What Happened at the Ramada Inn
FIRE REPORTS
In the early morning hours of June 14, tragedy struck the Ramada Inn Central in Fort Worth, Tex., when fire claimed the lives of five guests and injured more than 34 others. Losses were estimated at $1.25 million and $600,000 in business interruption. The fire thrived on many elements, including human error, inadequate building codes and sleeping occupants. Only through the efforts of fire fighters, occupants and others, were many lives saved that otherwise would have been lost.
Background
The Ramada Inn Central complex, completed in early 1973, was constructed to meet the 1970 City of Fort Worth Building Code, which was based on the 1970 edition of the Uniform Building Code. The original complex contained 225 guestrooms in four buildings, and an additional 112 guestrooms in a fifth building had been added. The fire building, Building B, contained 85 guestrooms, and was a two-story structure constructed to meet the provisions of Type V (wood) onehour fire-resistive construction. The structural frame and partitions were primarily wood, sheathed with gypsum wallboard. Roof construction was built-up tar and gravel, and the floor/ ceiling assembly separating the first and second floors was poured concrete supported by 2 X 8-inch wood joists with 5/8-inch Type X gypsum board sheathing below. The roof assembly was supported in a similar manner. Overall, Building B, 42,500 square feet, contained seven exits from the ground level and four exits from the second level. Though the floor/ceiling assembly met the required one-hour fire-resistive construction, the three open interior stairwells permitted by the Building Code negated the effectiveness of the separation.
Climate control was accomplished by individual heating and cooling units for each guestroom, and the rooms were vented directly to the outside through the exterior wall. Corridors were cooled by two 5-ton air conditioning units mounted on the roof directly over the center section of the upstairs corridor. There were no design provisions for air exchange between corridors and guestrooms. Guestrooms were separated from each other and from the corridors by one-hour fire-resistive construction that calls for a tested 20-minute door assembly between a guestroom and a corridor. The doors and frames were pressed wood construction and, from interviews conducted by fire department personnel, were apparently a poor fit.
At the time of the fire, 74 of the 85 guestrooms in the fire building were rented. Both that building and another in the complex were currently undergoing remodeling of interior finishes, including floor and wall coverings. In both buildings, carpet rolls had been illegally stored in the exit corridors for several days. The fire building contained six rolls of synthetic fiber carpet and 17 rolls of synthetic fiber padding. An interesting note is that several of the hotel guests who were questioned stated that they had noticed the carpet stored in the corridors; however, none stated that they had taken any action to have management remove it. Preliminary findings indicate that the carpet and padding were primarily composed of polypropylene, polyester and nylon.
The fire
The last guests checked into Building B at about 2 A.M. At approximately 2:30 A.M., the security guard inspected the building and detected no evidence of fire. Shortly thereafter, he proceeded to the cafeteria in an adjacent building.
The guard returned around 3:15 A.M., and detected a glow through the window adjacent to an exit door. The guard returned to the lobby and instructed the staff to call the fire department, then proceeded back to the fire, where he and two guests used pressurized water fire extinguishers in an attempt to extinguish the blaze.
An off-duty bartender, who was in the lobby when the guard reported the fire, performed perhaps the most credulous action in saving the lives of guests in the fire building. She went to the parking lot and used her car to circle the hotel, honking the horn to alert occupants.
The first call was placed to the fire department at about 3:22 A.M. by a Bell Telephone operator, whom the hotel had contacted. Simultaneously, the hotel operator began calling occupants of the burning building by room number order to notify them of the fire. The initial dispatch at 3:24 a.m. of a first alarm assignment brought one pumper, one quint, one ladder, one attack unit (minipumper), and a district chief; in all, 15 personnel responded.
The initial attempt to fight the fire with extinguishers had been aborted, and the guard and others tried to arouse the sleeping occupants from outside the building since the corridors were already impassable. Several guests attempted to escape via exterior windows, which were 1/4-inch plate glass fixed in a frame. Since the windows were not operable by design, the guests were forced to break them, and the broken glass hampered many from escaping, and caused quite a few injuries.
The first pumper on the scene arrived within four minutes after receipt of the first call, and about 10 minutes after the initial fire detection. The officer on the scene reported heavy smoke, the bulk of which was coming from the east end of the building, opposite the area of origin. The color of the smoke was comparable to that of an oil fire, though no fire was detected initially by the arriving companies. Most of the windows on the building’s south side had already been shattered.
The first arriving companies were faced with every fire fighter’s nightmare: heavy black smoke pouring out of windows, people inside screaming for help. The district chief immediately called fora second alarm. Fifteen to 20 people were spotted at windows on the south side seeking rescue. One person, who was spotted behind a smoke filled second floor window, fell back into the room.
Because of the number of victims attempting to escape via windows and the appearance that the building was about to burst into flames, the few initial companies established objectives oriented to exterior rescue with ground ladders. An attempt to rescue the man who had fallen back into his room, Room 205, was thwarted by intense heat. Still, neither flames nor the origin of the fire had been detected by fire fighters. Outside, operations were hampered by dense smoke limiting visibility to less than a few feet. The second alarm had dispatched 11 additional units, including 29 personnel, and was shortly followed by a third alarm with five more units and 15 more personnel. Additional requests went in for “all the ambulances we can get.”
