PREPLANNING PAYS OFF IN BUFFALO CHURCH FIRE
A well-involved fire in a large, old Gothic church generally results in the destruction of the building. In Buffalo, New York, many of these types of fires have concluded with 100-foot-longplus steeples crashing to the street. However, a five-alarm fire at one such church had surprisingly different results. Hard, aggressive work by firefighters; extensive preplanning of the building by first-alarm companies; and a little divine luck stopped a rapidly advancing fire in this 106-year-old church. While the incident happened in January 1990, it yields many timely lessons.
THE BUILDING
The Christ Lutheran Church, built in 1886, is located at 766 Broadway on Buffalo’s East Side. The building is approximately 70 feet by 150 feet. The main body of the church is approximately 65 feet in height with a steeple 120 feet tall.
The building had masonry walls on a heavy timber framework. The roof was constructed of a series of large wooden trusses. A choir loft with seating was built over the front section of the nave. This area had a small balcony that ran along each side of the church up to the altar. The altar was at the rear of the church, with a large sacristy behind the altar. A basement ran the length of the church; it was divided into offices and rooms used for storage.
The surrounding properties were as follows: Exposure 1 was a street (Broadway), exposure 2 was a twostory brick building approximately 50 feet by 130 feet, exposure 3 was a vacant lot, and exposure 4 was a parking lot. The building on the exposure 2 side was owned by the church and was used as a parish house and Sunday school. This building was used as the church until the present church was built.
The basement of exposure 2 was connected to the church by a tunnel at the basement level. This tunnel became key to our extinguishing the fire and saving the church.
The area that the church is in experiences a high degree of fire activity, much of it arson-related.
THE FIRE
On January 26, 1990, the Buffalo Fire Department alarm office received a call of smoke coming from the church at Broadway and Fox streets. At 0438 hours, a full assignment was dispatched (this sent three engines, two trucks, and one rescue unit to the fire, under the command of Third Battalion Chief Donald McFeely). At 0440 hours. Chief McFeely arrived and observed light gray smoke coming from the basement windows of the exposure 4 side of the church. Due to the size and type of building involved, he requested an additional engine and truck.
Firefighters opened the front door and were met with an extremely heavy smoke condition. The situation now indicated that an extensive fire was burning in the basement of the church. McFeely immediately requested a second alarm.
Within a short time, firefighters observed heavy smoke pushing from all the openings at the lower part of the church. Companies were reporting a fire that had control of the entire basement. Command ordered an exterior attack on the fire in the basement: There were only two stairways to the basement of the church, and they were very narrow.
Truck companies vented the basement windows of the church so lines could be operated. Engine companies operated two 2 1/2-inch lines from the exposure 2 side of the fire. The firstfloor windows were not vented so as not to draw the fire to this area. Also, there were not enough hoselines laid to this area yet.
Division Chief Edward Burch arrived. He was briefed by the battalion and then assumed command. By this time, heavy smoke was showing from the church steeple, and Burch requested a third alarm.
A portable monitor was positioned at the front entrance of the church but was not charged. A tower ladder and two ladder pipes were positioned in anticipation of full involvement of the building. Fire now was venting out of all the basement windows on the exposure 2 and 4 sides of the church, and fire already was breaking through to the first floor near the altar.
Based on previous experience with fires in these types of buildings and in consideration of deteriorating conditions, Chief Burch transmitted the fourth and fifth alarms. The need to sustain the attack on the basement as well as prepare for a heavy stream attack would require additional personnel.
Several more 2 1/2-inch lines were operated into the basement from the exterior. These lines had some effect on the fire but were hampered by the partitions in the basement. The third battalion had advised IC Burch of a tunnel that went from the parish house (exposure 2) to the church at basement level. Acting First Battalion Chief William Connors was sent with an engine company to assess the viability of using this tunnel.
The first battalion chief reported that an attack could be made from the exposure 2 basement tunnel. He was directed to command the attack from that sector. Two engine companies and a truck company, using two 2 ½inch handlines, pushed through the smoke and heat toward the heavy fire in the church basement. Exterior lines were shut down so the attack could progress unimpeded. A number of different crews operated in this sector; as they became low on air they were relieved by fresh crews so no ground was lost to the fire.
The third battalion, accompanied by a truck company, made a reconnaissance of the first floor of the church while the basement attack was underway. As the fire in the basement was darkened down, complete reconnaissance was accomplished.
(Photos by Bob Pressler.)
Firefighters reported the fire had completely burned through sections of the floor near the altar. A truck company was sent to the truss loft above the nave to check for fire. This area was charged with smoke but no fire was found. A significant volume of fire in the sacristy was knocked down with rVeinch handlines. Fire had advanced up numerous vertical channels into the first floor but was stopped by crews operating in the nave of the church.
During this stage of the fire, Fire Commissioner A1 Duke had assumed command, and the command function was further sectored to include overall operations, interior sector operations, exposure 2 interior operations, and operations in sectors 3 and 4. A safety officer was assigned.
Interior overhaul operations were slow because sector officers had to assess each area for stability before crews started work. Visibility still was poor in these areas. Some areas of the first floor were roped off to prevent members from falling through weakened areas.
The investigation of the fire commenced while the fire still was burning. The origin was found to be in the center of the basement. The cause was determined to be arson.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Many of the actions at this fire reinforced the procedures used at fires in large churches.
- The importance of preplanning can never be overstated. Mad members not recalled —from preplanning—the existence of the basement tunnel, through which they could aggressively attack the fire, the entire building probably would have been lost. The success of this operation relied first on effective preplanning.
- Call for adequate help early. With an aggressive interior attack and preparation for possible defensive operations running simultaneously, a large amount of resources was necessary.
- Designate and utilize a staging area so the incident commander does not become overwhelmed with incoming companies.
- Coordinating ventilation at larger structures becomes more complicated; uncoordinated efforts can have disastrous consequences. We felt at this fire that if wholesale ventilation of the first-floor windows had been performed, the fire would have gained complete control of the building.
- Within the context of the incident command system, exterior areas usually are well covered. Where complex, multiple-unit, dangerous operations are required inside the fire building, make sure the chief/com -mand officers are in charge of these areas. In such operations it becomes difficult for a company officer to coordinate a large number of companies. Also, it sometimes is difficult for a company-grade officer to get an immediate response to an order given to other companies. In these situations, a command officer’s presence is necessary to ensure orders are carried out immediately and without hesitation.
- Do not overlook 2 ½-inch handlines for interior use. Today some feel that large handlines are not needed. With a heavy volume of fire in a large structure, these lines are very effective.
- Radio communication at any incident is of critical importance. In Buffalo there are only two radio frequencies, and alarm office transmissions arc broadcast on both of them. This at times can hinder fireground messages. This problem is being alleviated with the addition of more radio channels.
- The possibility of rapid deterioration of such church structures under heavy fire should be considered early on. Apparatus placement, water supply and appliances for a possible defensive firefight, and positioning of personnel should be planned and controlled with this in mind.
- The incident is not over once the initial attack is performed. Safe overhaul operations are a must. Designate a safety officer and maintain sector commanders to enforce safe actions bv personnel.
