“Smoking Monkeys and Two In/Two Out” (Editor’s Opinion, December 2009) was a good starting point for a discussion of the two-in/two-out requirement that should have been carried out 10 years ago. Out of the starting gate, the Federal CFR and National Fire Protection Association 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, have been in conflict regarding the use of the four on-scene firefighters to meet the standards. We should also look at whether or not the two-in/two-out requirement is truly meaningful as written.
CFR 1910.134(g) (4) Note 2 to paragraph (g), as quoted in the editorial, leaves much to the imagination. I would presume this has given many company officers with fewer than four crew members the latitude of “performing emergency rescue” by making entry to accomplish a primary search and just happening to extinguish the fire while searching. This is a solid tactical decision; getting in and stopping the growth of the fire early in the operation usually lead to a safer and timelier mitigation of the issue. When the fire goes away, the threat to victims and firefighters also decreases. Unless the company gets in trouble and needs the “two-out” team, all is well. Many departments have adopted the rule that a structure is occupied until the fire department performs primary and secondary searches to verify that the structure is unoccupied. Is this just a way for those departments to violate the two-in/two-out requirements as well?
One of the questions that comes to mind is, just what does that fourth member of the company provide that changes the risk tolerance threshold? If an engine company arrives with a crew of three (one officer and two firefighters) at a building that is involved to the point of being a “loser,” does the presence of the fourth crew member alter the status of the building or the fire involvement? I think not.
If the fire involvement has made the building unsafe for interior operations with a crew of three, then it is also unsafe with a crew of four. Would operations of the four-member crew be more efficient and safer if two crew members and the company officer were advancing that first handline into the building that has been determined to be safe enough for interior operations? Probably. Does that efficiency of three crew members placing the first handline in operation quickly have a greater impact on the overall safety of the operation than mandating that only two crew members can advance the handline while the other two crew members remain outside? Maybe.
Has the two-in/two-out standard led us to rely on our rapid intervention team (RIT) to get us out of situations that we should not have been in to begin with? Why does a driver want to drive so close behind the car in front of him on a wet road? Have antilock brakes and supplemental restraint systems in passenger cars given some drivers the attitude of having a “RIT” that will overcome their ill-fated driving decisions? Do fire companies extend themselves too far into untenable environments with the attitude that they can call a Mayday and the RIT will save them from their actions? It should be just as vital to train firefighters to recognize the limitations of personal protective equipment, recognize and predict fire behavior, know building construction dangers, and know basic tactics as it is to train them in self-rescue and RIT operations. Our goal should be never to have the need to activate the RIT to rescue a firefighter.
From the earliest version of NFPA 1500 to the current (2007) edition, the use of the four crew members was defined in appendix A.8.5.11. This definition is also where the most glaring conflict between the Federal CFR and NFPA standards exists. NFPA 1500 allows the company officer, or incident commander (IC), to divide the company in one of several combinations. The IC may make entry as the second member of the entry team; the IC job may be assigned to the apparatus operator and the third crew member remains outside as the “two out”; or the IC may remain outside and be the “two-out” crew along with the apparatus operator.
In my opinion, the optimal use of the four crew members would be for the company officer to remain outside with the apparatus operator as the “two-out” component while the other two crew members make entry as the “two-in” component. NFPA math tells us that 2 (entry crew) plus 1 (apparatus operator/rescuer) + 1 (IC/rescuer) = 4. The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard alludes to activities that the “two-out” crew can or cannot do and still be ready to assist the “two-in” crew should they get in trouble. This leads many to believe that the pump operator cannot be counted as part of the “two-out” team. However, the standard implies that a crew of four can accomplish interior operations. OSHA math tells us that 2 (entry crew) + 1 (IC/rescuer) + 1 (rescuer) + 1 (apparatus operator) = 4 crew members. Firefighting must fall in a 20-percent tax bracket because it takes five firefighters to get a crew of four.
The issue of the pump operator’s being used as part of the “two-out” crew should not be an issue at all. If faced with the choice of using the pump operator to facilitate a rescue of the entry crew or to stay with the pump, I would not hesitate to use the pump operator in a rescue attempt. We must remember that these standards address a very narrow time frame in the operation. There is only one team of no fewer than two employees inside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere. We can assume that there is probably only one fire company and one piece of apparatus on the scene. If the pump operator has charged the hoseline using booster tank water, there is very little that will go wrong until the engine runs out of booster tank water or fuel. Should the “two-out” crew have to make entry, incoming companies should be notified of the need for rescue of the entry crew. It should be set procedure that the second-in company assigns someone to assume the role of pump operator and address any issues that may have arisen while the pump operator is engaged in the rescue. Although many scenarios can be created, the bottom line is that once the pump is engaged and is flowing water from the booster tank, the likelihood that it will continue to operate correctly until the water supply is exhausted is high enough to send the pump operator in for firefighter rescue.
If, according to the OSHA standard, the fourth crew member who remains outside with the IC to make up the rescue crew cannot be the pump operator, can the fourth crew member engage in other valuable tasks such as horizontal ventilation? The OSHA standard only allows for one of the “two-out” crew to be assigned another duty other than the rescue of the interior crew, so the IC takes that slot by being both a rescuer and the IC. Does the pump operator (that phantom fifth crew member) have to be assigned to do other tasks on the exterior such as horizontal ventilation? If so, is this “jeopardizing the safety or health of any other firefighter working the incident,” as is forbidden by the OSHA standard?