At approximately 3:33 A.M., only seven minutes after the first unit arrived and 18 minutes after detection, a report was received indicating heavy fire at the west end of the building. As fire suppression operations got underway, a fourth alarm was requested, dispatching an additional nine units and 24 personnel, that included an automatic mutual aid response from neighboring Arlington.
Fire department operations included establishing several fire sectors, a staging area for incoming fire apparatus and a patient triage area. As units continued to arrive, two attempts were made to launch an interior attack; however, these attempts were aborted as the hand lines were severed by glass from broken windows. It was noted that both double jacket and rubber hose suffered cuts, but only the double jacket hose failed completely when cut. Rubber hose continued to be useful to protect the fire fighters during their withdrawal.
Fifth alarm companies were called at 3:58 A.M., containing six more units and 21 more fire fighters. Fire fighting operations, which were hampered by “Texas-size” thunderstorms, consisted of an exterior attack with hand lines and master streams, both ground and aerial, to gain control of the fire. In all, 38 suppression units and 104 personnel were used to control the fire in an effort that lasted nearly seven hours.
Photos by Fort Worth Fire Department
The analysis of the fire conducted by the Fort Worth Fire Department encompassed not only an investigation of the incident, but also a human behavior study of the occupants.
In a pioneering effort to further study the significant actions of occupants during a fire, the Fort Worth Fire Department became the first department to originate and manage the distribution of a Fire Experience Survey human behavior questionnaire (FES) to the victims of a major fire. Included within this report are selected statistical results based on the 37 responses to 65 questionnaires which had been returned to the fire department. It is noteworthy that responses were often narrative. Therefore, a degree of subjectivity has been introduced into the data analysis in order to categorize responses. Future efforts will include more careful planning during the preparation of the questionnaire to eliminate possible vagueness.
Investigators determined that the fire originated in an exit corridor on the ground level adjacent to an open stairwell leading to the second floor. The fire initially involved rolled carpet and padding that was wrapped by paper and plastic. The fire is currently listed as suspicious, based on the determination that none of the potential ignition sources in the area of origin could be linked to the fire. Further, the facts that no evidence of fire was present one-half hour prior to the initial detection and that subsequent tests with cigarettes failed to induce ignition indicate that arson was a likely factor.
The first awareness of a possible fire condition occurred 15 to 20 minutes before the actual detection of the fire. A guest, who was awake at that time, stated that he smelled “something hot” and suspected a problem with his television set. The guest inspected the television, determined that there apparently was no problem, and proceeded to bed.
By the time the guard discovered the fire, it had grown substantially and involved several rolls of the carpet and padding. Thick black smoke, engulfing the long, undivided corridors, was assisted by the three open stairways and the air handling units for the secondfloor corridor, and was progressing into most or all of the guestrooms.
The FES analysis indicated that all of the guests awakened to varying amounts of smoke in their rooms. The FES respondents stated that 81 percent of the rooms had smoke entering around the corridor door, 16 percent through the bathroom vent, and 14 percent through the heating/air conditioning unit. The indication by the guests that smoke entered around the doors was in agreement with the findings of fire investigators, who determined that many of the guestroom doors were of a poor fit and lacking smoke seals. Because the manufacturer of the door assemblies is no longer in business, and because of the inadequacy of records regarding the building’s construction, it was not possible to determine whether the doors had actually passed the required 20-minute test to be in compliance with the building code.
The building exhibited a very unusual burn pattern throughout. Though there was substantial fire damage at the opposite end of the first floor, primarily, the center of the building remained damaged by only smoke. Again on the second floor, the fire burned more severely in those areas most remote from the area of origin. The burning synthetic carpet apparently generated enormous volumes of thick, black smoke which was distributed throughout the building early in the fire. Further, the fire burned vigorously, venting through exterior doors that had been propped open during the early attack with fire extinguishers. THe burning carpet alone is estimated to have produced some 14,000 to 16,000 Btus per pound, twice that of typical cellulosic combustibles.
I believe that a primary flashover occurred in the area of origin at approximately 3:30 A.M. and progressed as a flash through the smoke layer down the more than 300-foot long corridors, similar to the progression of a shock wave through a tube. As would a shock wave, the fire flame front appears to have released most of its energy when hitting the barrier at the end of the corridors. The apparent back flash at the end of the corridors caused substantial damage at the end of the building opposite the area of origin, while relatively less damage was done through the length of the corridors. This sequence is suggested because evidence was not supportive of multiple areas of origin.
It is further speculated that many rooms that were substantially filled with superheated smoke at the time the flashover occurred in the smoke layer, also flashed over because of the additional heat transmitted into the room at that time. In at least one case where the guest was not present in his room at the time of the fire and the door had remained closed, the room was completely gutted, with no evidence of an area where the fire had burned into the room. Similar bum patterns have been discovered in other hotel fires where the buildings were of the same design.
