BY ERIC G. BACHMAN
The term target hazard is often misused and misunderstood. It is often stereotyped as a large, complex, high-visibility facility within a fire district. When fire departments describe their fire district target hazards, they often list the large industrial buildings or the facilities that store, use, or manufacture hazardous materials and high-occupancy facilities such as hospitals or schools. No one will argue that these facilities are not target hazards. However, target hazards are not limited to large obvious facilities, and your analysis of target hazards should include all such structures within your protection district. If it can catch fire, release or contain a hazardous material, affect the environment, collapse, or harm your firefighters, it is a target hazard. If it will overwhelm your resources, expose your limitations, or exploit a deficiency, it is a target hazard.
Sometimes, we become complacent when evaluating potential hazardous situations because of the infrequency of incidents. Unstaffed facilities for which the chance of human error seems slim, such as a telecommunications switch site, and a lack of understanding about a site and the operations/processes that take place there sometimes add to the complacency. Because we have not had to respond to an incident at these sites, we may accept that the site poses little risk. A small building located in the middle of a field may blend into the landscape and be forgotten, feeding complacency (photo 1). One small incident at a small chlorination booster station building by the side of the road (photo 2) can test your preincident preparedness, earn or lose for your department the respect of your peers, and affect your reputation with the public. If you are not prepared and your actions or inactions contribute to an escalation of the problem, the postincident consequences will be devastating and difficult to overcome.
 (1) A telephone switch at the back of a small stone road. The building to the rear is a school. (Photos by author.) |
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 (2) A small chlorination booster station. It would take only one incident to challenge your preparedness. |
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TARGET HAZARD TYPES
You must gather preplanning information on the smaller, unassuming facilities and sites as well as the larger, high-profile facilities. Because a facility is small does not mean it is not dangerous. Because it is generally unstaffed does not mean there is no risk. And, because you may never have had to respond to an emergency at a site does not mean you never will. In the fire service, ignorance is no excuse. Fire officials must identify what they protect and be prepared to respond and manage the situation.
This article is not intended as a review of the operations for such utilities but to highlight preincident considerations that will aid in managing and operating an incident at one of these facilities. Your preplans must address local conditions and circumstances and aspects specific to each facility.
 (3) Electrical substation. |
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 (4) Natural gas pipeline pressure, gate, and valve stations. |
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 (5) Water treatment/pumping station sites. |
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 (6) Telecommunication facilities. |
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 (7) This natural gas pipeline valve station has a restaurant that may house dozens of children as an exposure. How would you respond? What actions would you take during an incident? |
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 (8) This water-pumping station, which has a fire station next door, uses gaseous chlorine. How would a release affect your response? |
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- Access. This is a critical factor at any target hazard. Utility facilities may be obvious or intentionally set back from primary roadways. Access must be addressed not only for entry considerations but also for getting to the facility the resources for mitigating the incident.
- Exposure. What is next to the utility, and what is the life hazard adjacent to the utility? Utility facilities may be remote with no exposures. Others may be next to a significant occupancy.
- Monitoring and protecting the facility. Is there any on-site or off-site monitoring of the utility’s conditions? In many cases, facilities are monitored remotely in a control center, where failures and outages may be detected. However, other utilities, such as a water pumping station, may have limited monitoring capabilities. It is important to understand which mechanisms are in place for monitoring and notification. The water-pumping station is equipped with a chlorine monitor. Do not get lulled into a false sense of security because a facility is constantly monitored. A utility may be monitored from a central station several states away, and there could be delays in notifying the local emergency services and facility response personnel. Corporate leaders may consider a four-hour response time acceptable for on-site representation. This time frame, of course, would be unacceptable to the local emergency services that have to deal with the problem. Fire departments must maintain a working relationship with their utility facilities before an incident. Not only will this aid in improving incident management, it may open up other opportunities as well such as funding and training.
RESPONSE FACTORS
Topography significantly affects how an incident is approached and where spilled materials may flow. When preplanning, review the physical characteristics of the materials in relation to the topography, and adapt your response plan accordingly.
SITE IDENTIFICATION
Include the correct site name and the name of the owner/operator and contact information in your preplan. I have found, especially for sites operated by larger foreign companies, that their identification of a site may not be as descriptive to the local responders as it is for corporate personnel. You must identify the companies that have sites or maintain product conduits through your district. You must know beforehand who owns, monitors, or is responsible for the site or product. At most sites, the company name as well as an emergency contact number is posted. It would be most difficult to obtain this information when a vapor cloud is surrounding the facility or there is intense heat or smoke streaming from an ignited source. You will not be able to get close enough to the sign to get the information. Contact the facility to discuss and coordinate preincident preparedness and response issues, and practice and review the response plan before an incident.
Preincident coordination with facility managers is important. Most, if not all, utility companies would insist that fire department personnel do not try to manipulate operational valves or shutoffs during an emergency. These actions may increase the severity of the incident and risk to firefighters.
