THE COST OF FREEDOM
BILL MANNING
From October 1997 to September 1999, the United States endured at least 12 mass killings or mass shootings of innocent people–an average of one every two months. The recent massacres in Paducah, Springfield, Littleton, Atlanta, Fort Worth, and elsewhere are a blight on the American consciousness.
Random acts of mass violence are the cost of freedom, the price of living in a free society, American style.
Five of the 12 mass shootings occurred in schools, two in church gatherings, and the majority of the others in institutional or business settings. High-powered weapons generally were used. At least two of the incidents involved explosive devices. In six incidents, the killers were teenagers–or younger. In nine of the 12, the victims included children. All of the shootings involved innocent victims.
And these are the incidents that made the big headlines! How many attempted mass killings have been foiled or aborted? How many are “in the making” as we speak?
Some believe this, like other social “rashes,” will peak and die out, that it`s just a “craze du jour” of the sick and twisted. But given that psychopaths are among us–in their heads living a movie whose screenplay calls for a very unhappy ending–it would be utterly foolish to gamble against anything but continued random violence against assemblies of innocent citizens. As such, fire departments must be prepared for such “tactical ultraviolence,” a term coined by Assistant Chief Gary Seidel and Captain Donald Lee of the Los Angeles City Fire Department.
Seidel and Lee are no strangers to fire department response under the threat of violence. Both have been involved in establishing departmentwide response protocols to mass casualty and terrorist incidents. At the invitation of Littleton (CO) Fire Department Chief William Pessemier, the two participated in an after-action analysis of the response to the shootings at Columbine High School and published a paper summarizing key issues and lessons learned from the incident (see also “Fire Department Response to the Columbine Tragedy,” Fire Engineering, September 1999).
They write: “This new culture in criminal violence [tactical ultraviolence] is directed not only at specified victims, but … at emergency service providers …. The rationale for employing tactical ultraviolence is predatory control of the immediate criminal environment through the creation of chaos and the infliction of terror, trauma, and death on presenting targets. The goal … has no other purpose other than to generate multiple casualties …. The potential here for collateral injury to responders is enhanced ….”
In Littleton, firefighter-paramedics were exposed to a hail of gunfire as they treated victims. And they were by no means dressed for the occasion. We were very fortunate that day not to have had to add names to the memorial stones in Emmitsburg.
It has been shown, in Littleton and other communities wracked by such terrorism, that to respond safely and successfully to tactical ultraviolence requires a “holistic effort,” as Seidel and Lee put it.
This means that fire departments not only must sit at the table with law enforcement, emergency management, hospitals, schools, and other service providers to develop an integrated response plan but must think nontraditionally to develop new response mechanisms to deal with tactical ultraviolence. Safety demands it; you will be called to respond, and you will be exposed.
The Sacramento (CA) Fire Department (SFD), for one, is on the cusp of the “SWAT fire-medic” concept, in which firefighter-paramedics in body armor protection will respond as a complement to law enforcement`s traditional SWAT teams. But the idea is “still in its infancy,” according to Division Chief Leo Baustian, human resources chief for the SFD. “We don`t have definite answers yet to such questions as, Will the fire-medics run with the police units? Whom do we train? Will they carry firearms? Would the fire-medics wait until the area is secured before making entry, or would they be right behind the initial entry team, taking some calculated risks?” There are many questions, but this is a start. And start we must; surely, the “T-shirt” response is unacceptable.
The fire service is (and has for a number of years been) the principal provider of emergency medical services in our communities. As such, in response to tactical ultraviolence and other forms of terrorism, the fire department has parity, a mutual reliance, with law enforcement. There is abundant justification to receive additional funding to compensate for what will be yet another expansion of fire department services.
Seidel and Lee write: “The implication is clear. Public safety risk managers must reassess current response strategies. Consideration must be given to existing vulnerability and the attendant consequences associated with exposure to acts of ultraviolence. Managers must develop exposure methodologies that include the use of ballistic garments, law enforcement escorts during tactical operations, awareness to potential secondary devices, rapid rescue and medical intervention to tactical teams, common communications, and in pragmatic unified command procedures for all responding agencies. These methodologies must be incorporated into all-risk tactical operation plans.”
Tactical ultraviolence response isn`t the latest buzzword. It`s the cost of freedom in America.
