BY STEPHEN MARSAR
Editor’s note: Part 1 was published in the December 2009 issue; Part 2, in the July 2010 issue. The Survivability Profiling series of articles is based on “Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-Up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York,” prepared by the author as part of the National Fire Academy Executive Leadership Course. It was selected as one of the 2010 Outstanding Research Award recipients. You can review and download a copy of all of the outstanding research projects from the U.S. Fire Administration’s Web site at www.usfa.fema.gov/nfa/efop/applied_research/awards.shtm.
When we look at national firefighter statistics,1 we see that less than half of one percent of civilian fire fatalities occur in the same structural fires where firefighters are killed. Over the past four years, 102 firefighters have been killed in structural fires, yet only five civilians were killed in those same fires. Combining this knowledge with the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation’s 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives2 and the International Association of Fire Chiefs’ development project for the Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting Safety,3 we may be able to lower the number of structural firefighter fatalities.
To put this new knowledge into practice, we will use one of the most succinctly written procedures pertaining to firefighter survival and the use of survivability profiling. It comes from the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department’s “Safety and Risk Management”4 standard operating procedure. It reads as follows:
- A fire in a rear bedroom of a house, with smoke throughout, may allow a survivable environment if a search and rescue effort is initiated quickly. We may extend limited risk, in a calculated manner, in these conditions.
- A significant fire in a residence with dense smoke under pressure to floor level throughout likely means victims could not survive. A very cautious, initial fire control followed by a calculated rescue operation would be warranted.
- A well-involved structure would likely represent a zero survivability profile. Similar conditions in an abandoned structure would indicate little survivability and little property to be saved. Members should avoid an initial offensive fire attack.
Let’s break down these words paragraph by paragraph and add photos to illustrate how the concept of survivability profiling may help save firefighters’ lives.
(1) A fire in a rear bedroom of a house, with smoke throughout, may allow a survivable environment if a search and rescue effort is initiated quickly. We may extend limited risk in a calculated manner in these conditions. (Photo by Nicholas Stein.)
Discussion of Photo 1: This photo shows a car fire in an attached garage. An attack hoseline and at least one backup line are in place. A third line is already charged and being advanced to follow and protect the search crews entering the front door. With a relatively light smoke condition emanating from the front door (note the ladder company member just inside the front door initiating the primary search), this is probably a situation where survivability profiling would warrant a quick and calculated interior search—starting in the area (bedroom) immediately above the fire for life and fire extension. Considering the response time, the number of responding members, and reports of people trapped (or not), the survivability of trapped civilians may be relatively high if the searches are performed quickly. Conversely, anyone in the immediate fire area would not survive.
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| (2) A significant fire in a residence with dense smoke under pressure to the floor level throughout likely means victims could not survive. A very cautious, initial fire control followed by a calculated rescue operation would be warranted. (Photo courtesy of author.) |
Discussion of Photo 2: Taken from the exposure 3/4 or C/D corner, we see a significantly advanced fire condition in the exposure 2/3 or B/C corner. Apparently, the fire is extending up the eaves on the exterior (to the bottom right of the chimney), or perhaps it is already burning on the second floor. There is a heavy smoke condition, under pressure, from the second-floor window, puffing from the top of the first-floor window (with the air-conditioner). Note the barely visible firefighter inside the front porch doorway surrounded by the first floor’s heavy smoke, which is down to his boots. A 360° size-up would have picked up on these clues. Survivability profiling of this structure should be telling you that the chance of civilian survival is extremely limited or perhaps nonexistent. Safety prudence should dictate attacking the fire first and conducting searches when it is relatively safe for the operating forces to do so. What do we say to a family member standing at the command post telling us the family members are still inside? We say, “We are doing everything we can.”
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| (3) A well-involved structure would likely represent a zero-survivability profile. Similar conditions in an abandoned structure would indicate little survivability and little property to be saved. Members should avoid an initial offensive fire attack. (Photo courtesy of author.) |
Discussion of Photo 3: A 360° size-up would indicate a severe fire throughout the structure; the fire probably started in the basement. The amount of visible free-burning, fully developed flames out of many openings and the limited amount of smoke (which indicates an advanced stage of fire and almost complete combustion) indicate zero survival chances for anyone trapped within the structure.
