THE BALTIMORE CONFLAGRATION
Description of ths Fire by an Eye-Witness With the New York Contingent.
A correspondent of FIRE AND WATER ENGINEERING who was present at last week’s conflagration in Baltimore, and was an eye-witness of the fire from almost the beginning to the end, gives some interesting details of that terrible disaster.
ROUNDUP: Baltimore 1904: ‘Building After Building Fell A Prey to the Flames’
He states that the building in which the fire started was equipped with an automatic fire alarm system, and, notwithstanding that fact, the fire must have been under way for fully fifteen minutes before the firemen received the alarm. The street box was pulled, and was promptly followed by a third alarm, and then by a general alarm. During the progress of the fire forty-three different alarms were sent in. He states that the city was not properly equipped with a sufficient amount of apparatus; it is doubtful, however if a greater number of engines would have stopped the conflagration after the headway it had gained. The fact that the city hall, courthouse and the post office were not destroyed seems remarkable from the fact that the fire raged all round these buildings, and their being saved can be accounted for only from the fact that the wind shifted at that particular time. Chief Horton, who worked nobly, was disabled early in the fire on Sunday by a shock from a live wire. During some of the time after his retirement former Chief McAfee was in charge, but during the greater progress of the fire and up to the last Assistant Chief Emerich had full charge. The fire seemed to work its own sweet will until it reached Jones’s Falls. Just before this point was reached the New York fire contingent, consisting of nine engines and one truck, under the direction of Chief of Battalion John P. Howe, came upon the scene, and it is stated that they practically stayed the flames on the Baltimore side of the creek. This was very fortunate for the Baltimore department, and it is beyond doubt that, had it not been for the efforts of the New York men, the fire would probably have extended to the large wharves in that vicinity. Chief Emerich stated that they had made during the fire about 300 hydrant connections, and he estimates that the loss of fire hose will exceed 6,000 feet, besides one steamer and one eighty-five-foot Hayes truck. The excessive heat compelled the firemen to keep constantly shifting their positions, and in this way considerable water pressure was lost from abandoning open hydrants He also states that, so far as he could leant, there was not a lack of water. During the period in which the fire raged the men of the department got practically no sleep. On Monday evening, after the fire was under control, Chief Emerich asked Chief Howe if he could not keep his companies and men there all night, as the Baltimore men were exhausted. Chief Howe replied, “Certainly.” Six companies of the Baltimore department then went home for their first night’s sleep. The New York contingent went to Baltimore in two sections—one over the Baltimore and Ohio and the other over the Pennsylvania railway. The time consumed in the trip was only four and one-half hours. The companies returned in one section over the Pennsylvania road, and along the route from Baltimore to Jersey City, they were received with the greatest enthusiasm, especially when they were met by Commissioner Hayes and Chief
Croker at the latter city. The territory burned was three-quarters mile long and one-half mile wide The members of the Baltimore fire department worked with superhuman efforts to control the flames, and the colored company from Washington received considerable praise for the work it performed. The Washington companies’ couplings did not fit the hydrants, and, in order to render as much service as possible, they procured barrels, which were kept filled from the hydrants and furnished suction for their engines. The Philadelphia companies could not render very much service until the fire worked its way down to Jones’s creek, and they were enabled to take suction from the bay. From the experience of our correspondent lie states that the rapidity with which the fire spread cannot be described, as a seven or eight-story building was destroyed in about thirty minutes. He thinks that, had it not been for the number of fireproof buildings in the city, there is no stating how much farther the flames would have spread. The iron fronts of buildings, as soon as they became heated, seemed to fall across the street, destroying those on the opposite side. This shows that some other material must he devised for the flooring of the so-called fireproof buildings, as the fire bricks seemed to disintegrate and fall apart almost as soon as the hot fire struck them. It was fortunate in one respect that the fire did not occur during one of the regular working days, as almost all the buildings were closed for Sunday, and the employes were not present. Had these people been on duty, there is no doubt that a great loss of life would have resulted. The district in which the fire occurred was the principal business portion of the city. People who have visited Baltimore will bear in mind that some of the large office buildings that were located at West Baltimore street. Calvert street, back of Fayette street and up through the dry goods district, including the Hurst
building where the fire originated, were all destroyed. It was soon realised that, with the wind blowing as it did, everything in its course would he destroyed in the direction of Jones’s creek. The Hurst build ing was a department store similar to the old Macy building at the corner of Fourteenth street and Sixth avetute. Manhattan, New York, and it contained a full assortment of inflammable materials. It was, therefore, only a question of a fire starting in a structure of this kind to know that the firemen could not possibly cope with it. especially when the wind was blowing at the rate of thirty miles an hour in the direction of large wholesale buildings.
