TROUBLE IN OUR BRIDGES
Last year, I found myself facing an incident and contemplating a decision that I had not experienced in my 20 years in the fire service. At approximately 1700 hours, I was notified of a call to which a neighboring fire department was responding, possibly within my city’s boundaries.
As the acting battalion chief that day, I responded to the location. On arrival, an engine company from the Davie (FL) Fire Department was on scene and had stopped at the entrance ramp to 1-595 from the Sawgrass Expressway, where three major expressways converge and intersect. Responders were looking up toward the top of the ramp. The engine company officer reported that smoke was coming from the underside of the ramp at the highest portion of the bridge. Knowing that the all-concrete bridge is hollow inside and that its inner core is approximately 5/4 feet in height, I had one question: What could possibly be burning inside?
Battalion Chief Dave Reardon of the Davie Fire Department arrived. He said that he had received reports that gangs were using these bridges as hangouts and hideouts and that cults use them for their religious practices.
Dark smoke was evident from the pinnacle of the ramp, and cars passing under the ramp were slowing down to look at the smoke. The Davie engine company was sent to the top of the ramp to investigate. I sent one of my engine companies to the expressway below to see if there was a way to get to the fire from above or below. Engine companies had reported that access was not attainable from their locations. This ruled out flowing water down into the bridge. We established command and called the Department of Transportation (DOT) for advice about the bridge’s structure and concerns about possible structural integrity problems due to the fire.
The Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) arrived and was advised to stand by. I received a report that a hatch under the bridge had been located and was in the open position.
At this point, many questions were running through my mind: What’s burning? Is someone inside? If so, would they be hostile? This last question was the most distressing, considering that they could be gang or cult members.
At this point, the thought of entering the bridge moved from the back to the front of my mind. My primary concern now was for the safety of the firefighters, to protect them from possible hostile actions at the time of entry. We are trained to suppress fires and deal with all types of situations and emergencies, but we can’t stop bullets.
Standing at the command post, I had to make the following decisions: Do I send firefighters in? If I do. how can they be protected?
After conferring with Chief Reardon and the FHP, we elected to place two FHP officers into 60-minute SCBAs. They would proceed approximately 50 feet ahead of two firefighters also wearing 60-minute SCBAs. The estimated length from the hatch opening to the top of the bridge was 1,000 feet. Consequently. the 60-minute SCBA was used.
Using the incident management system (IMS), we established sectors and functions for better span of control. A medical rescue crew was called to the scene to stand by, and a “treatment sector” was established. We held a meeting at the command post with all personnel making entry to confirm strategy. The FHP troopers were instructed on how to use the SCBAs. All personnel were in place and entry was made.
The FHP troopers, with guns drawn, moved ahead of the firefighters. The entry firefighters, who were in full bunker gear, had with them hand lights and a pressurized water extinguisher. The time between the entry and the first radio report was the longest span of time I think I ever spent staring at my command radio.
Approximately 150 feet into the bridge, the remnants of a completely burned mattress were discovered, along with evidence that people inhabit this bridge. There were candles, clothing, and graffiti similar to that found outside the hatc h. The FHP and the firefighters proceeded to the top of the span and found no evidence of additional fire or that people were in the vicinity (no footprints in the concrete dust). A critique/ debriefing was held at the command post. At this time, DOT personnel arrived, and the bridge was turned over to them.
CRITIQUE
Some may question the decision to send the Highway Patrol in ahead of the firefighters and to place them in SCBAs with little training. I invite your comments. The actions I took, however, were based on the potential rescue and firefighter safety considerations. Standards on confined space rescue since have been published: thus, decisions such as those that arose during this incident are easier to make.
(Photos by author.)
The DOT explained that situations such as these pose an ongoing problem for them. They have had their own locks cut off hatches and replaced with non-DOT locks. FHP personnel reported that they have encountered situations in which people will rob a house and store the stolen items inside the bridge. More evidence since has been found to indicate that religious practices are being conducted inside this bridge.
This information can only alert us to approach incidents of this kind with more caution. Incident managers walk a fine line when deciding whether or not to go and the level of risk to which firefighters and other emergency workers should be exposed.
Should 1 be placed in the same situation again, 1 know that the same thoughts and concerns that surfaced during this incident will be there. Only by familiarizing ourselves with the bridges in our areas, training in confined space rescue, and increasing our awareness of the additional challenges and hazards these changing times present for responders will we be prepared to deal with these incidents.
