for the Orange County 911 Center, if he would stay at the station and manage our communication network, which would be an important link because it was possible that many assignments would be channeled through him.
LESSON 4. Good communications are the key to successful operations. Face-to-face, radio, and telephone communications are all critical to success. Additionally, everyone wants to be at the scene where the action is. The ICS is a fully staffed organization and requires support personnel in all positions. Often, members may willingly fill the behind-the-scene positions. Remember to fill these positions and to reward those who support the operation from nonvisible positions.
ESTABLISHING COMMAND AT THE RIVER
On establishing a visible command post at the river, I determined that with the overwhelming amount of resources at hand it would be necessary to split the dive-recovery operations into two sections: Dive Master Tim Simmons from the Port Jervis (NY) Fire Department would be responsible for the divers in the water; SEC’s Dive Master Chris Morgan would manage all beach operations. SEC’s Captain Floyd Babcock took over logistics, and SEC’s 2nd Lieutenant Victor Valentin oversaw fiscal accountability and assisted in procuring and delivering items needed at the site.
Paramedic Captain Ryan Qualin, from Regional Ambulance Service, assumed the Medical Command role and kept a minimum of one advanced life support unit from Regional and one basic life support unit from the Port Jervis Volunteer Ambulance Corps on-site all day. Based on past experience, this was necessary because of the potential injuries to divers and other support personnel. Stress issues are another large concern, especially with numerous family members and friends on-scene. Under the mantle of Medical Ops, I established a small, crisis incident stress debriefing group that would be available if needed.
The State Police representatives from New York and Pennsylvania worked hand-in-hand with the Sheriff Department; the Deerpark police agency was in command of Police Ops.
I did not establish a formal Joint Operational Command, since the incident occurred entirely within the Sparrowbush Fire District; however, I requested that the fire chiefs from each state stay at the command center and assist with managing the assets they brought to the scene. Deputy fire coordinators from each state were moved into the Planning Section. This system worked very satisfactorily: Their suggestions were welcomed, and they understood that the final decisions rested with the IC.
LESSON 5. An operation of this size and complexity requires a robust command structure. A visible command post must be established and staffed by appropriate leaders. Unified command is always a good idea: It brings several different disciplines to bear on the planning, coordination, and execution of the operation. Requesting leaders to remain at the command post helps define their roles and diminishes opportunities for well-intentioned freelancing. Providing immediate medical assistance to rescuers is a command responsibility. Traditionally, this sector works for the logistics chief. Key ICS points here are visible command post, assignment of proper staff to the command post, and support (logistics and finance) and communication functions. Operations was successfully divided into two parts, further increasing the operation’s safety and efficiency.
FAMILY MEMBER AND MEDIA RELATIONS
Family members and media are always important factors to consider in an event of this type. With the animosity that surfaced the night before ever present in my mind, I was not sure of what I would encounter in my dealings with the family. In previous operations, I found that you must not close family members out but that you also had to establish “ground rules” for their behavior. This sounds simple enough, but you have to understand the stress they are undergoing, so be flexible. Don’t establish unenforceable rules and, if at all possible, try to avoid being confrontational with family members; it can affect the whole recovery operation. Remember, they have the biggest issue in the entire operation.
As part of this participation, the survivor from the incident was asked through family members if he felt up to returning to the scene to provide any additional guidance. Generally, my experience has been that although survivors from a traumatic incident can offer some information through a reenactment, it tends, in many cases, to be rather vague. The reason for the vagueness is they were usually in panic mode at the time of the incident and not certain if they were going to survive the event themselves. I have had cases where survivors would not return to the scene because they felt guilty that they survived and their friend did not. This is falsely placed guilt but nonetheless a reality for them. We did interview the survivor, who provided similar information to that he gave the night before, but it did help reinforce the decision on the general area to be searched.
We considered using neutrally buoyant objects to attempt to recreate the victim’s path and possible location. However, we have found that the river changes day by day, sometimes hour by hour, depending on how much water is released from any or all of the seven reservoirs that feed the Delaware River. Often, it is this fact and the uncontrolled runoff from rain and melted snow that make the normally placid river a very deceivingly dangerous place.
