METRO-DADE FIRE DEPARTMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK

METRO-DADE FIRE DEPARTMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK

Compiled from the Metropolitan Dade County Fire-Rescue Department Hurricane Andrew After-Action Report, prepared by R. D. Paulison, fire chief M. F. Montes, deputy fire chief and Carlos J. Castillo, chief Disaster Preparedness and Response Division, with assistance from Division Chief J. f. Brown, Planning, Policy, and Procedures, Metro Dade Fire-Rescue Department.

PRESTORM ACTIVITIES

Personnel. A Hurricane Watch was announced at 5:40 p.m. on Saturday, August 22, 1992. When the National Hurricane Center announces a Hurricane Watch, Metro Dade Fire-Rescue (MDFR) policy requires that all essential department personnel go on standby status and take immediate steps to secure their property and families, preparatory to reporting for duty when a warning is announced. Employees not on standby at home or at a listed telephone number are required to keep their on-duty supervisors advised of their availability at all times.

MDFR assigned two representatives to the Metro Dade County Emergency Operation Center, 2 t hours a day. They functioned as liaisons for the department and acted as the fire chief’s representatives. In addition, the department made sure its roster of employees was current prior to the storm.

Communications. In anticipation of losing communications with each fire station, antennas were removed and replaced with small ones. This saved the tall antennas, which were immediately reinstalled after the storm. This measure, along with the use of portable repeaters, allowed limited communications to be maintained throughout the storm.

The backup system consisted of four low-power portable transmitters/ repeaters installed at Dade County Telecommunications transmitter sites. Additional repeaters were strategically mounted atop 100-foot ladder trucks that were used as portable antenna towers, prestaged at fire stations. On Tuesday, Dade County Telecommunications asked to use the department’s portable antenna tower (ladder truck) to set up repeaters for other agencies.

In anticipation of the storm, all communication operators and supervisors went on Alpha/Bravo (two shifts, 12 hours each). Prior to sustained winds of 40 mph, five communication operators and one supervisor were sent to the emergency operations center (EOC) to staff the manual backup dispatch center. At 4:48 a.m. on Monday, August 24, communications were transferred as the communications center prepared to evacuate.

Difficulties with telephone lines were anticipated, so the department pursued the acquisition of cellular phones according to a preestablished verbal commitment with Cellular One, which currently holds MDFR’s service contract. Cellular One provided 10 transportable phones for the department on a temporary basis. Afterward, the department purchased several of these phones for emergency purposes.

Evacuation. Although MDFR was not directly involved in the evacuation of the public, seven fire stations within evacuation zones had to be evacuated. At Station 1 5 on Key Biscayne, an unmanned spare vehicle was equipped with the bare necessities to operate as a response unit after the storm, anticipating the likelihood that land access to the Key would not exist. This unit was located on the second floor parking garage of the Key Colony Resort, in an attempt to avoid the tidal surge. Access would be provided by an Air Rescue helicopter. The last of the evacuated fire stations was reoccupied on Tuesday, August 25, 1992.

Public information and warnings. The MDFR Public Relations Division was alerted and individual roles were confirmed. Equipment —from cameras to a satellite dish—was secured. A news release describing the department’s hurricane policy was updated and distributed. Post-storm public relations division staff members worked at the EOC in several capacities:

• media relations,
• command assistance,
• rumor-control assistance, and
• liaison with other departments and emergency personnel.

Personnel also were present at Fire Headquarters and in the field documenting damage and fire department activity. Staff members also assisted in other roles outside their normal scope.

Special operations plan. The MDFR Hurricane Policy and Procedures includes the following elements:

