PENNSYLVANIA COLLAPSE KILLS FOUR
A predawn fire struck a furniture reconditioning business in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on Friday, December 20, 1991. During fire department operations, a major collapse occurred, killing four firefighters. The officers of Pioneer Hose Company in Brackenridge and Hilltop Hose Company No. 3 in Natrona Heights, Pennsylvania, provided insight into this incident so that the fire service community could learn from the tragedy.
THE BUILDING
The occupancy at 924 Brackenridge Avenue was a two-story, 75by 65-foot building with a full basement. Built around 1930 (date uncertain) and originally designed to house an automobile dealership, it was a steelsupported structure with concrete floors and masonry walls.
Floors were of approximately fourinch-thick concrete on heavy metal mesh; some areas of its automobile ramp, running from the first to the second floor, had an additional twoinch layer of concrete. ‘ITie floors were supported by unprotected, nineinch, lightweight fabricated metal Ibeams on 20-inch centers, which in turn rested on heavy steel I-beams (girders) of various sizes, including 18-inch and 30-inch on 15-foot centers. The heavy beams in the basement were partly encased in cementitious fire-resistive material, with the flanges exposed. The main support beams were anchored into the bearing walls and further supported by unprotected steel 10-inch wide-flange columns.
The basement walls were of 14inch-thick concrete. Firstand second-story walls were of eight-inch terra-cotta block faced with a fourinch brick veneer. The roof was flat frame on wood joists.
The building was occupied by a furniture refinishing company. The first floor contained offices off an Lshaped hallway that ran from the front door to an interior stairway leading to the basement. This stair enclosure, at the basement level, was open. The second floor contained general storage. The firm specialized in restoring fire-damaged furniture. This was a busy time of year for the firm, and the building was filled with stock in various stages of restoration.
The basement housed the company’s refinishing operations and contained large quantities of paints, lacquers, varnishes, paint thinners, and other highly flammable materials. A finishing room was located in the west corner of the basement. It contained a very heavy fire load of furniture, protective cloth mats, and flammable liquids. This windowless room was constructed of drywall on wood frame and was designed as a “clean room” for final finishing. Like the other floors, the basement, including the finishing room, was not equipped with automatic sprinkler protection.
The building was located on a corner lot. Sides 1 and 2 faced intersecting streets. Exposure 3 is a two-story apartment building of ordinary construction separated from the fire building by a 12-foot-wide driveway. Exposure 4 is a 2’/>-story, wood-frame multiple-family dwelling located four feet from the fire building.
Hie West Interior Services company had closed for business on Thursday afternoon, December 19, and the last employee had left the building at approximately 1730 hours.
EARLY REPORTS
The fire was preceded by a series of ominous warnings. At approximately 2230 hours on December 19, neighbors at the rear of the building experienced interruptions of electrical service. Their apartment building was serviced by the same transformer that supplied power to the West Interior Services building.
During the night, some smoke and smoke odor reports were made by residents of the area. The first was made a few minutes after midnight, when firefighters at the headquarters of the Pioneer Hose Company, a 30member volunteer department located at 124 Morgan Street—just 100 feet from the furniture company and in direct line of sight—were notified of smoke coming from the chimney of the building. There was an odor of smoke in the air, but they believed it was a wood-burning furnace in operation, quite common to that part of the country, particularly on a cold, 8°F night. Two firefighters later checked the building from the exterior but did not see any sign of fire or smoke.
Later that morning, the Tarentum Emergency Radio Dispatch Center received a complaint of smoke odor in the area. Brackenridge police searched the area but observed nothing to indicate a fire at the West Interior Services building. Two firefighters again checked the building but, again, observed nothing to indicate that a fire was in progress. The building was last checked at approximately 0300 hours on December 20.
OPERATIONS
Shortly after 0530 hours, an employee arrived at the building to start work and discovered smoke in the building. He awoke a neighbor, who telephoned the emergency services dispatch center. Pioneer Hose Company was alerted at 0547 hours.
The department responded with two engine companies, two rescue companies, and a squad company. Fire Chief Dan Brestensky arrived at 0549 and assumed command. Initial size-up did not indicate a major fire in progress; however, there was a very light gray smoke condition oozing from the boarded-up basement windows and a very faint sign of smoke on the first floor. A hot spot was located approximately five to 10 feet inside the front door. No fire was visible. The second floor was clear. Since earlier reports had not resulted in fire department dispatch, Brestensky was not aware of those events.
