LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

NFPA 1710 not “real world”

I am another fire service professional who agrees with the sentiments put forth by Chief Dwight Van Zanen pertaining to NFPA 1710 in Letters to the Editor in the December 2000 issue. “Real world” is, I believe, that cities across our nation that are already paying for four or five personnel per company per day trying to keep three on the rig are not going to suddenly significantly increase operational costs to meet another standard which, at best, is highly controversial among the very members it purports to help.

There is nothing magical about the number four. Fire departments in this country respond to hundreds of emergency incidents every day for which a three-person-per-company crew is adequate. For some situations, a four-person crew would be adequate and a three-person crew would not. For some others, a five-person crew would be adequate where a four-person crew would not. All of us have responded to fires where even if we had had 10 people riding every piece of apparatus, we still could not have made a safe aggressive interior attack on the fire or have changed the outcome in terms of loss incurred. Again, the number four no more denotes “adequate” staffing for every incident for every fire company in the country than would three or five or 10 or any other number.

It is unreasonable to think all the fire companies in my department should be staffed at all times like companies in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Phoenix. It is just as unreasonable to think that the little town of 7,000 where I grew up-which, to its credit, has maintained a paid fire department for many decades-should be forced to staff its two fire companies as does my current department in a city of 58,000. Cities, driven by their citizens and the citizens’ comforts or discomforts related to fire-loss experience, should determine for themselves what is an adequate (and affordable) level of protection for their communities.

If NFPA 1710 is adopted, it will surely lead to a widening of the gap between fire department unions and city administrations and to increased litigation against cities, neither of which any of us needs. As a compulsory standard, 1710 is bad news and needs to be soundly defeated.

Mickey Jackson
Chief Fayetteville (AR) Fire Department

NFPA 1710 a “naked power grab”

James G. Tauber’s article “Pre-Emergency Deployment of Fire Department Resources: A Call to Action” (Fire Engineering, October 2000) makes the important point that fire departments must not only justify their actions to increasingly skeptical overseers and consumers but they must use more sophisticated methods to substantiate their decisions. His inability to articulate a clear, comprehensive, and concise model for conducting community risk analysis shows just how difficult this process really is.

Still, Tauber provides a very comprehensive and useful look at what has been done, what tools are available, and what’s required to achieve results. His detailed assessment of the state-of-art and practice reveals how much talk and how little action the fire service has committed to this subject over the past 35 or more years. To paraphrase G. K. Chesterton’s insightful comments about Christianity: “It’s not that risk analysis and master planning have been tried and found lacking but that they’ve been tried and found difficult.”

Notwithstanding his eloquent and appropriate reference to Thomas Jefferson’s writings about informed public opinion and the use of public discretion, I’m afraid Tauber’s admission that putting risk analysis into practice is time-consuming and tedious will only fuel the argument now popular among many quarters of the U.S. fire service that we should adopt one-size-fits-all approaches in the form of uniform deployment standards promulgated by a national body like the National Fire Protection Association.

I certainly agree with Tauber that risk analysis must become the foundation for fire service decision making. But these decisions must not be made by fire chiefs and fire protection professionals alone. We must engage communities in the decision-making process by encouraging discussion about fire department services. This begins by accepting our own limitations and acknowledging that we depend on our communities as much as they depend on us.

One of the ways we can demonstrate our commitment to and trust in our communities is to reject standards like NFPA 1710 in favor of developing consensus about a process that will help communities define local needs. Such an approach will reject imposing a coercive and corrosive culture of compliance on the community in favor of promoting a commitment to best-practice principles.

Given adequate information and good choices, few communities will knowingly opt for less than they need and may actually decide they want more, not less. When they don’t, it will often be because they have few if any good alternatives. Many small communities cannot afford their own independent fire service and should look at consolidation with their neighbors. Other “disappearing” paid departments with shrinking rosters should accept the need for volunteers to augment their numbers. Where volunteer retention and recruitment are hampered by competing demands for residents’ time, pay and incentives may need to be considered, even if it means higher property taxes.

If situations out there are as bad as some fire chiefs and firefighters suggest and communities will not respond to reason, fire chiefs and their charges may have to make hard choices themselves. Some already have, often at great personal and professional expense.

