BY DENNIS C. SHARPE
Lessons learned from previous scrapyard/tire fires and diligent training for large fires paid off when a fire occurred at a site with which Atlantic County, New Jersey, firefighters were too familiar.
 (1) Photo by Doug Calladonato. |
Shortly after 2 p.m. on June 8, 2004, Laureldale Volunteer Fire Company firefighters responded to American Auto Salvage on the west side of Route 50 in Hamilton Township for a report of a structure fire. Locally known as Joe’s Junkyard, it had been the site of numerous fires through the years, and the announcement of yet another fire at this location dismayed Atlantic County firefighters. The most recent large fire occurred in 1998 and destroyed the office building in a spectacular fire that drew dozens of fire companies. Looking at the western sky and seeing a large column of smoke rising in the distance, firefighters knew this response would be no different (photo 1).
Joe’s Junkyard, located in central Atlantic County along the boundary of Hamilton and Galloway townships, is a five-acre salvage yard containing cars, tires, and other salvageable material for resale. The rectangular site is bounded by Route 50 on the east (the entrance), Chestnut Street on the south side, and County Boulevard (which merges into Route 50 as it goes south) on the west side (photo 2).
The Laureldale Volunteer Fire Company, located three miles south on Route 50, together with Mays Landing, Mizpah, Weymouth, and Cologne volunteer fire companies, protects Hamilton Township, the largest municipality in New Jersey. Chief Ted Jones, a fire service veteran of more than 30 years, was all too familiar with fires at this locale.
Jones arrived on location and was faced with a large fire in a pile of scrap autos. He ultimately called all township fire companies to the scene and requested activation of the Alpha Tanker Task Force of Atlantic County (ATTF), one of two county tanker task forces. Alpha consists of fire departments operating tankers east of Route 50 to the Atlantic Ocean; Bravo includes fire companies operating tankers west of Route 50 to the county line.
The task forces were created after emergency response to several large tire fires in the 1980s depleted local resources and stripped communities of their fire protection. In a major incident, the past practice was to deploy all local departments, thus stripping their areas of protection, then having neighboring companies cover these areas. Now, it’s more feasible to bring in specialized equipment from throughout the county and leave one or two local departments home to “watch the store.”
Now, select fire companies respond from throughout the county and from several towns that lie outside the county; five counties border Atlantic County. These two task forces meet regularly and conduct drills throughout the year at various county locations that require large supplies of water to be hauled in.
The task force activation also brings the Atlantic County Fire Communications vehicle along with its support staff: the county fire coordinator, his deputies, radio operators, photographers who document the incident, and a tanker task force commander and his deputies.
Jones assigned the deputy Atlantic County fire coordinator, Assistant Chief Ken Badger of Mays Landing, to oversee the operations sector. A Mays Landing pumper/tanker laid a five-inch LDH hoseline into the fire from Route 50 with LDH supplied by a Laureldale tanker, later replaced by the south pond operations on Route 50.
 (3) Photo by Doug Calladonato. |
As the Alpha task forces arrived, they set up portable ponds, dumped their water into them, and proceeded to their assigned refill locations (photo 3). South of the fire, one engine went to Holly Street, where it drafted from a creek; two engines went to Mays Landing, where they refilled at local hydrants. These three engines filled tankers that supplied the south pond on Route 50.
Two additional engines were assigned to refill tankers from Egg Harbor City hydrants north of the fire; these tankers supplied water to the north pond.
The north portable pond was set up north of the junkyard entrance on Route 50 for a South Egg Harbor engine to feed the LDH laid in by Laureldale’s engine (it sent water to a manifold supplying the Laureldale engine, a portable monitor, and later a crash truck from Atlantic City Airport-all operating on the north side of the fire, the D side).
At the C or western side, County Boulevard, Chief David Elkner of the Cologne fire company set up a 100-foot platform downwind of the smoke and began pouring water on the fire, directly supplied by Laureldale’s pumper/tanker and Mizpah fire company tankers.
Command and operations were advised that a New Jersey Forest Fire Service helicopter was available and had landed at a nearby fairground; operations staff went up in the aircraft to get an aerial view of the fire. After aerial observation, the Bravo task force was called to provide additional water.