As for the media, they have a job and feel pressure from the deadlines they live with every day. You can make them your allies or your enemies. If you can accommodate them without adversely affecting operations, do so. They are not going to go away. If you do not establish control of how information is channeled to them, they will get the information from any sources. It is better to give them factual information from a reliable source.
There is no guarantee they will use the information you give them; but if you present yourself as a knowledgeable and reliable source, they will be more prone to go with your interview than with a spectator who offers unsubstantiated information. Don’t be confrontational; treat them as professionals. A public information officer (PIO) is always an option, but I feel more comfortable addressing the issues myself. As with the family, I clearly marked the parameters the media needed to abide by and received excellent cooperation.
I have found that the television, radio, and press media generally are unfamiliar with dive rescue/recovery operations and are eager to understand the functions taking place. By talking to their representatives, you can explain the operation, the difficulties members are encountering, and how dedicated they are to the mission. Throughout this event, police, fire, and EMS received very positive press in all media venues.
LESSON 6. Many rescuers may not be comfortable with dealing with the family and media. We are trained to fight fires, remove cars from around people, and conduct search and rescue operations. Emotional families and aggressive reporters are factors we must deal with to ensure success. Plan, practice, and train to deal with both. If you don’t, they will become huge problems that will overshadow the excellent efforts of everyone on-scene.
SEARCH EFFORT EXPANDED
Now that the stage was set and initial operations were in progress, I expanded the search effort, requesting, through Police Operations, helicopters from New York State and Pennsylvania. Initially, Police Ops could not get through on cell or radio-the site is nestled in a valley that is not communication friendly. The request was forwarded through our alternate communication net at the Sparrowbush Main Street fire station. Almost immediately, Glynn notified me that my request was approved and that the New York State Police helicopter was on its way. Pennsylvania State Police sent a special aviation liaison to the scene along with the helicopter.
Since visibility was excellent, my IAP was to have the helicopters scour the river and shoreline from a distant point downriver to our present site, to eliminate any possibility of the victim’s having drifted downstream into shallower waters.
Our primary search site had varying depths of between 30 feet off the cliffs to about 15 feet in the eddy, and was approximately 200 feet wide and about one-eighth of a mile long. A swift current flowed down the Pennsylvania side of the river, coming off a set of long rapids, whereas the New York State side had a strong eddy current running upriver. The two meshed in the center of the river. Based on my past experiences as a diver, I felt there was a strong likelihood of locating the individual somewhere near this eddy.
LESSON 7. Commanders must have hands-on experience in the operations they are directing. There is no substitute for experience. Many will say the commanders do not need to know the details of what members are doing. How can one develop and evaluate an incident action plan, deploy hundreds of department members and millions of dollars of equipment, and effectively run the operation without understanding the fine points?
The IC established the waterborne and shoreline search operation first. He then added the airborne division of the operation to complement them. Note that divisions in the ICS are geographical areas of operation. Air Ops searched areas not possible to search by other means. Additionally, the overall plan covered large areas, to rule out possible locations for the body, but at the same time focused on the most likely place. This is an example of excellent planning, execution, and deployment of resources.
CADAVER SEARCH DOG
The next call I received was for an offer of a cadaver search dog named Shamus from the Pennsylvania Sheriffs Department. I discussed this offer with Dive Ops; he was not keen on using Shamus. I was willing to give it a try, although I also had my doubts. Shamus was en route to a nearby class, so after some give-and-take conversation, I convinced Dive Ops to add this option to our box of tools. Shamus arrived; we sent a jet boat to pick him up. The thought was he might be distracted by the noise of the airboat. As the boat was proceeding upriver with Shamus packaged in his own doggie-style life jacket standing in the bow looking like George Washington crossing the Delaware, he suddenly alerted in the general area we had determined would be our initial and most likely search area.
By now the helicopters had completed their initial search pattern and reported that they were confident no one was in the shallow water or on the shoreline. This information along with the alerting by Shamus increased our confidence in the area in which we had selected to begin our recovery operation. While the Pennsylvania helicopter continued with over flights, the New York State helicopter landed on the nearby shoreline, and the pilot advised that once the angle of the sun increased, he wished to search the water area under the cliffs on the south side of the river. Large ice formations were hanging off the Pennsylvania cliffs, and I had some concern the downdraft might cause them to break off and fall. We agreed to remove divers and boats once he elected to take off.
