Changing Our Center of Gravity

By MIKE MASON

The American fire service should rethink its center of gravity in strategies and tactics and undertake no tactic without a strategy. All too commonly, by default, American firefighters approach structural fires with an aggressive strategy of offensive interior attack, overlooking significant fireground elements during their advance. But with a little strategic patience on arrival, we can make better decisions for an improved and safer tactical plan of operation.

At structural fires, it is not just a question of defensive vs. offensive; we must weigh other considerations in this fast-paced, dynamic environment. Our strategies define our commitment to take risks on the fireground—risks for civilians and firefighters alike. Interior and exterior risks exist at any given structure fire. First-in companies must identify these risks early on, depending on what they see and what they possibly hear, such as the possibility of collapse or basement fires. For firefighters and their commanders, it just isn’t deciding strategically if we are going in or staying out but also how our strategies and decision making are related to risk and what we think and do at structural fires.

At any structure fire, a good strategy includes determining how long it has been burning, what progress it has made, and how it has affected the structure. This may shift our strategies from an initial offensive aggressive campaign to a high-risk defensive campaign. The fire’s volume, growth rate, and duration and firefighters’ difficulty in advancing on the fire may indicate the strong possibility of structural collapse in portions of the structure.

We can no longer accurately predict fire behavior in the modern-day built environment because of multiple factors, such as lightweight materials and fire loads that produce high heat-release rates, which can result in more unpredictable high-risk events. It is all too easy in the modern-day built environment to experience flashovers, smoke explosions, partial interior/exterior collapses, limited visibility, and constantly changing conditions.

Buildings are falling apart too easily, and often without warning before fire crews go in and as a result of the developments occurring while firefighters are inside. Many times, large volumes of fire may not be visible, so what we think is manageable when viewed from the outside suddenly becomes unmanageable and out of control, even when we thought we made the right choice to go aggressive. In hands-on firefighting, we must understand the following: building construction, a full-view size-up, interior visibility, and the location of the fire.

Without these considerations, firefighters cannot understand what may be going on around their tactical area, let alone the overall action plan of command, which also may not see the big picture. All of this can result in poor lifesaving decisions that eventually halt our aggressive offensive actions because of an avoidable change of events. Many times, incident commanders (ICs) add to the problem by relying only on the fire that is visible from their exterior positions, not contemplating the fire’s effect on lightweight construction and the rapid heat release rates of fire loads inside. As a result, everything can climax in firefighter injury and death because of misconstrued fire location and prolonged zero visibility for interior crews. It has little to do with what we see on the outside when we first arrive, which can mislead us to believe that the fire is manageable for the aggressive interior firefight. When what was first thought to be manageable on the inside changes to deteriorating conditions, interior companies must inform command on the outside, because command’s overall picture may be something quite different. This two-sided coin—what we see and what we get from the outside and the inside—requires constant size-up and communications between interior and exterior positions.

Many in the fire service today think that we are too bound by abundant safety restrictions and overly cautious behavior. Some think we are losing sight of why we ought to be more aggressive in extinguishing the fire instead of pulling back. We are always expected to put our lives on the line in making decisions at fast-paced dynamic events, and subconsciously we feel we must make an offensive interior firefight. In the American fire service, if firefighters, officers, and some chiefs had their way, we would always opt for the adrenaline rush of going interior. Although we should always be willing to take on the interior firefight, we should combine a defensive posture with our driven approach as soon as we receive the alarm. Four strategies or postures encompass all of our tactics at fires from the initial dispatch through extinguishment and life rescues and should be considered before we aggressively move into an interior attack. We may shift among the following postures throughout any incident as we continuously evaluate the fire situation: defensive, transitional dynamic, cautious aggressive, and aggressive offensive.

Defensive Posture

The defensive posture and mindset begin when we receive the alarm and we maintain that stance as we fluidly assess the alternatives on arrival through to deciding whether to go interior. It starts when we climb onto the apparatus, wear our seat belts, and drive with restraint to get there alive and without injury. We know all too well the tragedy of firefighter and civilian injury and death from collisions and ejections occurring en route to the scene. In the volunteer service, this includes those responding from home in personal vehicles to the firehouse or directly to the scene.

The statistics speak for themselves. If we employ immediate aggressive behaviors going out the door, the writing on the wall becomes apparent—eventually, a civilian or firefighter will be injured or killed. Officers should control those who drive with a lead foot, who mistakenly think that arriving sooner will make the difference in our efforts to save lives and extinguish the fire—it won’t (photo 1)!