Phase I-Hurricane Watch

• Division chiefs and chief fire officers will keep the Fire Alarm Of-
• fice advised as to their availability.
• File director will establish a staff duty roster so everyone can identify’ the director’s representative at all times. The director will change the staff duty roster as required. Each division shall maintain a current copy of the staff duty roster as published by the director.
• The station commander or bureau OIC shall be responsible for hurricane preparedness at each station or bureau.
• Requests for supplies, necessary to ensure reasonable protection for personnel and facilities, will be submitted through the chain of command to the chief of the logistical services division for appropriate action.
• Rescue personnel and units will be assigned to designated shelters during the hurricane to provide occupants with medical aid and assistance. Specific information related to the county’s Emergency Shelter Plan will be distributed as it becomes available.
• Division chiefs will be responsible for providing instruction to their personnel regarding hurricane operational procedures.
• Division chiefs and supervisors will ensure that all assigned county vehicles considered to be essential during or immediately following a
• hurricane will be readily available and completely fueled and serviced.
• The director (or staff duty officer) will determine which essential employees should retain their vehicles during the hurricane. All other employees should be prepared to leave their vehicles at a designated location prior to their release from duty, before the arrival of the hurricane, and should arrange for other means of transportation. All county vehicles must be available for use during the hurricane and in recovery functions following the storm.
• The Mobile Equipment Bureau will provide extra fuel for apparatus, auxiliary power units, and station generators for cooking and lighting, to the extent that resources are available.
• All fire apparatus companies will back flush pumps and tanks and refill them with the cleanest water possible. If water is to be used for drinking, a boiling procedure or chlorination procedure will be followed at time of use (one cup of chlorine per 500 gallons of clear water, two cups of chlorine per 500 gallons of cloudy water ).

Phase II-Hurricane Procedure

(Photo by Justin Wasilkowski.)

• All units will perform essential fire/rescue services expeditiously. Available reserve apparatus will be staffed as needed. No individual will respond alone during the hurricane period. All safety precautions will be observed.
• Fire department buildings will be occupied by authorized personnel only. Stations will not be used as areas of shelter or refuge unless authorized by the director or higher authority.
• The battalion chief will recommend to the division chief when a station should be vacated and where crews will relocate. Units generally will go to prearranged locations. The nearest fire station that can house the personnel and equipment will be used when it best serves the public need. The Fire Alarm Office and chain of command will be advised of any required relocations.
• The Station OIC is responsible for maintaining a separate hurricane log (legal pad) in addition to the regular station log. The battalion chief will maintain a separate time log for offduty personnel reporting back to duty.
• A wakeful watch for communication (radio and telephone) will be maintained at each facility we operate.
• Where double crews are utilized for rotation on the same unit, or when more than one unit is available in the station to handle an incident, the battalion chief will make specific assignments of both personnel and apparatus rotation for response to alarms. The Alarm Office w ill be notified of w hich unit is responding when more than one unit is in the station.

MDFR currently is in the process of rewriting Phase 111-the Recovery Phase of the procedural guidelines, since this was the phase where plan deficiencies became apparent. Issues to be addressed include providing distinct guidelines and delegation changes (i.e., to make guidelines available tor those in the chain of command w ho may have to make operational decisions after they lose communications w ith those above them in the chain of command); staffing each station with at least one managerial staff member and at least one clerical staff member, for the purposes of processing field reports; and acquiring and prestaging heavy machinery and buses for the purposes of clearing roads and transporting people.

STORM ACTIVITY

A Hurricane Warning was announced at 6:47 a.m. on August 23 At this time, the Emergency Operations Center was placed in operation. Representatives from different agencies reported to their assigned positions. All fire divisions held planning meetings, and three command posts were established at the north, central, and south areas of the jurisdiction. These three posts were staffed beginning at 5:00 p.m. on August 23-

At approximately 3:30 a.m. on August 24, as w inds approached 50 mph, the incident manager ordered units to cease responding to calls. Communications operators, following guidance from the officer in charge of communications, directed units already on duty to report to the closest fire station and wait out the storm.

After this order, phone numbers and addresses of all requests for assistance were logged for callback and response after the winds had subsided. Dispatchers had the unpleasant and difficult task of informing callers of the department’s inability to respond.

The number of calls for assistance continued to increase throughout the storm. Calls reporting power lines down or gas leaks were referred to the Florida Power and Light and city gas companies.

Although the “no response” was in effect because of danger to personnel, MDFR responded to several calls after considering the facts. For example, a battalion chief was sent to check out a report of a fire on the seventh floor of a condominium in North Miami Beach. A heart attack victim was transported to the hospital by the rescue from Miami Hikes.

