Responding to the East Haven (CT) Plane Crash

BY P.J. NORWOOD

At 1122 hours on August 9, 2013, the station alert tone broke and the dispatcher’s voice crackled: “Structure assignment … Charter Oak Avenue plane crash … into a house.” This was not what we expected or hoped to hear. “911 East Haven, this is the tower at Tweed. We just had a plane on final approach to Runway 20 fall out of the sky and crash. We are not sure of the exact location.”

The 911 screen immediately lit up with multiple calls, all coming from a concentrated area; all were reporting a plane into a house. One caller reported children trapped in a rear bedroom.

INITIAL RESPONSE

The East Haven (CT) Fire Department (EHFD) dispatched a full assignment, which consisted of career staff Car (C) 4, Engine (E) 1, E4, Truck (T) 3, Rescue (R) 1, Squad (S) 5, and the volunteer staff with E6 and S2. Additionally, the office staff of C1, C3, and C6 (my designation) responded to the initial alarm. This added up to 14 career personnel.

Dispatch updated en route companies, confirming a plane crashed into two houses with two children trapped. The EHFD chief of department then ordered a mutual-aid response, a positive call that brought an additional 28 firefighters immediately to the scene.

Prior to arrival, an off-duty career firefighter who lived in the neighborhood reported over his portable radio, “Multiple structures on fire, a twin engine plane into a house, and children trapped.” Additionally, his son, a volunteer; an off-duty New Haven (CT) Fire Department (NHFD) firefighter; and an off-duty EHFD battalion chief, who all live or work in the neighborhood, responded when they heard the crash. On their arrival, they were met by a mother indicating that her children were trapped. Without protective clothing or a charged hoseline, they risked their lives searching and then forcing entry and searching the second house to conduct primary searches.

ARRIVAL CONDITIONS AND TACTICS

The first-arriving companies found 64 and 68 Charter Oak Avenue, both 1½-story Cape-Cod style wood-frame homes, showing heavy fire (photo 1). Fire encompassed the entire D side of 64 with some structural damage visible from the street, while 68 was showing heavy fire on the B side with significant structural damage to the B/C roof area. Additionally, a car in the driveway that separated the homes was also heavily involved.

(1) The first-due engine company arrived to find 64 and 68 Charter Oak Avenue involved. (Photo by Steve Brunelle Jr.)

The 360° size-up revealed and confirmed the following:

• Sixty-four showed heavy fire on the D side, which involved the first and second floors as well as the attic area, all on the D side. There was significant structural damage to the C/D corner where the plane impacted the home.
• Sixty-eight had fire burning on the exterior of its B side, which began to extend to the interior. There was significant structural damage to the roof, and the B wall showed signs of impending collapse.
• The plane’s fuselage was imbedded into 64 with one wing through the home’s C wall and extended across the driveway between both houses. The majority of the cockpit was inside 64.

Additionally, companies found arcing power lines from both homes. There was a woman in the street indicating her children were trapped in 64.

On arrival, C1 established command. C4, the on-duty battalion chief, took an operations role as the first-due engine (E1) and laid 500 feet of five-inch supply line. The off-duty firefighters from EHFD and NHFD began pulling the first line-a 2½-inch-toward 68. The engine rider and R1 driver teamed up and pulled a 1¾-inch attack line to 64’s front door. A member of R1 and C6 teamed up to begin a primary search for the children.

The search team entered 64 through a window on the C side near the B corner. While the rescue member entered and made it to the second floor, C6 began a quick primary search of the first floor. During this search, the fire grew exponentially and cut off the stairs to the second floor, trapping the rescue member on the second floor. The rescue member took self-survival actions by closing the door, searching the bedroom, and making his way to a window to call for a ground ladder. While he waited for a ground ladder, the bedroom door began to burn away, placing him in a high-risk situation. A volunteer firefighter and a police officer threw a 24-foot ground ladder to the B side window so the firefighter could safely exit.

C6 took refuge in a first-floor bedroom with the intention of making it to the second floor once water started flowing. However, conditions deteriorated quickly, forcing C6 to bail out the same window he had entered. The rescue member was then forced to create a makeshift EMS/rehab area to check for injuries.

During this search, NHFD companies began to arrive. NHFD Engine 16 (E16) laid its own supply line, which proved to be critical in the fire attack; EHFD’s five-inch supply line would later rupture after a ladder truck from a mutual-aid department drove over it, putting a tear into the line. (That department did not have five-inch line, so it appears the driver and officer did not understand the implications.) The rupturing of this supply line had minimal impact; the water supply was maintained, but it was reduced. Another arriving engine hooked up to a second hydrant that was facing in another direction. The hydrant that was connected to the torn line was shut down, and another line was fed from the second-due engine to the first-due engine without interruption to the handlines. Operators were able to remedy EHFD’s water supply by taking water from NHFD E16 with minimal impact on the fire attack. Unified command was established, and the operations were divided into two sectors based on the address. NHFD took fire attack and search operations in 68, while EHFD took 64. Fire attack on both homes was conducted, and the main body of fire was quickly knocked down.