Cologne’s tower, positioned in the rear of the fire on County Boulevard, needed a steady, uninterrupted water flow. The Laureldale and Mizpah tankers supplying it directly were replaced by a pond/tanker shuttle operation.
AFFF foam was used as a penetrating agent. The deputy ATTF commander requested a Weymouth fire company engine with a short wheelbase and CAFS capability. This proved beneficial later in the incident, since foam was brought in and was manually poured into the Weymouth engine’s tank and fed to Cologne’s tower.
The Weymouth engine laid LDH to supply the tower from the pond operation set up near the corner of County Boulevard and Chestnut Street. A Somers Point engine drafted and supplied the Cologne Tower and Weymouth engine at 1,200 gpm for six hours uninterrupted through a continuous tanker shuttle. A second portable pond, set up 1,000 feet north of the Cologne tower, also supplied the tower through a second tanker operation, using tanker task forces from Camden, Gloucester, Salem, Burlington, and Ocean counties. Once this operation was up and running, it was determined that there was sufficient water flow to sustain a second, smaller master stream. This pond operation also provided a second water supply to the units operating at the north side.
At the front of the fire by the junkyard entrance on Route 50, another ARFF unit from the Atlantic City airport applied foam on the fire, supported by an East Vineland fire company nurse tanker pumping from the south pond.
 4) Photo by author. |
Because of this effort and the use of machinery to remove the combustibles and break up the debris pile, most companies were picking up and on the way home by midnight (photo 4).
LESSONS LEARNED
The tanker task forces’ frequent training was essential to the success of this effort. Some problems were noted and discussed at a postfire critique.
1. Establishing a shuttle traffic pattern. Ideally, tanker shuttle operations should be set up as one continuous loop between the refill source and the dump site. In this operation, the refill sites were located north and south of the dump site at the junkyard entrance on Route 50. Some tanker drivers, unfamiliar with the area, wanted to turn around and keep going back to their original fill site. This complicated things, since north- and southbound tankers would arrive at the dump site simultaneously and would want to return to their respective water resources. The dump site did not allow them to do this because of the limited turnaround area available.
Instead of having two separate shuttle loops, one running between the south refill sites and the south portable pond and the other running between the north pond and the north refill sites, a better arrangement would have been one continous loop. Full tankers coming from a south refill site would dump at the portable ponds and proceed to the north refill sites, refill and return to the dump site, and proceed back to the south refill site. When using multiple dump sites, tankers heading north should go north to dump sites, and tankers heading south should go south to dump sites. Once they return, keep the pattern going.
2. Establish a speed limit. Adrenaline is flowing, but speed must be kept to a minimum. Caution tape was strung and speed limit signs were posted at this incident, which went on for 12 hours.
3. Accountability. Firefighters from six counties responded to this incident. Chief officers were assigned to maintain accountability and handled it well. In fact, the Atlantic County Office of Emergency Management (OEM) director was barred from entering the scene because he was not wearing personal protective equipment.
4. Parking. Police cars and the personal vehicles of responding emergency personnel were parked all over, interfering with tanker operations. A tow truck had to remove several personal vehicles at the scene. Even the command post had to be moved twice.
5. Basic necessities. Food, water, toilets, fuel, and multiple rehab sites need to be considered at extended operations involving a large number of responders. It was a hot and humid day, so the personnel required rehab. Food and water did not arrive on- scene unil five hours into the incident.
6. Establish an uninterrupted water supply. Two locations for refilling tankers were from hydrants on municipal water systems that are fed by gravity. This is a billable utility; its cost has to be recouped somehow. It is best to stay with streams, lakes, or other draftable water sources if available. Nine water sources were tried before engines were finally able to find adequate draft sites.
 (5) Photo by Doug Calladonato. |
The long-term effects of smoke and water exposure on responding apparatus and equipment, the environment, and personnel are not known. Some equipment was contaminated with oil and fluids from the site; according to the manufacturers, the equipment is designed to resist this. The water runoff into the ground will eventually find its way into drinking water, so this will have to be monitored. Firefighters involved in the incident should be monitored for any possible health issues arising from exposure to substances at the scene (photo 5). ■