Prearrival assistance was provided by emergency medical personnel assigned to the communications center to help victims help themselves until assistance arrived. At 4:22 a.m., an expectant father was talked through the delivery of his son, including cutting and tying the umbilical cord.

By the time the winds had reached such magnitude that response to emergency calls was prohibited, MDFR personnel were staffing all emergency shelters according to department hurricane policy. All MDFR units were supplemented with additional personnel and spare vehicles were placed in service to the level allowed by essential equipment.

POST-STORM ACTIVITY

Although officially fire/rescue response resumed at 8:40 a.m. when the winds had subsided to 40 mph, many of our personnel already had ventured out as the winds allowed. With approximately 250 calls holding, emergency units began to clear debris and make their way out of the stations to provide life-saving assistance, to conduct preliminary search and rescue, and to assess damage.

From August 1 to August 21, MDFR received an average of 334 requests for emergency services per day. On August 25, the first full day of operation following Andrew’s devastation, the number of alarm calls peaked at 810. In addition, it is estimated that for every call dispatched, fire/rescue units handled three or four more requests for assistance for people in the area.

Once the storm subsided, it was determined that the worst destruction was sustained in the county’s south end. All spare vehicles and some of the evacuated units were immediately reassigned south. Once the backlog of calls was reduced in the north end. units were moved south to augment the crews working the more severely affected areas.

Initially, all mutual-aid units that arrived were sent south. Later, mutual-aid units also were used to cover north end stations, releasing more MDFR units to be reassigned south. On a regular basis, 20 to 24 extra MDFR units (more than double the regular number) were assigned to the south sector; this did not include the mutual-aid units, contract ambulances, or volunteer personnel used for primary and secondary search efforts.

MDFR has mutual-aid agreements with the six fire departments in Dade County; however, since they themselves were dealing with post-storm operations, immediate aid from the closest departments was not available. However, more than 100 departments from Florida and 25 other states eventually sent aid. ITiis put us in the best and worst of situations, the support was needed, but organizing arriving units was difficult due to a lack of preplanning and difficulties with communications.

In order to process, feed, and provide sleeping facilities for the many mutual-aid personnel, a local high school was identified as manpower sector base. At this facility, personnel could check in, be assigned, and receive rest and rehabilitation prior to returning to work the next day. Despite the additional travel time to the affected zone, this was an ideal site that facilitated the coordination of staffing needs for both the disaster operations (i.e., search and rescue) and standard fire department operations (i.e., fire and FMS). Later, it was necessary to vacate the facility due to the start of the school year. A request was made to FEMA for U.S. Forest Service support in establishing and maintaining a base camp. A U.S. Forest Service Base Camp is a fully equipped and full) staffed portable rest and rehabilitation facility. It provides hot meals, showers, toilets, bunks, recreai tion, and washing machines. The base camp was set up in time to vacate the ! school. It served our purpose very I well.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Search and rescue. Primary search and rescue activities were initiated as soon as fire/rescue service was resumed. This was accomplished in conjunction with response to emergencies and an information-gathering process to assess general overall damage and the status of MDFR’s resources.

The secondary search and rescue consisted of two phases, coordinated from the south command post. First, there was a physical search of target or priority areas as identified by the initial damage assessment. The 18 priority areas included mobile home parks and the most devastated neighborhoods, in Naranja I^ikes and Country Walk. This first phase was completed Wednesday evening, August 26, with the help of mutual-aid personnel from other departments.

We received notice on August 25 that more than 400 mutual-aid personnel were expected and would be available the next day. Thus, a plan to conduct a more thorough search was prepared. The second phase consisted of a complete grid search, fireload assessment, and water availability estimates conducted over the 600 square miles in the south end of the county extending from SW 112 St. on the north to the Dade/Monroe county line on the south.

Search groups consisted of four teams of eight people and one group leader. Search canines were assigned to groups as they became available. The area was completely covered in about two days. Prior to departure, the groups were given a health and safety briefing along with their assignments. Each person was required to take at least one gallon of drinking water and sunscreen for protection against the south Florida August heat and sunshine. In all, nearly 1,000 people covered the entire area during the secondary search.

