Chemical Plant Fire
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Photos by Benicia FD.
Fire in an industrial complex with more than 200 hazardous chemicals stored in drums, railroad cars, and buildings imparts many lessons to responding firefighters.
At 0824 hours on November 14, 1988, a major fire, explosion, and hazardous-materials incident occurred at the W.R. Meadows Company of Benicia, California, sending towering clouds of dark smoke soaring over the city’s large industrial park.
This cold, rainy day was to be the first of a complex incident that would require ten-and-a-half hours of hard fireground activity and hazardousmaterials work, and four days of postrecovery time.
The City of Benicia, although relatively small in size with a population of 23,950, swells to a daytime population of more than 40,000. The city plays host to heavy industry and high-technology processing.
The city has a major Exxon refinery, a large asphalt refinery, and a deep water port with onand off-load docks for the transfer of crude oil, gasoline, aviation fuel, and coke that is exported to Third World countries.
Large, car-carrying transport ships also frequent Benicia’s port docks to offload automobile shipments from eight major Japanese manufacturers. It is not uncommon to see 150,000 new cars in the port holding areas on any day of the year. More than 300 tractor-trailers and numerous railroad cars visit the port to pick up the automobiles and take them to the auto dealerships.
The railroad’s main line for northern California crosses through the city’s industrial park. This creates an all-risk situation; anything from Amtrak to xylene shipments pass by rail through Benicia. Railroad marshalling yards handle the refining products and assorted industrial processes and transportation needs. It is not unusual to see 200 train cars of LPG present. The refineries tend to draw industry that supports their operational needs. Many of those businesses engage in metal processing and chemical-related processes.
The Benicia Fire Department, small in size with thirty-four career and forty volunteer firefighters, has, in the past, been tested under some trying conditions created by major fires, hazardousmaterials incidents, and traumatic medical emergencies.
The fire department experienced 45 hazardous-materials calls in 1988. The most significant incident prior to the W.R. Meadows fire was a 740,000-gallon crude oil spill released into the Carquinez Straits from a nearby Shell Oil refinery in Martinez, California. There are large petrochemical facilities based in this close geographical area; seven major refineries operate in the nearby area.
The W.R. Meadows Company, which manufactures and sells products for the construction industry, is a national corporation with facilities in Benicia; Goodyear, Arizona; Fort Worth, Texas; Austell, Georgia; York, Pennsylvania; Hampshire, Illinois; Elgin, Illinois; and Weston, Ontario, Canada. The Benicia facility is located on six acres of property on which there are two 15,000-square-foot storage warehouses of preengineered-metal steel construction and an 8,000-square-foot metal office building attached to one of the warehouses.
Three 10,000-gallon railroad cars, each storing asphalt, paraffin wax, and diesel fuel, and one 5,500-gallon, triplecompartmented railcar containing spent solvents, toluene, and blends were involved in the fire and explosion. More than 300 55-gallon drums containing miscellaneous oils and chemicals ruptured and exploded spectacularly in aerial blasts. Some of the drums were plastic and rubber; these disintegrated and lost their entire contents to further fuel the fire.
More than 1,000 drums were empty, awaiting product transfer. Numerous five-gallon pails were staged in outsidestorage areas on pallets, ready for sale. These contained resins and fillers for concrete work—all were of a flammable or combustible nature.
A large, external, below-grade saturator dip tank was situated near the storage tanks. Four-by-eight-foot sheets of fiberboard were pressure-impregnated with the blended compounds stored in the former railroad cars. These railroad cars were adjacent to one of the 15,000-square-foot metal warehouses. Immediately outside this area, 55-gallon barrels and five-gallon pails were filled; inside the warehouse, in excess of 500,000 pounds of assorted dry chemicals were stored, 270,000 pounds of which were destroyed in the fire and explosion.
The operation contained the fire to the processing and blending areas, to the four railroad cars used for storage of flammable products, and to the materials stored in the open on pallets.
Over 200 products—all of a hazardous nature—were stored at this site. The site had a well-prepared business plan to comply with the new SARA Title III requirements. Over 200 material safety data sheets (MSDS) were available for the facility. The incident commander and the hazardous-materials team reviewed the MSDS. The site manager provided the documents at the command post to the IC.
FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS
Shift change occurred at 0800 hours on November 14. Ten career firefighters were on duty. It was raining and cool that morning.