(1) Firefighters at a fully charged structure, in adverse climate or weather, make a slow, unprogressive attack that eventually results in defensive operations Tim Olk
(1) Firefighters at a fully charged structure, in adverse climate or weather, make a slow, unprogressive attack that eventually results in defensive operations. (Photos by Tim Olk.)

Another defensive mindset officers and firefighters should always keep in mind is the potential for flashover and collapse. With modern lightweight construction and the usual residential contents of hydrocarbon petroleum-based products, these two events are highly probable at structural fires. On arrival and with proper size-up, we should recognize these factors along with zero visibility. Because the visible fire before us stimulates our adrenaline, we immediately focus on speed, feeling that precious time to quench the beast is slipping away. We forget that the fire’s existence prior to our arrival is part of the timeline. We should consider the big picture and its relevance to our tactics—e.g., do we need collapse zones, should we go defensive, or should we make an aggressive interior firefight? Are we tunnel-visioned into just getting in and forgetting that we also need to get out?

On arrival, all firefighters, especially officers and chief officers, should consciously base their decisions on a risk/benefit analysis. We will risk a lot to save a lot. If we decide to move away from a defensive posture into more aggressive action, we should base it on a high probability of success in savable property and savable lives.

We don’t need to gamble—when things look bad, they are bad, and it’s time for nothing but defensive action, whether this entails hitting everything from the outside or setting up zones for potential collapse. If the situation begins to deteriorate and conditions worsen, we may have to expand our defensive actions even further. Many firefighters have been severely injured and killed even when they thought that they had established adequate collapse zones.

When we assume a defensive posture, the injury and death risks should diminish. On the other hand, even within a defensive posture, firefighters face possible risks when handling large hoselines, operating power equipment, working on tower ladders, and working in severe and extreme weather conditions. In some situations, the posture shifts from defensive to offensive because conditions may have improved or some life- or property-saving advantage may be gained, but we should weigh this decision carefully. Remember, if we felt some reward would warrant high-risk actions when we arrived, we would have performed them early rather than wait until well into an incident, when there is even less to gain.

Transitional Dynamic Posture

Now knowing a defensive posture should exist from the time of the alarm to our arrival, we consider the dynamics of transition on what we initially see and do at a structural fire. Firefighters and officers should realize that this posture still should not allow us to tunnel-vision into aggressive behaviors, such as entering the structure headlong without determining key elements for the interior firefight.

The transitional dynamic posture involves a solid size-up or 360° survey of the structure, and the information gathered at this point is most critical in determining whether we can cut loose for aggressive actions. If we do not read the fire and the structure correctly, we can do little about it once we enter and are exposed to a host of deadly possibilities. Even if we correctly decide to move to an aggressive campaign of interior firefighting and rescues, things may still end up going bad, so let’s make sure to get the odds as much in our favor as possible. How do we ensure our actions in saving lives and property in this transitional dynamic posture (photo 2)?

(2) Companies found additional fire on the second floor after extinguishing the main body of fire on the first floor, requiring them to transition their hoseline into another area.
(2) Companies found additional fire on the second floor after extinguishing the main body of fire on the first floor, requiring them to transition their hoseline into another area.

To this day, we still have firefighters and their officers who forgo the critical step of proper size-up—a sound 360° walk around the structure. With a proper size-up, we give ourselves and the civilians we are trying to save the edge in living. Many firefighters and their officers may perform a size-up, but they fall short in recognizing the hazards the structure is showing them. Often, things may not register because of our inexperience and lack of reference from previous fires. Encountering high-risk, low-frequency events many times results in incomplete size-ups.

Another result of incomplete size-ups is adopting a defensive strategy when an offensive one was possible. The fireground is ever-changing, so we should always examine our dynamic transitional posture. The following factors influence our dynamic transitional posture, requiring firefighters to take actions that may direct us into either an offensive or a defensive strategy:

  • Visible fire that we must extinguish from the outside to enable us to move in on the inside.
  • Visible occupants needing rescue or whose location is confirmed.
  • Changes in or revealing circumstances related to structural integrity.<
  • Attainable and coordinated ventilation needs.
  • Personnel available on the scene.

The above items, which require actions that influence our dynamic transitional state, occur frequently on the outside of the fire structure and also carry extreme risks—not necessarily death but serious injury to firefighters who are racing against time—this is inevitable. This is why training in performing all of these actions is so very important to a fire department and its members.