No matter how bad it gets, the choices available to the fire service do not include usurping the rights of communities’ citizens and elected officials to determine what kind of fire protection they want. Let’s recognize NFPA 1710 for what it is, a naked power grab, not a reasonable way to reach a rational consensus.

Mark Chubb
Christchurch, New Zealand

More on cargo tanks

This refers to “MC-306/406 Transport Tanker Incidents,” by Leigh T. Hollins (Haz Mat Points to Ponder, November 2000). I would like to clarify some misconceptions about cargo tanks.

Within the second paragraph, Hollins refers to changes in the federal regulations regarding “MC-306 to MC-406” cargo tanks that took place in 1990 and states, “The changes are not significant from the perspective of how first responders would handle an emergency involving a gasoline tanker.”

From a technical perspective, the new designation assigned to low-pressure cargo tanks manufactured after September 1995 begins with the designation “DOT” (i.e., DOT-407) and has no reference to MC codes. From the perspective of a responder, there are a number of advantages with the newer tanks that begin with better engineering standards, the age of the tank, and the operation of relief devices. For example, the DOT series of tanks do not permit the use of fusible or nonresealing relief devices. A fusible cap on an MC-300 series tank is also a pressure-relief device and poses significant danger to responders if the tank is permitted to exceed its design pressure, in which case a metal projectile approximately three inches wide and 1/4 inch thick would be hurled through the air at untold speeds.

In paragraph 3, “Proper Identity Critical,” Hollins discusses the importance of proper identification from a distance and identifies the MC-307/407 as a tanker that most often transports “liquid food products, most often milk.” He is correct when he stresses that proper identification is critical. However, many members of the emergency response community have embraced the notion that silhouettes will tell them the story. This is a misconception that could prove to be a harmful distraction to first responders. All gasoline tankers are not elliptical in shape and smooth-skinned. Other specification cargo tanks closely resemble low-pressure tanks when in fact they are high-pressure cargo tanks that may be hauling everything from propane to sulphur dioxide.

Hollins’ assumption that MC-307 and DOT-407 most often carry “milk” is not accurate. The MC-307 and DOT-407 are the “chemical workhorses of the industry” and are designed specifically for hazardous materials. While it is conceivable that a carrier may be using specification tanks to haul a food-grade product, I would question the reasoning and motive.

In paragraph 5 (photo 1), Hollins points out that the side ladder and insulation are indicators that this cargo tank is an MC-307. It should be noted that other cargo tanks including MC-312/DOT-412, food-grade trailers, and nonspecification tanks also have side ladders. Additionally, insulation on any of these units is an option for the carrier based on the commodity being transported.

The article goes on to indicate that the shipper and carrier did not properly placard this unit. While I accept the author’s opinion, I would encourage him to research the product (hydraulic fluid). It is not listed in the hazardous materials regulations under the “l17.101 Hazardous Materials Table” or in the Emergency Response Guidebook. The product’s classification would depend on its flash point and may not require placards or proper shipping papers.

The time for assuming the specification of a trailer based on its outer appearance has passed. In fact, there are only two ways to identify the specification of a trailer; one way is to communicate with the shipper, carrier, or owner. The other is to look at the trailer’s specification plate located on the front third of the trailer. After 1985, the plate can be found on the driver’s side near the landing gear. This is the most reliable way to identify the trailer and will provide the first responder with a wealth of information that will assist in successfully mitigating the incident.

Dave Wolfe
General Manager
Safe Transportation Training Specialists
Carmel, Indiana

Leigh Hollins responds: I appreciate Dave Wolfe’s comments. As the name of the department implies, these are points to ponder, which he correctly did. He is aware of some technical information of which I was not aware. I would like to say, however, that the article was not meant to be a technical feature concerning 306/406 and 307/407 tankers. It was intended as an overview of these types of trailers and of a few incidents that occurred in my area of the country.

With regard to the issue of whether first responders (an engine company) should, or would, significantly handle an emergency involving a 306 (older) tanker any differently than a 406 (newer) tanker, I stand by my position. The answer is, “No. They should not.” Our initial actions should be the same with either model.

