BY Mark Emery
It is time for the fire service to take a step back, look around, and ask, “What are we thinking? Getting out of the weeds and taking a fly-over view of the status quo can provide fresh perspective. This article provides a fly-over perspective of the nation’s structural fireground landscape that reveals perpetual problems and often ignored consensus recommendations.
It is easy to proclaim that “everybody goes home.” Is there somebody out there who doesn’t want everybody to go home? It is more challenging to be the first on-scene fire officer arriving at a 3 a.m. building fire and making strategic decisions and taking tactical actions that will fulfill that noble proclamation.
If you read fire service publications and training manuals or attend conferences or training seminars, you have discovered that there is conflicting information within the literature and among teaching-circuit instructors who ignore standards and mandates: Many suggest that the initial incident commander (IC) operate on a hoseline. How did it become acceptable that the IC operate on a hoseline?
Do you want more evidence of “crazy”?
Why does the fire service emphasize reactive tactics instead of proactive strategies? For more than a decade, we have been investing time and money training firefighters how to “save themselves” by doing ground-ladder carnival stunts. Why haven’t we invested that time and money making sure that fire officers know how to keep firefighters from getting into trouble in the first place? Where are those classes? The answer is simple: Reactive tactical entertainment is fun and exciting; proactive strategic discipline is difficult. It is time to recalibrate; it is time to reboot the status quo.
It’s amazing how perspective changes when you get out of the weeds and peer down at what’s really going on out there. When you’ve finished reading this article, I think you’ll agree that the fire service needs a strategic kick in the pants.
COMMAND-O-QUIZ
Before I get rolling, let’s warm up the brain with a Command-O-Quiz.
Question: During the progression of a structural fireground operation from first-due arrival to termination of command, select the one action that will have the greatest influence on a successful operational outcome:
a) Four firefighters arriving on each engine.
b) Nozzle selection and hoseline placement.
c) Laddering and prompt vertical ventilation.
d) Strategic action by the first-due fire officer.
Answer: d): Strategic action by the first-due fire officer.
It is not a revelation that the actions of the first on-scene fire officer will determine how smoothly the subsequent operation will unfold. If the first on-scene fire officer nails the strategic responsibility, the ensuing operation will have the best chance of progressing intelligently and safely. Should the first on-scene fire officer blow (or blow-off) the strategic responsibility, there is a good chance that the subsequent operation will evolve into random acts of tactical violence.
FIRST-DUE STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY
Let’s look at what the consensus standards recommend as the strategic responsibility of Engine-1’s officer:
• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1021, Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications
√ Section 4.6.1: “Develop an initial action plan [IAP]; given size-up information for the incident and assigned emergency response resources so that resources are deployed to control the emergency.”
√ Section 4.6.2*: “Implement an action plan at an emergency operation, given assigned resources, type of incident, and a preliminary plan so that resources are deployed to mitigate the situation.”
*A.4.6.2: “This requirement takes into consideration the officer’s ability to give orders, direct personnel, evaluate information, and allocate resources to respond to the wide variety of emergency situations the fire service encounters.”
This national consensus standard recommends that the first on-scene officer complete a size-up, develop an “initial” IAP, and (this next part makes it interesting) implement that plan. How can a fire officer accomplish this strategic evolution outside the building while performing a task-level evolution inside the building? The intent of this standard is for the first on-scene fire officer to function as a fire officer instead of as a firefighter wearing a different color helmet.
Also notice that NFPA 1021 takes into consideration the officer’s ability to give orders, direct personnel, evaluate information, and allocate resources. I guarantee that the intent of the NFPA 1021 committee was not to have the first on-scene fire officer jump off the rig and dash into the building with a hoseline.
For the sake of argument, let’s say that the Engine 1 company officer did complete a focused size-up and did develop an IAP based on a risk versus value appraisal. Where should the Engine 1 company officer be positioned to implement the preliminary action plan? Advancing a hoseline engaged in fire attack? Crawling through smoke doing search and rescue? On the roof with a power saw? Negative, those are tactical positions and task-level firefighter duties. The fire officer implementing the action plan (in this case Main Street Command) must be outside the immediately dangerous to life or health environment and command from a strategic position called a command post. This concept is reinforced by NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, and NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety, which happens to dovetail nicely with NFPA 1021:
• NFPA 1561:
√ Section 1.5.3: “The system shall include a specific means to identify and keep track of responders entering and leaving hazardous areas, especially where special protective equipment is required.”
√ Section 5.3.12: “The IC shall initiate an accountability and inventory worksheet at the beginning of operations and shall maintain that system throughout operations.”
These NFPA 1561 citations describe what a fire officer doing business as Main Street Command should be doing.
What Engine 1 did is provide a bunch of words that sound important on the radio, most of which don’t mean anything. What Engine 1’s arrival report fosters is reckless, unsafe, and in many states illegal. It ignores often repeated National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) fatality investigation recommendations and ignores consensus standards such as NFPA1021, NFPA 1561, and NFPA 1500. (I’m not making this stuff up.)