The searchers spoke with all residents encountered to account for all household members. If no one was home, the search teams accounted for the residents through discussions with neighbors. If unable to account for occupants, a complete search of the structure, including the use of search canines, was conducted. During this mission, no fatalities were discovered. This helped allay fears that persons reported missing would be found dead.

During this phase, a lot of information was distributed to storm victims. The search groups were briefed each morning with the latest information on food and water distribution sites, temporary shelters, medical care facilities, and general health and safety tips. This information was communicated to the public as the search teams conducted their missions.

Emergency medical services. Approximately three hours and 40 minutes after Andrew made landfall, all units, as per department policy, began to perform essential rescue services. They were immediately overwhelmed. Two hundred fifty priority calls were holding at the communications center. In addition, as the units made their way out of the fire stations, they quickly were approached by hundreds of people requesting assistance. The number of serious injuries directly related to Andrew was low. However, as people began to clean up debris, the number of injuries quickly rose. This, along with the backlog of calls, placed great strain on the department, especially since there were no medical facilities available. Fire/ rescue units soon found that all primary and secondary medical facilities in south Dade County were severely damaged and were unable to accept any patients. This added to the strain on the prehospital emergency care system, since all patients in need of definitive care had to be transported to other hospitals. Baptist Hospital of Miami, on SW 88th St., more than an hour away under the circumstances, was the closest. In addition, patients already in the affected hospitals had to be moved to other facilities.

As a result, MDFR requested that Randle-Eastern and Medi-Car ambulance companies make their units available for the transport of fire/rescue patients. Their participation allowed most fire/rescue units to stay in the affected zones to provide muchneeded care.

With no medical facilities south of Kendall Drive, MDFR took the initiative to begin organizing and staffing field hospitals. The first one was located in the new Government Center building.

Captain Ellery Gray, with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a branch of the U.S. Public Health Service, had been prestaged in the Dade County EOC. Captain Gray facilitated the quick deployment and establishment of two field hospitals requested by MDFR. These free-standing facilities arc each staffed by a Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), consisting of 36 medical personnel who can provide sophisticated emergency medical care in an austere setting. The first field hospital relieved the first-aid facility started by MDFR in the new South Dade Government Center in Cutler Ridge.

By design, the field hospitals are almost totally self-sufficient. However, in order for them to function efficiently, close coordination with the local EMS system is necessary. MDFR personnel were assigned to act as liaison officers in coordinating the transportation of patients to and from the field hospitals.

The two sites chosen by MDFR proved to be well-suited for the DMATs. The first site, the South Dade Government Center, was operational and seeing patients before noon on Tuesday, August 25. The second site, a senior citizens’ center in Homestead, opened at 7:30 p.m. that evening. Fen patients were waiting to be seen immediately after it opened. Three patients had serious medical conditions and required aeromedical transport.

Since Andrew, MDFR had operated under two distinct transportation policies. Outside of the medically affected areas, fire/rescue units applied the department’s normal transportation policy. For the medically affected areas, a modified policy was developed, fluid enough to meet the constantly changing situation of available units, field hospital capabilities, and the radio/telemetry system.

One of MDFR’s two helicopters was in service when the storm hit. Prior to Andrew’s landfall, we determined that Tamiami Airport, in south Dade County, was the best location for the one in service, to make immediate access possible following the storm. The brand-new hangar that housed it was built to withstand 130-mph winds. By the time Andrew passed on, the hangar and the helicopter were completely destroyed. Nevertheless, aeromedical rescue units were in service by Wednesday; MDFR flightmedics became part of five Air Force Reserve helicopter medevac units used to transport critical patients from the field hospitals to north Dade County hospitals. Air transport to hospitals in the north end ensured that patient loads were distributed equally throughout the county.

(Photo at left by Joe Starling; photo at right by Justin Wasilkowski.)

On August 31, MDFR Air Rescue returned to service with a Bell 412 helicopter, loaned to the department by Bell Helicopter. The Air Force Reserve and MDFR alternated calls until September 9, at which time the MDFR unit resumed full emergency responsibilities.

Damage assessments. As field units—i.e., rescues, fire trucks, etc.— gained access to roads, damages were reported via the chain of command. Due to communications difficulties resulting from the loss of repeaters (only one of three frequencies was operational) and the amount of radio traffic due to the increase in call volume, information flow was hindered.

