Quick Decision Is Required To Limit Initial Attack Error
The Volunteers Corner
When a foul-up occurs in the initial attack on a fire, the odds are great that this first error will have the effect of the first illness in an epidemic disease. The trouble will multiply unless the initial problem is isolated.
Reams of material have been written about initial size-up of a fire and most of it has been predicated on telling you how the first success of minor import leads unerringly to increasingly greater successes that terminate the fire problem. However, there are those times —rare through they may be—in every department when something goes wrong in the first minute or two on the fireground—a dry or frozen hydrant, the first line stretched to the wrong area, a pumper positioned so as to block use of aerial apparatus, or any number of other misfortunes.
Only an immediate decision by the fireground commander, who at that moment might be a company officer—not a chief officer—can isolate the foul-up before it contaminates the rest of the operation.
Background for decisions: Quick, effective decisions on the fireground don’t come out of the wild blue yonder. They are the product of extensive experience on the fireground, a thorough knowledge of fire fighting technology and a practice of developing alternatives to strategies and tactics that fail. Snap decisions that succeed do so because they come from a solid base of competency built up over the years.
In making decisions to overcome a fireground problem, you have to consider your department’s resources and the competency of the companies. Let’s look at an initial attack hose line that has been stretched to the wrong area. Should you order the line moved or should you order the company to leave the line and stretch another line to the desired position?
Knowledge of the competency of the company in handling hose lines and experience in evaluating the progress of the fire will form your decision. It may be quicker to stretch another line, depending on the length of the line and the possibility that the original line might later be useful as a defensive line. In a department with many engine companies, a realistic alternative could be to call another engine company to stretch a line to the proper position.
Preliminary reports, The policy of having the first-in company transmit what is sometimes called a “preliminary report” on arrival can be extremely useful to the responding chief officer. The preliminary report should briefly describe the size and type of building involved and the location and volume of fire—or smoke if no fire is visible. The report also should mention any rescue or unusual situation that is apparent and indicate the initial action being taken.
From a brief but pertinent preliminary report, a chief officer can make a reasonable evaluation of the fire problem and the first steps taken to resolve it. In the event that something is starting to go wrong on the fireground, an experienced chief officer can frequently find an indication of it in the preliminary report. At this point, he can issue an order by radio that can mitigate the difficulty.
The first orders transmitted by radio to companies arriving on the fireground also should be evaluated for indications of the size of the fire problem and the actions being taken to meet it. These early transmissions can give a pretty clear indication of how things are going, and the incoming chief officer will react accordingly.
In a serious rescue situation where fire control appears to have been forgotten, it may be necessary to order at least one engine company to line in to hold the fire in check to buy more time for rescue. Where a large volume of water is needed but is unavailable, the incoming chief can act to institute a defensive operation that can save part of the building and avert an inadequate offensive operation that can result ih a total loss.
Pre-fire plan: The officer-in-charge— who may be the first-in company officer— should think of the pre-fire plan, if there is one, for the involved building from two angles. The obvious first angle is how a fire in that building is expected to be fought. The other angle is to consider the unexpected difficulties the fire may create that may lead to unanticipated problems.
For example, the pre-fire plan for a warehouse may call for the protection and, as circumstances permit, removal of trailers from the loading docks. The alert officer will quickly scan the trailers for hazardous materials placards so that a protection and removal priority can be given to trailers that may hold a potentially greater problem than the warehouse fire.
This may require diversion of one or two companies that are needed to handle the warehouse fire, but it could avert a hazardous materials incident that would endanger lives over an extensive area. The officer-in-charge has to evaluate his resources and determine whether he has the companies and water necessary to at least confine the fire. If he hasn’t, then he had better get the one or more trailers with hazardous materials removed from the area.
Alternatives have to be considered and decisions made. Is it better to save half the warehouse and risk a serious hazardous materials incident, or is it better to lose the entire warehouse and avert a hazardous materials incident?
The beginning of that decision may start with the first-in company officer, but the completion of the decision will be the responsibility of the first-in chief officer.
