Aggressive Command and Tactics

By Anthony Kastros

We love to talk about aggressive tactics in this job. The debates drone on about which is the better method for tasks ranging from ventilation (vertical or positive pressure?) to fire attack (interior or indirect?). I hope the silent masses realize that there is a time and a place for many tactics and that limiting yourself is not practical given the differences firefighters face throughout America. We are all confronted by vastly different factors throughout the country-among them are construction type, structure size, fire load, occupancy, life hazards, water systems, weather, terrain, and population density. Perhaps the most dramatically different factors are staffing and resource levels. Obviously, one size does not fit all!

How often have you heard that firefighters hate change? It’s true that other industries allegedly study our inability to conform and change. We are that good at not changing. As I travel the country, I encounter pockets of tactical prominence and regions that proudly declare, “We always/never do ____.” This is ridiculous. The truth is that these entrenched ways of thinking are often based on fear; lack of knowledge; and, most often, lack of training. Tactical myths start to emerge and, like the Loch Ness Monster, start to take on a life of their own in which generations of firefighters pass on fears, and tactical “never” statements become the mantra of the department.

Sacramento (CA) Metro Fire is the result of 16 predecessor agencies merging over the years. We are proud of our lineage and celebrate the past while we forge ahead. When American River Fire District merged with Florin Fire District in 1997, one of these tactical edicts existed regarding a certain hose load that the American River firefighters loved. The “compartment load” was 300 feet of attack line loaded into the compartment nearest the pump panel, which we often referred to as “the engineer’s compartment.” There was one compartment on each side of the engine. American River firefighters “loved” their beloved compartment line-and with good reason. It worked!

The problem was that after the merger, many Florin firefighters were accustomed to using a crosslay or wyed lines for attack. Florin didn’t have the compartment line. Being the lead agency in the merger, the American River firefighters quickly proclaimed to every Florin person, “We don’t pull crosslays here” and “If you do pull a crosslay, you will be the one reloading it.” One famous quote was from an old salty engineer who proudly exclaimed, “You can pull that crosslay thing, but I won’t charge it!”

Here we are 18 years later after another merger. American River Fire is now a part of the (proud) past. Yet, compartment lines no longer exist. In fact, I would venture to say that 90 percent of our firefighters today have never seen a compartment line and maybe only heard of one around the campfire dinner table when one of our old engineers told his war stories.

What’s my point? Voluntarily limiting your tactical options is negligent. Limiting your tactical options because of a lack of understanding and training is downright stupid.

Command

What about command options? By now, Blue Card is a firehouse-hold name and most people can at least spell ICS (incident command system). Both are based on the sound command principles of clear objectives, manageable span of control, and creating an accountability and a communication platform to support operations.

Does your department have an “always/never” philosophy about command? I sure hope not. If you have become entrenched in a command philosophy (or, worse, the lack of one) that is impenetrable to reevaluation, evolution, or change, you are in the same boat as the tactically challenged.

Here are some questions for you:

• Does your command system allow you to be more aggressive in a way that makes you more equipped to make a save while keeping your crews safer?
• Can aggressive command and tactics coexist and even complement each other?
• Does your command system have its own set of preloaded standard operating guidelines (SOGs) or templates that can be quickly applied to organize a rapidly escalating structure fire?

For the purpose of this article, we will focus on ICS. California is the birthplace of ICS. Large wildfires in the 1970s and 1980s gave birth to ICS. We needed a way to organize these monster events in which hundreds of homes are burning and thousands of lives are threatened over many square miles. Being in the state capital, we use it here. That being said, we can always do it better. Sometimes, large wildland ICS gets applied to house fires. In that case, it doesn’t work very well (a topic for another article).

For now, we will focus on ICS for structure fires. Like any tool, ICS must be well understood before it can be used efficiently. And, like most tools, if firefighters don’t know how to use it properly, they will think, “This thing doesn’t work. I’m not using it!” The result is that the tool gets tossed into the back of the compartment or in the back of the apparatus room, where it will collect cobwebs and die before it ever has a chance.

The American fire service has thrown the ICS into the back of the apparatus room closet, under the stinky old boots and cotton hose with the brass couplings. Why? Because we haven’t trained with it properly, we think it won’t work, and we told legions of generations not to bother with it.