Field units were hampered in conducting damage assessments because of difficulty in traveling south Dade roads and the large numbers of people stopping them for assistance.

The department’s preplanning for hurricanes called for aerial assessments to be conducted by the MDFR Air Rescue Division. Because both helicopters were destroyed during the hurricane, this was not possible.

The MDFR Hazardous Materials Unit assessed damages to target hazard facilities, including Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, marinas, chemical facilities, agricultural chemicals in the field, and various other businesses that dealt with hazardous materials.

Restoration of services. Once fire/ rescue units were able to safely respond to requests for assistance, calls were prioritized to answer the most serious first. For the four-week period following Hurricane Andrew, most, if not all, of the department’s resources were used in support of the disaster operations and in answering the increased call volume.

All MDFR nonemergency activities were suspended for four weeks after the storm in the north end and remained suspended south of SW 104 St. for several months. Fire recruits, in a class that began prior to the storm, provided a valuable supportive role for the department during this total emergency period.

Other supporting roles. MDFR assumed a supportive role for other county and outside agencies. In particular, the department assisted the U.S. Public Health Service, Dade County Health Department, and the University of Miami Field Epidemiology Survey Team in assessing health and safety needs of the community.

During and after the search and rescue operations were completed, MDFR personnel led volunteers in setting up temporary street signs and spraypainting street numbers on intersections, poles, trees, etc. to facilitate finding addresses.

Fire/rescue units stood by and provided fire safety and suppression capabilities during the removal of boats and structural material from the collapsed dry dock buildings at Black Point and Matheson Hammock Marinas.

Firefighters helping firefighters. On Monday, August 24, Chief Paulison contacted Lt. Dominick Barbera, president of the International Association of Fire Fighters Local 1403, and requested his assistance in helping our employees whose lives were severely disrupted by the storm. Lt. Barbera and many members of Local 1403 set up shop at fire headquarters and began requesting aid from throughout the country. In addition to money and much-needed food and personal supplies, an enormous amount of building materials was donated for the families of fire department employees. More important, however, were the more than 1,000 firefighters and friends who came to town to help our employees. In addition to bringing food and supplies, they went to some of the most heavily damaged homes and assisted in clearing debris and “drying in” roofs. The outpouring of care and concern by these “family” members will always be remembered.

Critical incident stress management (CISM). After Hurricane Andrew, all but two members of the local CISM team were personally affected and thus were unable to immediately assist. On Tuesday, August 25, a call was placed to the Florida Critical Incident Stress Debriefers Association. By Wednesday, August 26, the first members arrived. Ultimately, all 11 teams from throughout the state spent numerous “shifts” in Miami helping our team members assist all emergency service workers. The state association was designated by FEMA as the official CISM agency for the disaster. In addition, teams from five other states responded and assisted. In the first month alone, more than 3,000 personal contacts were made by team members.

The previous “worst-case scenario” for a CISM team considered a severe incident such as a major air crash involving between 200 and 300 emergency workers (none of whom were personally affected by the disaster). With Andrew, more than 5,000 emergency workers were involved and more than one-half of them were personally affected. The first teams into the area stated that this incident would mark a new chapter in critical incident stress management; later teams referred to “a new book.” All personnel assisted by these individuals will forever be grateful for their kindness and understanding.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

