THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
BILL MANNING
We all know fireground commanders must have methods to account immediately for personnel on a fireground or other incident scene. And in a paramilitary organization, holding members accountable to authority helps ensure that the chain of command is kept intact, which has a direct bearing on span of control and firefighter safety and effectiveness.
Beyond these two accepted definitions of accountability (“to account for” and “be answerable to”), we often disagree on the methods for achieving the goal. But far worse, we are perpetuating the myth that plastic and fasteners can substitute for leadership.
Not too long ago at a national conference, I served as moderator for a distinguished panel on accountability. There were some interesting ideas brought forth. But afterward, I kicked myself because I felt I didn`t stress two key points sufficiently.
First, the typical accountability system, if properly followed, will give you a quick accounting of who is missing, but it won`t necessarily give you their location–that is, you may get a general “last known location,” but when the first floor is in the basement, all bets are off. A conference attendee said it bluntly, “Accountability tags are really firefighter dog tags for identification after the fact.” In a sense, he`s right.
Second, just as many acknowledge that the company officer is the true measure of the fire department. By extension, the company officer is the central figure in the accurate accounting of operating personnel. He is the critical link in the span of control from command to troops.
With the decimation of company staffing over the past 20 years, the typical American company officer is forced to compensate by performing procedural necessities that otherwise would have been performed by one or two now missing members. And you cannot have full control and full accountability if you`re elbows-deep in fireground tasks.
From somewhere I can hear at least one voice protesting, “But now the company officer`s got fewer people to manage!” True, but when you`re focused on tasks, tunnel vision is inevitable. You`re not reading warning signs. Not reading the building. Not reading the effect of tactics on fire development. You`re not focused on yourself, much less two other people who are your responsibility.
Company-level supervision has been sabotaged by the plundering of companies. And not a system or tag or passport in the world can overcome that.
The company officer has been handed the short stick from city management and fire chiefs. And if the company officer cannot fulfill his function as a working supervisor–not a worker–then the men and women on the line are grievously shortchanged.
If you wonder why we continue to lose large numbers of firefighters in burning buildings (I`d like to be able to assume, for argument`s sake, that the firefighters operating in the building are well-schooled in the art of real firefighting, but we can`t even be sure of that anymore), in many cases we need to look no further than fireground numbers and company-level supervision.
I`ve heard it said we`re being too hard on ourselves and on our chosen systems. What is this, a game of Kick the Can? All across America, we`ve grown accustomed to reaching for quick-fix, “systems-based” or hardware solutions for problems that can only be solved by human beings, by human behavior. As it was said in the conference I mentioned, “We bought a system, not a solution.”
We`ve given up the personal/team responsibility part of the equation for game-board firefighting, convincing ourselves all the while that it will keep us safe and “accounted for.”
That`s really another subtle version of CYA management. Accountability systems are good tools with limitations used as a cover-up for at least part of what`s ailing this fire service. It`s much more comfortable for fire managers, after a serious firefighter injury, to hold up a tag system in front of their bosses and call it “an unavoidable tragedy” than to accept responsibility for the real problems on the fireground: lack of experience, lack of training, lack of communications, lack of resources, and lack of company-level accountability–all conditions we have created ourselves.
The company officer must be given the opportunity to leverage his leadership and fireground management skills where the rubber meets the road. To do that, he needs people.
Mayors, city managers, council persons, and, yes, fire chiefs are engaged in a very dangerous game. In complicity, they`re rolling the dice, really–betting that firefighter line-of-duty deaths will be spaced far enough apart so that their payout will be far exceeded by the money saved from cutting personnel.
It`s high time the dice rollers were held accountable in a new accountability system, one that ascribes blame for a firefighter death squarely where it belongs.
Let`s hope when the officer comes to take your dog tag, you`re still breathing.