As we know, visible viable occupants in need of rescue, especially at windows, take precedence over other actions that are needed at structural fires. Also at times we have to take multiple actions so we can rescue savable occupants, such as providing hoseline protection during civilian rescues. Many successful, viable rescues are possible when known occupants are at windows within reach of our ladders, especially when the interior stairs are not tenable or an interior removal is not possible. When we receive visible, credible information on the location of those in need of rescue, their survival totally depends on our ability to act quickly.

When these elements are present, ventilation and where it will be performed may increase the dangers to survivable occupants by drawing fire and smoke conditions to them. Avoid any positive-pressure ventilation (PPV), since it may diminish the survivability of occupants by forcing fire and smoke conditions into their areas. Wind direction and speed can also diminish occupant survivability. Because we cannot control the wind, fire companies must move with even greater urgency when confronting wind-driven conditions.

The transitional dynamic posture includes an aggressive attack incorporating exterior water application as quickly as possible instead of running headlong into the interior for extinguishment. When a particular volume of free-burning fire presents itself through the exterior of a structure, we should consider knocking it down while cooling the rate of heat release from the exterior and then provide for an interior campaign. A fast, aggressive application of water will bend the odds in our favor before we go interior, reducing the risk of flashover and high-heat conditions. Also, it will probably slow the fire as well as prohibit it from extending farther to exposures within the structure. First-in companies should make this tactic a high priority when a proper size-up reveals these conditions.

Incorporated into this action is identifying the fire’s location and where it is going. Be very aware that even with this approach in sizing up a fire’s position and behavior, the fire dynamic is forever changing, especially after we leave the outside to go inside. Still, the positive aspects of this transitional approach will be well worth the effort by keeping the fire and its behavior more toward the room of origin. It will also help considerably in providing a wider window for occupant survivability and rescue.

When applying an exterior stream to reduce the fire’s energy before going inside, direct a straight or solid stream through the bottom of the window, deflect it off the ceiling, and do not rotate the nozzle. This will allow steam to vent out of the top of the window. Hitting the ceiling first is effective for fires on the first floor and even more so for fires on floors above.

This application is even more effective in reducing temperatures and limiting thermal inversions than previously thought. In the past, we believed we would be pushing fire throughout the structure and toward occupants needing rescue. The fire service should experience this tactic’s effectiveness and routinely incorporate it whenever possible because it guarantees the fastest attack possible with the quickest application of water on the fire, reducing risk to civilians and firefighters. Many times, it conserves our air supply for when we move in offensively.

Another important part of our aggressive campaign is determining structural integrity at structural fires. Although this should be part of our size-up, firefighters many times still walk into structures that looked sound and stable but that eventually collapsed. Unrecognized, unseen conditions were attacking and compromising the structure. This is especially relevant at larger structures, such as commercial or industrial buildings, because deep-seated fires many times mask compromised structural integrity. Exposure to fire and high heat for only a short time will quickly affect lightweight construction.

Although the size of a structure is usually clear from the outside, a structure’s engineered design is often hidden, elevating the risks that firefighters may encounter when deciding to aggressively go interior. It is important to note that although we must use an interior advance strategy to get to the seat of a fire at larger commercial or residential buildings, we should ensure that the fire’s extent and location are known. Always choose the shortest distance to the seat of the fire, since it can also provide a more easily accessible escape for our members if conditions should change. The fire’s size and location affect structural integrity, and we should know the structure’s ventilation profile on arrival and during the firefight. Before committing to an aggressive interior advance, we should know the relative position of fire within the structure to avoid going into areas in which the fire is above or below us. Such unrecognized fires often result in fatalities.

Understand that a transitional dynamic posture is part of offensive strategies and tactics, expediting our decision making in coordinating our fire attack and our ventilation needs and position. Aggressive fire attack and ventilation go hand in hand and are important to our survival and that of interior occupants needing rescue. Once firefighters open the front door for an interior approach, they have created a ventilation flow path that can have grave consequences, especially if combined with other preexisting or induced ventilation points. Many American fire departments continue to use PPV before and during fire attack—some positively, some with disastrous results. Sound ventilation techniques, timing, and position improve overall interior conditions, reducing risk to firefighters and civilians. Often, however, during the aggressive fire attack, only a single ventilation point (usually the front door) is created as we quickly advance onto a fire. If we are doing only this type of limited ventilation, then the fire’s ability to produce untenable conditions and prolong zero visibility takes its inevitable toll, either chasing us out of the structure or causing us severe exposure, resulting in firefighter fatalities from flashover. Along with single or multiple ventilation points that are affected by wind, this inevitably affects our ability to get to the seat of the fire and extinguish it. Wind causes fire to increase in size as well as spread rapidly throughout a structure, overtaking our ability to put the fire out as well as causing civilian and firefighter fatalities.