(1) The view of a house fire at night from the command post. Smoke, darkness, trees, and apparatus made it difficult the see the home. The fire was heavy in the rear. The second battalion chief was assigned Division A; all interior companies reported to him. (Photos by author.)

If we are willing to open our minds a bit and rethink ICS for structure fires, we will find that it is an excellent tool that will keep our firefighters well accounted for, ensure clear communications, and allow for appropriate risk assessment. All these ingredients are necessary to save our lives and those of the public we serve. Your firefighters will be able to more rapidly and aggressively search and attack fires while maintaining an appropriate risk-vs.-benefit ratio. Radio communications will go from garbled, fragmented feedback transmissions to clear, calm, and concise messages.

Instead of having several officers with orange vests and clipboards running around, progressive use of ICS at structure fires creates a balance between aggressive and rapid tactical deployment of resources to save lives and effect proper risk assessment, communications, and accountability to ensure that the risk-vs.-gain calculation is appropriate.

By now, you should have heard of the NIOSH 5. These are the top five causal factors on the fireground for line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) as determined by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). These are the operational causes of death, not the physiological causes. In other words, these are the operational factors that were present when a firefighter died at a fire. These factors also apply to deaths of civilians, near misses, and significant injuries.

The NIOSH 5 are inadequate or improper

• risk assessment,
• incident command,
• accountability,
• communications, and
• SOGs or failure to follow SOGs.

The goal of incident command should be to ensure that these failures never occur on the fireground.

The following are mandatory for a safe, effective, and efficient command system:

• An appropriate and ongoing risk assessment.
• A proactive ICS that stays ahead of the incident power curve.
• An accurate and ongoing active accountability system.
• Clear, calm, and concise communications.
• Adherence to up-to-date SOGs and national standards.

ICS Levels of Structural Firefighting

How does the ICS help us achieve these goals? First, the ICS for structure fires is predicated on this simple truth: There are three distinct levels on which a structure fire is fought-task, strategic, and tactical. Failure to recognize this stratification of levels will make it difficult to use or understand ICS at these fires.

• Task level. The task level is where the work gets done. At the individual or company level, tasks are accomplished. Stretching hose, donning self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), searching, forcing entry, cutting a hole, pumping an engine, and throwing a ladder require a focused mindset. Situational awareness at the task level is only from zero feet (when smoke is in your face) to six feet (your realistic reach when engaged in these tasks). You simply do not see the bigger picture.
• Strategic level. It is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the task level. The incident commander (IC) is at the command post (CP) and often too far away from the building, or his view of the building is blocked by everything from apparatus, smoke, the darkness of night, trees, or other buildings (photo 1). Whereas the task level companies are too close to have appropriate situational awareness, the strategic level IC is too far. Even if the IC is on the front sidewalk, he cannot see the rear, sides, or fire-floor landing.
• Tactical level. This level, the most critical one, is between the task companies and the strategic-level IC. The tactical supervisor (division or group) is positioned at the threshold of the hazard zone/immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) area. The tactical supervisor is not too in the weeds, in zero visibility (at task level), yet not too far away at the CP (at the strategic level). The tactical division/group supervisor has the following roles on the fireground:
• Risk manager.
• Tactical decision maker.
• Accountability officer.
• Safety officer.
• Communications czar.

The tactical division/group supervisor must be highly mobile, highly agile, and highly hostile. He is a field commander. Think of Captain Winters in the Home Box Office series Band of Brothers. He held a rifle and fired when needed (task level), but his primary job was to lead the troops in the field with tactical decision making. While the generals were at the CP, miles away (strategic level), Captain Winters led his troops, saw the tactical situation, and was able to anticipate the enemy’s position and tactics to put his troops in the proper position with the most effective tactics of choice. He had real-time accounting of the situation and his troops’ location (active accountability).

The soldiers on the rifles were too close and focused on shooting the enemy (task level). The generals were too far away and acted in a support/logistical capacity (strategic level). Captain Winters, at the tactical level, made it happen in the tactical gap. He was the vital connecting link to make the plan happen in the field.

The highly hostile aspect of the tactical field commander refers to the command presence required of the position. I pride myself on being calm on the radio as an IC. When I am a division or group supervisor, however, I become much louder and strive to have a strong command presence. I get in crew members’ faces; grab them by the shoulder; and clearly, calmly, and loudly state what I want.