The incident was called into Benicia’s joint fire/police communications center. Almost simultaneously, all six 911 emergency lines announced the major problem that was to follow. Callers reported that a fire and explosion had occurred in the W.R. Meadows plant.
At 0810 hours, Engine 1 and Paramedic 71 responded to a Priority-1 Medical Assist. At 0824 hours, the joint communications center prealerted and toned out a first-alarm assignment for a structure fire and explosion. Engine 1, a 1,250-gpm pumper with a crew of four, left the medical assist and arrived on scene at 0838 hours. Truck 2, a 2,000-gpm 110-foot quint, also responded at that time with a crew of four. Paramedic-71 was committed to an EMS hospital transport. It arrived to the fire at 0900 hours.
Deputy Chief/Chief 3 Gene Gantt responded to the fire. Upon leaving headquarters he could see a large column of smoke in the fire area, five miles away. He ordered a second alarm while enroute to the fire. This process initiated the automatic paging tone for off-duty career and volunteer firefighters.
Fire Chief Hank Howard responded to the call and assumed command upon arrival. Chief 3 moved to the position of operations chief within the Incident Command System.
Mutual aid was special-called from Vallejo Fire Department, Fairfield Fire Department, Cordelia Fire Protection District, and Suisun Fire Protection District. Vallejo fire units were directed to the fire, and two engines arrived at the fire scene.
Benicia’s Engine-1 forward-laid 300 feet of five-inch large-diameter hose and immediately supplied and operated its 1,000-gpm monitor to apply water on the involved train cars and building. The crew then made up a monitor hoselay with 100 feet of five-inch LDH to a three-way, five-inch manifold into three fifty-foot sections of 2 Winch hose to a 750-gpm ground monitor. This hoselay was made up on the street due to safety considerations; several 55-gallon drums were exploding quite spectacularly.
The ends of the four railroad cars were pointing toward the affected operational area. Engine-1’s captain, aware of the potential for a BLEVE of the rail tank cars, set the monitor up, cooling the flame impingement points, and left it unmanned to apply water to the end of the fully involved train cars. Benicia’s Truck-2 foward-laid 300 feet of fiveinch LDH and set up a preplumbed 1,000-gpm ladder pipe operation to cool the train cars and structures. Truck-2’s crew then made another 1,000-gpm monitor hoselay and set up an unmanned monitor on the side of the tank cars along the property’s north boundary fence. The crew then set up a 2 1/2-inch foam line, using an eductor with five-gallon foam pails, to attack the large ground fire. Thirty gallons of 3% ATC-AFFF foam were used.
The second alarm dispatched our assigned State of California Office of Emergency Services 154 and Engine-2, both 1,000-gpm pumpers, and a mobile air compressor unit, Air-1, to the fire. The fire chief directed an off-duty recall due to the projected low daytime volunteer response.
Vallejo’s Engine 4 laid a 650-foot dual 2 1/2-inch forward lay to operate a 1,000-gpm monitor to cool the northeast side of the fire and contain a large outside fire. Vallejo’s Engine 6 relay-pumped to Engine 4.
OES-154 laid 300 feet of four-inch LDH line into Truck-2’s quint pump to provide additional water. Exxon’s foam pumper was set up on the north side of the fire near Truck-2. The quint provided supply lines for this foam pumper, which laid out two 1 3/4-inch foam lines to fight the ground fire. Two other responding engines were staged and used in the manpower pools. Engine-1’s crew, with the help of additional manpower, stretched two 2 1/2-inch handlines between the two warehouses to protect exposures, control the large amount of involved chemicals, and to fight the outside fires. Furthermore, a 150-foot preconnected foam line was advanced by Engine-1 to the rear of the warehouses and effectively used to knock down the ground fire in the dry chemical storage warehouse and in the outside storage area of five-gallon pails of resin and sealers. Engine-1 used 50 gallons of 3% ATC-AFFF foam from its foam storage tank.
INCIDENT DATA
Incident Type: Fire and explosion; secondary explosions; chemical fire involving railroad cars (used for storage); 500,000 pounds per dry chemicals involved, drum storage.
Property Involved: 15,000-square-foot processing building; three 10,000-gallon railroad cars; one 5,500-gallon railroad car; 500,000 pounds of assorted dry chemicals in bags, barrels, pails and carboys; 300 55-gallon barrels, open storage stock on pallets.
On Arrival: Four railroad cars on fire, all venting at the top; large ground fire in a dike area; 270,000 pounds of dry chemical drums exploding in aerial burst; stocks of outside wooden storage pallets on fire.