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 (10) The two warning lights on the exterior of this water-treatment building activate if internal sensors detect chlorine or ammonia. |
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Fire officials must understand the marking system used by their utilities. Line markers, mile markers, and casing vent markers should be identified before an incident. Determine the utility’s preferred identification and reporting methods so that precise information is communicated, reducing confusion and delay. Many utilities reference their medium with a company- or industry-specific system. Specific addresses may not assist in identifying the location of the emergency site. Utility companies, for example, use a specific numbering system for utility poles. An address would not be helpful in identifying the location of a pole involved in a motor vehicle accident, for example. The utility would have to be told which marker the pole is near and then relay the precise location of the pole.
The utility company must be notified immediately when an incident occurs. In the case of a pipeline rupture, shutdown procedures can be initiated. It may take some time for the product to stop flowing. In one case involving a hydrocarbon pipeline rupture, shutdown procedures were initiated from a transfer station nearly 15 miles away. Even though the pipeline was shut down promptly, it took several hours for the residual product to spill out.1 The result was that more than 40,000 gallons of diesel fuel spilled, causing a significant environmental cleanup that took several months.
 (11) A pipeline and line markers. |
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 (12) This small chlorination station maintains two 150-pound cylinders of chlorine. |
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 (13) These utility markers indicate gas (left) and buried cable. |
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SITE CHARACTERISTICS
It is important to know what the facility is and its operating hours, if and when it may be staffed, and what it contains. A small utility building can pose a great risk. In the case of a water chlorination station, a 150-pound cylinder of gaseous chlorine will kill a firefighter as effectively as a ton cylinder. Not all water-treatment facilities use gaseous chlorine. They may use other materials. You must know what they are, their characteristics, and their hazards. Know what is being transported through the pipes.
In south central Pennsylvania, common products distributed include gasoline, butane, propane, fuel oil, kerosene, jet fuel, natural gas, and nitrogen. Responders must be familiar with the characteristics of these materials and how they will act when released. Some considerations include the following: the vapor density of propane and where unignited product will travel, the vapor density of natural gas and where unignited product will travel, and the flash point of gasoline vs. diesel fuel. In some cases, a pipeline may transport different materials at different times: Gasoline flow may alternate with another commodity in the line.
Telephone switching offices often contain lead/acid batteries for backup power. The sulfuric acid in lead acid batteries has the potential to leak, spill, or break, thus creating a spill and an exposure problem. Sulfuric acid is hazardous by all routes of entry. What are the chemical characteristics of sulfuric acid? Liquid sulfuric acid has a specific gravity of 1.23 to 1.350 (heavier than water). It has a vapor density of greater than 1; it is heavier than air. Under normal conditions of use, sulfuric acid vapors are not generated. However, vapors or a mist may be generated when the material is overheated or oxidized or when it is part of other processes or damaged. Sulfuric acid may cause severe respiratory irritation and burns. These batteries also may emit hydrogen gas, which may result in a fire or an explosion. The explosive range of hydrogen gas is 4.1 to 74.2 percent. With that said, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 704 marking system for sulfuric acid is 0 flammability, 3 health, and 2 reactivity.
 (14) Confined spaces may be anywhere, such as in a sewage pumping station. |
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 (15) The manhole in the foreground provides access to pumping equipment below. Be aware of power supplies and associated materials |
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 (16) The rear of a water pumping station. Note the diesel fuel tank as well as the confined space hatch to the right. |
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POTENTIAL SITUATIONS
Knowing the locations of the utility facilities in your response area will help you to recognize when a utility may be involved in an incident. Instead of a routine response to a vehicle accident, you may actually have a vehicle that crashed into an aboveground pipeline valve station. An incident dispatched to a nonspecific address location, such as “in the area of” or “to the rear of,” may be a utility emergency.
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On July 24, 2001, the Neffsville (PA) Community Fire Company was dispatched to a truck fire in the area of Buch Avenue and Weaver Road. On arrival, members found burning a pickup truck, another truck, a trailer, and a gasoline pipeline valve station. Crews were working on the valves and left the engine of one of the vehicles running. A leak occurred; the vehicle engine ignited the fumes, causing a large fire that burned for more than 15 hours.
The scenarios for incidents involving utilities are endless, and the risk to the public and firefighters is significant. Fire officials cannot conceive of every possible situation; therefore, it is essential that you be aware of the hazards that exist and prepare for potential emergencies.
Reference
ERIC G. BACHMAN, a 22-year veteran of the fire service, is former chief of the Eden Volunteer Fire/Rescue Department in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and currently serves as captain. He is the hazardous materials administrator for the County of Lancaster Emergency Management Agency and serves on the Lancaster County Local Emergency Planning Committee. He is registered with the National Board on Fire Service Professional Qualifications as a fire officer II, fire instructor I, hazardous materials technician, and hazardous materials incident commander. He has an associate’s degree in fire science and is Pennsylvania state certified in emergency management. He is also a volunteer firefighter with the Manheim (PA) Fire Department.
1. Bachman, Eric, “Pipeline Rupture: A Case Study,” Fire Engineering, April 2001.
