BY ANTHONY AVILLO
There are some jobs you never forget. Some you remember by virtue of a great rescue or a great stop. Others are memorable because of the sheer magnitude of the fire or the size of the building-and sometimes the size of the loss. Having parking lots named after you also seems to immortalize certain fires. Sometimes, you remember the incident because the unusual circumstances surrounding it make it a “once-in-a-career” fire. This is one of those responses.
THE OCCUPANCY
The fire building was an old one-story taxpayer of ordinary construction and approximately 25 feet wide by 80 feet deep. It was occupied by Marzigliano’s, a live produce store in West New York, New Jersey, that for decades had been a staple on Bergenline Avenue, a long thoroughfare lined with stores and mixed commercial-residential occupancies. Bergenline Avenue runs from the Jersey City line on the south end and stretches northward through the municipalities of Union City, West New York, Guttenberg, and North Bergen, terminating at the Hudson-Bergen County line. This area is protected by North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue (NHRFR). (In 1999, the fire departments of the four above-mentioned municipalities and the township of Weehawken merged to form NHRFR. NHRFR, located directly across the Hudson River from Manhattan, protects three out of the five most densely populated cities in the country, with more than 60,000 people per square mile. There is no such thing as a fire without severe exposure concerns. Bergenline Avenue is at the heart of population and exposure central.)
Customers could go to Marzigliano’s to buy a live animal and have it slaughtered and prepared to take home to cook, or they could purchase a live animal and take it home. You can imagine what we were greeted with as we arrived at this fire scene in the middle of the afternoon, when many shoppers were out. Goats, sheep, chickens, ducks, and rabbits were evacuating into the middle of Bergenline Avenue. It looked something like Noah’s Ark meets Animal House.
ANIMALS EVACUATING
One of the things I will remember most about this fire is the amount of on-the-spot improvisation and adaptation that took place to meet the needs of the incident. First, there was the need to control the livestock that was rapidly evacuating the structure; this operation necessitated a redeployment of personnel who otherwise would have been assigned other duties.
The second alarm was struck immediately. Quick-thinking firefighters used several small portable dumpsters as well as some 55-gallon drums to create a makeshift pen near the building (photo 1). They placed all the animals they could catch in the pen, where they waited until the Humane Society responded. Some animals wandered the avenue and had to be corralled. There were also reports of civilians carrying away some of the animals. I vaguely remember seeing a civilian carrying a goat down the block as I was getting out of the Division car.
FIRE CONDITIONS ON ARRIVAL
On arrival, heavy smoke was issuing from the roof area and drifting across Bergenline Avenue. Arrival conditions indicated a delayed alarm; the fire appeared to have taken hold of the cockloft in the rear. A moderate amount of smoke was venting from the open front doors. It was also churning at the floor level, which indicated the possibility of a cellar fire. I asked the owner how to get to the cellar; he said there was no cellar. I found this strange because of the age of the building and my knowledge of the buildings in the area. Skeptical about his denial of the existence of a cellar and wondering what we might find beneath this unusual occupancy, I sent a company to see if they could determine if there was a cellar. The report was negative, so we were able to concentrate on the fire in the cockloft.
The smoke in the interior was heavy at the rear, but there was no fire. Animals were still running around in a panic in the smoke. Conditions were very interesting in there. Later, fire began to drop down at the rear, as the roof and ceiling began to fail; however, in the early stages, the fire was confined to the cockloft.
It appeared that the fire had gotten a good head start: The store’s staff tried to fight the fire without success before calling NHRFR. The garden hose on the roof attested to this fact. Someone apparently had been using a flammable solvent to clean a feather evacuation system that mechanically plucks chickens. This system, constructed of metal ductwork, not unlike a common HVAC system, pierced the ceiling, extended into the cockloft, and terminated at an accumulation point on the roof. It was obviously packed with highly combustible feathers and other debris, as was the cockloft area. The fire originated at roof level, where the work was being performed, and spread downward into the cockloft through the system’s ductwork. No fire protection system was in place to protect the system, the structure, or occupants.