As far as Wolfe’s concern about first responders’ (keep in mind that we are not talking about haz-mat teams here) using silhouettes as a means of tanker identification, this is a totally acceptable way to “initially” size up a scene. As a matter of fact, the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook (2000 ERG pages 18, 19) to which Wolfe refers, and every haz-mat class I have attended, accepts this method as a way to “initially” identify what you are dealing with.

My “assumption” that 307/407 tankers most often carry food products is a “regional” fact and not the case across the country.

Wolfe is correct in that the product’s listing depends on the fluid’s flash point. I contend that hydraulic oil is listed in the ERG as “Oil, n.o.s (not otherwise specified), placard #9277” or “Oil, petroleum, n.o.s., placard #1270” and should be marked as such on the transport tanker.

I know that firefighters assigned to first-response engines, for whom I wrote the article, need to size up a scene as quickly and as accurately as possible. As Wolfe suggests: If there is time to communicate with the shipper or if it is safe to approach the spec plate for an accurate identification of the tanker trailer, fine. In my experience as a firefighter and officer, that is not usually the case. Initial assessment from a distance may be all you have to work with. Therefore, it is important to know the various features and to be able to identify the type of tanker and the product as best you can from a distance, as described in the article.

Every skill adds to fireground survivability

I differ with Deputy Chief John J. Gelinas’ views on the headfirst ladder slide in Letters to the Editor in the January 2001 issue. I firmly disagree that training firefighters in this technique is, as he states, “to train them to injure, paralyze, or kill themselves.” I believe the opposite to be true. Those departments and academies that do not train their personnel in every possible means of self-rescue and firefighter survival are doing a disservice to their people.

Gelinas is correct that there are many variables to doing this maneuver safely; however, through aggressive training, we can provide our personnel with yet another option for getting out alive. Every skill we can deliver to firefighters adds to fireground survivability.

Having been an avid reader of Fire Engineering (FE) my entire career, I do not remember FE advocating that we replace basic firefighter training with “exotic procedures.” FE’s standard has always been to continually train and improve our ability to come home alive. When this includes new techniques, FE presents them as such. Gelinas’ accusation that this is sensationalism used to garner speaking engagements is a callous insult to many dedicated fire service educators. Such a statement is far beneath a man of Gelinas’ position.

Although he may be “disgusted” with FE, I applaud FE, the FDIC staff, and those involved with the Illinois Fire Service Institute, where I first learned this procedure. These people are continually working to improve our ability to survive in a changing hostile environment.

Aaron J. Heller
Training Officer
Hamilton Twp. (NJ) Fire District #9

This is in response to Deputy Chief John J. Gelinas’ Letter to the Editor addressing the headfirst ladder slide.

As a fire service instructor and an advocate of, and participant in, firefighter survival training, I was saddened by the comments and accusations presented by Gelinas. While he is certainly entitled to his opinions, his rationale and reasoning not only lack credibility but defy common sense.

Let’s start from square one.

Firefighter survival training is designed to prepare the firefighter for “sudden and unexpected” fireground situations. The ladder slide is one tool that may be implemented by the firefighter if it becomes necessary to suddenly extricate himself from an untenable situation. Note the emphasis. No one claims this is a routine operation. This evolution is designed to familiarize the firefighter with a type of extrication, which does occur. I think those who disagree read fire service periodicals and fail to look at the pictures. The photo shows the member is bailing out of the fully involved room headfirst onto a ladder. It’s a heck of a time to try the ladder slide for the first time, isn’t it?

Reality aside, let me specifically address some of Gelinas’ more pointed comments/ examples. Are firefighters today lacking in some of the basic firefighting skills necessary to adequately perform the job? Absolutely. But that issue is an entirely separate argument. Confusing the lack of adequate fire or live-burn training with the need for education in the skill of firefighter survival is misguided. Gelinas outlines various considerations that may or may not be present. Fire escapes, physical obstacles, and window types are certainly all considerations, just as street conditions, water supply, and fire severity/location are some of the factors that enter into tactical firefighting decisions.

This is where the training enters into play. Survival classes discuss and present many of the situations that concern Gelinas. Hands-on seminars provide the opportunity to experience the evolution under safe, controlled conditions, just like every other evolution presented in the fire service. As for the comments that the ladder slide is “sensational” and “advocates for the headfirst ladder slide will get speaking engagements” are concerned, as a fellow educator (and one, by the way, who has never had a speaking engagement), I am appalled that a training coordinator would make such a comment.

