BY MIKE WISKO
Galveston, Texas, is a barrier island that sits just off the upper Texas coast, southeast of Houston. The island is 32 miles long and serves as home to more than 57,000 people. That population swells to more than 300,000 in summer months and during periods of special events throughout the year. Galveston has been in the path of many hurricanes. The most significant and deadliest one struck on September 8, 1900. It killed more than 6,000 people and changed this Texas coastal city forever. No storm has matched the destruction witnessed in 1900that is, until Hurricane Ike in September 2008.
THE UNCERTAINTY OF IKE’S STATUS
On September 1, 2008, Tropical Storm Ike formed just west of the Cape Verde islands in the Caribbean. For the next 12 days, Ike careened across the open waters, wreaking havoc in Haiti and Cuba before entering the Gulf of Mexico and progressing toward the upper Texas coast. At its peak, Ike was a Category 4 storm with winds reaching 145 miles per hour (mph). It made landfall as a Category 2 hurricane, but it produced a storm surge consistent with a Category 4 storm.
Ike became a concern to Texas Emergency Management officials around September 5. The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a long-range forecast that put Ike in the northwestern quadrant of the Gulf of Mexico by Thursday, September 11. This forecast initiated daily conference calls involving all emergency management and city officials in Texas. Over the next seven days, with an ever-changing forecast and landfall predictions, officials discussed, planned, and prepared for the landfall of a significant hurricane somewhere along the Texas coast.
 (2) This house fire, just outside of downtown, occurred the same afternoon. This house was saved from fire during Hurricane Rita in 2005, but we were unable to reach it in time to save it from Ike. |
On Monday, September 8, we began pulling crews in to review search and rescue marking procedures. Fire Chief Michael Varela Sr. met with each class and discussed the city’s plan as well as the latest storm forecast. The forecast was changing every four hours. Landfall was projected from as far east as Tampa and as far west as Brownsville. We reviewed the department’s hurricane standard operating procedures (SOP) and reminded all personnel to begin preparations at home and to report to work for an extended period of time. These meetings were repeated with the respective shifts on Tuesday and Wednesday.
 (3) This fire occurred approximately one week after the storm. Crews were just arriving. No injuries occurred. |
By Wednesday, the mood around the city was starting to get very tense. The NWS continued to update its “cone of uncertainty,” and Galveston was once again within this cone. The storm forecasters were very stern in their message that regardless of where Ike finally made landfall, there would be a storm surge of 15 to 20 feet. This would mean catastrophic damage to any place in its path. Late Wednesday afternoon, Galveston city officials called for a voluntary evacuation of the island’s west end. This area is not protected by the seawall (see the sidebar “The Seawall”) and would undoubtedly fall victim to the storm surge if Ike were to strike anywhere within 100 miles of Galveston. As residents went to bed that night, things were looking pretty good for the island. The NWS was predicting landfall south of Galveston as early as Friday afternoon. For all practical purposes, Wednesday was the last “normal” day we experienced in Galveston for many months.
ACTION PLANS
Evacuations
As residents awoke Thursday morning, they quickly learned of some changes throughout the night. Ike was now predicted to strike within 50 miles of Galveston. It was time to act. The voluntary evacuation for the west end became mandatory. The rest of the island was under a voluntary evacuation order. The state had directed buses to Galveston to pick up residents who needed assistance evacuating. As part of a prearranged agreement with the city of Austin, nearly 3,000 evacuees were taken by bus to Austin for sheltering.
The University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) Hospital complex was also busy evacuating its patients. UTMB is the only hospital on Galveston Island; it has a capacity of 700 beds. It is home to a Level 1 trauma center, which serves a nine-county region, the state’s oldest medical school, and a world-renowned burn center. An evacuation of this scale was performed once before, in anticipation of Hurricane Rita in 2005.
Once the UTMB complex had completed evacuating its facilities, a skeleton crew was left to manage the emergency room and other key departments within the complex. This presented another challenge to our operation, because the ability to care for sick and injured storm victims would be minimal at best. Critical patients would need to be transported off the island to other medical facilities. The closest hospital is 20 minutes away, and the closest Level 1 trauma center is 45 minutes away, in Houston.