MODEL ARRIVAL REPORT
It is not difficult to find manuals, college classroom sessions, and seminars that offer traditional ‘initial radio report’ narratives for the first-due fire officer at a building fire. Often, these on-scene arrival reports are framed as if they qualify as a size-up. Let me make this perfectly clear: What you see through the windshield does not qualify as a size-up. The following is an example you will find within a respected incident management manual taught by numerous respected instructors and used by many respected fire departments:
Engine 1 is on the scene of a one-story building with a working fire. Engine 1 is going in with a handline for fire attack and search and rescue. This is an offensive fire attack. Engine 1 will be Main Street Command.
What do you think? Did Engine 1’s company officer nail it? Is anything missing? Closer examination reveals that the arrival report encourages aggressive tactics and discourages aggressive strategy. In this example, the officer ignores the following important strategic considerations:
• Size-up: There is no evidence that Engine 1 completed a size-up before “going in with a handline.” In fact, there is ample evidence that Engine 1 did not complete a size-up. The radio announcement “on the scene” means that Engine 1 had just arrived and the officer was looking through the windshield. Engine 1’s company officer gave a tidy speech, exited the apparatus, and defaulted to aggressive tactical entertainment. Engine 1’s aggressive tactical action raises compelling strategic questions:
√ Did the officer identify incident problems such as fire location, the fire-growth phase, and the status of life safety?
√ What does “working fire” mean? Is smoke showing, or is fire showing?
√ Did anybody check for a basement? A basement would make it a two-story building.
√ What if the main body of fire is in the basement?
√ What if the side C basement fire is venting horizontally and heating an exposed liquefied petroleum gas tank?
√ What if a victim is dangling from a side C window?
√ What does “one-story building” mean–a one-story garden shed or a one-story Wal-Mart?
• Initial action plan: Did Engine 1develop what NFPA 1021 calls the “IAP,” which is based on size-up information? What do the subsequently arriving companies do? Freelance? If preassigned, are the assignments appropriate based on the location of the fire, status of life safety, type of building construction, determination of value, and the condition of exposures? • Water supply: Before “going in with a handline,” did Engine 1 establish an uninterrupted water supply? If not, who will establish the water supply? Are we to assume it is preassigned?
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 29 CFR 1910.134(g) (4): How many personnel arrived on Engine 1? If it has fewer than four personnel, Main Street Command violates the OSHA two-in/two-out mandate and the direction of NFPA 1500. (Engine 1 was not in rescue mode; the officer declared the mode “offensive.”)
• Ventilation coordination: Did Engine 1 coordinate the offensive entry with ventilation? If so, who did the ventilation? What is the method of ventilation? (It sure sounds as if Engine 1 is the only on-scene company.)
• Operational mode: Doesn’t “going in with a hoseline for fire attack” mean the same as “This is an offensive fire attack?” Can you execute an offensive fire attack without going in with a hoseline? What exactly is “fire attack?” Does fire attack mean the same as confine and extinguish?
Consider this: The term fire attack has zero strategic value. Assume that a battalion chief arrives and broadcasts: “Engine 1 from Battalion 1, progress report.” Engine 1 reports: “Fire attack in progress.” What is the strategic significance of that report? Is Engine 1 winning or losing? Short answer: don’t know.
What if declaring “offensive” meant that Engine 1 was doing confine and extinguish? Now, when the battalion chief asks for the progress report, Engine 1 reports: “Fire confined, extinguishment in progress.” Is Main Street Command winning or losing? Short answer: winning.
Fire attack has never been a component of RECEO (Rescue, Exposures, Confinement, Extinguishment, and Overhaul). Words should mean something. Declaring the mode “offensive” should communicate that confine and extinguish have been coordinated with ventilation and will comply with the two-in/two-out OSHA mandate (and NFPA 1500, 8.5.7, which aligns with the OSHA mandate).
• Words of command: Do the words “Main Street Command” mean something? Where is Main Street Command? Is the IC at a command post or engaged in fire attack? Since when is it acceptable for an IC to operate a hoseline? Did Engine 1’s radio designator change to Main Street Command? (If yes, where did “Engine 1” go?) What harm would there be if Engine 1 continued to be called Engine 1? Although Main Street Command sounds important on the radio, if it doesn’t mean anything, why say it? Words should mean something.
• Companies allowed to freelance: What about incoming resources? What do they do? Is each company preassigned, or are they allowed to freelance? (Tactical preassignments eventually morph into institutionalized freelancing.) Attempting to chase tactics with strategy is never a good idea.
• Search and rescue: As if offensive fire attack and being the IC were not enough on Engine 1’s plate, the company officer added a side order of search and rescue. Wow, Engine 1 is certainly an impressive team. Does search and rescue mean the same thing as primary search? Short answer: no. Search and rescue conveys that there is compelling evidence of a viable occupant who needs to be located and rescued. Primary search is assigned when the status of life safety has been declared “unknown if occupied.” (This is determined following a systematic and focused size-up.) Words should mean something.