As per department SOP for a structure with smoke showing, engine companies laid in with five-inch supply lines and command radioed for truck company support. A ladder company from the Hilltop Hose Company No. 3, two miles away, was dispatched. Hilltop was taking calls for Highland Hose Company, located in the adjacent municipality of Tarentum, whose ladder truck was out of service.
Each engine crew pulled a two-inch preconnect. Engine 50 took its line to the basement door located on side 3, and Engine 51 stretched its line to the front door. Members of Engine 51, with two men on the line (in addition to a hydrant man and an engineer), were instructed to await the arrival of Hilltop Hose Company firefighters before entering the building.
Engine 50 reported a frozen hydrant. Command requested two additional mutual-aid engine companies from nearby Tarentum. The Eureka Hose Company engine crew was instructed to take an alternate hydrant and lay into Pioneer E-50. Highland Hose Company was assigned truck company duties.
Hilltop Hose Company’s Truck 33 arrived with its seven-member crew at approximately 0600 hours and was instructed by command to stage at side 1 in front of the building and join Engine 51 to complete a six-member first-floor mask team. Hilltop’s Engine 31, with a six-member crew, followed thereafter and was directed to a staging area. There were at this time five engine crews, two rescue units, one squad unit, and a truck company on the scene, and fireground operations were sectored into Division 1 (first floor) and Basement Division.
Assistant Chief Don Frantz Jr. of Hilltop T-33 assembled his team and reported to Pioneer Assistant Chief George Skurko, sector commander of Division 1 operations. This team, like the others in operation, was in full protective gear. Two of the members were equipped with PASS devices (the company will complete its phasein of PASS devices on all SCBA this year).
The Division 1 team entered with a charged line and checked the floor for signs of spalling. That proved negative. The atmosphere on the first floor was relatively clear—nothing to indicate danger. Soon thereafter the crew members observed light-colored smoke seeping from under the doors of the offices. Officers at the command post believed that smoke from the basement was being circulated by an air-handling system. It was believed at this time that the departments were facing an incipient-stage fire.
The Division 1 crew located a door that led to the basement. It was hot to the touch. The door was locked, and a key was secured from building personnel now on the scene. Personnel unlocked the door but were instructed to stand by until basement team progress was established and a coordinated effort undertaken.
NO PROGRESS IN THE BASEMENT
Meanwhile, the basement crew entered through an exterior man door on side 3The basement was choked with light-colored gray smoke—so thick that the crew could not find their way through the maze of dip tanks and stock. The team reported that visibility was near zero—no heat, just a dense, light-colored smoke condition. No flame was visible to them.
However, Assistant Chief Dennis Vrotney, Basement Division commander, observed entirely different conditions from his vantage point at the top of the stairs leading into the basement, at basement ceiling level.
He could hear a hot fire crackling in the distance. The sounds were punctuated by exploding aerosol cans. As he observed the slow progress of the hose crew, he noticed the color of the smoke at ceiling level change from light gray to a rolling, dark black. There was a rapid increase in ceiling temperatures. He ordered the attack crew out of the building. They had penetrated only about 30 feet into the basement and had not been able to get close to the fire.
Vrotney felt that ventilation of the basement would offer firefighters the opportunity to advance a hoseline down the interior stairs from the first floor. Command agreed. A chain saw was called for to open the power garage door. A charged line was placed into position for protection.
Companies were directed to ventilate the second floor of sides 1 and 2. Since there were no connecting stairways between the first and second floors (access to the second floor was made via the auto ramp), command directed that only the windows be opened at this time but nevertheless readied a team for roof ventilation.
Interior reports indicated that smoke conditions on the first floor were worsening: The smoke seeping from the basement was now a dark gray and was thicker. The Division 1 crew on the first floor maintained its position about 30 feet into the structure, awaiting orders to initiate attack down the stairs while horizontal ventilation operations continued. Smoke and heat conditions in the basement intensified as the basement was ventilated. Horizontal ventilation on the second floor had a negligible effect on smoke conditions.
