BY TOM LAKAMP
It has been 10 years since the tragic and untimely death of Cincinnati Firefighter Oscar Armstrong. On March 21, 2003, Armstrong was burned alive inside a single-family dwelling while operating as the nozzle man on an uncharged 1¾-inch fire line on a first-floor kitchen fire in a small two-story residence. This kitchen fire grew unimpeded, and a flashover occurred on the first floor, engulfing Armstrong and two other firefighters. An unfortunate series of events occurred on that fateful day. These events started before companies were ever dispatched to 1131 Laidlaw Avenue.
WHAT HAPPENED
To first examine why we fail and how we succeed as it relates to the tragic death of Firefighter Armstrong, let’s examine what caused his death and some of the key findings of the investigation of this fire. Before the fire, companies were not in quarters. Engine 2 (E-2), which should have been first on the assignment, was drilling with hose off its apparatus. Engine 9 (E-9) had a very young crew the day of the fire. In the back seat, E-9 had Armstrong, who had fewer than two years of experience, and a detailed firefighter with less than one year of experience. The captain of E-9 was a 20-year veteran of the department. The driver was a firefighter riding out of class acting as the fire apparatus operator; it was his first time driving the apparatus on an actual shift. The captain of E-9 wanted to ensure that the acting driver knew how to get water, how to transfer to hydrant supply, and the proper pumping pressures, so they were out of quarters and drilling way before the fire was dispatched.
During this drill, neither back-seat firefighter participated in the training and had no desire to learn about pumping an apparatus. When dispatched to the fire, E-9 was much closer, ended up arriving first on the assignment, and made the water supply connection with the front intake at a fire hydrant directly past the building.
The fire building was a wood-frame, two-story, single-family residence with a basement. The fire started accidentally in the kitchen. On arrival of the first-due companies, fire was venting from the rear of the structure at the kitchen. The structure was approximately 20 feet × 40 feet and had no access problems on flat terrain.
From the placement of E-9’s apparatus to the front of the building was approximately 100 feet, enabling a relatively easy stretch to the fire. E-9 deployed its rear long-bed preconnected 1¾-inch fire line that was 350 feet long. Armstrong took a shoulder load and proceeded to the front door with the captain. A 360˚ walk-around was not conducted, and the front door was the door of choice for the first company. The occupants left the “B” side door open. It would have allowed easy access to the kitchen fire by about a 10-foot stretch inside and one left turn. As Armstrong and the captain were stretching to the front door, the detail firefighter deployed the remaining 350 feet of hose in front of the building. Several piles of hose and severe kinks were between the apparatus and the building as a result of poor execution of the hose stretch. When Armstrong and the captain made it to the front door, it was locked. No effort was made to force entry, and the halligan tool was left mounted on the apparatus. Armstrong and the captain decided to proceed to the rear of the building and attack the fire head on from the rear door. When they arrived at the rear of the building, the first-arriving district chief was there and advised them to go back out front and attack from the “unburned side.”
At this point, a 360˚ walk-around still had not been conducted, and the chief remained in the rear of the building.
E-9 now had hose behind the apparatus, in the front yard, and along the “D” side of the building and was heading back to the front door.
As this was occurring, the fire had consumed the kitchen and was heating all surfaces in the open first-floor plan and sending hot smoke and extreme heat up the open staircase to the second floor.
As E-9 made its way to the front, the first-due ladder company arrived. Ladder company duties are typically split with an inside and an outside team. The inside team consists of an officer and a firefighter who force entry, search, and perform immediate rescues. The outside team consists of the driver and another firefighter, and they generally do outside vertical or horizontal ventilation, raise ladders, and rescue trapped persons.
The inside team started breaking windows in the rear of the building adjacent to the fire and down the “D” side toward the front as they made their way to the front of the building. This was all on the windward side of the fire. At this point, the fire line wasn’t in position at the front door, the front door was closed, and water had not been started in the fire line. The outside team placed the aerial to the roof and began roof operations. While this was occurring simultaneously, the detailed firefighters retrieved forcible entry tools and forced the front door as Armstrong and the captain were donning personal protection equipment (PPE). The detail firefighters and captain reported heavy, pressurized smoke conditions about one foot from the floor at the front door at this time.