Hazardous Materials Involved: 10,000 gallons of heated wax paraffin base; 10,000 gallons diesel fuel; 10,000 gallons toluene; 10,000 gallons aboveground storage; 6,000 gallons underground storage; 10,000 gallons of blended hydrocarbon products; 500,000 of dry hazardous materials, titanium oxide; 300 55-gallon drums of various chemicals; 500 5-gallon pails of concrete sealers, patching and curing materials. Stock and pallets of concrete expansion joints; sulfuric acid; pale oil, solium silicate; surfynol and many more.
City: Benicia, California, a heavy industrial city located 25 miles north of San Francisco on the Carquinez Straits.
Population: 23,900; daytime population 40,000
Area: 12.5 square miles
Fire Departments Responding: Benicia Fire Department: 43; Exxon Fire Brigade, Benicia; 10; Vallejo Fire Department: 9; Cordelia Fire Protection District: 3; Suisun Fire Protection District: 3.
Additional Departments and Agencies Responding: City Agencies: Joint City Dispatch Center: 3; City Police Units: 5; City Public Works Director: 2; City Assistant Public Works: 1; City Streets Superintendent: 1; City Street Division: 10; City Waste Water: 2
County Agencies: Office of Emergency Service: 2; Environmental Health Team: 3; District Attorney: 1.
State Agencies: California Highway Patrol: 2; Air Quality Management Board: 2; Fish and Game: 4; Water Quality Board: 1.
Federal Agencies: U.S. Coast Guard: 5; Federal EPA: 2; Federal OSHA: 1.
Private Agencies: Pacific Gas and Electric: 4; Exxon Safety and Hygienist: 1; S.P. Railroad Safety/Security: 2; Universal Engineering Chemical Response Team and Cleanup: 20; Private Ambulances: 3.
These combined actions contained the fire at 0912 hours. Afterward, master streams were shut down and most of the work left was to overhaul chemicals of the wooden pallets still burning. Explosions left debris spread about the property. Stocks of outside storage pallets, with chemicals still on them, continued to burn. The fire was placed under control at 1025 hours by the IC.
The operations chief requested loaders and baekhoes from the city’s department of public works to overhaul the area. Two were dispatched, and firefighters in full turnouts and with SCBA operated the equipment in the toxic environment.
INJURIES
The first-arriving police officer who searched the building for occupants prior to arrival of the fire units was treated for smoke inhalation and released. Two volunteer firefighters operating the mobile air compressor received minor chemical burns. They, too, were treated and released.
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER
The Benicia Fire Department has an SOP that sets policy for its fireground PIO. In the W.R. Meadows incident, the PIO controlled and updated 25 onscene reporters. His previous training and work with the media on other major incidents was invaluable. The IC was thus able to concentrate, without interruptions, on his command responsibilities. The PIO also produced followup releases on the fire investigation and postrecovery actions.
RUNOFF CONTAINMENT
Six master streams and seven handlines were used to control the fire. Approximately 6,000 gallons of water and foam were discharged each minute for about thirty-five minutes. The water, mixed with the hydrocarbons and chemicals released in the explosions and fire, made for a highly toxic solution that posed a significant environmental threat. It had to be contained.
CHEMICALS INVOLVED
10,000 Gallons Asphalt
10,000 Gallons Diesel Oil
10,000 Gallons Paraffin Wax
10,000 Gallons of Blended Products of Hydrocarbons Surfynol
300 – 5 Gallon Pails Titanium Oxide
500 – 5 Gallon Pails of Concrete Sealers, Resins, Patching, Curing
Norselene Resin TM
6,000 Gallons Toulene
Mineral Sprits
Zonerez
Spent Solvents
Sodium Silicate
Sulfuric Acid
Pale Oil – Vegetable Oil
500,000 Pounds of Assorted Dry Chemicals
300-55 Gallon Drums of Assorted Chemicals
Numerous End Products in Open Storage
Treated Expansion Joints and Pallets
Ten minutes into the firefighting operations, the IC requested that the director of Benicia’s department of public works and heavy equipment be dispatched to the scene. Four dump trucks with sand arrived, and the public works director arrived with maps of the storm drain systems in the area. (Unfortunately, a lateral storm drain was uncharted and was later located on the rear of the property. Firefighters were able to locate the drain and made use of improvised salvage covers and materials to block the chemical runoff down the lateral drain.)
