By SEAN STUMBAUGH
The fire service experienced 445 line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) in 2001. We know of the 343 firefighters who were murdered on September 11, but there were also an additional 102 LODDs that year. Among those 102, Bret Tarver is the only name I have committed to memory. Tarver died trying to extinguish a fire in the Southwest Supermarket on March 15, 2001, with the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department (PFD). Although each of those 102 heroes had a story to tell and a lesson to teach, I had to ask myself, “Why do I remember Bret?” Why did his story change the fire service as I know it?
Simply, we—the fire service, as a collective—reached him through our efforts and training on rapid intervention. However, we were still unable to save him. We retrieved him, but because of his disorientation and altered state, he slipped away. After that type of failure, something had to change.
| (1) Nobody Gets Left Behind instructors provide mentoring to students at the incident command post. (Photos by Captain Sean McCormick.) |
In January 2009, the Sacramento, California, region fire services participated in a “Commanding the Mayday” course, a 16-hour class designed for chief officers and aspiring chief officers to learn the basics of saving a lost or downed firefighter. The class was delivered by the “Nobody Gets Left Behind” (NGLB) training group, a group of fire service professionals that has done exemplary work in the areas of firefighter safety and rescue over the past few years. They brought their custom program to the Sacramento region and trained more than 50 students.
This class was the final phase of a countywide effort to standardize our rapid intervention company (RIC) deployment and operations.1 During the class, chief officers were trained in their crews’ capabilities: search techniques, thermal imaging, packaging of firefighters for extrication, air support to downed firefighters, and rescue relay air management. The class consisted of eight hours of didactic classroom presentation and an eight-hour day of hands-on training in a vacant retail store. These classroom and hands-on training days were delivered around a shift schedule to accommodate as many students as possible.
One of the major goals of this training was to establish a baseline of knowledge from which all line chiefs could work. In Sacramento County, we operate under a common dispatch center. Our system includes a boundary drop mutual-aid component that often causes us to run emergency calls together. Any on-duty chief can command a fire in a neighbor’s jurisdiction. With this in mind, having common levels of training will make for more consistent and effective operations. This class will give a chief the necessary tools to perform as a RIC supervisor.
| (2) Crews assigned to RIC prepare to support a simulated rescue effort by entering from the “Charlie” side of the building. |
The hands-on drills were set up so that crews from the participating agencies (Cosumnes Fire, Folsom Fire, Sacramento Fire, Sacramento Metro Fire, and West Sacramento Fire) would perform rescue practices in simulated situations. Students in the class would act as responding battalion chiefs. The scenarios were established based on realistic, past problem incidents. During the simulated exercise, a firefighter radios from the interior of the fire building that he has either been separated from his crew or has lost the hoseline. The incident commander (IC) makes initial contact with the Mayday crew member and gives search option instructions to crews. The IC then assigns one of the class participants to assume the RIC group supervisor role and manage the rescue. The fire companies at the drill deploy as RIC and perform search.
After the Bret Tarver incident, the PFD performed a “recovery process.” During rescue tests, the department discovered that it took an average of 12 firefighters to rescue one in a complex building. It also discovered that typically one out of every five rescuers would report his own problem during the rescue attempt. Other studies have been performed with similar results: Worcester, Massachusetts; San Mateo County, California; and San Jose, California have all done studies that support Phoenix’s numbers. ICs need to consider this when preparing for and responding to a firefighter emergency; these study numbers appear true to form in our drills. On average, we deploy three companies to effect our rescue, each staffed with three or four persons, making our average number of rescuers to accomplish the task mirror those of the other studies.
During one exercise, an engine company member became disoriented and called a Mayday after losing contact with a search rope. The rescue group supervisor once had to respond to this actual call for help and moved companies to assist him. A truck company operating in the area found him and got him back on the rope. This event proved that reality-based training is a necessary component of firefighter survival.
| (3) Postincident analysis was a critical part of the drills. Chief officers and instructors received feedback, positive and negative, from the crews involved. These lessons learned help us as chiefs to be able to better support our members in a very difficult time. |
Generally, our regional crews performed very well. The chiefs observed how much training the crews had been through and how seriously they treated their training. Regionally, we were 100 percent successful in finding, packaging, and bringing out our simulated downed firefighter. The Sacramento regional approach seemed to be paying off, and firefighter safety has been improved. However, we were not perfect; there is always room for improvement. Although we have a standard policy, standard training, and standardized equipment, we did notice a few problems.
First, because of budgetary restraints, we have not fully deployed all identified equipment to all pieces of apparatus. Second, not all regional members have received the same amount of initial training; this RIC training has proven to be extremely expensive and difficult to deliver. We have more than 1,200 paid firefighters to train in our region. With injury, sick time, and vacations, it is virtually impossible to get these numbers through all the drills. We did the best we could, but obviously some members will fall through the cracks. Regional training officers will have to rely on company officers to make sure their personnel are up to speed on policies and techniques.
The training officers and NGLB members have all received positive feedback for the program’s success. As with any drill of this size, some things did not go as planned or intended. A couple of participants vented their frustration in short post-drill analysis sessions. Much of the feedback received was positive, and anything that was identified as a challenge was done so with courtesy and professionalism. We have made a lot of progress, but we still have some areas to polish.
(4) Here, the incident commander has written down the name of the member they are looking for. Confirming that a person who has been found was the one reported lost is a critical component of closing any “accountability loops.” |
We have agreed on how to communicate with a downed or lost member, but there has been great debate on how to address this member. Rather than consider him an anonymous entity or a riding position “number,” we call him by name. Although it was tragic when Bret Tarver’s name was broadcast live on Phoenix television, this event brought to light the question of how to speak with lost firefighters.
Firefighter Tomazin was a member of Engine 14 with Tarver. Tomazin was lost in the building at the same time as Tarver. He was eventually found and able to escape the building and survive. If the crews did not know that they were looking for Tarver, they may have stopped their efforts once Tomazin was accounted for. We ask the member who needs help who he is and who he is with. This way, when we find someone, we can confirm that he is indeed the firefighter we are looking for.
One critical function of incident command is maintaining personnel accountability in your system. We use the acronym PAAR, which stands for personnel accountability and air report. The moment a Mayday is called is not the time to implement your accountability system; your system needs to be in place and operating at each incident. Practicing PAAR on a routine basis makes it part of your operations and culture. ICs should be proficient at maintaining PAAR and should have a process for closing “accountability loops.” Redwood City (CA) Fire Department Battalion Chief Steve Cavallero described this process during his instruction in this course. A break in the accountability loop occurs when a company reports a PAAR number that is different from the IC’s information. The IC must find the reason for the discrepancy in numbers. It is critical that this accountability loop is closed before the IC moves on to his next function or task.
This more than two-year effort to create, adopt, and implement a regional rapid intervention program has been done for one reason—to do our part to reduce the 100 LODDs occurring each year. It is our sincere desire to keep our members from becoming a “household name” or, worse yet, an obscure statistic in our family’s long list of members who have paid the ultimate price.
ENDNOTE
1. Stumbaugh, S. “Common Policy for an Uncommon System.” Fire Engineering, April 2010.
SEAN STUMBAUGH is a 27-year fire service veteran and a battalion chief with the Cosumnes Fire Department in Elk Grove, California. He has an associate degree in fire protection technology and is a California-certified chief officer, fire officer, and instructor III.
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