US&R TASK FORCES AND PORK-BARREL POLITICS BY CHASE N. SARGENT
In 1990 in a small room in Washington D.C., I was part of a group of 15 personnel who were hunkered down to grade and evaluate the 34 Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Force applications. The applicants each had spent months and countless organizational hours and money putting together their application packages. For us it was the beginning of a very long week. It was also the beginning of a life-changing event for most of us in the room and for most of the organizations selected as task forces. The work was long and hard.
When we finished, the nation had its first 25 task forces. The development began with a mere $800,000 in federal matching fund grants, divided among 25 teams. Each locality was required to match with local funds whatever amount it received. In Virginia Beach, that meant talking the organization and politicians into forking over $100,000! For the next five years, funding for the program was abysmal. In many instances, short of being deployed and receiving money under the Stafford Act, little or no funding for equipment, training, or just maintaining the task force existed then or even now.
Over the next year, we saw at least two task forces drop out due to time and financial constraints. For those who stayed in the program, we found that it changed the entire culture of our organizations. Most task force coordinators found that it took 50 percent of their organizational time to run and manage the US&R program. Some organizations had to add a full-time US&R coordinator. Officers and firefighters assigned to the team found that they were spending half of their shifts and countless off-duty hours doing what was necessary to keep the task force up and running. The dedication required and given by these people in simply developing and making the task forces functional locally was remarkable.
No one outside the system saw or understood the strain placed on organizations and personnel in running and managing a task force. Organizations that did not have task forces only knew that these “superteams” were out there, getting press and money (ha! ha!). Little did they know that then and even now the vast majority of the work and money has come from local or state agencies, not the federal government. Over the past six years, different levels of operational capabilities have been achieved in 18 of the 25 teams, or roughly 66 percent of the national capability. The federal government has provided very little in the way of funding in grants, and most of the cost in staff time to develop, train, equip, and maintain these teams has been borne by local and state sponsoring agencies.
And then Oklahoma City happened. Teams considered operational were de-ployed, many without full caches of equipment due to the lack of funding. But, boy, did the money roll in during deployment. For those teams that were deployed, their caches were quickly filled. This process was the only method by which teams were funded for equipment. Congress and the Appropria-tions Committee had for years refused to fund US&R at a level that was necessary to even maintain a task force, let alone run one!
The press the teams received made them appear superhuman. Every time you turned on the TV all you saw was the “rescue teams.” It was the best and most prolific event ever to occur to the Federal Emergen-cy Management Agency (FEMA) and the US&R program. While the teams operated superbly in the most dangerous conditions they had ever encountered, the nature of the event did not lend itself to a rescue operation–only recoveries. The Oklahoma City fire, EMS, and law enforcement agencies completed all the rescues before the first US&R Task Force landed at Tinker Air Force Base. Despite all that, US&R teams and FEMA were now on the map and in America`s vision.
Now everyone wanted a FEMA task force. No one knew what it entailed, how much organizational effort or local money was required, or how much personal commitment it really took to have a first-class team. They only knew that they wanted to get on this bandwagon, regardless.
In October 1996, FEMA requested a cost breakdown of exactly what it cost to administer, manage, train, and equip a FEMA team. FEMA was to supply this information to the Appropriations Committee at Con-gress`s direction. It took organizations weeks of staff time to put together and finalize the reports. The cost analysis from our task force and others indicated that the average task force is spending between $1 million and $1.5 million a year in local money (not federal funds) to maintain a task force. The average grant from FEMA in 1996 was as little as $32,000 to each task force!
Pork-barrel politics had taken hold. The FEMA budget falls under the Senate Appropriations Committee, which deals with Veterans Affairs, HUD, and independ-ent agencies. The committee was chaired by Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond (R-MO). Majority members included Senators Conrad Burns (R-MT), Ted Stevens (R-AK), Richard C. Shelby (R-AL), Robert Bennett (R-UT), and Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO). Minority members included Senators Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD), Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), J. Bennett Johnson (D-LA), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), and J. Robert Kerrey (D-NE). The Appropriations Com-mittee passed House Resolution HR 104-204 and noted the following: “Finally, the conferees note that urban search and rescue (US&R) is a critical element of the effective response to earthquakes and other disasters, and are very supportive of this program. However, the conferees are concerned that not all of the FEMA US&R teams are considered fully operational at this time, and note that the geographical distribution of the teams appears to be inadequate particularly in the Midwest. In addition, the conferees are aware of the concerns that current funding for each of the teams may be insufficient. The conferees therefore direct FEMA to report within 60 days of the enactment of this Act on (1) the appropriate number and geographical distribution of US&R Teams, (2) the process for discontinuing support to teams that are not fully operational, and the Agency`s plans to discontinue such teams, and (3) funding requirements for a viable program. As a replacement for inadequately funded or not fully operational FEMA teams, FEMA is further directed to establish at least one new US&R Team, taking into account adequate financial support, operational abilities and geographical distribution, as quickly as possible but not later than 180 days of the enactment of this Act.”
Now comes the real kicker (you tell me if it`s ethical). Senator Kit Bond, head of the committee, also represents the Boone County, Missouri, congressional district. In September 1996, before the act was even passed, FEMA was ordered to perform a Phase One evaluation on the Boone County Fire District US&R Task Force! The Phase One evaluation team, consisting of task force leaders and FEMA staff, flew to Boone County and spent a week evaluating, using US&R money. On December 12, the Federal Register was published, soliciting applications for at least one, possibly two US&R Task Forces. Each task force selected will receive a $500,000 grant, with no match–that`s right, no match! That`s more money than any task force currently in the system has received in five years! Now let me say (just so the angry letters are kept to a minimum) that I have nothing against the Boone County Fire District. In fact, we have assisted them in getting their cache together and in any other way we could. I`m talking about politics here, not an organization.