Under the guidance of Dive Ops and Beach Ops, divers began entering the water from the various rescue boats, with one of the boats employing an underwater camera. To successfully probe the deep and swift water areas, the camera had to be attached to a pike pole by duct tape. Dive Ops and Beach Ops kept a running list of all divers entering the water, along with their times. Beach Ops also made certain a picket line of boats was established downstream of the dive grid to pick up and account for all divers who might be pushed downstream by the swift current.
 (4) Rescue personnel use an underwater camera to search for the victim. |
LESSON 8. ICs need to keep an open mind to options. Although there was some doubt concerning Shamus’ ability, all available resources were deployed. Why not try it? The operation was in motion; Shamus was an available resource; it was a good opportunity to try out a new tool. Maybe Shamus would become a useful member of the team. Additionally, how do you justify to family members not using all the tools available? Of course, you must use some judgment so you do not confuse and complicate operations with every crackpot idea that comes along.
PLANS FOR THE RECOVERY
Since family members and close friends were in attendance, I informed Dive and Beach Ops that if we had a recovery, the body would be taken downstream to our boat launch site, where it would be met by the New York State Police and a coroner. About this same time, a local town supervisor from Pennsylvania, who had been viewing the scene along with some other town officials, handed me a phone number and said I was requested to return the call. I recognized it as a Washington, DC, area number and requested that Glynn, at our Communication Center, call and see what it was all about. Apparently, a close friend of the family had contacted a high government official, who in turn had requested the U.S. Coast Guard to assist us in any way possible. I politely declined the offer; we had sufficient water and air assets on-scene.
 (5) Divers and support personnel recover the victim. |
As it passed noon, Logistics established an area away from the beach dive area where divers, boat operators, and support personnel could take a break and have some refreshments. Food and drinks were furnished by local delis; their costs were absorbed by the delis or private individuals. This was a welcomed initiative, as we now had more than 100 individuals at the site.
LESSON 9. Rescuers have needs, too. These members are working hard and need and deserve a break. It is a good idea to keep them away from the media and family members during the break. Often, we need to break the ice with some typical firefighter gallows humor, which may be appropriate among ourselves but certainly not in public. Also, it may appear to family and media that rescuers are goofing off and not taking the mission seriously. Often, the IC will have time to refine the plan during slow periods of the operation. The plan for what to do with the body was one of these refinements in the IAP.
UPDATE MEETING
While this break in the action was underway, I called for all the Command, Operations, and Planning personnel to meet with me for a concise update regarding where we were and where we were headed. The consensus was that although several indications pointed toward the general area in which we were searching (the dog’s alerting, the helicopters’ eliminating the shallow waters to the south, and a possible sighting of a human hand by an underwater camera), we had not found any conclusive proof that a body was located. Although Dive Ops, Beach Ops, and I all felt strongly that the individual was down in this area, we also knew that we would be forced to expand our search into other areas very shortly if we kept getting negative results.
After careful evaluation of everyone’s input, I requested that the dive teams make one full complete and thorough search after lunch. If it was not successful, we would move the dive recovery downstream. I also had the Planning Section start working on calling in additional police and fire mutual-aid divers to supplement and replace the original dive team members. They had previously alerted 911 centers that a call might go out for additional divers if we were unsuccessful in our initial search and needed more resources.
LESSON 10. As stated previously, command must assemble the team to evaluate, reevaluate, and modify the IAP if necessary.
RECOVERY ACCOMPLISHED
To decrease the pressure on Command, I requested that Glynn report to the scene. He was put in charge of all operations: Dive Ops and Beach Ops would report to him. On resumption of the search, at about 1 p.m., we chose to have Shamus make one last tour of the primary search area before we shifted our efforts downstream. Almost immediately, Shamus alerted in the area where the eddy forms off the swift water. This somewhat frustrated us because we felt we had put copious recovery efforts into this specific area. Yet, the dog kept saying to us, “Look here, look here!” Admittedly, I was troubled. Should I believe the dog or start a new recovery effort?