All our fire department companies assisted with the evacuations at UTMB as well as the five retirement centers and nursing homes across the island. These evacuation operations were in addition to the usual fire and medical responses and our storm-preparation activities. On this particular day, our runs were up slightly, and we had a three-acre grass fire adjacent to a residential subdivision caused by a sparking electrical transformer.
Increased Winds and Flooding
Early Thursday evening, the two stations (7 and 8) on the island’s west end were evacuated and relocated to stations 1 and 4, behind the seawall. Throughout the night, the waters of the Gulf began to rise and churn, and the winds increased. Downed power lines and arcing lines were issues throughout the night.
By the early morning hours of Friday, September 12, tides were running six to eight feet above normal, which meant that waves were already crashing into the seawall and pushing water and debris up onto the roadway. The streets downtown were beginning to flood from water backing up through the storm drains. By 0800 hours, water was already two feet deep downtown.
Operations Moved to Hotel, Fire Personnel Assigned
By 0700 hours, city leaders had decided it was time to relocate all city operations to the San Luis Hotel, a 15-story resort hotel located on the seawall at 52nd Street. It was built in the early 1980s on an old World War II Army bunker. It had served as the city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and employee shelter during Hurricane Rita in 2005, so the officials felt comfortable that the building could withstand this storm as well.
Fire department personnel were assigned to rooms by companies. All personnel were kept to two floors to enable us to account for and get messages to all, if needed. The plan was to have the shift on duty (C shift) handle all the responses on Friday. The A and B shifts reported to the hotel to be available if they were needed. A shift would go to work at 0630 hours Saturday morning; B shift would be the backup. This would allow C shift a chance to rest. Sometimes plans change!
By noon, tides were 10 to 12 feet above normal, and many streets were flooded. For the most part, all those who intended to evacuate had done so. It is estimated that some 15,000 residents remained on the island to “ride out” the Category 2 storm.
Structure Fires
It was at about this same time that a structure fire was reported in a west end subdivision. With smoke visible from two miles away, crews began making their way toward the area. They encountered water over the roadway almost immediately and soon determined that they would be unable to reach the fire. That particular fire resulted in three houses being lost.
Another fire was reported at 1400 hours; this one was in a boat-storage facility at the yacht club on the east end of the island. Again, it didn’t take long to determine that the rising water would prevent us from getting to that fire. The fire created a large plume of thick smoke that blanketed the island for hours and led to many subsequent reports of fire that turned out to be smoke from this fire. In the end, more than 150 boats were destroyed in that fire.
In that same time period, another fire erupted in the historic section of downtown, destroying a two-story home that ironically was saved from fire during Hurricane Rita in 2005. Again, the rising water prevented us from reaching the home. The causes of all these fires are still under investigation.
RESPONSES CEASED
By 1600 hours, it was determined that we were no longer capable of responding to calls because of the continually rising water and the hurricane-force wind gusts that had begun to impact the island. We do not operate any boats, and it was not safe to drive the streets any longer. Most areas of town were already under three to five feet of water. Chief Varela ordered all personnel to the San Luis Hotel. All apparatus were secured inside the city convention center, four blocks west of the hotel on the seawall.
For the next 14 hours, 120 firefighters along with the city police, public works, dispatchers, and administrative staff rode out the storm inside this hotel. 911 dispatchers received multiple calls for rescue evacuations and structure fires. They had to inform the callers that we were unable to respond because of the weather. What was even more painful was the fact that from the upper floors of the hotel, firefighters were able to see fires all across the island, knowing they could not respond. We lost all power to the building around 2030 hours. The rest of the night was spent in darkness with flashlights and cell phones as our only sources of light.
The eye of the storm moved across the heart of Galveston at 0230 hours. The winds ahead of the eye wall reached 115 mph; the water reached almost 15 feet in some areas. The back side of the eye wall was even more intense than the front. The outside of the hotel began to fall apart. You could hear the large glass windows cracking as though they were about to explode inwardly.