Often, the first and most important aspect of assuming a group or division is telling all the companies that they now work for you. This is vital if the system is to work. I was recently on a duplex fire on a hot day with winds. The IC was at the CP across the street; a truck blocked his view. Meanwhile, the crews inside were in near-zero visibility, and there was heavy fire in the attic. They still needed to complete primary searches on both sides of the duplex, yet heavy fire was on both sides of the attic.

The radio traffic was jammed with feedback and competing crews attempting to talk to command while he tried to have a clear size-up and CAN reports (conditions, actions, needs). When I arrived, he directed me to perform a 360° lap. I assumed Division A, and the crews inside the duplex were working for me. Our objectives were fire attack and search.

My first priority was to rapidly move forward to the front of the duplex. I went to the hotter side and yelled into the front door, “This is Battalion 7. You are now working for me. I am Division A. Do not talk to command anymore. Go through me. Let me know when you complete a primary search.”

I did the same thing on the other side of the duplex. The radio traffic instantly went silent. I had on full personal protective equipment and SCBA. When I had to go into the building (hazard zone), I clipped my mask-mounted regulator (MMR) onto my mask and accounted for crews, gave them condition reports from the outside, and told them to finish the primary search.

When I wanted to talk to the IC, I went back outside, doffed my MMR, and clearly gave the IC a CAN. Then, I yelled up to the Roof Division, which was finishing up some holes on the roof. They were getting off the roof. I updated command and donned my mask, went back inside, and told the interior crews to move 10 feet farther to access the seat of the fire and that the truck was getting off the roof.

(2) The Engine 101 crew is inside. The captain of Engine 20 is about to enter the structure with his crew and backup line.

Think about the last time you were at a structure fire. Really think back. You probably couldn’t see your hand in front of your face. Did you really hear the radio? Was it easy to communicate with command?

Crews inside a burning building have less situational awareness, higher heart rates and blood pressure, more tunnel vision, greater auditory exclusion, and often do not know what is above or below them. This is not conducive to risk assessment or clear communications, especially through SCBA. Remember the NIOSH 5? How many LODD reports state that the crews didn’t know what they had?

Rather than compete with other crews with overwhelming feedback on one frequency to communicate with command, crews can communicate face-to-face with their tactical supervisor who is watching conditions over their heads, looking at building conditions and fire spread, and anticipating needs. Obviously, if the radio is needed, the supervisor can communicate with crews that way as well, but the need is dramatically reduced.

Another critical component of setting up a group or division is to clearly state the Who, What, and Where for the division or group. In the above example, the Who was the crews working in the division (Engines 62, 54, and 61 and Truck 65); the What was the objectives for the division (fire attack and search); the Where was the boundaries of the division (all interior crews in both sides of the duplex).

An appropriate radio transmission from command would be, “Battalion 7, you are Division A. Your objectives are fire attack and search. You have Engines 62, 54, and 61 and Truck 65 working for you.” This should immediately reduce radio traffic. If Engine 62 still tries to communicate with command on the radio, then command should redirect Engine 62 to go through Division A.

At a recent commercial fire in downtown Sacramento, I was assigned Division B. The main structure was a large brick building with vehicles stored inside and heavily involved. It was primarily a defensive operation. Division B was a large, two-story walk-up Victorian house. It was extremely close to the main fire building. We were downwind, so it was reasonable to anticipate our exposure or others downwind in our division being involved if embers landed on the roof of any of them.

I ordered four engines and two truck companies to the division. Since it was a large, multiple-alarm fire, we had our own tactical channel, separate from the other divisions, for communication. I spoke to command on the command channel for CAN reports.

We had one truck company go to the roof in anticipation of the attic or roof becoming involved. Embers crept up underneath in the eaves and ignited the cockloft. Crews inside accessed the cockloft while the roof crew opened up the top. Engines knocked down the fire, and we kept the damage to the attic and ceiling.

The whole time, I was in and out of the house, up and down the steps, and talking to the crews face-to-face. Obviously, I spoke to the truck on the roof over the radio, but most of the communication with the companies inside was in person.