The United States Coast Guard Hazardous Materials Team from Alameda, CA, the State Water Quality Board, and the California Fish and Game Departments inspected the storm drain system and found the outflow heading to a threatened marsh area. The public works director then dispatched the four dump trucks loaded with fill, sand, and AB mix to the area where the runoff was surfacing.
The primary objective was to construct dams and dikes so that it would not get into the Carquinez Straits. Benicia lies at the confluence of ten rivers that originate in the Sierra Mountain Range. The rivers run into the Suisun Bay, then flow past Benicia along the Carquinez Straits. The marshes and straits are the habitats for a variety of waterfowl and fish, including the striped bass and sturgeon.
The Benicia Street Department’s dump trucks were able to shuttle more than 33 loads of fill and sand from a nearby quarry. Under the direction of the California Fish and Game Department, dikes were built to contain the fire water runoff and isolate the outflow. Approximately 150,000 gallons were contained. A cleanup company deployed five large vacuum trucks and siphoned the toxic mix from the marsh area.
The Water Quality Board and Fish and Game Department took samples at the scene and conducted a two-hour biological test to see if live sample fish would survive. Over 210 tons of sand were used to block street drains and build a dike in the marsh to contain toxic liquid waste. A backhoe, a bulldozer, and a two-yard loader were used at the fire scene to overhaul the area. Firefighters operated the equipment with full turnouts and self-contained breathing apparatus inside the hot zone to complete the overhaul.
Sand was placed near the hot zone to build dikes for decontamination procedures for the public works equipment and the fire hose. Two vacuum trucks were located near the fire site to vacuum the water from the street dikes and the residual water from decontamination procedures. The cost for public works materials and man-hours was S 5,600.
SITE MITIGATION
The county district attorney, who was at the emergency scene, directed the property owner to begin immediate cleanup operations. The urgency was due to ongoing rainfall and the forecast for it to continue for the next few days.
A Benicia cleanup contracting firm responded with its emergency response team, whose efforts were supervised by fire prevention personnel. Oversized dumpsters were used to contain the onsite liquid waste, and barrel crunchers compacted the 5 5-gallon drums and five-gallon pails. The four railroad cars were all removed intact. Prior to removal, each car was defueled of its toluene and diesel oil. The parrafin wax and asphalt solidified. The cars were loaded onto lowboy trailers and transported to a Class I waste site in central California.
All dry chemicals and haz-mat waste was loaded in 30-yard end haulers and disposed of at the waste site.
Underground storage tanks also suffered damage in the explosion. Piping broke, allowing fire runoff water to enter the tanks. Three thousand gallons of toluene was contaminated and was disposed of at the cost of S2.75 per gallon. Another 10,000-gallon underground storage tank of diesel was also contaminated. Removal of both tanks was required by the State Water Quality Board. The disposal costs were $40,000. The total cleanup cost so far has exceeded $350,000, and 1,800 man-hours of response cleanup labor has been expended.
DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS
Ten minutes into firefighting operations, the operations chief summoned Benicia’s Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and Benicia’s Mass Casualty Unit (MCU). Vallejo Fire Department dispatched its haz-mat unit to back up our ERU. The Benicia ERU apparatus is a high-sided van, retrofitted by firefighters into a fully equipped, fully operational vehicle for hazardous-materials response. Benicia has the only Level A haz-mat response vehicle between San Francisco and Sacramento.
The IC and command staff met faceto-face and set up the decon work plan. The haz-mat team and the fire department paramedics reviewed the MSDS and decided to utilize a soap-and-water scrub-down to decontaminate the large amount of related hydrocarbon chemicals present in the fire. A nine-step decontamination process (taught by the National Fire Academy) was followed. The ERU personnel were given directions to set up the decon station; numerous items are available on the unit, including various decon cleaning agents, bleach, TSP, and vacuums.
Forty-three firefighters required decontamination. The decon work plan objectives were fourfold:
- that turnouts, boots, helmets, and SCBA, all heavily exposed, undergo gross decon;
- that members involved in firefighting operations be stripped down from station uniforms and their bodies washed down with soap and water, using scrub brushes;
- that members be issued disposable clothing, and transported to a secondary shower;
- that tools and equipment, fire hose, backhoes, and loaders be decontaminated.