A lesson to be learned by Baltimore from this fire is, that the city must be properly equipped with fire apparatus, and that the new buildings to he constructed on the sites of the old structures must be more substantia! and strictly fireproof. Our correspondent states that during the whole progress of the fire the city was under martial law, and that all saloons were closed. He noticed only one case of intoxication during the whole time inside the fire zone. To this fact may be attributed that there was practically no loss of life. There was only one fireman from York, Pa., seriously hurt, who had his leg broken in trying to get away from falling walls. Chief Horton had engine company No. 6’s house turned into a hospital, with surgeons, assistants, and nurses, who attended to all the men who were overcome from the hard work. It is pleasing, however, to state that these men, to the number of forty or fifty, all recovered from the injuries they sustained. It is a remarkable fact that during all the excitement and the great number of buildings that collapsed so rapidly, so few casualties have been recorded. Owing to the inexperience of using dynamite, the efforts to blow down the buildings were not effective. In one instance dynamite was applied to a large building with the intention of razing it; but. instead of accomplishing the object, a large building almost a block away received the shock, and all the windows were demolished; and this might he said in other cases where the effort was made to use dynamite. In this connection, it might be well for a few of the firemen in all departments to be properly drilled in the use of explosives, as a great number of large fires in the United States might have been prevented from spreading, if some of the men had been skilled in leveling buildings. In New Yorkcitv there is an organisation of sappers and miners; but, as it is difficult to practise with dynamite in the city, they have little experience in their work.
It was a dreadful sight that Chief Howe and his aids witnessed, as they traveled through the district devastated by the flames. Over small mountains of burning debris that filled the streets, crumbling walls of tall buildings threatened to fall upon the party, and in almost every collapsed building tongues of fire were leaping out, making the tour of inspection the more difficult. It took Chief Howe eight hours to ascertain the exact situation, so that he could report to the commissioner. The large quantities of hose abandoned at the hydrants showed how quickly the firemen had to retreat from the excessive heat. In bis investigation of the burned district, Battalion Chief John P. Howe, of the New York city fire department, was accompanied by Captain Wm. Reilly, of hook and ladder company No. 5; A. F. Volgenau, private secretary to Commission er Hayes; Dr. H. M. Archer and S. J. Rosenthal, chief clerk of the fire department. The following is a list of the New York fire companies that were sent to Baltimore: Battalion Chiefs John P. Howe and Joseph Shea (in charge of the department’s hospital stables). Detailed to Chief Howe as aides were Firemen Wash. Howe, engine company No. 17, and Frank C. Kelly. The fire companies and foremen were as follows: Engitte company No. 7, Assistant Foreman Bandrick. with eleven men; engine company No. 5, Foreman Walsh and Assistant Foreman Carlock, with eleven men; engine company No. 31, Assistant Foreman Wilkinson, with
nine men; engine company No. 13, Assistant Fore man Tullwa, with nine men; engine company No. 12, Assistant Foreman McLaughlin, with ten men; engine company No. 33, Foreman Behler and Assistant Foreman Tea re, with eleven men; engine company No. 27, Foreman Doonan, with nine men; engine company No. 16, Assistant Foremen Regan and Mitsch, with ten men; engine company No. 26, Foreman Gieger. with nine men; hook and ladder truck No. 5, Captain William Reilly, with ten men.
ELECTRIC VIRES AT BALTIMORE.
A correspondent writes as follows:
The streets in the burned district of Baltimore presented a network of overhead wires all live. Against these Chief Horton had over and over again vigorously protested. Outside, therefore, they formed a source of danger and handicapping to the firemen. From within they were apparently the same, and, if, at least, the fire which started in the Hurst building, where the conflagration originated, was caused by an electric light wire falling against a tank of combustible fluid and causing an explosion, the department, which is thoroughly well organised, but might be stronger manned and better equipped, was on hand at once and began a fight in every way well directed. But the overhead wires had to be reckoned with. They caused a loss of time and the fire, which had got big headway before it was discovered was burning furiously the while. Soon the wires began to fall. They came in contact with the firemen and their apparatus. They fell across the hose which became conductors of electricity to such an extent as to drive the firemen back, owing to the shocks they inflicted upon them. It was then that Chief Horton was so badlly injured and put out of the fight. Through the confusion thus caused more time was lost, and the flames, fanned by the tierce wind, got the upper hand of the department. Probably the city authorities will now see that Chief Horton’s former warnings were not without foundation. It is hard, however, that the role he played should have been that of a Casandra, the prophetess of Troy, on whom was placed the curse that the truth of her prophecies should never he believed till their direful fulfilment was accomplished.