EHFD volunteer companies and mutual aid from the Branford (CT) Fire Department (BFD) began to arrive. The BFD was assigned vertical ventilation of 64 and as the rapid intervention team. Additional mutual aid from North Branford and BFD along with EHFD’s E5, R3, and R4 was activated and moved into stations to cover companies and staging.

The 1¾-inch attack line was brought into 64, and EHFD C6 and NHFD C36 advanced to the second floor while additional companies searched the first floor and basement. Primary and secondary searches of the floors and basement found nothing. However, 25 percent of the basement and 25 percent of the first floor were unable to be searched; this area-the C/D corner-took a direct hit by the plane. Sixty-four was moved off its foundation, the C side foundation was dessimated, and a majority of the airplane was in the basement, which collapsed the first floor into the basement. At this time, there was also conflicting information coming in on the number of passengers that were on the plane, so crews did not have a definitive number of potential victims.

During the fire attack and searches, many operational tactics and considerations were being handled. Scene security became an issue; East Haven and New Haven police as well as the Connecticut State Police (CSP) began locking down the area. A media area was created down the street, and a time to hold a press conference was set. The American Medical Response established an emergency medical service area, which also became the meeting place for the family members of those still missing in the house.

The fire marshal notified the CSP’s Fire Investigative and Major Crime Units, and other specialized units were summoned for assistance. Other agencies began to arrive in droves including police from EHPD, NHPD, CSP; federal agencies; Tweed personnel; local and national media; Federal Aviation Administration; the mayors of East Haven and New Haven; the governor and lieutenant governor; and other nonuniformed personnel. The scene grew fast, and scene security continued to be challenged.

Employee assistance program (EAP) personnel who specialize in critical incident stress were bought to the scene to begin triaging personnel and aiding with any psychological responses. This early notification was key. EHFD members are familiar with the company and members who came to the scene ahead of time because of proactive training between departments.

Fire operations continued with all fires being extinguished and searches of areas that could be searched completed (photos 2-5). One deceased victim was located in the basement of 64, but crews were not able to reach the area because of the instability of the house and plane wreckage. Connecticut Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Force 1 (CT-TF1) was requested to shore up operations within 64 so searches could be conducted and debris removal could begin. NHFD and EHFD chiefs and the towns’ mayors updated the family that lived in 64 regarding scene progress. Then, the first press conference began (photo 7). Family members were moved from the scene to a conference area less than one mile away at the airport.

(2-5) On the ground, crews surveyed the scene and prepared for search after extinguishment. (Photos by Ray Kline.)

CSP, EHFD, and CSP major crime units began their incident documentation and investigations. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection was consulted, and a private contractor was brought in to begin removing approximately eight to 10 inches of water and jet fuel from the basement 64.

(6) An aerial view of the incident. On the left is 64 Charter Oak Avenue and on the right is 68. (Photo by Ray Kline.)

CT-TF1 arrived and immediately began shoring operations. Once the shoring operations were complete, EHFD members and the CSP Fire Investigative Unit met with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and proceeded to the basement of 64 to begin debris removal and recovery of the victims. Two occupants inside the home, ages one and 13, were located along with the aircraft’s two occupants. With the assistance from the medical examiner’s office, the bodies were removed from the home. It was then determined that the bodies of the victims aboard the plane were still inside the plane. Using a private contractor and USAR, the plane’s fuselage was removed from the house. EHFD members then removed the other two bodies, ages 17 and 54, with the assistance of the medical examiner’s office.

Fire operations were completed at around 1300 hours. However, the mitigating of all hazards and removal of the deceased continued until 0100 hours the following day. The CSP and EHFD fire marshals and CSP Major Crime Unit completed their investigations. The scene was turned over to the EHPD, who secured it until the return of the NTSB, which began its investigation at 0800 hours the following day.

On Saturday, August 10, the EAP provider returned to the firehouse and began talking with personnel. All equipment was inventoried and inspected, and protective clothing was inspected and washed (some clothing was removed from service).

EHFD held an administrative meeting to focus on the recovery steps. Staff worked with the EAP provider and critical incident stress management (CISM) team to evaluate and offer opportunities to all members for care and to schedule debriefings. Also, CISM team materials and EAP family resources were mailed to all members’ homes so families could be educated and made aware of the services available to them to deal with such an incident. The emotional care of the members must begin early; members must know that the effects of an incident may not end once the incident ends. They may last longer than their career!

SMALL COMMUNITIES

East Haven is a small community that came together during these tough times. The tragedy did not end when the companies cleared the scene. On Sunday, August 11, EHFD’s E1, R1, C4, C1, and C2 returned to the scene and assisted the family in recovering personal items. A memorial was started by townspeople, and the emotions of the family proved to be emotionally taxing for the crews.

