MAGNUM FORCE A Potential Firefighting Nightmare
Features
SPECIAL RISK FIRES
While years of experience, education, and training can’t guarantee exemption from the exceptional fire situation, they can help to prepare a fire company to successfully and safely mitigate the unanticipated incident.
Yet, when the Meriden, CT, Fire Department responded to a call of a chemical fire in the basement of a single-family residence that also stored firearms, all the department’s practical knowledge and training films on this type of emergency contributed to nothing more than a false sense of security. Even in-depth test studies concluded that “When ammunition is involved in a fire, it will not mass detonate or explode,” and that “Projectiles from the ammunition are low velocity and do not present any significant hazard to firefighters wearing standard turnout gear and face protection” (see “Ammunition Fires,” FIRE ENGINEERING, November 1984).
The most important lesson that we learned from the Cook’s Arsenal Works fire was that there is no guarantee that testing conditions and real life situations will always produce the same results.
FIRE LOCATION
Larry Cook, a federal, state, and locally licensed firearms dealer and collector, restores and replicates firearms in the basement of his one-story ranch-style home. His arsenal consists of firearms from the Spanish-American War, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. The collection consists of cannons, muskets, pistols, rifles, shotguns, derringers, machine guns, and other artifacts whose worth approaches the several hundred thousand dollar category. In addition to the firearms, Mr. Cook had ammunition to support each and every piece. A conservative estimate of 100,000 rounds was said to be in his basement at the time of the fire. The caliber of live ammunition consisted of .22, .45, .30, .30/40 krag, .45/70, .50 caliber in belts that would be used in machine guns, .30/30, 30.06, shotgun shells, canisters of modern powder (a black powder substitute), percussion caps, and a variety of other ammo.
Some of the ammunition was lying loose in cardboard boxes and in U.S. Army ammo boxes. Some were in clips, stored in canvas bandoliers, or chambered in loaded firearms. Much of the ammunition was stored in a .032-inch thick metal locker measuring 45 X 15 X 72 inches and divided into six equal compartments.
The arsenal was isolated from the rest of the basement by a concrete and cinder block, reinforced partition. Entrance into the arsenal could be gained only through a horizontally barred, sliding door. The door served as a deterrent from intruders as did the bars covering the-small basement windows of the arsenal. Since the basement wasn’t totally confined, this made it easier for fire travel. The remainder of the basement contained a variety of heavy machinery used to restore the many weapons.
ALARM AND ARRIVAL
Because inspections of single-family homes are not required, firefighters were unaware of the presence of the arsenal when they responded to a report of a spontaneous chemical ignition fire in a basement.
The first engine reported heavy smoke showing, and the incident commander, conferring with Mr. Cook, confirmed that no civilian life hazard existed.
Mr. Cook told the incident commander that he was awakened by “popping noises” and ran to the basement to investigate. He observed flames coming from the cabinet area where he stored paint thinners, tri-chlorethylene, and other solvents used in his business. Mr. Cook also informed the incident commander that he had quite a bit of ammunition in his basement.
Once it was determined that there weren’t any exceptional chemicals in the basement, it was decided to launch an offensive interior attack since we believed that our normal turnouts and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) would fully protect us from the hazards associated with ammunition fires.
The first line was stretched along Exposure 2 side of the building in an attempt to attack through the exterior basement entrance into the rear of the structure. The operation was delayed, however, for two reasons: Heavy smoke, hugging the ground, caused firefighters in full SCBA to crawl low in the yard in order to locate the basement door. Also, the basement entrance was further away than anticipated because of a sizeable deck attached to the house and a 24-foot, above-ground swimming pool. Time was lost when an additional length of hose had to be added. The basement door was in the open position, which accounted for the heavy smoke condition and zero visibility.
Photos by Ken Robinson III
A second attack line was advanced from the Exposure 4 side of the building to the exterior basement entrance to back up the first line. A third line was advanced to the front entrance and a fourth positioned at a basement window near the fire. Firefighters on the third line were unable to enter the structure, as a large section of the floor was missing, having collapsed into the basement.