Now, gentle reader, you can read be-tween the lines, but let me give you the following facts to chew on, and consider the politics and pork barrel attached.
1. When asked by the Appropriations Committee how many task forces were enough, FEMA indicated 25! It also indicated that funding was needed for the current system before even considering expanding the system. The committee, however, decided to ask FEMA to do what it was already doing and then rejected its recommendations anyway. What does FEMA know–it has only been running the system since its inception!
2. Boone County has already had a Phase One evaluation. The language of the bill states “at least one team from the Midwest,” and Senator Bond represents Boone County in the Midwest (which, by the way, had already been evaluated even before the language of the bill was drafted). In law enforcement, they call this a clue!
3. If Senator Bond and the rest of the committee are really concerned with the system`s status and current funding, why had they not funded it in the past? And why are they spending a million dollars on two new task forces when the current ones, who have worked diligently for five years, can`t even get funded?
4. FEMA has for years had a system in place to evaluate and eliminate teams that do not meet the requirements to be operational. However, each time FEMA and the evaluators have eliminated a team due to lack of preparedness, the local member of Congress has stepped in and politically blocked elimination of the task force, requiring that FEMA jump through more hoops and spend additional money and staff time until it effectively got rid of those teams.
5. The issue of geographical distribution, rather than the system`s efficiency (maybe because proficiency is not the real name of the game here), seems to be a misguided focal point for the committee. Maybe I read my geography wrong, but from a response standpoint we have teams in Nebraska, Indiana, Tennessee, Colorado, and New Mexico that literally ring the Midwest for response! Fund those teams at the level necessary, and you have five teams ready to quickly respond to the Midwest. Placing a team in the Midwest directly will not enhance the response aspects geographically.
6. I suspect that since the committee is hanging its hat on the geographical distribution issue that Congress will require that FEMA hire a consultant to evaluate the current distribution of the teams (read: more money going to consultants and none to the operational teams). The consultant`s report cannot tell them anything that we don`t already know–that is, that 25 teams are adequate and that funding for those teams is abysmal at best.
7. The 180-day limit on the bill is obviously an attempt to speed up the process, thereby eliminating the time required for an organization to effectively complete and return the application paperwork. Any task force in the system will tell you that it took four to six months to complete the application.
The FEMA US&R staff has worked diligently over the past five years, fighting for every dollar they could get for the US&R program. In many instances, the program was zero-budgeted and had to take a little money from here and there just to maintain the program. They have evaluated and attempted to eliminate task forces that do not meet the standards. It`s really a catch 22, since you can`t get operational if you are not funded, and you can`t deploy and get funded if you are not operational! Every organization that currently has a task force has spent years and countless hours of staff time and organizational monies keeping its task force proficient and ready for the next national disaster. This partnership has been strained at times, but the teams have always been able to respond when needed and to perform exceptionally. I know the staff at FEMA cannot express these views; it is the nature of politics. But I can. And the truth will always be the truth no matter how you wrap it.
Now the US&R program should not be and never has been an “exclusive boys` club.” Every task force currently operating competed in an open and published process for the right to function as a task force. No one was given anything, not by divine right, geographical location, or the identity of its congressional representative. Every member of this system has had to meet stringent requirements, expend tremendous amounts of money and organizational resources, and continually manage its system to maintain its place among the teams. Finally, each organization had to put up its own money to match federal funding to even enter the program. In a nutshell, the task forces currently in the system worked hard to get there and work hard every day to stay there!
Now I know that the letters will fly over this. To those organizations that are applying as a task force, I wish you good luck. You will fully understand what I have described here by the time you are finished. I hope you have not wasted your time. Personally, if I were taking the time that you are to apply for this process and knew that at least one decision had already been made, I would be enraged. I might even go to my congressional representative and complain that the playing field has been altered from what it was in the beginning! Only time will tell if this commentary is accurate. When the teams are selected, out of the 100 or so applicants (up from the 34 we originally evaluated when we had to match money), I suspect that Boone County will be either the only one or one of the two teams selected. If that occurs, then surely it has prepared, competed successfully, and met the guidelines to score the highest in the selection process.
While it takes nothing away from Boone County, it certainly indicates that this bill was written with one thought in mind: not to improve the system, not to upgrade the funding for current task forces to become operational, and not to address the current national response capabilities in dealing with US&R–but solely to fund, at $500,000, a senator`s home district with a US&R Task Force. By the time this commentary is printed, it will be too late: The task force process, funding, and other political mechanisms will be well on the way to doing what they do best when home pork barrels are involved–getting things done quickly and quietly to ensure success. I suppose that when you hold the purse strings to organizations such as FEMA, you can pretty much get what you want from the US&R program. Pork-barrel politics–you have to love `em! n
CHASE N. SARGENT, a 17-year veteran of the fire service, is a battalion chief of special operations with the Virginia Beach (VA) Fire Department. He has a bachelor`s degree in forestry and wildlife and a master of public adminstration degree with a major in local, state, and federal government. At the Oklahoma City Bombing, he served as night operations officer.