• According to department policy, upon announcement of a hurricane warning, the normal complement of on-duty operations personnel will be augmented by the immediate past shift. Unless otherwise instructed, on-coming personnel are expected to report to their duty stations within one hour of the warning’s issue. Onduty personnel will be relieved of duty by the reporting immediate past shift so the former can secure their property and families prior to reporting back to duty. Employees are expected to return to their duty stations within four hours. However, since the warning occurred right at shift change, it was difficult to determine who was the “immediate past shift.” The off-going shift (immediate past shift ) had not had the opportunity to secure their property and families. This led to many more people than planned needing to be off to secure personal property.
• MDFR did not receive mutual aid from any departments in the county until the second week following the storm because the devastation was countywide. However, more than 2,000 firefighters and paramedics from outside the county came to the assistance of MDFR. Although the department could not have provided the level of service it did without these personnel, there was no plan in place to provide food and lodging for this many people. Many volunteers drove into affected areas without first checking in. Although they performed an indispensable service, their existence was not known to the system, thereby making coordination an impossible task. The Florida Fire Chiefs Association has established a mutual-aid disaster response plan for the state of Florida with the intention of avoiding such confusion in the event of future disasters. Five regions and coordinators have been established within the state, and inventory is currently being taken to see who can best provide resources to whom in the case of disaster. When activated, the plan would work similarly to FEMA’s emergency operations plan.
• Following the storm, it was clear that the incident command procedures used by MDFR primarily to manage large fires and other incidents is inadequate for a disaster of this magnitude. A preliminary ICS management structure was developed on Monday, August 24. However, the system was not able to address all areas of department involvement. By Thursday, August 27, the organizational structure was modified to include elements of the structure used by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Based on the National Interagency Incident Management System, the DART structure was developed with the assistance of members of the department’s International Disaster Response Team. This system is suitable for managing natural and manmade disasters, regardless of team size. Department feedback revealed that the modified DART organizational structure was successful, that an incident management system for disasters should be adopted by the department, and that all personnel should be trained in its use before the next emergency.
• As fire/rescue service resumed after the storm, field units had to first clear roads of debris to answer calls for assistance. Fifty chainsaws had been purchased and distributed to all fire stations prior to the storm. Hie chainsaws were very effective for cutting tree limbs and wooden debris. However, in the most severely affected areas, many downed concrete utility poles and other massive structures made most roads virtually impassable. The need for prestaging heavy equipment (bulldozers, etc.) at fire stations was evident.
• Most of the personnel on duty during the storm were unable to communicate with their own families. Nevertheless, they continued to work and provide essential fire and rescue service to the community. As mutualaid personnel from many departments arrived, MDFR personnel were systematically relieved from duty to check on their families and property . What amount of training could have prepared department members to be both victims and rescuers? This issue is now being explored in the depart merit’s disaster planning process.
• Communication is key to the effectiveness of any operation. It consists of two essential components: technical communications, which involves mechanical communications systems, and organizational communications, which describes the flow of information within and outside the department. Countywide technical communications were never totally lost with fire stations and responding units. However, the south-end frequency repeaters were destroyed, causing a loss of communications between Fire Alarm and the fire stations and their respective units south of SW 104 St. This began to occur at approximately 4:00 a.m. the morning of the storm. MDFR’s backup communications systems (portable repeaters), maintained for the unlikely event of failure to the primary’ system, worked well. However, not enough equipment and frequencies were available to adequately cover the volume of calls and the areas of need. The technical communications system that worked best in the storm —i.e., the three mobile repeaters, operating on EMS, normal dispatch, and air rescue frequencies and mounted on aerial ladder platforms—will be expanded in the case of another emergency.
• The preestablished verbal commitment with Cellular One provided portable cellular phones. However, due to the number of cellular phones in south Florida and the reduced number of cell sites, communications through this medium were ineffective except from about 2:00 a m. to 5:00 a m. In the future, it would be ideal if public service organizations were given transmission priority during a disaster. Unless such priority were legislated, however, liability issues would make it difficult to enact. The issue currently is being discussed.
• Due to the different frequencies used by the participating agencies, MDFR had difficulty communicating with the military or with mutual-aid units. Even when the assisting units were provided with radios on the same frequencies, difficulties were still found, since many of them were unfamiliar with the radio language used by the department. Some of the communications dispatchers who came to assist were not familiar with MDFR’s system or trained in medical communications. Dispatch teams (two to three dispatchers working at each console, as a team) were developed to handle the heavy call volume, validate calls, ensure that the proper dispatch was made, and integrate mutual-aid personnel into the system. During a disaster situation utilizing mutual aid, clear text communications in English are the best solution.
