By MIKE MASON
The American fire service should rethink its center of gravity in strategies and tactics and undertake no tactic without a strategy. All too commonly, by default, American firefighters approach structural fires with an aggressive strategy of offensive interior attack, overlooking significant fireground elements during their advance. But with a little strategic patience on arrival, we can make better decisions for an improved and safer tactical plan of operation.
At structural fires, it is not just a question of defensive vs. offensive; we must weigh other considerations in this fast-paced, dynamic environment. Our strategies define our commitment to take risks on the fireground—risks for civilians and firefighters alike. Interior and exterior risks exist at any given structure fire. First-in companies must identify these risks early on, depending on what they see and what they possibly hear, such as the possibility of collapse or basement fires. For firefighters and their commanders, it just isn’t deciding strategically if we are going in or staying out but also how our strategies and decision making are related to risk and what we think and do at structural fires.
At any structure fire, a good strategy includes determining how long it has been burning, what progress it has made, and how it has affected the structure. This may shift our strategies from an initial offensive aggressive campaign to a high-risk defensive campaign. The fire’s volume, growth rate, and duration and firefighters’ difficulty in advancing on the fire may indicate the strong possibility of structural collapse in portions of the structure.
We can no longer accurately predict fire behavior in the modern-day built environment because of multiple factors, such as lightweight materials and fire loads that produce high heat-release rates, which can result in more unpredictable high-risk events. It is all too easy in the modern-day built environment to experience flashovers, smoke explosions, partial interior/exterior collapses, limited visibility, and constantly changing conditions.
Buildings are falling apart too easily, and often without warning before fire crews go in and as a result of the developments occurring while firefighters are inside. Many times, large volumes of fire may not be visible, so what we think is manageable when viewed from the outside suddenly becomes unmanageable and out of control, even when we thought we made the right choice to go aggressive. In hands-on firefighting, we must understand the following: building construction, a full-view size-up, interior visibility, and the location of the fire.
Without these considerations, firefighters cannot understand what may be going on around their tactical area, let alone the overall action plan of command, which also may not see the big picture. All of this can result in poor lifesaving decisions that eventually halt our aggressive offensive actions because of an avoidable change of events. Many times, incident commanders (ICs) add to the problem by relying only on the fire that is visible from their exterior positions, not contemplating the fire’s effect on lightweight construction and the rapid heat release rates of fire loads inside. As a result, everything can climax in firefighter injury and death because of misconstrued fire location and prolonged zero visibility for interior crews. It has little to do with what we see on the outside when we first arrive, which can mislead us to believe that the fire is manageable for the aggressive interior firefight. When what was first thought to be manageable on the inside changes to deteriorating conditions, interior companies must inform command on the outside, because command’s overall picture may be something quite different. This two-sided coin—what we see and what we get from the outside and the inside—requires constant size-up and communications between interior and exterior positions.
Many in the fire service today think that we are too bound by abundant safety restrictions and overly cautious behavior. Some think we are losing sight of why we ought to be more aggressive in extinguishing the fire instead of pulling back. We are always expected to put our lives on the line in making decisions at fast-paced dynamic events, and subconsciously we feel we must make an offensive interior firefight. In the American fire service, if firefighters, officers, and some chiefs had their way, we would always opt for the adrenaline rush of going interior. Although we should always be willing to take on the interior firefight, we should combine a defensive posture with our driven approach as soon as we receive the alarm. Four strategies or postures encompass all of our tactics at fires from the initial dispatch through extinguishment and life rescues and should be considered before we aggressively move into an interior attack. We may shift among the following postures throughout any incident as we continuously evaluate the fire situation: defensive, transitional dynamic, cautious aggressive, and aggressive offensive.