The EHFD returned to the scene numerous times to assist in different matters. Members attended an interfaith candlelight prayer service in a local park. EHFD members also dismantled a large collection of stuffed animals at the memorial before they were ruined by rain. Department members were also notified that the deceased girls from the home were related to two NHFD members.

EHFD’s presence was requested at the funeral. Members professionally and honorably attended the services in a show of support to the family. Department members also attended fund-raisers that were created to support the family; this proved to be very rewarding for the members. Attending and participating in these events helped with the closure of the psychological file. However, it also added to the psychological scarring.

(7) A press conference area was staged for the contingent of media that descended on the scene. (Photo by Ray Kline.)

The EHFD performed with the utmost professionalism and handled this challenging incident as well as it should. It arrived to find conditions that would challenge any department with greater staffing and even greater immediate resources. EHFD members and mutual-aid departments together mitigated this incident to the best of their ability and should be proud of their efforts.

LESSONS LEARNED

With every response, regardless of its size, there are always lessons to be learned. This incident was no different. Following are some lessons from this incident from which we all can learn.

• Departments must call for additional resources early! Incident commanders cannot wait and should frontload the assignment as soon as possible. It is better to be standing in the street looking at the resources than standing in the street looking for them! The EHFD chief called for an additional assignment from NHFD prior to his arrival based solely on the dispatcher’s reports.
• Work with your mutual-aid departments, and have an intimate knowledge of their capabilities and resources ahead of time.
• Establish an effective command structure immediately, and then broaden it to a unified command structure. This scene grew extremely fast with many agencies and organizations. Without unified command, everything is compromised.
• Your local law enforcement agency must be aware of its role ahead of time. The fire service is great at preparing for emergencies such as this one. However, are your other local agencies on the same page? Security will be an immediate concern, and explaining a situation while standing in the street is never a good tactic. You must work and prepare with your law enforcement agency ahead of the call.
• Teach self-survival skills. At this incident, a search crew member became separated, and his self-survival skills prevented a greater tragedy. The member did not panic or hastily bail out of a window. He relied on his training and took appropriate actions.
• Ground ladders must be thrown to every area being searched. Any structure that has crews operating within must have ladders thrown to all sides and all levels.
• Conduct specialized training. Tweed Airport, EHFD, NHFD, and all other agencies involved worked seamlessly together on this incident. This is directly credited to the yearly tabletop exercises and the tri-annual drill full-scale exercise that is conducted at Tweed.
• Critical incident stress can affect your members at any incident. Departments must be proactive by providing all members training before an incident like this. Department members should also be familiar with the local EAP providers and CISM team members prior to needing their support.
• Working with mutual aid, dividing the incident into sectors, and flowing big water proved extremely valuable. Additionally, both first-due engines laying their own supply line was key to a sustained fire attack. This incident required fire attack on two separate homes, plane wreckage, and a motor vehicle. This would be a big challenge for any department that may be arriving with many more members than the 14 EHFD had on scene initially.
• Don’t lose sight of the survivability profile when searching. On arrival, companies were met by a mother screaming that her kids were trapped. Members did an outstanding job gaining access and searching all possible areas. Crews identified areas that needed to be searched; they searched what they could safely and effectively.
• Know what specialized resources are available to you and how to obtain them to minimize the reflex time. Incidents of this magnitude may require specialized resources. In this scenario, CT-TF1 was needed for members’ expertise in shoring operations.
• All departments must have a public information officer (PIO) with which the media is familiar and who has set clear boundaries ahead of time. If your department has a good working relationship with your media, large-scale incidents will go more smoothly. Remember, an incident is not the time to assign a PIO. The PIO should be delivering the department’s message on a regular basis.
• Complete postincident reviews and critiques on multiple levels. Incidents such as this will move very fast; it is necessary for all to have the opportunity to learn what was done, why it was done, and how it can be done better next time. Large-scale incidents that involve multiple agencies will make it a greater challenge. However, these reviews and critiques are valuable learning tools that must not be overlooked.

The success of this incident’s fire operations is directly related to the members who were operating on scene and their years of training and preparation. The success is also related to every call that came before this one. Treat every call like the large ones. Small incidents are building blocks for the large ones. Treat every call like the learning opportunity it is.

P.J. NORWOOD is a deputy chief training officer for the East Haven (CT) Fire Department and has served four years with the Connecticut Army National Guard. Norwood has authored Dispatch, Handling the Mayday (Fire Engineering, 2012), coauthored Tactical Perspectives of Ventilation and Mayday DVDs (2011, 2012), and was a key contributor to the Tactical Perspectives DVD Series. Norwood is an FDIC instructor, Fire Engineering contributor, Fire Engineering University faculty member, and host of a Fire Engineering Blog Talk Radio show. He serves on the Underwriters Laboratories Technical Panel for the Study of Residential Attic Fire Mitigation Tactics and Exterior Fire Spread Hazards on Fire Fighter Safety. He has also lectured across the United States and overseas. He is certified to instructor II, officer III, and paramedic.