RESPONSE RESUMED
Sunrise Saturday morning signaled two things for us. We knew we had survived the storm, and we knew it was time to get to work. The winds had subsided to 75 mph. Using our makeshift command post in a dark hotel meeting room, we split the department into two operations (Rescue and Fire), placing each group on a separate tactical channel with a battalion chief as incident commander (IC) for each operation. We assigned A and B shifters to these two operations. We managed to keep most of the C shift personnel in the hotel. At 0900 hours, we deployed crews across the island to determine what our immediate areas of concern would be.
 (4) FEMA USAR resources are staged on a bridge in Texas. (Photos 4-7 by Jocelyn Augustino/FEMA; FEMA Photo Library.) |
It was about this same time that we learned the county’s enhanced 911 system had taken a slight hit. We normally use the “smart zone” configuration, which allows the radios to hit the closest tower regardless of which county the tower is geographically located. This was not working well, so we reverted to the local county system. Although it limited our communications with surrounding cities, it served us well on the island.
We knew we had rescue problems caused by collapsed structures, and we knew we had fires burning. The challenge was to identify and prioritize the problem areas and set up operations. We also knew that we would need more people and specialized equipment for collapse search and rescue.
 (5) |
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 (5, 6) FEMA USAR team members search in areas/neighborhoods impacted by Hurricane Ike. |
During a 0700-hour conference call with the state’s EOC, we requested FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Texas Task Force 1 (TX-TF-1). Although its members were staged in Houston and across the Texas coast prior to the storm, we knew it would take hours for them to reach us by ground because of the water and debris. By noon our crews had identified 27 collapsed structures. Most of them were wood-frame houses or apartment buildings. Crews initiated searches as best they could and removed any occupants they found.
We also found several fires, most involving multiple structures, still burning. What made this even more difficult was the fact that the city water system was down. The backup generators had gone underwater. It would take three weeks to get the system back up and running adequately across the city. We were forced to draft or shuttle water when necessary. There were still more areas of town that we could not reach because of high water. It took most of the day to get to every part of the island.
 (7) Members of Indiana Task Force 1 mark a house as they complete searching it. |
TX-TF-1 arrived shortly after noon. We met with the overhead team at the hotel. Soon, we headed out with TX-TF-1 to the areas identified by our crews as priorities. They immediately assigned crews to these areas, and they worked through the night searching for victims. Based on the resources that would be needed to assist TX-TF-1, we determined that the best place to establish its base of operation would be the Moody Methodist Church, a large church complex in the center of the city. Ironically, it was one of the only areas of the island that had not been completely devastated by the storm surge. It was also one of the only places capable of accommodating the 400 USAR team members heading to Galveston.
For the next five days, TX-TF-1 and USAR teams from California, Colorado, Arizona, and Indiana worked with Galveston Fire Department crews to systematically search and check all of Galveston and the Bolivar peninsula.
By the end of the first week, the death toll was at seven on Galveston Island. Most of these were from natural causes or drowning. There were many reports of missing persons, and the local law enforcement agencies were working to clear those cases. We recorded more than 60 structure fires and an untold number of rescues before, during, and after the hurricane. Our fire investigators are still working to determine the causes of many of these fires. Although the storm lasted 24 hours, the impact and devastation it caused will take years to overcome.
Of the 130 Galveston Fire Department personnel, more than 45 suffered major losses to their homes and property. All of our stations were damaged; two stations (4 and 5) were destroyed by the flooding. In mid-November these two stations temporarily reopened in modular buildings. Our entire inventory of personal protective equipment (PPE) was damaged or lost in the storm, and we lost two apparatus to flooding. We anticipate encountering multiple mechanical issues in the near future resulting from driving these apparatus through streets flooded with saltwater.
We were fortunate to have the newly created Texas Intrastate Fire Mutual Aid System (TIFMAS) provide apparatus and personnel from across the state. Based on our request for additional mutual-aid resources, TIFMAS coordinated several departments as they spent several days each in Galveston assisting us with fire support.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Many lessons were learned as a result of Hurricane Ike.