Defensive Posture
The defensive posture and mindset begin when we receive the alarm and we maintain that stance as we fluidly assess the alternatives on arrival through to deciding whether to go interior. It starts when we climb onto the apparatus, wear our seat belts, and drive with restraint to get there alive and without injury. We know all too well the tragedy of firefighter and civilian injury and death from collisions and ejections occurring en route to the scene. In the volunteer service, this includes those responding from home in personal vehicles to the firehouse or directly to the scene.
The statistics speak for themselves. If we employ immediate aggressive behaviors going out the door, the writing on the wall becomes apparent—eventually, a civilian or firefighter will be injured or killed. Officers should control those who drive with a lead foot, who mistakenly think that arriving sooner will make the difference in our efforts to save lives and extinguish the fire—it won’t (photo 1)!
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| (1) Firefighters at a fully charged structure, in adverse climate or weather, make a slow, unprogressive attack that eventually results in defensive operations. (Photos by Tim Olk.) |
Another defensive mindset officers and firefighters should always keep in mind is the potential for flashover and collapse. With modern lightweight construction and the usual residential contents of hydrocarbon petroleum-based products, these two events are highly probable at structural fires. On arrival and with proper size-up, we should recognize these factors along with zero visibility. Because the visible fire before us stimulates our adrenaline, we immediately focus on speed, feeling that precious time to quench the beast is slipping away. We forget that the fire’s existence prior to our arrival is part of the timeline. We should consider the big picture and its relevance to our tactics—e.g., do we need collapse zones, should we go defensive, or should we make an aggressive interior firefight? Are we tunnel-visioned into just getting in and forgetting that we also need to get out?
On arrival, all firefighters, especially officers and chief officers, should consciously base their decisions on a risk/benefit analysis. We will risk a lot to save a lot. If we decide to move away from a defensive posture into more aggressive action, we should base it on a high probability of success in savable property and savable lives.
We don’t need to gamble—when things look bad, they are bad, and it’s time for nothing but defensive action, whether this entails hitting everything from the outside or setting up zones for potential collapse. If the situation begins to deteriorate and conditions worsen, we may have to expand our defensive actions even further. Many firefighters have been severely injured and killed even when they thought that they had established adequate collapse zones.
When we assume a defensive posture, the injury and death risks should diminish. On the other hand, even within a defensive posture, firefighters face possible risks when handling large hoselines, operating power equipment, working on tower ladders, and working in severe and extreme weather conditions. In some situations, the posture shifts from defensive to offensive because conditions may have improved or some life- or property-saving advantage may be gained, but we should weigh this decision carefully. Remember, if we felt some reward would warrant high-risk actions when we arrived, we would have performed them early rather than wait until well into an incident, when there is even less to gain.
Transitional Dynamic Posture
Now knowing a defensive posture should exist from the time of the alarm to our arrival, we consider the dynamics of transition on what we initially see and do at a structural fire. Firefighters and officers should realize that this posture still should not allow us to tunnel-vision into aggressive behaviors, such as entering the structure headlong without determining key elements for the interior firefight.
The transitional dynamic posture involves a solid size-up or 360° survey of the structure, and the information gathered at this point is most critical in determining whether we can cut loose for aggressive actions. If we do not read the fire and the structure correctly, we can do little about it once we enter and are exposed to a host of deadly possibilities. Even if we correctly decide to move to an aggressive campaign of interior firefighting and rescues, things may still end up going bad, so let’s make sure to get the odds as much in our favor as possible. How do we ensure our actions in saving lives and property in this transitional dynamic posture (photo 2)?
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| (2) Companies found additional fire on the second floor after extinguishing the main body of fire on the first floor, requiring them to transition their hoseline into another area. |
To this day, we still have firefighters and their officers who forgo the critical step of proper size-up—a sound 360° walk around the structure. With a proper size-up, we give ourselves and the civilians we are trying to save the edge in living. Many firefighters and their officers may perform a size-up, but they fall short in recognizing the hazards the structure is showing them. Often, things may not register because of our inexperience and lack of reference from previous fires. Encountering high-risk, low-frequency events many times results in incomplete size-ups.
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