“WE HAVE MEN TRAPPED”
At 0626 hours, a portion of the first floor at the front of the building fell in a hinge-type collapse, dropping inward and opening a 15-foot-wide gap that extended the 65-foot width of the building. An eruption of heat and flame burst out of the basement through the gap and engulfed the entire first floor. Black smoke filled the street to within an inch of the pavement.
Seconds before the catastrophe, Don Frantz Jr. was at the exterior assisting with the vent effort and observed smoke rising between the sidewalk and the building. He then witnessed, through the front doorway, a huge white-purple fireball rising out of the hallway floor.
Firefighter Michael Vrotney was entering the building to assist with attack operations just prior to the disaster. The floor seemed to bounce a little. He looked down and saw a small opening in the floor, through which he saw what looked like burning embers. At that moment the floor began to give way.
Captain Sam Jones, also preparing to enter the building, watched in horror as the floor began to collapse with Michael Vrotney riding it. Vrotney lunged for the door as the floor collapsed into the basement. Jones grabbed him and dragged him to safety.
The basement attack team members knew something dramatic had occurred but didn’t know exactly what it was. Those who were instructed to reinforce the Division 1 team ran around the corner to the front of the building to see personnel tugging on the Division 1 hoseline and shouting for those inside to get out. It was too late. The ball of fire had severed the line.
Chief Matt Frantz of Hilltop Hose Company No. 3 was directing vent efforts on side 2 prior to the collapse. When the glass was broken, the ladderman disappeared in a boiling cloud of dark smoke. Frantz ordered him off the ladder immediately. As the ladderman reached the sidewalk, someone shouted, “We have men trapped!” Frantz knew they were his men.
Four members of Hilltop Hose Company No. 3—Firefighter David G. Emanuelson, Firefighter Michael Cielicki Burns, Firefighter Frank Veri Jr., and First Lieutenant Rick Frantz— w ere struck down from behind by the fireball as they defended the basement doorway.
RESCUE EFFORTS
Chief Brestensky’s priorities were rescue of the trapped firefighters, fire control, and exposure protection. He requested additional mutual-aid support. Within minutes an aggressive outside extinguishment effort was underway from side 1, using several streams from side 1, but the fire continued out of control.
It was thought that the four firefighters had fallen into the basement, and rescue efforts were first concentrated there. Immediately following the collapse, Eureka Hose Company Fire Chief Rich Heuser informed command that he was committing two three-member teams with attack lines to a rescue attempt from the basement garage door. He and two other firefighters stood ready with a heavy hoseline to serve as a rescue team should his personnel become trapped. The rescue teams fought their way deep into the basement. On their first attempt, they reached the collapsed area before having to withdraw—they weren’t getting enough firepower from two attack lines.
A portable deluge supplied by a three-inch line was operated from the basement garage door. This stream, in addition to the draft created by the rising fireball, allowed the rescue teams to gain control of the basement fire and reach the collapsed area.
(Photo 1991, Valley News Dispatch, Tarentum, PA; W.T. Larkin, photographer.)
(Photo by author.)
(Photo ® 1991, Valley News Dispatch, Tarentum, PA; W.T. Larkin, photographer.)
(Photo by author.)
They performed a thorough search of collapse debris. This proving negative, they made the interior stairs to the first floor. Command ordered outside streams operated from side 1 to be shut down while the rescue team attempted to penetrate the first floor from the interior stairs.
At the top of the stairs, the lead firefighter encountered heavy heat as soon as he opened the door; it was so intense that it melted his helmet. He was able to sweep only a short distance inside the first-floor hallway. On its third attempt, the team penetrated farther into the hallway but again was turned back. It is estimated that the team came within eight feet of the fallen firefighters.
Five attempts at coordinated interior rescue and suppression attempts were launched. At approximately 0730 hours, Brestensky decided that conditions were too dangerous to continue interior operations: Flammable liquids were floating on the buildup of water in the basement; flames reached 70 feet in the air; and also walls were beginning to bow, indicating impending secondary collapse of the structure. He ordered all firefighters out of the building, established a collapse danger zone, and switched strategy to fully defensive. Soon thereafter, secondary collapses of the second story, roof, front, and portions of the sides 2 and 4 walls occurred. There was some damage to equipment that could not be moved in time, but all personnel were accounted for.