E-2, which should have been first due but was delayed because of a training exercise, arrived around this time. The driver initially passed the main street, and the officer had to dismount the apparatus to stop traffic on a busy five-lane road. As E-2 made its way down the street, the fire building or E-9’s apparatus couldn’t be visualized because of the heavy smoke conditions outside the building. E-2’s driver assumed he would be using the hydrant in front of the building. When E-2 stopped, one of the firefighters left E-2 and joined E-9 on the front porch (splitting the crew without the officer’s knowledge). The E-2 officer notified his driver to reposition around the block to another hydrant and told his other firefighter to take a second line off E-9’s apparatus and proceed to the rear of the building. E-2 didn’t hear the initial on-scene report and didn’t pay attention to the location of the first line’s placement. The officer assumed the fire was in a car, in the garage, on a porch, or on the exterior as he assessed the building.
At this time, the district chief was still in the rear of the building. When he was faced with E-2’s stretching the second line to this location, he ordered them to the front to back up E-9.
As this was occurring, the captain of E-9 called for water after his PPE was donned. (From the first call for water until flashover, it was approximately 60 seconds.) He stated he waited a long time and water never came. He knew he wanted water prior to entry. After what he thought was a minute, he called for water the second time. (It was actually only 15 seconds.) At this time, the E-9 driver informed the officer that he started it the first time, and it was on its way.
Water was still nowhere in sight, and the officer decided that his two firefighters on the front porch couldn’t fix the water problem and assumed the firefighters driving in and out of classification position for the first time at a fire made a mistake. He decided he had to leave the porch and figure out the issue.
When he left the porch, he quickly realized there was a major pile of hose and water was stopped at some kinks, prohibiting water from progressing through the fire line. He was only 10 to 15 feet from the lines and decided it was best to just take care of this task himself. The kinks were removed, and water still had to travel through three or so sections of hose to reach the nozzle.
As the captain was flaking hose, the firefighters on the porch (Armstrong, the E-2 firefighter, and the E-9 detail firefighter) entered the structure with an uncharged hoseline. While inside, the detail firefighter on E-9 indicated it was extremely hot with zero visibility and heat pushed everyone to the floor. He thought he was only 10 feet inside from the porch and was third in line on the hoseline. He was worried and retreated on the hoseline a distance he estimated to be 10 feet at the edge of the porch and saw water coming through the hoseline toward his direction.
He went back into the building following the hose. This time, he stated it was even hotter, “unbearably” hot. His face was pushed to the floor. While his face was against the carpet, he noticed pressurized white “gas” or “smoke” issuing from the carpet in a vertical fashion. At that time, the structure flashed over, and he instinctively grabbed the firefighter in front of him and threw him toward the door from where he had just come. Luckily, both firefighters made it out with minor burns. Armstrong wasn’t as fortunate. He was trapped in the flashover on the first floor and succumbed to his injuries.
KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
In the enhanced line-of-duty-death (LODD) report issued in conjunction with the Cincinnati Fire Department and Cincinnati Fire Fighters International Association of Fire Fighters Local 48, 47 recommendations were made for the Cincinnati Fire Department. Among them were the following.
• Poor execution of hose stretch. The number one key issue was poor execution of a simple hose stretch. This was a fire that occurs almost every day across the United States in a structure that can be found in any community. The engine company was positioned at a hydrant in front of the residence, leaving the officer and two firefighters to perform the stretch. Oscar Armstrong should never have died with a hoseline in his hand at this fire.
• Key issues prior to the fire. The problems with hose deployment and several other issues occurred a long time prior to this fire:
–Inexperience was a key factor in this fire. The firefighter working out of classification was an inexperienced apparatus operator. Experienced drivers often break the long line so extra hose isn’t used and often follow the line from the engine to the building to remove any kinks.
–Inexperience also played a crucial role in the firefighters and makeup of E-9 on that fateful day. Both Armstrong and the detailed firefighter were relatively inexperienced.
–Training, or lack thereof, was also a major factor. At the time of the fire, the Cincinnati Fire Department had 800 firefighters; three personnel were responsible for all training, including recruit training. Needless to say, any formalized incumbent training was nearly nonexistent. Other than company level training initiated by company officers, training in basic firefighting functions didn’t occur. Proficiency in standard hose evolutions and truck company functions was lacking, or as the buzzword in the fire service states, “Many including those at that fire weren’t ‘battle ready.’” The key is to be ready for whatever job, be proficient, and always expect fire.
