THE CAL STATE NORTHRIDGE FIRES
THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE
At 0755 hours on January 17, I was directed by Battalion Chief Larry Schneider to respond with my three Tac Team engine companies to the Cal State Northridge campus, 18111 Nordhoff Street, to investigate reported structure fires. There, I found three science laboratories, each approximately 400by 50-foot, threestory masonry buildings. Smoke was showing on the third floor of Buildings 1 and 2. All three showed signs of minor structural damage from the earthquake, and all three were placarded with the number “4” in each section of the diamond.
Two teachers were in Building 1. 1 directed Engine 90 to interview these teachers, search the rest of the building for occupants, and-if it could lx* safely accomplished-perform a reconnaissance on the fire. Engine 90 reported back that they could handle a small fire and would need additional water. 1 directed them to find hydrants with water-there was no water in the hydrants in the immediate area.
The fire in Building 2 was well-advanced and spreading rapidly. Engine 10 directed handlines onto the fire but had only limited success. Members found a hydrant with residual water and were able to apply water to the fire intermittently. Engine 10 was withdrawn when material began to explode in the lab. About 30 to 40 explosions occurred.
Radio communications were very difficult due to the very high traffic volume. One channel completely failed while 1 was requesting additional companies and could not be used. The reserve sedan was not equipped with a cellular phone. Eventually, additional companies were requested, including a haz-mat task force, as was the County Health Department. The time was now 0822 hours.
At 0845 hours, a small amount of smoke began to show’ on the first floor, east end of Building 3, in what appeared to be an equipment area. Engine 18 was sent to investigate but could not find the source. At about this time, firefighters knocked down the fire in Building 1. Later investigation showed the cause to be either heating devices knocked over in the earthquake or the reaction of spilled chemicals that ignited combustibles.
By 09(H) hours, additional companies began to arrive and were used to increase our water supply. Task Force & Squad 39 arrived at 0915 hours, and I conducted a planning meeting. 1 directed Captain Arturo Resendez of Sq-39 to determine the types and quantities of chemicals in the fire area. We decided to develop a continuous water supply using a relay from an operable hydrant 8(H) feet away and a 1,000-foot relay from pumps operating from draft in swimming pools at the north end of the campus.
The explosions in Building 2 had stopped, and wagon batteries (master stream devices permanently mounted on hose wagons or pumpers) with tank water were positioned at the access driveway between the buildings to limit the spread of fire. At 0918 hours. Engine 16, while investigating to determine if the roof of Building 3 could be used to apply water on Building 2, found a fire on the third floor of Building 3. 1 directed Engine 90 to assist with locating and investigating this fire. After determining that an attack could be made on this small fire with a reasonable degree of safety for all members, an interior attack was initiated.
Battalion Chief Robert Teachenor, with five companies, arrived at 0920 hours and was designated “West Division.” I directed him to check for water in the mains on the west side of campus. Captain Dave Bolding of Fire Station 84 arrived and volunteered his services. I designated him “water resource officer,” directing him to find water and make necessary company movements.
Within 10 minutes of the initial attack, the fire in Building 3 was knocked down. Meanwhile, members applied heavy streams from wagon batteries into Building 2 and at 0944 hours reported that the fire had been knocked down. Firefighters continued to direct handlines into the second and third floors of that building from exterior positions.
Many teachers, doctors, and students had arrived on the scene and were assisting Sq-39 with identification of the materials in the fire area. All radioactive substances were located; it was determined that these materials were not near any of the fires. Resendez. conferring with campus doctors, scientists, and students. plotted out the fire area. Amounts and types of hazardous materials located in these areas were determined using documents supplied by these individuals. Campus technicians expressed concern about the laboratory across the hall from the main fire in Building 2. After meeting with all concerned, a plan for a limited interior attack to cut off attic fire spread was approved.
By 1000 hours, water supply was relatively plentiful. Teachenor’s strike team brought handlines to the west side of Building 2. Task Force 39 entered on the upwind side of the third floor with blowers ventilating ahead of them and quickly determined that the fire had not penetrated the attic into the south side. They extinguished the remaining fire in the lab area, left lines in place, and exited. All members were in full turnouts and self-contained breathing apparatus at all times.
Engine 10 entered the second floor of Building 2 and extinguished small fires there, then exited. All fires now were extinguished. TF & Sq-39 remained on scene to wait for the County Health Department and secure the scene.
