Just when we think we have seen all the types of incidents we are ever going to see, along comes the completely unexpected.
During the past 30 years, I have served as a police officer, a volunteer firefighter, and a director of EMS. I have helped deliver newborn babies, free trapped people and animals from some of the most bizarre entanglements, resuscitate people whom I never expected would survive, conduct interior rescue and fire control, and perform more vehicle extrications than I care to remember. In addition, I have assisted with far too much body recovery and watched helplessly while paramedics performed field pronouncements of death. I have helped to manage some complex emergencies in Ontario, Canada, including a large tire fire, pesticide fires, train derailments, a forest fire in an area where we had been told one would never occur, and an ice storm that closed eastern Ontario for 27 days.
I thought I had seen it all until the day when a man set himself on fire at the town hall in Caledon, Ontario. This emotional and unusual incident, which occurred on April 11, 2006, forced me to draw on all of my training and experience in ways I never anticipated.
On that day, I was attending a senior management team meeting beginning at 0900 hours in our town hall. I left the meeting at about 0953 hours to pick up some agenda material in the print shop. As I left the meeting room and began to walk toward the main foyer of the town office, I noticed a slight odor of gasoline. While I thought that this was unusual, I didn’t think that it was totally inappropriate given the rural character of our community. There was little time for me to think about just how odd it was.
When I entered the foyer, I found a man seated at the top of a flight of stairs. He was dressed in winter clothing and was holding a 2 1/2 -gallon red plastic gas can. Some of the gasoline had been spilled onto the tile floor, and he was waving a pack of matches around. A Provincial police officer from the neighboring courtroom was standing about seven feet to the gentleman’s right side, attempting to establish a dialogue or negotiate with him. I remembered as a police officer trying to engage in similar discussions, and I immediately had a bad feeling about the outcome.
EVACUATION AND A CALL FOR BACKUP
I retreated to the corridor and commenced what I hoped would be a quiet, orderly, and systematic evacuation of the town hall. I called the Joint Fire Communications Centre and requested backup for the police officer, EMS, and the response of a single fire company. I requested that this entire response be low profile: no lights, no sirens, and no rush once on-site. I did not want to place public safety personnel in harm’s way, and I really didn’t want to agitate the man with the gasoline.
I established a command post at town hall by telephone, and this information was passed on to the responding fire company. Building management shut down the heating and air conditioning unit (HVAC) and ensured that all possible interior doors were closed. I flaked out a dry standpipe hose but did not charge it because the audible fire alarm and detection system might activate and upset the man with the gas can.
The town hall has approximately 60 staff and was evacuated in about two minutes. The responding fire company arrived in about five minutes and was ordered to mask up and stage in the west parking lot with dry chemical fire extinguishers, out of sight until advised to move forward.
The town staff had an assigned safe staging place in the event of a fire alarm, but the evacuation of the building in this instance took on a different tone based on a real threat. Many staff used exit paths that were more out of the way and discreet rather than using the closest exit path they would take during a fire alarm. It took some time for staff to assemble at the meeting place and to ensure that they were safe outside of the building. The chief administrative officer (CAO, or town manager) acted as the Operations officer for the facility and for business continuity-i.e., for the continuity of the municipal government portion of this operation. The town clerk assumed accountability sector responsibilities for all town staff and visitors in the building. She later assumed accountability for all other agencies responding to this incident. Department heads or their alternates normally would have assumed full accountability, but a primary search of the entire town hall was not possible while the man with the gasoline was in the building.
The Provincial police detachment commander arrived and assumed command of the police. The fire company and police officers received the same briefing, and both disciplines had a clear understanding of their roles, responsibilities, and expectations during the incident. When the police were ready to commence their negotiations with the person contemplating suicide, the fire company was split into a Fire sector and a Rescue sector. Both sectors were equipped with SCBA and 20 pounds of dry chemical each. The standpipe hose was available if needed. EMS personnel were on-site, and they established the Medical sector on the west side of the building where firefighters were already staged.
THE GASOLINE IS IGNITED
The police entered the main foyer passing through fire doors that were returned to the closed position. Fire crews waited behind a wall in the customer service area of the building. We did not have a view of the police activities, but we did have communications with the police on the scene. Following a few minutes of discussion, voices were suddenly raised. I heard the all-too-familiar commands from police to the man with the gasoline. There was a sudden flash followed by one of the closest rushes of hot air that I had ever experienced.