Vertical ventilation, forcible entry, and search (for the seat of the fire) were being coordinated and carried out simultaneously with hose advancement. Additional companies were requested and additional shifts reported to the scene.
A deafening barrage of firecracker-like sounds, more violent explosions, and repeated concussions and tremors of the basement floor brought about a change in strategy. Firefighters were ordered to retreat and fight the blaze defensively, directing outside streams into the basement windows.
Interior lines were unable to advance directly to the seat of the fire because of the intense heat and smoke and because the machinery covered a considerable amount of floor area. The machinery also made it impossible to use either wall in a left-hand or right-hand pattern so as not to become disoriented.
While exterior lines were being played into the basement window, a glow similar to that of burning coal could be seen. When water was applied to it, it seemed to have no effect; in fact, the fire appeared to intensify. We can only assume that this was caused by burning powders.
DAMAGE SUSTAINED
After the fire was extinguished and overhaul completed, we surveyed the damage.
It was determined that the fire’s origin was electrical in nature and began above the basement’s false ceiling directly under the kitchen. Approximately 20 X 24 feet of the first floor burned through to the basement. Floor joists, measuring 2X6 inches, were consumed as was the sub-flooring and floor covering of the first floor. A partial collapse occurred when the kitchen stove and refrigerator crashed into the basement.
Antiques were in ruins. Remains of weapons and ammunition were everywhere. It is difficult to determine with complete accuracy exactly how much of what caliber of ammunition was stored in which location. However, there are few points about which we are sure:
• Holes in the right quadrant of the metal locker matched perfectly with expended shell casings, not the bullets themselves, from .45s, 30/40 krags, .45/70s, a 1to 9round clip from a .45, one bullet hole from a chambered round of a .357 and another bullet hole from the chambered round of a .44 magnum.
• When a firearm is loaded, including having a round in the chamber, it will, if heated enough, eventually discharge with enough velocity to shoot a hole through a .032-inch thick steel cabinet.
• Our only explanation as to why casings penetrated the locker in the upper right quadrant with more frequency than they did any other place is because the .45/70s and the .30/40 krags were stored there in canvas bandoliers from the Civil War. These bandoliers provided each shell with enough confinement so that when heated, the exposed shell casing followed the path of least resistance out of the bandolier, becoming a neardeadly projectile which penetrated the steel locker.
• During overhaul, when the locker door was opened, the muzzle ends of both the .357 and the .44 magnum were pointing towards gaping holes, providing true testimony as to what had occurred.
• Almost all of the projectiles that penetrated the locker then hit either the inside of the foundation walls or the concrete partition.
• Sealed oneand two-pound cans of modern gunpowder were stored in various areas of the basement and several of them ruptured. However, the intensity of the rupture did not seem severe, as the cans were not twisted, only ballooned. The cans appeared to have swelled from the heat, separating the seams and allowing the gases from the powder to isnite with a whooshing sound. None of the canisters of this powder seemed to explode because we were able to recover each can from the area in which it was stored.
Photos by Ken Robinson III
Another noteworthy observation is that each can had residue of powder inside. In some cases over half of the cans’ contents were recovered.
• The .45 nine-shot clip was fully loaded. We can only assume that several, if not all of the shells exploded simultaneously, causing it to rocket through the locker.
CONCLUSIONS
A chambered round exposed to fire will shoot just like pulling the trigger on a loaded gun. After all, that’s exactly what it is. Rounds confined within a bandolier, when heated, will explode with enough velocity in one direciton to penetrate .032-inch metal and then chip concrete. Our turnouts will not stop such an impact. If a canvas bandolier can provide sufficient confinement, then so can other items such as leather.
If the cabinet was stored in a different area of the basement, if the concrete wall was not present, or if the bandoliers had been hanging in the open, it is impossible to gauge what might have happened. Had an engine company been able to advance a line through the front door (which was within the area of the floor collapse), it’s quite possible that they could have met with serious injury or death.
We need to recognize that fire involving small arms ammunition can kill. Test burns aside, we are speaking from a real world experience. Granted, this fire may be classified as the exception rather than the rule, but getting killed at an exceptional fire rather than at a normal one doesn’t make you any less dead.