The bottom line is this: Firefighters not only deserve but should demand the very best training available. The basics are the foundation. Hands-on survival classes enhance the firefighter’s ability to manage difficult situations. Survival skills build on the basics. As educators, we should strive to prepare firefighters to deal with both the routine and the unexpected. It is our job to train those who will follow to deal with the inevitable life-threatening situations that will undoubtedly occur. It is our calling to provide the tools-all the tools. It is the responsibility of the firefighter to select which ones to use.

It is interesting that Gelinas concludes by voicing his “disgust” with Fire Engineering and taking the magazine to task for providing a “disservice to the firefighter on the street.” Does he also fail to instruct recruits in various other forms of survival tactics with which he disagrees? Is it really the magazine that is providing the disservice?

Richard J. Blatus
Battalion Chief
Fire Department of New York

Investigate first, then overhaul

Reference is made to “Overhauling for Successful Fire Investigation,” by Mark Wallace and Dr. John DeHaan (December 2000). The article contains some excellent information. With many years of experience as a firefighter, company officer, and command officer, I agree with the authors’ observations and suggestions.

We have worked hard here to train our fire companies and command officers to call investigators in as soon as possible and delay overhaul activities until the investigators have completed necessary photos and evidence gathering. It was difficult to get hard-charging fire crews to slow down and assist with customer service and investigations, but we have been very successful.

What has been even more difficult is to train our investigators to wear the proper level of personal protective clothing (SCBA) while doing preliminary investigative work prior to overhaul activities.

Dewey Ray
Deputy Chief
Special Operations and Training Division
Mesa (AZ) Fire Department

Hepatitis C study underway

I’m a co-principal investigator of one of the studies that the International Association of Fire Fighters referred to as an “uncontrolled/flawed education and screening program” in “Hepatitis C and the Fire Service, Part 1: Assessing the Risk” by Mary Jane Dittmar (December 2000).

Hep-C ALERT is conducting a university-sanctioned, institutional review board-approved research study. The results will be published when the study ends in March 2001. The value and credibility of our research should not be diminished because of contention about how the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) worded the report or analyzed the statistics.

I invite the IAFF’s key staff to visit our organization to review our methods and procedures and to observe our data collection and field services. I’m positive that a hands-on audit would allay their concerns about what we’ve reported both to the CDC and to the public-at-large.

Andi Thomas
Executive Director
Hep-C ALERT, Inc.
athomas@hep-c-alert.org

Skilled volunteer leaders needed

Steven A. Savia’s “Supervisory Techniques Are for Volunteers, Too” (Volunteers Corner, December 2000) is one of the best and most timely pieces of information [I’ve read] in a long time. We can only hope firefighters will stop and take heed before rushing off to read a tactics article. This county and many other counties are nearing the crisis stage with volunteer responses, or lack thereof.

A recent county survey found the greatest reason for dissatisfaction-read that “nonparticipation”-is poor management skills by those elected or appointed to leadership positions. The volunteer fire service will remain a viable force only if this is corrected.

Mike Waters
Onondaga County (NY) Fire Coordinator
Syracuse, New York

Seeks fire departments with annual budgets of under $15,000

I am in desperate need of finding ALL fire departments, nationwide, with an annual budget of under $15,000 for three reasons:

  1. to have a current database of departments that need help from Helping Our Own firefighters,
  2. to have facts in hand when I testify on H.R. 4736 in a congressional hearing, and
  3. to pass on evidence to a national television show that is toying with the idea of showing just how many poor rural departments there are.

Since the beginning of Helping Our Own, we have had three goals: to get help where it is needed, to raise nationwide awareness to the fact that there is a problem, and to draw firefighters closer together. For more information, contact me by e-mail at or by phone at (417) 679-2828.

Mark S. Warnick, Founder
Helping Our Own
Firefighters Helping Firefighters

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Delta explosion

Two Workers Killed, Another Injured in Explosion at Atlanta Delta Air Lines Facility

Two workers were killed and another seriously injured in an explosion Tuesday at a Delta Air Lines maintenance facility near the Atlanta airport.