- Obviously with respect to any disaster, preparation is a key element. Identify the types of disasters prevalent in your region. Using that knowledge, determine how your normal operations would be affected and develop alternative ways of providing emergency services during those times. Develop SOPs that clearly explain how to conduct those operations. Practice and review these SOPs annually, and modify them as needed. The best people to aid in the development of these SOPs would be the individuals who will be first to employ them when such an event occurs.
- Incident management is an area that will make disaster response a success or a failure rather quickly. The fire service seems to be well versed in National Incident Management System (NIMS) Type 4 and 5 incidents. Most of us in the fire service were using these principles before the NIMS guidelines were developed. What would be very beneficial before a major incident would be to train those individuals identified as emergency managers in the art of NIMS. Many times, these folks are elected officials who really want to do the right thing but lack the experience and knowledge to be successful. It is our responsibility to prepare them.
The next step in this process would be to develop a Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT) or participate with existing teams in your area. Get involved with the Type 1 and 2 teams as well. Your elected officials and all city employees need to understand NIMS and the fact that these incident management teams exist for these major incidents. Local government officials should be willing to use these teams when needed. There will be a lot of things to do after a disaster with regard to restoring normal operations and determining what the needs will be to start the recovery process. If the city officials are overwhelmed with emergency management issues, they will not be able to focus on restoring and maintaining the daily operations of the city. These IMTs can help in each of these areas. - Public education is another key element. It is absolutely necessary to educate the citizens in your community about why evacuations are ordered and when they would be asked to leave their homes. It is difficult for emergency responders to work in devastated areas when residents are meandering through the streets complaining, “No one was here to help us!” or asking, “What are you going to do for me now?” The simple fact that they need to understand beforehand is that when emergency managers recommend evacuations, they are doing so to protect the citizens from harm. Their failure to leave is not the government’s fault, and the lives of emergency personnel cannot be risked to save them from their decision. When they understand that no one will be coming to get them in the middle of a forecasted weather event because it is too dangerous, they may be more inclined to evacuate when directed to do so.
- Safety is another key element that plays a major role in the success or failure of your operations. Do not abandon safety practices during disaster events. The emotions of surviving a catastrophic event in addition to not knowing the status of your family and personal property will cause you to act in unsafe ways if you allow it. We all accept the risks associated with our chosen careers or volunteer service. Emergencies are our business, and we must remain calm and competent during these events. When weather situations are such that evacuations are needed, who are we to think that we will survive the event while outside in the street? There will come a time during a severe weather event when it is not safe or practical to place personnel in harm’s way. Understand that when Mother Nature is finished kicking your butt, you will need every apparatus and every member of your organization available to respond and perform their duties. Remember that your family is just as concerned about your safety and that if you get hurt or killed because you didn’t have time for safety, then you are making the situation much worse.
- Critical incident stress management is another area that is often overlooked during the planning phase. When this storm hit, it affected all of us in a variety of ways. A large number of Galveston Fire Department personnel and other city workers live on the island. Their homes were destroyed by the storm surge. Most of our families were evacuated in the days before the storm, and the inability to communicate in the first few days after the event was stressful for everyone. The families were watching TV and seeing the worst of the devastation while we were seeing it firsthand and hoping that they were safe wherever they had evacuated to. Make plans beforehand to have critical incident stress management teams brought in after the event. It may not be practical right away; but as soon as possible, your personnel and your families will need to talk about what they felt. We always say that the fire service is a family. Don’t forget the families after the storm.
- Another element often overlooked until the disaster strikes is mutual aid and other outside assistance such as USAR teams and IMTs. These groups may be needed. Your personnel need to understand how and why they will be brought in and used after such events. It is difficult for most of us to welcome outsiders into our community to help when a disaster occurs. If you have experienced such events in your community, you understand what I am saying. It is necessary for all departments to understand and recognize who these people are. They have regular emergency services jobs in their hometowns. They have stepped up to be part of this national response team, created to assist local departments during times of crisis. Although they may be state or federally funded and wear uniforms that say “FEMA” or “USAR,” they are no different from you and me. They are coming to help you because they were requested.