To be helpful, both the NFPA and the OSHA standards should be written so that following one standard means you are following the other standard. Some parts should remain. RIT is a must. Working in teams of no fewer than two is a must. Remaining in voice or visual contact is a must.
But if the standard is going to require four crew members as the minimum to engage in interior operations, then the standard should take the step and mandate minimum staffing of four crew members in a fire company. If a department chooses to use red and white chevrons on the rear of an apparatus in place of the NFPA-mandated green and red, that department has accepted the consequences should someone be injured as a result of the modification. Likewise, if a department chooses to staff a fire company with fewer than four crew members, then the department would knowingly be violating an OSHA standard and should be willing to pay the consequences should an understaffed company perform interior fire operations and suffer an injury to a crew member. A department could choose to mandate that a three-member company perform only exterior operations until the arrival of more firefighters, but that is probably not realistic.
The standard should be altered to allow the use of the limited resources on-scene to best improve the operating conditions for the “two-in” crew. Until the arrival of more companies, the focus of all activities performed by the “two-out” crew should be to support the “two-in” crew and make the interior operations safer. The IC must be held accountable if the “two-out” crew cannot fulfill its primary mission of firefighter rescue. But the IC must also be able to address as many issues as possible that will have an impact on the interior operations while maintaining readiness for what may occur. The measure of whether the “two-out” crew is fulfilling its duties is determined not only if the “two-in” crew gets in trouble and the “two-out” crew can assist them out of harm’s way. Successful performance by the “two-out” crew can also be measured by the tasks that support the “two-in” crew, leading to an uneventful and positive outcome to the early phase of the incident.
Harold Hoskins
Battalion Chief
Lexington (KY) Fire Department
Smoke-control systems benefit firefighters
This is in response to “Smoke-Control Systems” (Roundtable, January 2010) by Assistant Chief John “Skip” Coleman. We at Marriott International have been installing smoke control/smoke exhaust and stairwell pressurization in all our high-rise properties six stories and above around the world for more than 25 years now.
It is still amazing to us that so many in the nation’s operational fire services community are still not as well trained on this proven technology as Chief Coleman’s article and the comments offered in support indicate. Our experience with smoke exhaust has been hugely successful, and we have for years now helped interested fire personnel understand how the systems operate. Smoke-control systems, also commonly referred to as smoke exhaust systems, make a huge difference for occupants and first responders during fire events; we are glad to report that these systems are relatively few and typically are more easily controlled because of our requirements for a broad range of built-in protection—including smoke control—in addition to “systems” such as sprinkler, alarm, kitchen hood protection, that are supported by our emphasis on fire-safe furniture and furnishings, not to forget the ongoing emergency preparedness training for our associates.
This is not to say we don’t have our challenges, for indeed we do. That is why our staff of 45 fire and life safety professionals is on the road nonstop inspecting existing properties. Additionally, we test all systems for compliance prior to acceptance of new properties—before they are allowed to open—and on a daily basis assist hotel associates in properties large and small in communities of all sizes to understand our expectations of their own testing of these systems. In addition to working with our hotel associates, we also interact daily with others interested in fire and life safety from the public and private sectors on all manner of emergency procedures and protocols, too.
It does concern us that there may be responders who might even seek to disable smoke-control systems because of a lack of understanding regarding the importance of automatic smoke-control measures. Sadly, it could even be that some fire departments may end up working against these built-in safety systems, which are designed to contribute to their safety and efficiency by using manual (positive-pressure) ventilation, popping of stairway scuttles, or turning off the very systems that can make their operations more effective.
We were recently surprised to learn that one major urban U.S. fire department had received significant federal grant funds to test the effectiveness of smoke control even though we already had a number of high-rise properties in their jurisdiction with such systems that have worked well for us for two and a half decades now. I must also add that I have empathy for fire personnel in that we’ve seen designs—and also a few initial installations—so nightmarish that we totally rejected them, opting instead for simpler, more effective systems. Thus, my concern is that there must be systems out there, in buildings other than ours, that use approaches certain to be unacceptably complicated to building maintenance personnel and firefighters.
We are always available to answer questions from fire officials including fire marshals, command personnel, and training officers on how smoke-control systems function and how they can assist in making fire department operations go smoothly. We commend Chief Coleman on helping increase the awareness of smoke control for your readers.
Sonny Scarff
Senior Director
Corporate Fire Protection
Marriott International
Bethesda, Maryland
Editor’s note: Marriott Fire Protection (MFP) is part of the Risk Management Department of Marriott International, the parent corporation of 20 hotel brands including Ritz-Carlton, J.W. Marriott, Bulgari, Renaissance, Residence Inn, Courtyard, Fairfield Inn, SpringHill Suites, and TownePlace Suites. Marriott International ensures fire and life safety in more than 500,000 guest rooms around the world by strict compliance to fire safety codes and practices as a core business ethic. MFP is comprised of an industry leading staff of fire professionals from a wide range of experiences. A primary job requisite of an MFP associate is service in a firefighting and rescue department in an urban/suburban setting. The hard work of MFP has resulted in many fire-related awards over the years. Other milestones include being the first in the hotel industry to retrofit automatic sprinkler systems in hotels in 1982 (before national codes required such protection).