Cautious Aggressive Posture

On arrival at structural fires, first-in companies all too commonly quickly assess the situation and then announce that they will employ interior offensive operations. In reality, we should think cautiously as the first-arriving members are establishing an aggressive dynamic posture. Many fire service commanders and authors have used the term “marginal mode” on the fireground as if this were part of the attack strategy. Fire departments should remove this term from their operating procedures. It is an unclear communication that is open to interpretation. If chief officers and firefighters feel that something is marginal or that it could go either way, they should probably take the defensive posture first and then reassess. The cautious aggressive posture should exist throughout the entire fire attack. Fire departments and their members should concentrate on thorough size-ups and more committed actions, either defensive or offensive (photo 3).

(3) Fire companies advance into the structure offensively while maintaining caution and monitoring the free fire ventilation showing.
(3) Fire companies advance into the structure offensively while maintaining caution and monitoring the free fire ventilation showing.

Many times, we say we are committing to interior operations, but we should consider ourselves only in more of a transitional posture until we actually cross into the immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) plane into zero visibility. Once we move from the transitional posture to a cautious aggressive posture, we finally commit to either defensive or offensive fire attack. We must also remember that many times, our success in saving lives and property can combine the defensive and offensive postures— but only separately, not simultaneously.

Maintain the cautious aggressive posture continually on the fireground, especially during interior actions that involve extreme fire dynamics and prolonged zero visibility, which present the most danger to interior operations. When visibility is zero, especially in the interior, consider the importance of reading smoke and its characteristics such as color, velocity, and volume.

The reality is we are posturing ourselves and our actions in a fuel-filled environment. The geographical landscape of interior structural firefighting is unique to each structure. Because of this, our orientation and situational awareness are constantly threatened. The loss of sight creates the following three predominant problems that threaten our members: loss of orientation, unrecognized signs of structural collapse, and unrecognized fire growth that leads to flashover.

Often, these conditions exist before we enter a fire structure. It is when we are working for an extended time with little progress that they truly begin to reveal themselves to us, when it becomes all too late to escape.

One of the most important tools of the fire service in recent years has been the thermal imaging camera (TIC). However, our increased reliance on it on the fireground may give us a false sense of security and encourage us into more aggressive behaviors. However, with proper in-depth training, we should also realize the TIC’s limitations, which users may often overlook.

TICs can often reduce the situational awareness because what is seen is misinterpreted and temperature variances are relied on too heavily. Combined with tunnel vision, this can put members into compromised and unexpected positions, especially during an interior firefight in limited visibility. A TIC displays only surface temperatures, not below-surface temperatures, so it will show temperatures on the floor you are on but not on the floor below. Another misconception is that the TIC can see through walls and glass. These are just some of the factors that may mislead us into more aggressive actions, often with disastrous results.

Do not tolerate a marginal mode of attack on the fireground. Instead, consider a cautious posture, which can be offensively or defensively aggressive. Firefighters involved in firefights, especially in modern lightweight construction, are placing themselves in high-risk exposure, since they can become lost, trapped, or overrun by fire. Maintain a cautious mindset during aggressive actions, understand that the fire environment may present the unexpected at every fire, and realize that no two fires are ever alike. Whether the fire is in a compartmentalized or a more open structure, the interior environment provides the possibilities of smoke, rollovers, flashovers, smoke explosions, and backdrafts, which can occur at any time, in any structure, in any fire. Our offensive actions over extended periods of time during interior firefighting will have consequences that sooner or later will overtake us if we cannot produce a fast and overwhelming force with determined progress on fire extinguishment and early occupant survival and rescue. The cautious aggressive posture provides a solid format for a minimal risk management plan for every firefighter on the fireground. The time spent inside a structure and the visibility that fire conditions create drive our fire extinguishment efforts and determine true occupant survivability.

When conditions decline, the parameters tighten, and occupant survivability diminishes, we must readjust and think more about getting out. On arrival, visualize conditions and the diminished possibilities of occupant survival before going in. There are always the options for the aggressive offensive fire attack with quick applications of water on fire showing from the outside, increasing safety and survival for civilians and firefighters, and then quickly moving in for the aggressive interior attack.