ICS on House Fires

Remember, most firefighter and civilian fatalities occur in homes. As of this writing, we have had three fatal house fires in the past two weeks in our region. ICS should be proactively used on house fires as well. If the fatality statistic isn’t enough to convince you, then consider this: If you do not practice on the smaller incidents, like house fires, why should you expect to be good on the larger incidents like apartment buildings, tenements, and commercial fires?

Fire departments that do not use ICS (or a similar system, like Blue Card) on house fires are really missing the boat. Casting off house fires as “routine” and not using ICS is like saying, “My family only uses our seat belts when we are more than 50 miles from home”-in other words, just for the big trips (big fires). But where do most vehicle accidents happen? Within 50 miles of home, just as many fire fatalities occur in smaller residental fires.

(3) The captain of Engine 103 assumed Division A and is in a tactical position to manage and communicate with his task level crews inside and outside.

At a one-story house fire, Engine 101 was initiating fire attack at the task level. Engine 20 arrived second and assumed command. Because of the amount of fire in the house and attic space, Engine 20 immediately took a second backup line inside as I arrived and assumed command (photo 2).

Truck 20 arrived and went inside the structure to initiate a primary search at the task level. About two minutes later, Engine 103 arrived. I assigned the captain as Division A. His objectives were fire attack and primary search, with Engines 101 and 20 and Truck 20 working for him. These task level companies were no longer communicating with me; they went through Division A, who performed a 360° lap of the house and interacted with his task level crews face-to-face (photo 3). Radio traffic was minimal.

Shortly after knockdown but before a primary search was completed, a Mayday was called. A portion of the rear patio cover assembly fell onto Engine 101. The Engine 101 crew was quickly extricated. Fortunately, we had Division A established, which minimized radio traffic, allowing the Mayday to be transmitted clearly. We had a rapid intervention crew established in case it was needed; however, it was not used. The point is that we had a manageable span of control and clear communications and accountability before the Mayday was called, not afterward. ICs must always be proactive and stay ahead of the incident power curve.

ICS as an Aggressive Tool

As I stated at the beginning, proactive use of ICS can often allow for more aggressive tactics when appropriate. We had a single-story commercial strip mall with heavy fire in the attic. Multiple crews attacked the fire from underneath under the supervision of Division C in the rear and Division A in the front while a Roof Division, comprised of two truck companies, performed vertical ventilation.

Radio traffic was minimal, yet accountability and risk assessment were maximized and decentralized to the division supervisors. At one point, there was concern about the amount of fire in the attic, as shown in photo 4. The ongoing size-up and risk assessment by the division supervisors revealed that the roof was built up and very structurally sound. Normally, this amount of fire through the roof would have been a concern, especially as viewed from the CP. We were able to maintain an offensive strategy because of the clear communications and risk assessment by the divisions, including the Roof Division supervisor.

Trench cuts on the roof kept the fire from traveling laterally and were coordinated through tactical level supervisors who stepped back a bit from the tasks to see the bigger picture. Attack from underneath along with appropriate and aggressive trench cuts saved several businesses.

A very seasoned captain once told me, “When I know ICS is being used at a structure fire and there are clear communications and accountability, I feel much more comfortable knowing that if something happens to my crew, we will be immediately accounted for. Rather than wading through jammed radio transmissions and feedback, my division supervisor always knows where I am through active, eyes-on, hands-on accountability. Without ICS accounting for us, I won’t push as hard tactically because I can’t trust that command will know where we are if things go bad.”

The key is to get crews performing critical tasks as soon as possible and yet not wait so long to set up your groups or divisions that you become overwhelmed and behind the power curve. Once you get over your head with span of control and communication gets sketchy, it’s often too late to get back ahead of the incident.

The first one or two engines into the fire will likely be at the task level, attacking the fire. You may likely get a truck inside searching as well. The key is to place the next chief or company officer in behind them as a division supervisor while the incident is still escalating. This will keep radio transmissions minimal and yet enhance the communications and give you a better active accounting of your crews through their division supervisor.