EXPOSURES
As always in this area, there were exposure concerns. The fire building was a single story. Access into the building was through the front door and a door in the alley on the D side. It was decided not to use this side door, even though it was closer to the fire area, because the heavy roof equipment involved in fire was in close proximity to this doorway. The concentrated load over the main attack access and egress point presented a hazard. It was easier and safer to attack from the front and use the reach of the streams. Additionally, the alley was only about 10 feet wide; any operation conducted in that alley would be directly in the collapse zone of the D wall of the fire building.
Exposure B was an attached two-story mixed-use building of ordinary construction (photo 2). A jewelry store was on the first floor. The owner understandably had security concerns, especially as the afternoon and evening wore on. The major issue with this building, however, was that the second floor, which was residential, had several windows that faced onto the roof of the fire building. Since the fire was in the cockloft and was breaking through the roof on arrival, these windows were a main focus in regard to exposure protection.
 (2) The one-story fire building is seen at the right with exposure B at left. The hoseline is being stretched to the roof of exposure . |
Exposure D was separated from the fire building by a 10-foot alley (photo 3). Although this two-story mixed commercial-residential structure was of ordinary construction, a wood-frame addition at the rear on the second floor was imminently threatened by the fire venting from the roof at the rear. Since the wind was blowing toward exposure D, the vinyl siding was already melting.
 (3) The D side of the fire building and the alley seperated the fire from the D exposure. |
Exposure C was a 12-story fire-resistive high-rise. A 35-foot courtyard separated it from the rear of the fire building. Because of the building construction and the distance from the fire, the only protection needed for this building was to close all the windows on the fire side. The West New York Police Department handled this task. The courtyard provided a strategic advantage for Command in that it not only separated the fire building and the exposure by a good distance, but it also allowed apparatus access on the side.
RESPONSES AND OPERATIONS
The first-alarm response to the fire consisted of four engines, two ladders, Rescue 1, the safety officer, the Command Tech, and a battalion chief. I responded as the deputy and incident commander.
During the day, from 0800 until 2000 hours, as the deputy, I am not required to respond until a working fire is confirmed. It is my option. Since this call “sounded like something,” I decided to respond with the first-alarm companies. In NHRFR, confirmation of a working fire also brings a fifth engine as well as the rapid intervention crisis (RIC) team. The fifth engine helps to front-load the initial on-scene personnel profile as well as provide some operational flexibility in the initial scene assignments addressed by the standard operating procedures. Each additional alarm brings another two engines, a ladder, and a battalion chief. This fire went to a third alarm, not only because of the need to address exposure and tactical reserve issues but also to bring personnel to evacuate the animals from the building.
In addition to the animals that had been evacuating, walls were lined with cages filled with live chickens, ducks, and rabbits. We were hoping that these cages might be on wheels, but they were not. Not only were they not portable, but they were bolted in place so that the animals had to be taken out of the cages one by one. It took more than six hours to evacuate all of the animals and turn them over to the Associated Humane Society of Hudson County.
Chickens are easily agitated. Scared chickens are downright vicious. Full turnout gear and face and hand protection were required. During the fire suppression operations, firefighters removed the animals, loaded the livestock into dog-style kennels, and carried them out to the civilian handlers (photo 4). I assigned one of my company officers as supervisor of the Animal Rescue Group; he had once worked in the store and had experience in this area. Firefighter experience knows no boundaries. Always use it to your advantage.
 (4) Chickens that got away are being loaded into the kennels. Many people and the media were watching, so personnel ensured that they handled the chickens with care. |
After the fire was extinguished, the Humane Society took over the job. We kept a skeleton crew of companies to assist in removing the animals and maintain a fire watch.
The first-alarm companies worked in the fire building, exposure B, the roof, and just outside the alley between the fire building and exposure D. These companies were reinforced and relieved by the second-alarm companies. Two lines were stretched into the fire building for attack through the front door. A line was stretched to the second floor of exposure B to address the concerns of the windows facing on the roof of the fire building, and a line was placed at the entrance to the alley to protect the exposed wood-frame surface at the rear of the exposure D (photo 5).