A multi- or perhaps a double-pronged attack using a careful combination of exterior master streams followed by, or in conjunction with, limited interior water application would be called for.
WHAT WOULD YOU DO?
Now, it’s your turn. You’ve been given some examples of how the concept of survivability profiling can be applied. Here’s the scenario: You are the first-arriving officer/incident commander at each of the following scenes. Applying the concept of survivability profiling, would you commit your firefighters to an immediate search and rescue operation, or would you darken down the fire first and complete the searches when it is relatively safe for operating forces to do so?
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| (4) Don’t be deceived by this photo. The smoke condition doesn’t look all that bad. At night, it may even seem to be a fairly minor fire on the first floor (if you did a 360° size-up and ruled out a basement fire). So, crews committed. The firefighters are in the front door with a charged hoseline, and they put out the fire. If the staircase is just inside the door, a quick run up for searches seems reasonable. (Photos 4-6 by Paul Szymanski.) |
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| (5) From the exposure 2/B side, we probably are thinking a first-floor fire in the 2/3, B/C corner. The charged line seems to be making progress from the front door as exterior VES is being performed. |
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| (6) What the heck? The line is advancing and hitting the fire. Although the smoke and pressure may increase slightly as the water introduces air into the fire area, it should change in short order to that nice grayish/white color that all officers, particularly the IC, want to see. Are there savable people in this structure? |
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| (7) There it is! There is that gray/whitish smoke we want to see. However, as the thermal-pane windows are being vented from the exterior, we start to see a much different story. Even the first-floor picture window, where the line is operating, is showing that things are not what they first appeared to be. What are the volume, pressure, and color of the smoke that was previously hidden saying to us? Have we committed too far? Are the trapped occupants savable? (Photo by Peter Hart.) |
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| (8) Things are getting worse. What are the reports from the inside and rear sectors telling us? If we’ve already committed interior searchers to the second floor, do we have a means of protecting them? Portable ladders are great if the windows are vented and the firefighters who need them know where they are. Survivable victims? Did you get fooled? (Photo by Paul Szymanski.) |
Admittedly, attempting to make a cultural change in the mindset of firefighters is not easy. However, given the right tools, along with a little bit of knowledge, time, and perhaps some prodding, firefighters will excel. They will accomplish any task.
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| (9) You can apply survivability profiling even in mid-rise or high-rise fire resistive buildings. Is anyone alive in this fire apartment? Probably not, at this stage. What about the floor above and the adjoining apartments? Survival remote from the fire is more likely in a fire resistive building. However, what about several floors above or on the top floor? Searches will be labor intensive and must be done quickly. Each stairwell, floor, and even the roof must be searched as quickly as possible. The attack stair must be searched but only from the safety of the floor landings. Searching the attack stair from within is flirting with disaster. (Photo by Stephen “Butch” Moran.) |
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| (10) Although remote survival is more likely in multistory commercial or multiple dwellings, we must also consider weather effects on these structures. Wind is the weather factor that has the most detrimental effect on fire, as it alone can overtake all of the other firefighting efforts. Stack effect is another phenomenon with which we must contend. Smoke in multistory structures does not always go up. In instances where the building is cooler on the inside than the surrounding outside air, reverse stack effect may take place, and smoke and toxic gases will move downward. This will affect and hamper firefighting crews long before they reach the fire floor and the floors above the fire. It will also cause potential harm to civilians in areas we usually don’t expect to find them—below the fire area or below the fire floor. (Photo by Lt. John P. Leavy, Courtesy of Fire Department of New York Photo Unit.) |
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| (11) Once again, ordinary construction and advanced fire. Where will we commit our searches initially? Is there a likely survivability profile in the fire apartment? Look at the low smoke stains on the windowsill where the firefighter is contemplating VES. Now, look at the darkened windows on the floor above and the probability of autoexposure. Where will your initial search commitment achieve the greatest results while also providing for the safety of your operating forces? (Photo by Roy Bacchi.) |
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| (12) Is this residential fire a room-and-contents fire, or has the fire started to attack the structural components? A 360° size-up and quick water on the fire will make everything better. Searches can be performed simultaneously or immediately after the fire has been darkened down but not fully extinguished. (Photo by Stephen “Butch” Moran.) |
Survivability profiling is about saving firefighters’ lives. Risk a lot to save what is savable, risk a little to save savable property, and risk nothing to save what has already been lost.