It was clear that the gasoline had been ignited and a small fireball had erupted. The fire doors blew partially open and then closed again. Fire and Rescue sectors as well as additional police resources were promptly deployed to the foyer to extinguish the fires. The bulk of the fire, except for police uniform clothing, had died down when firefighters entered the foyer. The remaining fire was extinguished with less that 20 pounds of dry chemical agent. It is important to note that the building is equipped with automatic fire detection, standpipe fire hoses, and sprinkler systems. The period of high heat was relatively brief but long enough for all of us to realize that this was a significant event. The fire alarm activated, but the sprinkler system did not.
When firefighters entered the foyer, they encountered four police officers with serious second- and third-degree burns on varying surface areas of their bodies. All four required evacuation from the building, on-scene treatment by fire and EMS personnel, and transportation to the hospital. Firefighters also encountered the gentleman responsible for this incident in a high degree of agitation. He was struggling with a number of other police officers, and it took some effort for police to take him into custody. The man received no burn injuries during this incident. It is believed that his winter clothing provided a higher level of protection from the fire than the uniforms worn by police.
As soon as the man was removed from the building and patient care was underway, the building was ventilated, air monitoring was established, and a primary search of the building was commenced. Because the entire building, including the attached Provincial Courthouse, was considered a crime scene, the facility was searched by two teams each consisting of a police officer, firefighter, and building maintenance staff member.
The police ensured that one of their officers was involved in each part of the search. Police were responsible for identifying and securing any suspicious packages and identifying and making safe any booby traps. They also were responsible for ensuring continuity of any evidence found in other parts of the building away from the hot zone. Firefighters were responsible for safety, air monitoring, and communications. As luck would have it, no additional hazards or pieces of evidence were located, and we had an “All Clear” on the primary search by 1025 hours. A secondary search was completed by 1055 hours. All injured were removed from the site by 1035 hours.
Town staff had been evacuated from the building for close to an hour before the primary crime scene had been identified and secured. The weather was cool and breezy. By that point, it was necessary to consider releasing staff or sheltering them off-site. The decision was made to release most town hall staff. Prior to their release, one member from each department was escorted by a firefighter or facility maintenance staff to their office to remove coats, purses, and other personal belongings of all staff in the department. Prior to being dismissed for the day or assigned to other work places, all staff members were briefed by the CAO on the incident, actions taken, and the known outcomes. They also were briefed with respect to signs and symptoms of critical incident stress and the methods available for seeking assistance. Staff were thanked for their prompt evacuation and completing the accountability process as quickly as possible under the circumstances.
NEWS MEDIA QUERIES
With four police officers injured and a fire in the town hall, you can imagine the ensuing police response and heightened media attention. Within minutes, there was an additional significant police presence, including criminal investigators, identification officers, and senior ranks from the Provincial police. There was an equal and corresponding media response. Caledon is a rural community of about 57,000 residents serviced primarily by volunteer firefighters from nine fire stations. We routinely experience serious motor vehicle collisions that gain media attention, but we are rarely inundated by the media the way we were on this day.
Once the fire, patient care, and facilities issues were addressed, firefighters were ready to be released from the scene. Police requested that firefighters remain on-scene to support their investigation throughout the remainder of the day. At that point, I was named media liaison, and the deputy fire chief was assigned to support the police investigation. Even though the perimeter of the town hall was secure from the outset, the media had a clear view of most exterior operations. The media asked pointed questions and wanted detailed answers. Fortunately, the police media liaison and I had an opportunity to review our notes and decide beforehand what information would be released and who would release it. Police dealt with operational law enforcement issues; I addressed operational fire and rescue issues. I also had the opportunity to address issues surrounding building safety, security, evacuation planning, and training.
With town hall operations closed for the day, there was a pressing need to maintain town operations. The fire command post was deployed to the scene. This allowed senior staff to maintain business critical services on-site. At the same time, additional staff was assigned to the fire administration office, located a half mile west of the town hall. The administration office was responsible for remotely accessing the municipal IT network to complete critical functions, including administrative support and the biweekly check run. The telephone system also was preempted remotely with a new recording advising callers inquiring about the incident to stay away from the town hall for the day. Callers also were advised of an alternate number to call if vital services were required.
A 67-year-old male resident of Caledon was charged with a number of criminal charges, including arson and mischief endangering life. He eventually was found not to be criminally responsible for his actions and was remanded to psychiatric custody for an indefinite period.
LESSONS LEARNED
- Department heads had started Basic Emergency Management training in February. The IMS component of their training was implemented early in the incident and worked fairly well. Staff assigned functions within the IMS had a degree of confidence in their assignments and responsibilities.