Limited Supply of Resources or Chiefs

One size ICS plan does not fit all. Some departments have two-person engines that arrive 20 minutes apart. Others have four-person engines that arrive within close time intervals. Consider the following when establishing your ICS for the structure fire you are commanding:

• The building. Is it commercial or residential, large or small, modern or legacy, balloon frame or conventional? What type of construction (Types 1-5)? Is it vertically or horizontally oriented? All these things matter.
• Conditions. Is there heavy fire or light smoke? Are there known rescues, or have all victims been reported to be out of the structure? Is the structure vacant or heavily occupied? Is there collapse potential? Consider countless permutations such as weather and exposures, for example.
• Resource level. How many engines, trucks, and chiefs respond to your fires? What is your staffing? How far apart geographically are your companies? Do you have a rural area? Are your chiefs there quickly, or do they respond from far away? Do you have other staff or overhead responding?

These inputs create your ICS formula:

Building + Conditions + Resources = ICS. If any of these inputs change, chances are that your ICS will change.

With this in mind, you can start to build your ICS templates for common fires. Like the playbook for a football team, you can use the templates to train for given situations. This training will enable you to rapidly deploy an ICS consistently for a given situation, which will rapidly organize your fires and prevent the NIOSH 5 “fatality causes” from developing. Your operations will be much cleaner, more effective, and more efficient.

ICS is always hailed as incident driven; that is true. However, the rapid escalation and lives threatened in structure fires warrant some templates to use as a starting point for quickly deploying and accounting for resources while communicating clearly and continuing an appropriate risk-management matrix.

Some situations to consider for templating include the following:

• House fire, less than 2,500 square feet.
• House fire, more than 2,500 square feet (McMansions).
• Commercial strip mall or taxpayer.
• Commercial big box.
• Garden-style apartments
• Center hall-style apartments.
• Known rescues in homes, duplexes, four-plexes, and condominiums.
• Exposures involved on arrival.
• Tenements and high life hazards.
• Mid-rises and high-rises.

Again, templating is just a starting point for training and rapid deployment. However, because each incident is unique, consider your ICS formula. Chances are that one of the three factors (building, conditions, or resources) will drive the ICS more than the others. A simple ICS in a duplex may become different if that same duplex has multiple victims trapped. The victims become the overriding factor and may warrant the following groups: Fire Attack, Rescue, Vent, and Medical.

(4) Note the clear view from the command post, yet the CAN reports from the Roof Division and Divisions A and C indicated that an offensive strategy be maintained.

If you have multiple victims in a three-story, center-hall apartment, the building may become the overriding factor, and you may choose divisions instead of functional groups for each floor.

Whatever templates you create should fit your agency and be trained on before you have a fire. Also, like a good football team, you can adjust the template (or play) or call an audible when needed. Training is the key to success!

ICS is like any other tool: If you don’t use it, understand it, practice with it, and train under realistic scenarios, you will become the tool and will relegate it to the scrap heap of other things that “don’t work.” Instead of overcomplicating the fire, proactively using ICS allows you to have more aggressive tactics, potentially save more lives, and keep your crews more accurately accounted for. Your span of control and communications will be much more manageable, and the fires will run more safely, effectively, and efficiently. A prerequisite knowledge of task, tactical, and strategic levels is critical so that you can place tactical field commanders in positions to connect the task crews working with the strategic IC at the CP.

Applying proactive ICS to rapidly escalating structure fires is paramount to staying ahead of the incident power curve and preventing the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment. The more of these NIOSH 5 factors that align in the tactical gap, the more likely civilian and firefighter lives will be lost and significant injuries and near misses will occur. Templating is based on your agency/regional factors and can serve as a starting point for given structures, conditions, and resources. Just because ICS is incident-driven doesn’t mean that you have to wait for the incident and make it up as you go. Proactive training in realistic conditions is the key to success.

ANTHONY KASTROS is a 29-year veteran of and a battalion chief for Sacramento (CA) Metro Fire. He is the founder of TrainFirefighters.com and TrainFirstResponders.com, teaching fireground command, tactics, leadership, and officer development throughout the United States. He was the FDIC 2013 keynote speaker and has published Mastering the Fire Service Assessment Center and the DVD series Mastering Fireground Command, Calm the Chaos, and Mastering Unified Command- from Hometown to Homeland (Pennwell).

Anthony Kastros will present “Aggressive Command and Tactics” on Monday, April 18, 1:30 p.m.-5:30 p.m., at FDIC International 2016 in Indianapolis.

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