A Test of Survivability Profiling
An early-morning call challenged the Bellmore (NY) Fire Department (BFD), consisting of 100 volunteer firefighters and fire-medics, to use survivability profiling in a very real way.
At 0233 hours on Saturday, August 21, 2010, the BFD was called for a “possible house fire at the intersection of Croydon Drive and Abbey Court.” Less than one minute later, Assistant Chief Robert Taylor signed on the air responding. The dispatcher notified the chief that they were now receiving multiple calls for a house fire at 55 Croydon Drive with several reports of people trapped. Taylor acknowledged this additional information and arrived on scene at 0235 hours. He was met by frantic neighbors reporting the family was home and trapped. The chief transmitted a “Signal 10” for a working house fire with “confirmed people trapped.”
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| (1-2) Fire conditions on arrival of the first units. These photos show the conditions shortly after the arrival of the assistant chief and the first engine. The valiant entry attempted by Chief Robert Taylor was thwarted by the intense heat and flames that met him on the first floor. The chief immediately called for portable ladders to be placed to the second floor in an attempt to VES. [Photos by Vinny Scaduto, public information officer, courtesy of the Bellmore (NY) Volunteer Fire Department.] |
The chief quickly donned his personal protective equipment and notified the dispatcher that he was making entry. The first engine (Unit 603) arrived on scene with seven members at 0236 hours and performed a forward supply hoselay (hydrant to fire) while simultaneously stretching three handlines to begin operations from the 750-gallon booster tank, per department standard operating guidelines (SOGs).
The first two 1¾-inch handlines were stretched to protect the home exposures on each side of the fire building; the third was for entry through the front door. The use of a deck gun and a 2½-inch hose was initially considered but was set aside because of the confirmation of trapped victims and the need for maneuverability and rapid search and rescue.
As the members of Engine 603 were performing the supply and attack hose stretches (photo 3), the unit captain met with Taylor on the front lawn of the burning home where a quick 360° size-up, including the basement, was made and an attack strategy developed. The chief passed on information that one woman and possibly two children were trapped.
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| (3) The first engine to arrive stretches three 1¾-inch attack lines and lays a forward supply line. |
These officers assessed the situation using survivability profiling and determined that the likelihood of survival for any of the trapped occupants had probably already expired and noted that vent-enter-search (VES) by portable ladder would only be successful if done from the second-floor front window on the exposure 2 side (photo 4) and only after knockdown of the exposed exterior fire. The assessment considered the large amount of visible fire and smoke throughout the structure, the advanced stage of fire progression, the danger of VES above the fire, the unlikely survival of the occupants, and the extending of fire to the exposures.
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| (4) The only possible location for VES was the second-floor front bedroom windows. |
Knocking down the advanced fire became the first priority. Based on the sheer volume of fire in the rear, first, and second floors (photos 5-7) and the self-venting fire that was already through the roof, tactics were deployed to save the adjoining homes on the exposure 2 and 4 sides, whose vinyl siding had now begun to melt and burn (photos 8, 9). The first ladder company (Unit 606) and second engine company (Unit 602) arrived on the scene at 0237 hours, followed shortly by Engine 601, heavy rescue 607, and three BFD advanced life support ambulances. Ladder 606 members divided responsibilities to place portable ladders as directed by the chief and to assist Engine 602 in staffing one of the 1¾-inch attack lines and stretching a fourth line, a 2½-inch hoseline, to the rear of the house.