Occupant survivability is compromised not only because of exposure to flame but, more importantly, exposure to the products of combustion. How long a victim can survive a fire depends more on his inhalation of fire gases and smoke. When trapped or overcome within compartmentalized or enclosed areas within a structure, occupants suffer respiratory tract burns. Other deadly gases, such as carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide, further reduce the victim survivability profile to a very low threshold against time. Rarely can a structure’s occupant endure these conditions for more than 10 minutes.

So the time from the fire’s incipient stage to our arrival becomes the critical factor in saving lives. Saving lives requires the offensive mode and the offensive attack posture, which always incorporates life rescue and fire extinguishment. To firefighters arriving at a well-involved fire, so much has been lost with so little to gain that the effect of aggressive offensive endeavors is questionable. The potential for early collapse because of lightweight structural components compounds the problem with even greater risks.

However, we should not give up our proud heritage of aggressive firefighting. We can still be aggressive and perform quick actions by recognizing and creating more proactive actions. We can act more aggressively if we do the following in our cautious aggressive transitional posture:

  • Recognize the potential for long periods of low to near zero visibility.
  • Complete a visualization that incorporates a 360° size-up.
  • Create proper ventilation openings that effect proper fire flow paths.
  • Hit certain fire volumes from the exterior for quick knockdowns, thus decreasing fire and heat release rates.
  • Interior visibility should improve in less than 10 minutes for an aggressive interior firefight to continue.

Taking proper actions and postures at structural fires will improve firefighter and civilian survival profiles. A more accurate sense of our risk vs. reward capabilities on arrival allows us a more intelligent, quick-thinking decision making process in such a fast-paced, dangerous environment, justifying our aggressive action.

The Aggressive Offensive Attack

The aggressive fire attack is what the American fire service is known for worldwide, in addition to our line-of-duty injuries and deaths. The American firefighter has been trained to take pride in the aggressive firefighting tradition and in winning at every incident. Because of our aggressive actions in such a fast-paced, dynamic, and unpredictable environment, we often move into harm’s way because of insufficient risk assessment at structural fires. Locating fires within structures and searching and advancing lines in low- to near-zero visibility take their toll eventually and expose every fire department to that tragic day of the loss of one of their own (photo 4).

(4) Fire companies take an aggressive offensive posture here, committing to an interior attack with minimal ventilation.
(4) Fire companies take an aggressive offensive posture here, committing to an interior attack with minimal ventilation.

We proudly and willingly commit our strategies and tactics to the interior firefight. Improper size-up, low to near zero visibility, mistaken fire location, and underestimated fire size will defeat our efforts unless we again address The Fire Doctrine, the four main principles that determine whether we go offensive.

The Fire Doctrine

  • Firefighters are committed to interior offensive firefighting only if absolutely necessary.
  • Not acting presents a compelling risk.
  • We must have and apply an overwhelming force to engage and prevail over the fire.
  • We must have an exit strategy within all areas of the fireground for firefighters.

In going offensive, we should incorporate sound action plans that will provide us with a win/win outcome. The ability to get to the seat of the fire and improve visibility for our members is paramount to saving lives and property and bringing our members back to quarters after every fire.

If considering operating and advancing to the interior, our strategy should be to achieve good visibility and to relieve high heat conditions. First-in officers should communicate to all on arrival of their decision to commit to an interior firefight. This commitment should be based on their belief that with the present resources, the fire’s dynamic, and the need for civilian rescues, the odds are in everyone’s favor. As long as there is little confusion and we apply clear, relevant tactics to the fire’s location, growth, and probable extinguishment, the aggressive offensive attack is forthright.

The transitional moment begins when fire companies arrive and commit to offensive procedures from the outside before entering the front door. Things can change, and quickly, as we proceed with our aggressive offensive postures. Sometimes, that is unavoidable, but those deciding to go forward should be aware of this possibility and have a planned exit strategy. When conditions warrant and it is easier to approach the seat of the fire or a search for victims because of improved heat conditions and visibility, we will accomplish our goals. Such conditions are usually more likely to be present early at a structural fire than later, after fire and smoke take over the structure more and more. So the obvious mentality we should adopt, from when we go out the door to when we arrive, is that these early conditions are rarely present.

As we proceed to the offensive aggressive attack, we are more and more exposed to the hazards of a fuel-filled environment, which is always advancing just as we are advancing into it. A quick and decisive knockdown is the only way to come out of such aggressive actions. Also, a quick and decisive knockdown will probably save more lives than an attack delayed because of misread or overwhelming conditions.