• Organizational communications also suffered. Information gathered at the department’s after-action workshop indicated inadequate reporting of information up and down the chain of command. This was partially due to technical problems. The department is in the process of coming up with enhanced guidelines for everyone in a managerial capacity, regardless of where they are in the chain of command. This initiative should reduce the problems resulting from breaks in communications.
• Evacuation and Special Needs shelters were staffed by MDFR paramedics and emergency medical technicians along with appropriate medical equipment. In the past this hits been a good practice, probably because Dade County has not had severe storm damage in more than 25 years. However, the experience with Andrew demonstrated that this practice resulted in an underutilization of valuable resources —resources that were needed on the streets. Staffing these facilities with nurses and other volunteers would have more appropriately met the public’s needs.
• As in other department areas, communications difficulties, both technical and organizational, hampered the effective flow of information. Preidentified assignments for the staff worked well, as did prescripted news releases. An important lesson learned is that disseminating poststorm safety and informational releases will be of immense value in the future.
• Because South Miami Homestead Hospital and Deering Hospital, the two major facilities serving south Dade County, and two large health care clinics were closed due to storm damage and because almost all physician offices and primary care facilities had been destroyed, basic first aid and primary health-care services were also provided by a large contingent of volunteer health-care personnel. Many private organizations and groups set up temporary “first-aid stations” or “clinics.” They operated out of recreational vehicles, vans, and tents in the devastated areas. At times there was almost one clinic per square mile of populated land. Some of these clinics provided community outreach. Health-care professionals either drove or walked door-to-door to provide medical assessments and care to the homebound, infirm, or those who feared leaving their homes. While poorly organized from a “systems” perspective, these clinics fulfilled an immediate need and reduced the number of minor injuries treated by fire/rescue, hospital emergency rooms, and field hospitals. Unfortunately, the numerous clinics weren’t integrated into the EMS Medical Communications or the 911 system; therefore, the presence of most of the “clinics” was unknown to MDFR. As phone service was restored and access became more immediate through the 91 1 system, MDFR, for the most part, was able to integrate these resources into the system.
• Damage to Fire station overhead doors, coupled with the number of people left homeless and without food and water, created security problems as civilians loitered around local fire stations. In the disaster’s early stages, fire stations became refuges for many of the homeless, who received water and some food until they could be relocated to more permanent shelters. At the Cutler Ridge fire station, the number of homeless was so great that MDFR secured a building in the Cutler Ridge Mall and later found space on the second floor of the South Dade Government Center to house hundreds of citizens for several days. The department could not access the proper mechanism to authorize personnel, such as the National Guard, Metro-Dade Police Department, or Florida Highway Patrol, to provide permanent security for the fire stations and its resources and supplies. As a result, a considerable amount of equipment disappeared.
• As roads were cleared and access to the south Dade area was made easier, traffic became a serious problem. Missing traffic signals, stop signs, and street signs, coupled with the large number of “disaster tourists” flooding the area, caused delays in answering calls for assistance. Understandably, the area saw’ an increase in traffic accidents.
• MDFR participated in the distribution of resources, and many fire stations were used as initial distribution sites. As part of the revision process for its hurricane plan, the department presently is compiling a list of resources identified before and after Andrew struck. Many of these resources—most notably U.S. Sugar Corporation from Clewiston, Florida—probably would not have been identified prior to the storm. However, they provided valuable assistance in many ways. MDFR feels strongly that the private sector can be a key player in disaster relief and that relationships with these elements should be fostered in preparation for other disasters.
• During the second week after Andrew hit, FEMA asked MDFR to assist in locating sites for a 10,000person city. The department recommended that if tent cities were in fact needed, they should be smaller in size. It is well-documented that removing families far from their neighborhoods and placing them in massive tent cities adds to emotional distress. Furthermore, while forcing culturally diverse people to live in marginal conditions under one tent may ease logistical problems, individual and
• family stress, health, and well-being may be compromised. Two tent cities were established in the south end of the county, each with the capacity to house 2,500 people. Personal interviews with many of the victims revealed that many were reluctant to leave their homes and whatever possessions remained. Others, especially seasonal farm workers, were afraid to go to a tent city associated with the federal government.
• MDFR distributed a large amount of relief supplies and equipment, most of which were donated. These goods, especially the needed food, water, and sanitary facilities, arrived in extraordinary numbers. At times, this was a mixed blessing, since much of the assistance was inappropriate or arrived too late to be of any assistance. There was no effective strategic plan to distribute the goods or to remove waste as it accumulated.

(Photos by Joe Starling.)

(Photos by Joe Starling.)