–Fireman-ship. Personnel have to have a desire and want to be a “firefighter.” This sometimes can’t be supplied by training. You have to be ready for your job, whatever is thrown at you, and not just work for the fire department because of the work schedule and benefits. Hoping that you “get by” should not be a combatant’s mindset.
• No recognition of impending flashover conditions. Poor fire behavior education existed for all rand-and-file prior to this incident. Other than for basic recruit training instruction on fire behavior and flashover, incumbents never received training on newer fire behavior issues, smoke reading, modern fuels and flashover recognition/survival.
• Engine companies working together. As with other organizations, many companies are driven by pride, and there is a strong desire to get water on the fire first. Prior to this incident, there was no focus on collective measures to place and support the first fire line.
• Uncoordinated fire attack and ventilation. Windows were broken on the windward side one to two minutes before the flashover, and when the front door was opened, all conditions got worse and rapidly advanced to flashover.
• Unsupervised personnel. The officer focused on task work and didn’t inform personnel to “stay put” when he left the porch and engaged in task-level work.
• Poor size-up and lack of a complete walk-around. The walk-around would have allowed direct access to the fire and would not have allowed crews to get deep inside the building without a charged hoseline because they would have been adjacent to the seat of the fire.
WHY DO WE FAIL?
As we outlined a brief review of the bad things that happened that allowed the dominos to fall correctly on that day, we can begin to create a list of reasons engine companies fail. They can be broken down into a few categories: lack of realistic hands-on training, lack of fire behavior education, poor discipline in operations and job assignments, nonexistent firefighting mindset, and physical and mental inability to perform. The biggest factor falls back to training and the lack of realistic hands-on training in basic skills. We focus on so many things in today’s fire service (emergency medical services, urban search and rescue, hazmat, fire prevention) that we lose focus on maintaining proficiency in our original mission. The original mission of saving lives and controlling fires is the most dangerous aspect of our job, and if we aren’t prepared for battle, eventually we will fail.
HOW DO WE SUCCEED?
How do we ensure engine companies always succeed? First, we have to get company officers involved and educated to ensure they are capable of preparing their members for battle. The success or failure of the company’s operations starts with the officer. The officer sets the tone and must have clear expectations of personnel. All training and expectations should strive to master the basics because muscle memory is developed through mastery of the basics and operating in extreme conditions will be second nature. If we expect to prevent future needless LODDs, our efforts as a fire department must focus on preparing our resources for response. This is best accomplished through training. You can’t only talk about what to do or watch it on TV. You must get out and do hands-on training frequently and strive for excellence in all aspects of a hose stretch and other critical firefighting tasks.
Personnel must be disciplined and focused on their tasks and areas of responsibility. If your job is to get the fire line from point “A” to point “B,” you must do everything in your power to ensure that you are capable and ready for this challenge and maintain your positioning (nozzle, backup, officer, door control, etc.). You must also show up to work with the proper mindset, expect to see fire on arrival, and know what you are going to do when you get there. Just as professional athletes prepare for games, the fireighters need to mentally and physically prepare for the jobs and assignments they will have to perform. You must mentally imagine how and when you will deploy, flake, and advance the fire line in a multitude of situations. You must practice each aspect of the skill in your assigned role and strive for perfection; only when perfected, will you be totally ready for battle. However, it doesn’t stop there. Skills you don’t perform will be lost, so repetition in training is essential to maintain skills along with mental and physical toughness and stamina.
GO MAKE A DIFFERENCE
It was an extremely bad day on March 21, 2001. As a department, we have learned a lot and improved operations as a result. We can’t afford as a department or fire service to have any more bad days. We will continue to be called to put out fires and rescue occupants. We must ensure that we are ready for our next battle. We must strive for perfection and become masters of basic firefighting skills. These skills need to be maintained and practiced thoroughly to ensure sound muscle memory. Failures or inability to perform the mental and physical aspects of this dangerous occupation can have deadly “preventable” consequences. Go train, master the basics, and ensure another firefighter doesn’t die with the nozzle in his hand.
BIO
TOM LAKAMP is a 25-year veteran of the Cincinnati (OH) Fire Department, where he serves as the district chief of special operations. He is an adjunct instructor in the University of Cincinnati Fire Science program. He has a bachelor’s degree in fire science and is a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program.