As soon as possible, insert your crews with the strike teams when they are deployed. Local responders can assist these teams in many ways. Our crews were able to navigate and direct the USAR groups around town. They knew the areas they were going into and were able to help the USAR groups accomplish their tasks more quickly. The experiences will be beneficial to the local personnel during the recovery process. I can say that even with more than 400 outsiders on Galveston Island for five days, there was very little “tail sniffing.” The members of TX-TF-1 and the USAR teams were nothing short of professional and courteous while helping us serve our citizens. I thank them for their service to our community in this time of need.
- You must take care of your apparatus and equipment. If you abuse the rigs before and during the event, you will not have them when you need them after the event. We lost two apparatus. One was disabled in the shop at the time of the storm, and it was flooded. The other had seen better days and was pushed as far as it would go before it stopped working. All apparatus were secured during the height of the storm and were not deployed until the water had receded. Even then, the operators tried to avoid debris and hazards to the best of their abilities.
- Training is the final key element. Once the SOPs are written, the emergency managers are trained, and the public is educated, you will need to train regularly in these areas. Every day, more and more demands are placed on us as emergency responders. We have to learn new techniques and procedures while staying up to date on the basics of fire and EMS. I can’t help but refer back to my risk management training. Low risk/high frequency events are just as dangerous as high risk/low frequency events in the sense that we are good at those things we do all the time. We aren’t very good at what we don’t do often. We get hurt during low risk/high frequency events because we get complacent. We get hurt during high risk/low frequency events because we aren’t comfortable and are under stress to resolve the problem quickly.
Many unpleasant events will occur as a result of Hurricane Ike over the next five to 10 years. Our friends from Gulfport, Mississippi, came to Galveston four days after Ike made landfall. Fire Chief Pat Sullivan and his staff met with us and provided valuable information on how to start recovering. They shared the many things they would have done differently had they known what to expect. Although we were all extremely tired when we met with them, their insights and words of support have helped us in so many ways.
The International Association of Fire Fighters and our Texas State Firefighter’s Association arrived in Galveston on that Saturday morning after Ike had hit. They coordinated getting assistance for our members in the way of food, water, and supplies. Other local members from across the state were here to assist with debris cleanup around our homes and supporting us in our time of need. We will be forever grateful to them.
We don’t yet know how the current financial crisis of our nation will affect us. We know we can expect some severe revenue losses because of the storm. Some of our largest employers on the island have already begun the grueling task of conducting layoffs because of financial shortfalls. Residents are working tirelessly to rebuild their homes and businesses, and the tourist industry is doing its best to bring tourism back as soon as possible. The city leaders have made some tough decisions to keep the city operating, and they are to be commended for their efforts.
The 130 members of the Galveston Fire Department worked tirelessly as one group to perform our jobs and help each other. These men and women are no different from anyone else in our profession. They do whatever has to be done to serve the citizens of Galveston whenever needed. I am proud to be a part of this organization.
We all choose where we make our homes and careers. In that, we must accept the risks associated with living there and have a plan for dealing with the results. The communities we serve expect us to be there during these desperate times, and we accept that responsibility proudly. We must be prepared for worst-case scenarios, and we must realize that even we, as emergency responders, cannot prevent the devastation brought about by Mother Nature. Planning, practice, and good judgment will enable us to serve our communities regardless of the situation. Take a look at your plans. Make sure you are prepared for the disaster that could affect you someday. It will be worth the time and effort.
MIKE WISKO is a 20-year veteran of the Galveston (TX) Fire Department, where he serves as chief of safety & training. He was assigned as chief of rescue operations during the days following Hurricane Ike and worked with Texas Task Force 1 while it was on the island. He is president of the Galveston County Firefighter’s Association and serves on the Texas Commission on Fire Protection’s Firefighter Advisory Committee.
The Seawall
Following the 1900 storm, the seawall was constructed using granite, sandstone, and concrete. The seawall is 17 feet high and 16 feet wide at its base and extends 10 miles across the island, protecting a large portion of the island from the Gulf of Mexico. Approximately 18 miles of Galveston’s west end sits unprotected by the seawall. The initial phase of the seawall construction project occurred between 1904 and 1910. There were two additional phases; the final phase was completed about 1963.