- On-site communications between disciplines proved to be critical. Firefighters were aware of the tactical planning for the police response. This allowed us to staff each sector to the necessary level of support. Time was allowed to stage additional equipment close to the hot zone if it were required.
- In an incident such as this, where possible, a slow, quiet, and methodical approach is preferred. This allows for adequate planning, resources, and communications. In this case, the collective response did not incite the man with the gasoline.
- For this type of incident, limit the response to personnel necessary to work at and support the operation. During the post-incident evaluation, there was some discussion about the staffing for the response. This was a dangerous incident in terms of the nature, the threat, and the potential response. Fire staffing and the number of people potentially placed in harm’s way were deliberately limited. Only those necessary to execute operations and provide support were assigned. All other firefighters were staged at the fire station a half mile west of the town hall.
- Municipal departments need a method of ensuring accountability in an evacuation. Most have adopted a sign-in/sign-out sheet that is removed by a fire warden in an evacuation.
- Additional planning and town hall staff training are required for building evacuation based on threats other than fire.
Town Hall Emergency Evacuation Procedures
Caledon has developed valid and approved fire safety plans for all town facilities, but it is necessary to consider that there are potential incidents that may not be fire related but may require the prompt, discreet, orderly, and safe evacuation of facilities. Using the same principles outlined in the fire safety plan, the following procedures are to be used for nonfire emergency events requiring building evacuation.
Policy
In a nonfire emergency, which may include the spill of toxic chemicals, gas leaks, weather-related events, or potential threats of harm to public or staff, the following evacuation procedures are to be implemented immediately. DO NOT activate the fire alarm, as this may cause patrons to enter into a contaminated space or dangerous area. DO NOT enter any area that staff have been directed to avoid.
Procedure
1. Any staff member may start the town hall evacuation procedure, based on risk or threat.
2. A member of senior management or the manager of town properties must be notified of the nature and location of the emergency.
3. The evacuation will be coordinated by a member of the senior management team until an incident commander is assigned and on-site.
4. The manager of customer service or, in the event of his absence, the customer service representative, switchboard staff, or other assigned staff will then be notified. Staff will communicate that there is an emergency in the building, state the need to evacuate-either discreetly or otherwise-identify the safest exits to be used based on the nature and location of the emergency, and advise other staff of an appropriate meeting place if the Fire Plan locations are not appropriate. Communications of the event will be undertaken by the following means:
- electronically via e-mail to town hall staff;
- direct verbal communications among staff; and
- if necessary, the voice communications system in the building use to provide a direct or discreet warning to evacuate the building.
5. The manager of customer service will direct customer service staff to contact (9-911) Caledon Fire & Emergency Services, and the local police if necessary. Caledon Fire & Emergency Services is to be contacted in all cases, except in the case of deliberate threats to harm public or staff. In these instances, the police must be notified.
6. All town hall staff is responsible for evacuating their work areas through the identified safest exits, locking interior and exterior doors and gates or barriers on their way out, and directing patrons to the determined safest meeting place until further instructions are received. When evacuating the building, take coats, purses, and personal belongings if it will not delay the evacuation.
7. Staff will assemble in the designated safe areas away from the building. In inclement weather or unsafe conditions, staff may be assigned to meet at the Caledon complex or the library at Robert F. Hall School. The CAO (chief administrative officer) and senior management team will assemble in their assigned area.
8. The manager of customer service or custodial supervisor will meet the Caledon Fire & Emergency Services and/or police on their arrival and provide whatever information and assistance are necessary. If these staff members are not needed to assist in the evacuation, the manager or supervisor will go outside and direct the public away from the building.
9. The fire department may obtain keys to the building using the Chubb box to the west of the main doors to the town hall.
10. Fire wardens or their alternates will complete an accountability check for their department or area and report to the CAO or his designate.
11. All media communications will be directed to the CAO. Staff members are not to speak to the media unless directed by the CAO.
12. The Caledon Fire & Emergency Services will determine when it is safe to return to the building during a fire or public safety emergency. The police will determine when it is safe to return to the building during a threat to harm the public or staff.
13. The manager of customer service or his designate will then communicate the message to all town staff and patrons that the emergency has been terminated.
14. These procedures will be regularly reviewed.
BRAD BIGRIGG is chief of the Town of Caledon (Ontario, Canada) Fire and Emergency Services. He has served in public safety throughout Ontario for more than 25 years as a police officer, a chief fire officer, and an emergency manager for the Ontario Office of the Fire Marshal. He is a community emergency management coordinator and a deputy fire coordinator. He is an associate instructor for the Ontario Fire College.