The offensive aggressive attack truly begins the minute we enter the door to an IDLH environment. Everything before that point is merely an announcement of our intent to go interior. As long as we remain alert before the final advance past that front door, we can change or alter our first decision (hitting a fire from the exterior) and then still mount an aggressive campaign to go interior. In short, keep a defensive approach in mind until the offensive approach becomes viable. Many solid considerations still allow us to be aggressive and proceed with the offensive interior attack, but keep in mind a quick transitional posture. This all occurs on the outside first, even though we want to go inside or know we can go inside and prevail.

All we need to set this mentality in motion is to conduct a focused 360° size-up of the structure and the situation. The following conditions revealed in the 360° size-up determine whether we hold on to our aggressive stance and take extreme risks at a given structure fire:

  • Is there visible rescue required?
  • Is there fire present that will affect rescues or diminish occupant survivability?
  • Is the structure still strong?
  • Can we provide effective ventilation for interior firefighting and increase occupant survivability?
  • Will environmental concerns such as severe weather and wind delay or accelerate fire growth?
  • Can we provide a more aggressive exterior attack before we transition to the interior attack for better survival of occupants and firefighters?

If we observe carefully and act with these considerations in mind, we will increase the overall survivability of our firefighters and the interior occupants. If we want to control the fire and increase the visibility by providing quick extinguishment and life rescue, we should consider these parameters. When we don’t and enter blindly and aggressively into these environments, we end up on our hands and knees in high heat conditions, often unable to get to the seat of the fire or to occupants in need of rescue.

An aggressive offensive attack does not necessarily always have to beat the living daylights out of us to make it a good fire, just so we can say we slayed the beast—but, more importantly, it should be that we did not ignorantly expose ourselves in losing our lives.

Part of the aggressive offensive interior attack mindset should be that when heavy fire is showing or present on the interior on arrival, we initiate attack from the exterior with the assumption that we will then quickly move to the interior advance tactic. Consider this an offensive approach since the intent is to ultimately fight the fire on the interior for complete extinguishment. With the exterior fast water application, we are indirectly reducing the volume of fire and reducing the temperatures that increase the rate of heat rise to help diffuse flashover conditions. Also, it will often improve smoke conditions. This, coupled with coordinated ventilation procedures, guarantees a winning combination and the safety of occupants and firefighters. This essential concept of quick exterior to interior firefighting also helps reduce the risks associated with interior firefighting (e.g., confusion, prolonged zero visibility) that can lead to the loss of situational awareness and eventual disorientation.

The aggressive offensive posture taken at structural fires is many times anything but aggressive when searching for fire or victims. When we enter a world that impairs our senses, especially our ability to see, our aggressive campaign becomes slowed and questionable. We may call our strategy or tactic offensive and consider these actions part of the offensive procedure, but we need to fully realize that we should be on the defensive when pursuing these actions on the interior. If low visibility, high heat conditions, or both slow the engine company, personnel may not find the fire quickly or the fire may come to them with overwhelming force. Blind searches in near zero visibility also reduce and slow the interior aggressive posture of the offensive action. The relationship of the aggressive offensive fire and rescue posture correlates with the fire and its aggressive speed in taking over.

Firefighters rarely perceive the passing of time when advancing, searching, and getting to the seat of the fire. This also depends on the structure’s complexity, its compartmentalization, and floor plan. Inside, we completely focus our thoughts and energies on interior operations as conditions worsen, which increases the potential for us to lose our way and our situational awareness. Loss of visibility and the misperception of time are among the most prominent causes of firefighter fatalities.

The following conditions usually precede firefighter fatalities in interior firefighting:

  • Initiating aggressive interior actions without proper size-up.
  • Interior disorientation.
  • Separation from advancing hoselines.
  • Discerning egress off multiple lines.
  • Separation from company members.
  • Accelerated diminished air supply.
  • Falling debris and collapse.

Without question, the decision to assume the aggressive offensive interior posture comes down to firefighters’ abilities to conduct proper size-ups, recognize prolonged zero visibility, and know when to apply an exterior to interior application of containment when necessary.

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MIKE MASON is a retired 31-year fire service veteran. He was a lieutenant with the Downer’s Grove (IL) Fire Department, assigned to Truck 2/Squad 2. He is a certified instructor III and fire officer II and has an associate degree in fire science and master’s certificates in strategic and organizational leadership from several universities. Mason is the director of and an instructor with RicoFireRescue Inc.

Mike Mason will present “The Strategic and Tactical Battleground for Survival” on Friday, April 24, 10:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m., at FDIC International in Indianapolis.

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