Dive Ops and I exchanged glances. I knew at once he wanted to squeeze out a few more minutes of precious time at this site. I consented. Within 20 minutes of the resumed search, a mutual-aid diver signaled that he had a recovery. As sad as this point in the operation is, I felt a wave of relief wash over me, knowing that we had solved the puzzle. Two issues had weighed heavily on me during the day: the passing during the night of Ernie Allen, a much beloved firefighter from SEC, and the loss of a neighboring fire company’s air boat during a rescue mission a few months before in water similar to this.
Throughout the day, I kept spokespersons for the family informed of our intended actions and their results. At times they had specific private requests, some of which I could accommodate; others I could not. Now came the moment of truth when I had to inform the immediate family members of the recovery. As I moved toward the family, I sensed they already knew what I was about to tell them. Keeping the family in mind, our recovery dive team and boat operators were extremely tactful in handling the recovery process, but this is always a difficult issue to deal with, more so when the victim is young.
LESSON 11. Sometimes you have to trust your instincts and gut feelings. Commanders need to expand their own horizons and experiment with new resources and tools-in this case, Shamus. Rescuers tried a new resource and developed confidence in it. The new tool may become a valuable asset in the next operation. If we never tried new tools, we would still be using horses and steamers to put out fires.
DEBRIEFING AND CRITIQUE
As I terminated Command and ordered the return of replacement dive team assets that were en route, I glimpsed at the final group of family members wandering away down the stately entrance to Eddy Farm Hotel. My thoughts now turned to a request that all participants report to the Sparrowbush Fire Station for a quick debriefing and review of the overall operation. This is always worthwhile, because there is something to be learned from talking to one another about a shared experience. Also, I wanted to extend my personal thanks to all for a job well done. Many of the mutual-aid personnel were unaware of the story that led to the drowning. That was part of our discussion.
In the final analysis, it turned out that the two, well-liked local boys had loaded fishing gear into the canoe that fateful day with the intent of going fishing. They had done it before with no problems. Three life jackets were attached to the struts in the canoe. They had discussed putting them on just prior to turning over. We can never know conclusively if donning the life jackets would have been of any value; but based on our past experiences, they undoubtedly could have. I have been involved in more than 70 drownings on the Delaware River alone, several more in surrounding lakes and ponds, and only three individuals died while wearing a life jacket, two from hypothermia and one caught by a strainer.
Each incident, besides being decidedly devastating to the family, also takes a piece off our supposedly tough outside veneer. Fire Chief Joe Kowal from Port Jervis summed it up best in a note to his daughter the next day, expressing regret for his moodiness when he had returned home the day before after the recovery was concluded: “It is inevitable .… We all feel it, whether we admit it or not.”
As difficult as it was, Chief Van Horn and I paid our respects to the family at the wake a few days later. It was a wise decision: The father greeted us and expressed his deep-felt thanks and gave us a long hug. I felt much better!
JOHN (Jack) F. FLYNN has 35 years of diving/rescue boat operations experience and of commanding difficult, dangerous, and always complex rescues and recoveries on the Delaware River. He is a former chief of the Sparrowbush (NY) Engine Company (SEC), served 13 years as a chief officer, and is now 2nd assistant chief. He is a Scuba Schools International (SSI) certified advanced open water diver and is also certified by the National Association of Underwater Divers (NAUI) as a swiftwater rescue 1 technician. Flynn is also the director of emergency management for Deerpark, New York, and is a former career chief, with experience in the structural and aircraft crash/rescue fields. He is employed by the federal government in the emergency management field.
JERRY KNAPP is a training officer at the Rockland County Fire Training Center in Pomona, New York. He is a 33-year veteran firefighter/EMT with the West Haverstraw (NY) Fire Department, has a degree in fire science, was a nationally registered paramedic, and is a battalion chief with the Rockland County Haz Mat Response Team. A frequent contributor to Fire Engineering and other journals, he is an FDIC HOT Engine Company instructor and seminar presenter. He is the plans officer for the Directorate of Emergency Services at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.