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| (5) Fire in the rear of the house. |
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| (6) Fire on the first floor with autoexposure. |
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| (7) Fire on the second-floor master bedroom self-venting through the roof. |
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| (8) The house on the exposure 2 side shows severe likelihood of fire extension. |
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| (9) The house on the exposure 4 side shows radiant heat damage. |
The officers of Engines 602 and 603 and Taylor held a brief conference to ensure there would be no opposing handlines during the initial interior attack. Prior to this entry, the most reliable report was obtained concerning the number of trapped victims. It came from the neighbor on the immediate exposure 2 side, who just less than an hour before had been sitting on the back porch of the home on fire with the female occupant and knew that the victim’s two children were out for the night and that she was the only person home.
The hoselines quickly knocked down the fire on the first floor; a strong push was made to enter and reach the second-floor bedrooms by going through the front door and up the open unenclosed interior stairs just inside. Prior to this entry, the officer of Engine 603 made a quick search of the first floor, directing exterior units to extinguish pockets of fire unreachable from the front entrance while making a second quick look down the basement stairs to confirm there was no fire below.
While this search was being performed, the captain noticed the flashing lights of the outside apparatus through the now burned-away staircase. He radioed an urgent message instructing firefighters not to go up and asked that a portable ladder be placed over the questionable staircase. Almost before he concluded this transmission, the members of Ladder 606, assisted by mutual-aid firefighters, placed a portable ladder through the front doorway and onto the stairs (photos 10, 11).
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(10-11) The fire-damaged stairs and the roof (hook) ladder used for interior attack. |
The aggressive attack was continued. The hose team fought its way up the stairway on the portable ladder to the master bedroom, where the adult female victim was found lying on her bed. The attack on the second floor and attic continued as mutual-aid relief engines were called to replace the now fatigued crew.
Engine 603 and Ladder 606 remained on the scene for several hours to help the Nassau County Fire Marshal’s Office investigate the origin and cause of the fire and removed the lone female victim for the county coroner.
There was one firefighter injury. The nozzle firefighter of the interior attack line received second-degree facial burns during the aggressive push up the stairway, which caused debris to fall and dislodge his face piece and hood.
The use of survivability profiling, coupled with the strategy to darken down the fire first and perform the searches as soon as practicable, proved most valuable in preserving the lives of these aggressive firefighters. Although the autopsy results for the female occupant were not available as of this writing, the firefighters and investigators believe, based on the victim’s condition and her position when she was found, it was likely she died of smoke inhalation prior to the department’s arrival and never awoke from her sleep. It was not determined if working smoke detectors were present. This fire proved to be an uneasy test; the knowledge that there was a known victim (or victims) could have easily swayed the judgment and decisions of the incident commander (IC), fire officers, and the firefighters who responded. Luckily, it did not.
Even with a very quick response time and water application, the fire progression with its accompanying toxic by-products, coupled with the occurrence of two, possibly three, flashovers prior to the firefighters’ arrival and another just after, proved fatal for the victim in very short time.
In this incident, putting firefighters at risk to attempt rescue of the known life hazard could have been a terrible mistake. Survivability profiling kept the IC and officers focused: darken down the fire first, protect the exposures to contain the incident, and conduct a search when relatively safe for the firefighters to do so.
References
1. National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, Emmitsburg, Md., March 2010.
2. National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (2004). Life Safety Initiatives. Firehero.org. http://www.firehero.org/index1.aspx?BD=26803.
3. Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting. IAFC On Scene, 23(11), 7-9. June 2009.
4. Phoenix Fire Department, Phoenix, Ariz., 2009.
● STEPHEN MARSAR is a 20-year veteran and a captain in the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), where he is assigned to Engine Co. 8 in Midtown Manhattan. He is a former fire commissioner of the Bellmore (NY) Volunteer Fire Department. His certifications include national and New York State fire instructor II, New York State Department of Health regional faculty member and instructor coordinator, and International Advanced Critical Incident Stress Management provider for the emergency services. An an adjunct faculty member of the Nassau County (NY) Community College’s Fire Science degree program, he also serves as a second deputy chief instructor for the FDNY and Nassau County fire and EMS academies. Marsar has a bachelor’s degree in fire science and emergency services administration and is a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program. He is a presenter at the FDIC and a contributing author to several national emergency service magazines.
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