 (5) An exposure line operates in the alley on the D side of the fire. |
The second-due engine (Engine 5) established a water supply for the first-due Squad 1, operating as the attack engine. Squad 2, the fifth-due engine, established a second water supply on the opposite side of Bergenline Avenue. The first-due Ladder 4 raised the aerial to the roof of the fire building for ventilation operations. Rescue 1 conducted the primary search of the fire building. Both the primary and the secondary searches for human life at this fire were negative. Ladder 2, second-due, entered and evacuated the B side exposure.
Ladder 4 reported that fire was venting from the roof in the C/D portion of the roof near some heavy roof equipment. This was the site where the fire originated. The concern was that the old roof would not support the equipment for too long. Ladder 4 opened some natural openings on the roof and was attempting to cut a hole to localize fire spread. The crew encountered a spongy roof as it moved closer to the fire area.
During this same time, the reports from the interior confirmed that the fire was in the cockloft. The lines had advanced about halfway to the rear; there was a heavy smoke condition but no fire. The crews were having difficulty accessing the cockloft. The 2 1/2-inch streams were not penetrating the ceiling, and the support personnel with pike poles were having a difficult time getting openings into the ceiling. In the smoke, they thought that maybe they were encountering tin ceilings or even double-tin ceilings, not unusual for this area or type of building. Because of this difficulty, they could punch only some small inspection holes into the overhead, which allowed limited stream penetration into the cockloft. It turned out that the ceilings were made of Formica® over plywood. We had never encountered such a ceiling and could not see it in the smoke. The owner advised that this covering was used because of the animal blood and fluids present over much of the area. The Formica®-covered ceilings and walls made cleanup easier, as did the concrete floors that were pitched toward a drain.
The crews overcame the ceiling-penetration problem by using chain saws to get the ceiling opened so that streams could be operated from a distance to keep the fire in the cockloft in the rear and prevent it from advancing. This operation took time. An A-frame ladder was brought in to accommodate the cutting of the Formica® and plywood.
These interior reports were coming to the command post at about the same time as the spongy roof reports. Based on the fact that the roof support and structure were being compromised by the fire and the presence of the dead loads in that area, I ordered that the evacuation tones be sounded and that the fire building and the roof be evacuated. I felt the risk of continuing the interior or roof operation was not worth the benefit of saving the old building.
The companies working in the interior evacuated, as did Ladder 4 from the roof. A roll call was taken; all personnel were accounted for. The companies previously operating in the interior and the Interior Division commander notified me at this time that there was a brick wall about halfway back in the interior separating the front service area from the rear slaughter area (for lack of a better term). They felt that they could operate in an interior defensive fashion on the safe side of this wall to keep the fire to the rear. Before evacuation, they had put a few inspection holes in the ceiling on the service side of the wall and found no fire traveling in the cockloft there. Their plan was to open the ceiling and expose the whole brick wall on the safe side and fight the fire from there. After consulting with the battalion chief assigned as Interior Division commander, I decided to let them attempt this operation, provided they kept a keen eye on the fire’s movement. I assigned the safety officer to keep an eye on this area as well, so we would keep it as safe as possible. We decided that since the fire was eating up the roof decking at the rear, vertically venting the roof, manual vertical ventilation would not be needed. This enabled me to keep personnel from operating on the roof in an unsafe area.
We placed additional lines on the roof of exposure B to hit fire and to assist in protecting the rear D exposure. This line had a better angle than the line operating in the alley; but, to be safe, I kept both lines operating. I also had a line positioned on the roof of exposure D in case the fire broke through the roof and further threatened the exposure. An interior protective line was also stretched into the wood-frame addition of the exposure. Since this was an add-on, the only access into this area was from a metal stairwell on the C side (photo 6).
 (6) Companies entering the wood-frame addition at the rear of exposure D. Note the severity of the exposure problem as evidenced by the smoke travel. |
In addressing the C side of the structure, there were no windows or doors for stream penetration or ventilation opportunities. It was decided to place Engine 11, a telescoping waterway, in the courtyard to be used in a defensive fashion to address fire venting through the roof. This stream was readied but was not used initially because we did not want to drive fire back into the building. We waited for more of the roof to burn away. A third water supply was established to supply this master stream. A Division C commander was assigned to the rear. These were third-alarm companies (photo 7).