What the Engine 1 arrival report describes are factors that NIOSH investigation reports identify as contributing to firefighter injuries and fatalities. Look at Engine 1’s arrival report again. Nobody was fooled by Engine 1’s radio speech. What do you think Engine 1 was really doing after entering the building with that fire attack hoseline?
1. Incident command.
2. Search and rescue.
3. Fire attack.
4. All the above.
Hint: The smart money is on the activity that is the easiest and provides the most recreation.
Engine 1’s offensive entry is illegal in the 22 OSHA plan states and thumbs its nose at the recommendations of NFPA 1021, NFPA 1500, and NFPA1561.
FAST ATTACK FLAWS
What the arrival report by Engine 1 describes is a dubious operational mode called “fast attack”–fast (or quick) attack that advocates the stampede to aggressive tactics and the glaring omission of aggressive strategy. It describes an offensive mode with the following corners rounded:
- NO size-up,
- NO IAP,
- NO water supply,
- NO coordinated ventilation,
- NO two-out standby team, and
- NO IC at a command post.
As each corner is rounded, risk increases and the operation deviates from best practices established by NFPA standards and the OSHA mandate (not to mention fire department and fire officer liability escalation.) What the Engine 1 arrival report example encourages is the stampede to aggressive tactics and the glaring omission of aggressive strategy. Fast attack sacrifices strategic focus for tactical speed.
If you are a mature, commonsense, strategic thinker you probably share my judgment that the term “fast attack” needs to be whacked and buried deep so that nobody will find it. Offensive fast attack encourages reckless, unsafe, and illegal behavior. (I am not advocating that Engine 1 loiter on scene until the cavalry arrives. There is plenty to do, strategically and tactically, before throwing the offensive switch.)
I can’t think of better justification for a four-person engine company than to liberate the first on-scene company officer to do officer work.
CHASING TACTICS WITH STRATEGY
Chasing tactics with strategy is not how the system is supposed to work; chasing tactics with strategy generates anxiety that can be alleviated only with aggressive strategy. If you’ve ever experienced chasing tactics with strategy, you know that it can be like herding cats (it doesn’t work).
Many fire departments institutionalize hazard-area freelancing by dressing it up with an official title: preassignments. Freelancing is the initiation of hazard-area tactics before a size-up has been completed; risk has been factored; and an action plan developed, implemented, and coordinated.
Following is a not uncommon example of chasing tactics with strategy:
- The first company officer on scene has done no strategic front-loading.
- Preassigned tactics are already underway, and “Command” is inside the building on a hoseline.
- The battalion chief arrives to the uncomfortable situation of attempting to chase the underway tactics with strategy.
- The battalion chief assumes command and scrambles to support the freelancing with bits and pieces of strategy.
- At some point, the battalion chief will try to determine where everybody is and what they are doing.
Here’s the point not to be missed: You are that battalion chief. You arrive to an offensive operation that is already underway. No focused size-up has been completed. Hazards have not been identified. No action plan has been developed. Tactical accountability has not been achieved. Teams are busy doing moth-to-flame self-assignments. You are not 100 percent sure of where everybody is or what they are doing. Nobody is aware that the main body of fire is beneath them in a basement.
Are you ready to own the potential consequences? What will you do to make sure that everyone goes home?
CALL TO ACTION
If you somehow missed the message of this article, here it is: What the first-due fire officer does during the first couple of on-scene minutes will make or break the rest of the operation. To ensure that the first couple of on-scene minutes provide strategic significance, fire officer responsibility has been articulated by NFPA 1021, Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2. To reinforce NFPA 1021, look to NFPA 1561, Sections 4.5.3 and 5.3.12. If that’s not enough, there’s OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134(g) (4), which mandates a minimum of four personnel be assembled on scene before entering a self-contained breathing apparatus-required environment. If that is still not enough, the OSHA mandate is reinforced by NFPA 1500, Section 8.5.7.
Some of you may be thinking, “I don’t care what the NFPA standards say.” Really? Would you purchase SCBA that don’t comply with NFPA 1852, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)? How about a ground ladder that doesn’t comply with NFPA 1931, Standard for Manufacturer’s Design of Fire Department Ground Ladders? Would you wear personal protective equipment that doesn’t comply with NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting? Why would you tolerate a company officer who doesn’t comply with NFPA 1021 or a fireground operation that doesn’t comply with NFPA 1500 and 1561?
Often, during a fire department operation, the only feature that isn’t NFPA compliant is the operation itself.
If your first-due company officers are not going to do officer-related work, there’s no need for apparatus to respond with officers onboard!
Is there a downside to ensuring that your company officers comply with NFPA 1021 and that your fireground operations comply with NFPA 1500 and 1561? Remember, many good people would be alive today had their fire departments fostered a proud history and tradition of aggressive strategy, which includes addressing applicable NFPA standards.
BIO
MARK EMERY serves as a fire commissioner in King County, Washington. He created the Command Competency Clinic, the Essentials of Honorable Leadership, and the Ten Commandments of Intelligent and Safe Fireground Operations. He co-developed the Integrated Tactical Accountability System (ITAC). He was named the 2013 George D. Post Instructor of the Year.