Overall, the fire-resistive characteristics in the construction of the building appeared to perform as expected. Most of the one-hour separations in the building prevented the complete penetration by fire; however, the fire did consume substantial quantities of combustible members used in those partitions. Carpeting as an interior finish did not appear to contribute significantly to the spread of fire. However, it is quite obvious that the rolled carpet and padding did not perform in a manner commensurate with what might be indicated by the passage of required federal testing.
Further, the vinyl wall covering used as an interior finish on corridor walls certainly did not perform in a manner commensurate with the results of the flamespread test conducted in the ASTM E84 Steiner Tunnel Test. The tested flamespread ratings, 0-10 or less, were acquired by samples placed on the ceiling of the testing tunnel with the flame fixed at one end. This test in no way predicted the performance of the material placed vertically on the walls of the corridors. In this case, the vinyl wall covering actually flashed, substantially propagating flame and generating significant quantities of smoke.
Human behavior
Analysis of the results of the human behavior study tended to indicate that panic was not a factor in the actions of occupants attempting to gain safe egress. The FES encompassed the occupants’ detection of the fire, actions, observations, and suggestions to improve fire safety. Of the respondents, 43 percent had resided on the first floor and 57 percent on the second floor. A few selected results of the FES are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Statistically, the most likely scenario experienced by a guest began with him or her becoming aware of the fire by the smell or presence of smoke in the room. Sixty-eight percent of the guests stated that they felt the fire was extremely serious upon detection. Most of the guests originally attempted egress using guestroom entry doors; however, none was able to pass through the smoke filled corridors. Consequently, all guests were forced to escape through exterior windows. Fifty-seven percent of the guests used a chair adjacent to the window to break out the glass and gain egress. Thirty percent of the respondents stated they had attempted to call the operator and those who were able to get through were basically told “We know” and promptly disconnected. Several guests stated that they were alarmed and angered by this response, having expected instructions or information.
When queried, “Did you receive previous fire safety information,” 43 percent of the respondents indicated they had received fire safety information on television, 38 percent by publication and 19 percent by radio. All guests who indicated receipt of fire safety information credited this information as assisting in the determination of their actions. When queried as to their suggestions to help others in a similar fire situation, 30 percent suggested mandatory installation of smoke detectors, 19 percent suggested mandatory installation of fire alarms, and 16 percent suggested mandatory installation of automatic sprinkler systems.
Fire deaths
All of the five victims who perished in the Ramada fire were awakened prior to their death, based on analysis of the locations of bodies in the guestrooms. All of the deaths were classified by the coroner’s office as “death by asphyxiation due to smoke and carbon monoxide.”
The only female victim, 27 years old, had resided in Room 101. This woman was the first person called by the hotel operator in his attempt to notify guests of the fire. Further, there was an unverified rumor that this victim had exited the building from her room immediately adjacent to an exterior exit door, and later returned for an unknown reason.
The four male victims resided in Rooms 205, 218, 230 and 242.
Conclusions
Several factors contributed to the substantial loss of the Ramada Inn fire, the most outstanding was the lack of automatic sprinklers, smoke detectors or a fire alarm system. Without fire protection or detection systems, a situation was created where the fire detection by most occupants was relatively slow. In response to obvious code inadequacies, the city of Fort Worth on August 16, 1983, passed ordinances requiring smoke detectors and/or fire alarm systems in several occupancy classifications where they had not previously been required. Included in the ordinance was a requirement that all new and existing hotels more than three stories high or containing more than 20 guestrooms install a fire alarm system throughout the premises with smoke detection in all guestrooms and interior spaces.
Another factor that likely played a significant role in the severity of the fire incident was the installation of fixed ‘/j-inch plate glass windows in the guestrooms. Several guests reported extreme difficulty in breaking the windows. Broken glass not only caused an undetermined number of injuries, but also hampered fire fighting operations by severing hose lines. Windows are now required by the building code to be operable and of dimensions allowing for escape.
Also contributing to the magnitude of the fire were the long, undivided corridors on both floors connected by open stairways, turning much of the building into a large, common fire area. An ordinance will shortly be proposed in Fort Worth to require that open stairwells only be permitted within individual dwelling units of those buildings where occupants could be expected to sleep.
As to the fire fighting operation, with an initial response of 15 personnel, the first arriving companies were obviously overwhelmed by the number of people requiring rescue and the apparent severity of the fire situation. The humid weather and severe thunderstorms held smoke very low to the ground, requiring that SCBA be used even by those fire fighters performing exterior fire fighting activities. Replacement air bottles became scarce and fire fighter efficiency was reduced. Even with the adverse conditions, fire fighters managed to remove more than 15 people, and the department’s recently adopted mandatory F.MT program proved invaluable in treating a large number of casualities.
As a final comment, it is important to highlight that the burning characteristics of the rolled carpet and padding and the vinyl wall coverings were in no way predicted by their performance in standard fire tests. Fire officials should always remember one rule when applying the results of standard fire tests, which is similar to the statement made by car manufacturers concerning gasoline mileage, “These results are for comparison purposes only, actual field performance may vary significantly.”