 (7) Engine 11 is ready to operate on the C side. |
We now had the fire surrounded, and it was matter of coordinating the operations of the companies behind the brick wall on the interior with the master streams at the rear and the streams from the roof. Ladder 4 officer, assigned as the B Roof Division commander, coordinated stream operations with the other assigned division commanders. There was some minor extension into the service area through some unprotected breaches in the brick wall; however, since it was open, companies were in position to quickly contain this spread. They used pike poles, chain saws to open the ceiling, and a well-coordinated and disciplined handline operation.
While these exterior/interior defensive stream operations were underway, the animal evacuation operation continued. Since the lines on the interior were behind the cages lining the walls, they protected the companies conducting the animal-removal operation.
One of the problems we encountered with the stream operations was that the runoff was accumulating in the sloped drainage areas that happened to be in proximity to the animal cages (photo 8). As a result, the water became contaminated with feces, feathers, and other nastiness. To address this concern, a Decon Group was established. A small-diameter line was set up on the exterior on the A side; anyone working in the interior was ordered to be decontaminated after exiting the structure. All personnel who operated at this fire were encouraged to fill out NHRFR hazardous exposure reports so that the incident and the offending material could be properly documented. Further, the Department of Health was requested to respond early in the incident to evaluate the hazards. In addition, we put into service three sump pumps to remove the water building up in the area.
 (8) The amount of water accumulating in the service area created a containment concern. Note the stacked cages of chickens inside the store. |
As expected, a good portion of the roof collapsed at the rear. Since the building was old, the roof had been built up for many years with tar and roofing material. As a result, fire was hiding under the collapsed roof decking and was not burning away the roof as quickly as we would have liked. The interior defensive operation was successful: The fire did not pass the brick wall. However, it appeared from below that only a small portion of the roof had collapsed in the slaughter area because the plywood and Formica® ceiling was so strong that the roof collapse did not collapse the ceiling, except at the rear. Thus, the ceiling in most areas other than for the extreme rear of the building, was intact. The interior companies were considering the idea that it would be safe to move in to cut away the ceilings to finish extinguishment after the exterior streams had been shut down. Fortunately, they communicated these plans to the exterior companies. As it turned out, the view from the exposure roofs was quite different. The interior companies were informed that they should not pass the brick wall and attempt to expose and extinguish fire burning above what they thought was an intact ceiling. We had to move a few well-intentioned, but misinformed, companies out of the area in the early stages of the overhaul phase. For the most part, however, the Interior Division companies stayed behind the brick wall. Good communication and disciplined operations always bring about better coordination on the fireground.
I was also able to get a better feel for the operation by virtue of a Command transfer. The protocol for NHRFR is that when a third alarm “doubtful” is issued during the progress report, as was the case here, the chief of the department responds and takes command of the incident. The deputy then is assigned as Operations Section chief. The advantage of this move, especially at this fire, is that you are no longer shackled to the command post. I was able to do a personal reconnaissance to get a better idea of the operation and to understand what was happening on the fireground.
I first climbed Ladder 4’s aerial to see what was going on at the roof level (photo 9). From there, I could see the extent of the failed roof and the dead loads in those areas. It was more extensive than what could be seen from the interior. I now understood the gravity of the radio transmissions going from the roof to the interior. I quickly looked at the interior and consulted with the Interior Division commander relative to my concerns. Things seemed to be under control there.
 (9) Getting a better view of the fireground once the department chief took command of the operation. |
I then went to the rear and climbed the telescoping waterway to survey the amount of fire still confined under the fallen roof. To extinguish it, we would have to access it from the interior or from the exterior somehow; access from the interior was not possible because of the danger of a secondary collapse
Access from the C side also was not possible unless we breached a wall, which was not worth the effort at this stage of the fire. To bring in demolition crews to remove the rear wall to access and finish extinguishment was also not an option, as the Building Department declared the building sound except for the roof and a candidate for rebuilding. There would be no tearing out of the rear wall. Another option quickly discussed and just as quickly dismissed was to let the fire burn through the rest of the roof. It was decided that if we waited for that to happen, we would be there forever.
