“Lessons learned” intention of article, not an attack on NYPD
In his Letter to the Editor (October 2005), John H. Busching, of the Fire Department of New York’s (NYPD) Emergency Service Unit’s (ESU) Specialized Training School, expressed his displeasure with comments made in the Editor’s Opinion (Fire Engineering, June 2005) and my article “Helicopter Operations for High-Rise Emergencies” (June 2003).
Detective Busching, who is also a volunteer firefighter whose father was a member of The Fire Department of New York (his brother is a current FDNY firefighter), explained why the NYPD ESU is not a duplication of the services provided by FDNY’s rescue companies, squads, and special operations command support truck companies. He listed the training standards for ESU. He also implied that he agrees that all agencies, including the NYPD, should use the incident command system. He closed by mentioning the deaths of 23 ESU officers in the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11.
I can’t speak to the June 2005 Editor’s Opinion because I wasn’t the author. However, with regard to my June 2003 article on helicopter high-rise team operations, I feel Detective Busching deserves a reply.
In my discussion about the use of helicopters to deploy firefighting and rescue teams and conduct other tasks at major high-rise fires, I highlighted certain helicopter-related issues that occurred during both of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (1993 and 2001). This included the NYPD’s decision to deploy ESU personnel on the roof of a smoke-charged Trade Center tower after the 1993 explosion and fire without notifying or consulting the FDNY incident commander (IC), which was problematic, and some issues that occurred on 9/11.
With all due respect, I wouldn’t characterize my comments as an attack on the NYPD. My intent was to highlight the need to develop clear protocols and parameters about the use of helicopters for high-rise firefighting and rescue operations, to avoid problems that can lead to a cascade of other predicaments, regardless of the city, state, or nation in which high-rise disasters occur.
To illustrate that point, here are the offending passages from my original article:
“The 9-11 World Trade Center attack naturally raised questions about helicopter high-rise operations. The conditions that confronted FDNY on September 11, 2001, were so extraordinary that it’s difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the ultimate efficacy of using helicopters in high-rise fire/rescue operations. To some, the WTC attack raised more questions than conclusions in this regard:
“Were the NYPD helicopter teams staffed by rescue-trained police officers, properly equipped (including personal protective equipment) and trained (including high-rise fireground tactics and strategy) to be working above a raging fire in a high-rise building?
“What (if any) high-rise firefighting and rescue experience did the police officers have?
“If the NYPD pilots had been trained and experienced to fly in proximity to large fires (like fire service pilots who fly helicopters in wildland and urban fire conditions and other situations that might be applicable to a high-rise fire), or if they had been trained to fly in simulated high-rise fire conditions (including specially programmed helicopter flight simulators), could they have found a reasonably safe way to insert teams on the upwind edge of the roof of either tower?
“Were the police officers prepared to force open stairwell doors that had reportedly been locked from the inside (thereby potentially allowing people trapped at the top of the stairwells to escape) and to deal with the heat that might have emanated from within (similar to attacking a cellar fire)?
“Were NYPD personnel prepared to conduct search and rescue operations on the upper floors for long periods of time in smoky and oxygen-deficient conditions (e.g., using closed-circuit SCBA, thermal imaging systems, and wearing full turnouts)?
“Were NYPD helicopter crews prepared to insert FDNY companies that were properly equipped, trained, and experienced to fight a high-rise fire?
“Were the police officers prepared to hook up their own fire hoses to operational standpipes to fight fire and protect means of egress?
“Was there a plan to begin rooftop helicopter evacuations in the early stages of the fire, when conditions might have been more favorable for extracting unknown numbers of people?
“If and when did NYPD helicopter crews notice signs of structural instability, and were appropriate efforts made to transmit that information to the fire department IC? And if not, why not?
“The one thing we can definitely say about deploying personnel to the rooftops of burning high-rises is this: Crews without full turnouts and SCBA, without extensive high-rise firefighting experience, without fire department communications, and operating outside the fireground command system are ill-prepared to operate effectively on the floors above a high-rise fire. They are more likely to be a liability. In short, it’s a bad idea, when there are well-trained and highly experienced firefighters who could be inserted on the roof in their stead.
“We can also definitively say that ‘non-fire department’ agencies with helicopters on the scene of a burning high-rise have a moral and societal (and perhaps legal) responsibility to coordinate all their efforts and operations with the jurisdictional fire department IC, to establish open radio and other communications with the firefighting forces operating inside the building (and their commanders), to immediately share critical intelligence with the fire department, and to operate under the aegis of the fire department. To do anything less is to endanger the lives of citizens, firefighters, and other people affected by the event.