EXTINGUISHMENT
Thirteen fire companies from the Allegheny River Valley responded on the call for mutual aid. Brestensky, realizing that critical flow rate could not be reached with the current water supply, directed these incoming units to establish large-diameter hose relays from independent water sources while on-scene companies controlled extension into threatened exposures 4 and 3. LDH lays of up to 3,000 feet were made from four sources: the Allegheny River; the Allegheny Ludlum Steel plant, which operates on its own water supply; the Tarentum Water Works; and other Brackenridge municipal hydrants. These water sources would eventually deliver 4,000 gpm on the fire.
The fire was extinguished shortly after 1100 hours that morning.
The bodies of Emanuelson, Cielicki Burns, Veri, and Rick Frantz were recovered at approximately 1330 hours. They were found lying next to each other in the first-floor hallway about 35 feet into the building, in an area that had not sustained collapse. They had not been crushed by debris. Laying next to them were their handtools and nozzle. The coroner’s report concluded that they had died from massive burns from the fireball. They apparently perished quickly, without an opportunity to escape or take defensive action.
AFTERMATH
After rescue attempts were discontinued, Hilltop Hose Company personnel were relieved from firefighting duties. They were transported to Allegheny Valley Hospital, where they were counseled by members of a critical incident stress debriefing team. Two such debriefings were held tor Hilltop Hose members and another for Pioneer members. Hilltop Hose Company was placed back in service the following Thursday.
An eight-week fire investigation was conducted by 15 investigators from a variety of agencies under the direction of John Kaus, Allegheny County fire marshal. The final report concluded that the fire was accidental and originated in the basement finishing room. The cause of the fire was, according to the report, “the buildup of overspray and deposits of combustible residues onto the exterior of the overhead [ceiling-mounted) heater located in the northwest corner of the finishing room. This overspray buildup.became heated and eventually liquefied…[andj dropped onto flammable and combustible products being stored on shelving directly below the heater, thus resulting in the combustion of this material.”
The fire had been burning for an extended period of time prior to fire department arrival—as early as 2135 hours on December 19, according to the fire marshal’s report. (This was determined through interviews with neighbors who noticed the smell of lacquer at that time, indicating the liquefaction of overspray material.) As the fire intensified during the night and early morning hours, cans and containers filled with flammable liquids began to explode, beginning a free-burning process. The fire investigation estimated fire temperatures in excess of 2,000°F.
The fire weakened the metal joists and concrete floor assembly. Cementitious fire-resistive material on one side of the support beam in the fire room was spalled off. The floor joists had been notched at the ends and fitted to the main support beams, so they were not actually nine-inch joists for their full length. While most of the steel joists were in good condition prior to the fire, those located at the first-floor garage door entrance (immediately over the area of fire origin) and along the front wall appeared to have been severely rusted from weathering. When that segment failed, the adjoining segments failed in a domino effect across the front of the building. Other steel joists within the same fire area that were not deteriorated twisted and sagged from the heat but did not collapse. Furthermore, the girders at the front of the building—at the portion that failed — were supported by a single wideflange column (the remaining basement girders each were supported by two wide-flange columns set at equidistant intervals).
Another collapse factor was movement of the main supporting member, which may have pulled the joists away from the wall. The beam’s supporting column eventually failed and caused the main beam to sink toward the basement floor. This column’s failure led to the collapse of a second-floor segment along the front of the building and to the collapse of the roof.
In August 1981, the Borough of Brackenridge adopted the 1976 Fire Prevention Code of the American Insurance Association. The fire marshal’s final report notes that interpre- tations of the local code by investigators indicate what appeared to them to be a number of code violations at the West Interior Services facility. These possible violations include:
- The company did not possess a permit to use more than one gallon of flammable or combustible liquid for
- spraying on any working day.
- Ignition sources —overhead space heaters, radio, scanner, and overhead fan—were located in the finishing room area.
- There was excess storage of flammable materials in the finishing room area.
- The spraying area was not protected with an automatic fire suppression system.
(Photos by author.)
(Photos by author.)
(Photo by author.)
(Photo by author.)
The fire marshal’s report states, “Delayed detection and possible local code and ordinance violations cannot be ruled out as contributing factors to the collapse.”