We instead opted to bring the ladder of the telescoping waterway to roof level and to work from the safety of the ladder to slice inspection holes in the portions of the roof still attached to the rear wall. The bulk of the hidden fire was concentrated under this area. We then placed a distributor in the hole and let it operate, alternating between holes for the remainder of the fire and the fire watch. Along with the line on the roof of exposure B that was hitting visible hot spots, it did the job. By the next morning, there were no remaining hot spots.
Another issue that competed for the attention of Command was the circus-like atmosphere in the area. This was a major newsworthy as well as a civilian-heavy event. You don’t see farm animals running down a busy intersection in the middle of an urban area every day. As a result, the press was everywhere: in the streets, in helicopters, and generally in the way with their cameras. We quickly used the police to establish and maintain a civilian safety perimeter. We also set up a press staging area, where reporters could take their pictures and be briefed and updated by NHRFR officials. One of our directors operated as press liaison and coordinated interviews with the incident commander and other players in this incident.
In the end, the building was saved, the exposures were undamaged, and scores of livestock were removed from harm and transported to shelters.
LESSONS LEARNED
• Listen to your officers. From my vantage point, I would have maintained a strictly defensive operation based on what I knew from the command post. The information from the players on the front lines made it possible to take advantage of building construction features to limit the fire’s damage and save the structure without compromising safety. Remember that the decisions are ultimately the responsibility of the incident commander; however, the best decisions come about as a result of sound reporting from critical areas in a timely manner. That’s why you have officers. You must trust their judgment. To do this, you must know them. If you don’t know them well enough to make a decision about trusting them, you are behind closed doors in your office too much.
• Be prepared to manage surprises. Animal evacuations and capture, contaminated runoff and turnout gear, Formica®-over-plywood ceilings, and the need to use alternative tactics to safely conclude extinguishment of concealed fire all stretched the improvisational abilities of the personnel on-scene. Involve your personnel in helping to solve these problems.
• Be prepared for operations that eat up personnel (photo 10). The need to evacuate the large population of animals necessitated what amounted to an additional alarm assignment. The need to evacuate, corral, and build a holding pen for the fleeing animals also took an immediate commitment of a portion of the first-alarm personnel. For this reason as well as the fire condition on arrival, a second alarm was transmitted immediately. The third alarm was transmitted soon thereafter. A good friend of mine, Tom Gavin, a fellow instructor at the Monmouth County (NJ) Fire Academy, gave me this advice about resources: “It is better to be looking at them than looking for them.”
 (10) The need to address unusual situations will demand command flexibility as well as the stretching of resources. Keep the incident well-staffed. |
• Be aware that the press will be everywhere. You must show respect for them and operate in a professional manner at all times at all incidents. Realize that they have a right to be there. Make sure they are kept out of harm’s way. The efforts of NHRFR, as reported by the press, were extremely positive.
• Show care for your customers, even if they are animals. People as well as the press were more interested in the welfare of the animals than in any other issue. The fire actually took a back seat. A dispassionate attitude toward your customers, whoever or whatever they are, is extremely unprofessional. We were told that the ducks, goats, sheep, and rabbits evacuated found their way to petting zoos. The chickens and the other animals left in their cages, unfortunately, had to be euthanized because they were contaminated by smoke. With regard to the animals carried away by civilians, their whereabouts are unknown.
ANTHONY AVILLO, a 21-year veteran of the fire service, is a deputy chief in North Hudson (NJ) Regional Fire & Rescue, assigned as platoon commander of the 1st Division. He is an instructor at the Bergen County (NJ) Fire Academy and at the Monmouth County (NJ) Fire Academy. He is a partner in Study Group, Inc., a firm that trains promotional and entry-level candidates in the fire service. Avillo has been a Hands-on Training (H.O.T.) instructor and speaker at FDIC and a keynote speaker at FDIC 2004. He is a member of the Fire Engineering editorial advisory board, as well as a frequent contributor, and is the author of Fireground Strategies (Fire Engineering, 2002) and Fireground Strategies Workbook (Fire Engineering, 2003).