The ERU crew set up a static five-inch LDH circle to form the decon holding pool. A 2 1/2-inch static line from Engine 1 charged the five-inch LDH. The circle is overlaid with visquine plastic. Two metal wash tubs were placed inside the decon pool for gross decontamination of turnouts and two plastic pools for body decon. The 55-gallon overpack drum was positioned outside the ring, and a manual transfer pump was used to siphon water out of the wash tubs and pools into the overpack drums. A contractor’s vacuum truck was used to siphon out the overpack drums. Later on more overpack drums were added to hold the liquid. Stiff scrub brushes were used on the turnouts. Soap-and-water solution was applied by the use of Hudson Agriculture Sprayers. Turnout gear was bagged into large, individual garbage bags. The bags were marked with duct tape for individual identification purposes.
The decision was made to industrialdecon all the turnouts and personnel clothing. Outer clothing and undergarments were placed in separate garbage bags. Personnel stripped naked and were washed down with soap and water using the sprayer soap mix and soft brushes. Personnel were then rinsed with a one-inch handline and issued towels to dry themselves. They were then issued disposable garments and transported to the nearby Exxon refinery for a secondary hot shower. The Exxon facility has the ability to recover the wastewater in its large shower unit. This worked out very well because Benicia fire stations could never have handled the total amount of wastewater from decon of 43 people.
At Exxon, they were again issued new towels and new disposable garments and transported to Station 1. Mutual-aid personnel returned to the scene to recover their equipment and apparatus. A decision was made to release the bagged protective clothing with the agreement that it would be cleaned by the mutual-aid agency and billed back to Benicia Fire Department.
After all the personnel were deconned, the process of decontaminating the SCBA, tools, equipment, and hose began. A sump containment dike was built to hold the hose, backhoes, and loaders. The vacuum truck used to siphon off water in the decon rings was employed to catch the residue from the rinse water use in this stage of the operation.
FIRE INVESTIGATION
Benicia’s fire marshal and fire investigators conducted the postincident analysis of the site. It was learned that a dip tank, used to heat a mixture to more than 200°F prior to its being added to the toluene, asphalt, and paraffin, was contaminated with water. The water reacted with wax and the asphalt, causing a steam buildup. This additional internal pressure caused a flammable toluene vapor release to vent from the top of the tank car.
Three workers in the area of origin stated that they were standing in a waste-high, white, heavy vapor release. They spotted a small fire in the top of the railroad car serving as a blend storage tank. They ran and exited the white vapor cloud. It found an ignition source and an explosion occurred. Several subsequent explosions followed from drums containing various mixes of resin, sealers, and chemicals.
The fire was ruled accidental. Direct loss is estimated to exceed 5500,000. Indirect loss may exceed an additional S 500,000 for cleanup and business interruptions.
RECOVERY ACTIONS
Four full days were spent in the recovery period. All exposed turnout clothing was sent to industrial cleaners. One item of interest was that each garbage bag with the individual’s turnouts and station uniforms had to be reexamined and valuables removed from pockets. All decon equipment was replaced at a total cost of S 5,000. A special purchase order allowing emergency requisitions was issued to replace the damaged protective clothing. This was also done in the case of boots, fire pants, and gloves. Fifteen-thousand dollars has been spent so far for the purchase of new personal protective clothing.
CHEMICAL PLANT FIRE
Benicia has a cost-recovery ordinance to recover funds spent in the suppression or mitigation of an extraordinary emergency. We expect to recover our costs for recall, our equipment loss, and the cost for public works man-hours and materials.
The W.R. Meadows incident points out the heavy logistics involved in joint fire and hazardous-materials operations. Regional approaches to hazardous materials are essential. Mutual-aid responders need to know the plan in advance and should be aware of what is expected of them when they respond to another agency’s problems.
It is strongly suggested that fire departments investigate bulk storage plants or chemical processes using old railroad cars for storage or blending. In the past year, we have experienced several other fires in our industrial park. Many times we have noticed that the standards of workmanship were less than the trades would normally permit. Small companies tend to have “jacks-of-all-trades-and-masters-of-none” mechanics. Since quality control is virtually absent and cost margin and production is the prime objective, plant management tends to look the other way and uses unlicensed mechanics to do inhouse work.
With small departments, it is almost impossible to inspect these businesses with much detail. Unfortunately, from every fire we tend to gain knowledge of industry’s shortcuts and half-stepping in production. In the area of Class I flammabies, chemical transfers and the production and bulk storage of hazardous materials necessitates stricter code compliance.
Training in decontamination operations needs to be expanded so that the logistics of such extensive operations are fully understood by all personnel who will participate.