“Non-fire department agencies that refuse to operate by these rules simply confirm the argument that more fire departments should operate their own helicopter fleets to effectively execute the fire department mission without interference of the uncooperative outside helicopter-equipped agencies.”
These are legitimate questions, and my comments about parameters and requirements for deploying personnel on the roof of burning high-rise buildings are also legitimate. Insofar as we are talking about one of the most extreme fire conditions to be found, it’s reasonable to expect that helo high-rise teams would, wherever possible, consist of highly experienced and properly trained and equipped firefighters and officers who have years of experience evaluating fireground conditions and commanding fireground operations.
Furthermore, the argument can be made that, for cities and counties with large numbers of high-rise buildings and other conditions where helicopter deployment of rescue-trained firefighters is advantageous, it’s prudent for the local fire departments to consider establishing their own helicopter fleets, to maximize the effectiveness of these operations and to ensure availability of helicopters whenever they are needed for fireground and rescue operations. This is a standard model of operation for many progressive fire departments, including places where there are separate police helicopter fleets primarily for law enforcement purposes.
In large metropolitan areas like Miami-Dade, Florida; San Diego, Los Angeles City, Los Angeles County, Sacramento, California; and others, fire department-based air operations have proven track records in saving lives and property, and they give the fire department assured access to helicopters for high-rise fires. Along those lines, one can make a case for FDNY developing its own helicopter capabilities to enhance the response to high-rise fires and other emergencies and disasters, which is probably why FDNY members present and past have discussed it on different levels in recent years.
With respect to the sharing of information and cooperation between agencies, it’s a positive sign that FDNY and NYPD are collaborating on a level never seen before.
Again, there are existing models where this cooperative approach works well. After previous years where conflict occurred over jurisdiction in certain rescue operations (especially in the mountains of L.A. County), the Los Angeles County Fire Department and the Sheriff Department established a memorandum of agreement (MOA), signed by the fire chief and the sheriff, defining how these agencies shall work together for the best interest of the patient.
The Mountain Rescue MOA mandates the use of the incident command system, and specifically the use of unified command (with the first-arriving agency as the initial IC and the next-arriving agency reporting to the IC to establish the unified command), during technical rescue emergencies in the mountainous areas. On a daily basis, L.A. County Fire Department engines, truck companies, helicopters, and rescue companies work hand-in-hand with the Sheriff Department’s rescue helicopter and the volunteer mountain rescue teams to rescue people trapped or in need of medical aid in some of the most rugged terrain in North America, under a range of entrapment conditions that sometimes defies imagination.
This partnership, hammered out a decade ago after previous years of conflict, allows us to work together to save lives in ways that weren’t possible without the unified command concept. It’s an example of how the fire department and law enforcement can take care of business together, even with services that sometimes seem to be in competition.
I’d also like to note another of the passages in my original helo high-rise team article, which speaks to Busching’s letter. I wrote: “The intent of this article is to review the sometimes-debated use of helicopter-deployable teams of firefighters for high-rise emergencies and to present an argument for increasing the role of helicopters in response to high-rise emergencies. The goal is to improve the life-saving capabilities of fire departments during fires, terrorist attacks, after earthquakes, and in other urgent situations in high-rise structures, through an examination of helicopter-based options available to the modern fire service.”
If my article spurred conversations at the local and regional levels about how and when helicopters can be used to improve the saving of lives and prompts reexaminations of protocols and requirements for handling these high-risk missions, I’m satisfied that it accomplished its intent.
I really appreciate Busching’s comments and his viewpoint. The members of ESU are clearly dedicated to the mission of saving lives. I’ve had long and meaningful collaborations with NYPD’s ESU.
As a member of the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue “Red” Incident Support Team, I’ve also had the pleasure of having the New York US&R Task Force (consisting of personnel from FDNY and NYPD) being deployed in my division or branch, including during search operations on the Mississippi coast in Hurricane Katrina. I’ve also trained with NYPD members. In every case, the NYPD ESU personnel were professional, well-prepared, and dedicated to the cause of saving lives.
That being said, I would like to conclude by concurring with Busching when he said, “We should learn from this and move forward together.”
Larry Collins,
Captain,
Los Angeles County Fire Department,