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- The value of code inspections cannot be emphasized enough. The final report issued by the county fire marshal indicated a number of possible code violations that in all likelihood contributed to fire growth, collapse, and firefighter deaths. While an ongoing code inspection program is difficult for volunteer departments to maintain, efforts toward regular inspections, particularly of identified high-risk occupancies, have a direct correlation to reducing fire loss and firefighter injury. Where the local fire department is not authorized to perform building inspections, the municipal building inspection department
- should coordinate activities with the fire department.
- Fire departments should be more proactive in their investigations of reports of smoke. Action plans for determining the actual source of the smoke—be it friendly or unfriendlyare highly recommended.
- The incident commander must be informed of any previous incident calls that could have an effect on the operation in progress. This requires a close working relationship between the fire department and the emergency communications center. Communication of “unrecorded” fire department response must be made between firefighters and chief officers.
- The basement fire presents one of the most difficult firefighting challenges. Ventilation is one of the keys to that operation. A greater understanding and magnification of the backdraft phenomenon have led to a more cautious approach to ventilation of tight spaces. However, experience still shows that rapid horizontal and vertical ventilation in a basement fire, though difficult and time-consuming, can be a major factor in its control when closely coordinated with an aggressively advancing hoseline attack.
- Preplans are a component of effective and safe fire response. Highrisk occupancies especially should be preplanned. Preplans present the incident commander, officers, and firefighters alike with the opportunity to make more educated risk-benefit analyses and fireground decisions based on knowledge of building construction, occupancy layout, occupancy storage, processes, hazardous materials, and other factors. The West Interior Services building was not preplanned.
- The fire service must place greater emphasis on training firefighters to be aware of and recognize signs of structural collapse.
- Fireground communication, including information exchange of fire conditions and structure conditions, is vital to safety and success. Firefighters operating above the fire, in particular, must keep close watch on signs that could indicate structural compromise and should be warned of any condition that could compromise their safety.
- Anticipate the need for additional fireground support. Build strong mutual-aid systems whose participants train and work together on a regular basis. Prior training and operations enabled departments at this incident to react quickly to establish effective water supplies and fire defense.
- The fire service must continue to educate the public on the importance of automatic sprinkler protection, press for local ordinances that will mandate such protection, and inspect and test the systems periodically. Remember, however, that sprinkler systems are designed for specific loads and will not function as anticipated should occupants exceed load restrictions—thus, the need for inspections is evident.
- Compartmentation can have a major effect on limiting fire spread. However, in this incident, while the fire originated in the spraying room and was contained there for a considerable period of time, compartmentation also hindered attack and ventilation efforts. In operations where structural conditions have provided enough time for their deployment, alternatives to “conventional” suppression methods—such as cellar pipes and Bresnan distributors applied from the floor above—have succeeded in overcoming attack limitations imposed by the basement environment.
The storage, handling, and use of flammable liquids in basements present an extreme hazard; that is the reason that many fire prevention codes (such as NFPA 30) ban their use and handling in basements. Storage of Class 1 liquids are usually prohibited in this type of industrial occupancy.
Most fire prevention codes recommend against performing spraying operations in basements. Requirements for spraying operations include the installation of automatic fire suppression systems, extensive ventilation requirements, overspray collection, use of “classified” electrical equipment, specific drying details, maintenance/ cleanliness requirements, and several other specific provisions.
Chief Brestensky since has instituted an active fire inspection program in Brackenridge.
The incident commander at this incident did not have at his disposal vital information about previous reports of smoke odors that might have factored into fireground decisions and allowed him to establish a duration of preburn.
Time of day must be factored into command decisions. Fires reported at the beginning of a business day may have had extensive preburns that may have weakened structural components well in advance of the fire department’s arrival.
Knowledge of building construction, supplemented by a preplan, is vital to firefighter safety. This is underscored by the fact that the fire service operates in many buildings where structural deficiencies are hidden from view and fire extension is not readily apparent because of construction type. Firefighters at this incident were unaware that steel structural members were unprotected and deteriorated and unaware of actual
fire extension because heat movement through the concrete floor was slow.
Chief Brestensky since has instituted a program to preplan target hazards in his jurisdiction.
