Make rapid intervention work for you, not against you
Is your department trying to provide a rapid intervention team (RIT) with your first-alarm assignment companies? If so, ask yourself the following questions: In the days before RIT, how many companies were dispatched on structure fires? Did your department add a company on the assignment, or are you using the same number of companies as before?
If your department is like many other departments, the answer is, “No, we have not added staffing or companies. We are trying to add a RIT to our fireground inventory, but we have not added the appropriate number of firefighters to do it.” The result of this effort to make the fireground safe has made it more dangerous.
How is it dangerous? If you short-staff your alarm assignment, something is not getting done on the firegroundthe line is not getting into position soon enough, the search is not getting completed in a timely fashion, the backup line is being delayed, the water supply is not getting established, and ventilation is all but forgotten. Why? Because the company that used to do it is busy making the fireground safe by standing around in the RIT staging area. This is ludicrous. Could the flashover that trapped and killed the firefighters have been prevented if the truck company was doing its job venting instead of standing by as a RIT? The end result of these oversights will be firefighter and civilian casualties. At a minimum, more and more property will be lost.
Keep in mind one important thought: There is safety in numbers. If you want to have a RIT at fires, then make sure your department has added the company on the alarm assignment or increased the number of firefighters per company. If this is not possible, you really have to consider the automatic mutual-aid options. You cannot do this on a per-fire basis; you have to have an established written agreement that you can implement for every report of a building fire or whenever a first-alarm assignment is dispatched.
Fireground safety is paramount; there is no disputing that. But it has to be real safety, and it has to be effective. Deliberately short-staffing yourself is not real safety if something goes wrongand something will go wrong. Find a way to make the rapid intervention concept work for you, not against you.
Craig Ferris
Ann Arbor (MI) Fire Department
Initial on-scene report
I was disappointed that Nick Brunacini’s article, “The Importance of the Initial On-Scene Report” (July 2001), slipped by Fire Engineering’s advisory staff and was published, potentially influencing some young, impressionable fire officer.
His advice concerning the initial size-up report to the dispatcher on arrival should not include most of the information that he recommends. Although he correctly states that generally the first-arriving unit at the scene of a fire is the “engine,” it is not conceivable that the engine officer can also be the “incident commander.”
We must remember that even in small- to medium-size fire departments, the engine officer’s portable radio is on a fireground frequency and his transmissions are to the engine chauffeur and not the dispatcher. Because of this and the fact that the engine officer’s primary function is to stretch and properly place the initial handline, he cannot be the incident commander. If anyone is the incident commander during this preliminary stage, it is the engine chauffeur, who should have the capabilities of communicating with his officer as well as using the mobile radio to communicate with the dispatcher and incoming companies.
Furthermore, Brunacini should know that the preliminary report or initial size-up is almost always one sentence long, with the possible exception of an additional sentence regarding whether the occupants are still inside and trapped or have exited and are accounted for. It is crucial that this report is short, sweet, and to the point. Besides, even an experienced engine officer has such an important responsibility and so very little time that the more information that he may try to communicate, the more chances of inaccuracies in his messages.
It is totally unnecessary to give the size of the building on arrivalthe computer information usually indicates this fact, and the firefighters probably already know this information anyway. Also, it is much more vital that the officer state the floor on which the fire or smoke is showing.
To say you are “laying your own supply line” is already understood. If you don’t establish your own water supply, then it is the chauffeur’s responsibility to transmit the need for a second engine to establish this supply. The remaining two sentencesregarding the fact that you are taking an attack line to the fourth floor and that this is an offensive fireare irrelevant.
I know Fire Engineering is concerned with and dedicated to printing valuable, useful, and strategically helpful information so experienced and inexperienced readers can gain insight into the proper tactics a fire department should deploy at a fire scene. I am sure Brunacini did not intend to give misinformation, and that may even be the way that his department operatesalthough I hope not! I can say in all modesty that his information will only serve to confuse most newly elected or promoted officers and, if the information is followed, the officers will waste valuable time and make serious mistakes.
Jim Johnston
Chief
Wantagh (NY) Fire Department FDNY (Retired)
Nick Brunacini responds: The material in my article is based on 25 years of national command system evolution, using the system every day on every call. The comments in Jim Johnston’s letter are somewhat obsolete.
The goals of firefighting operations are to complete the tactical priorities (rescue, fire control, and property conservation) and to provide for firefighter safety. Many fire departments have found that the quickest, most effective, and safest way to accomplish these objectives is through the regular and standard use of an incident command system.
The elements described in Johnston’s letter reflect a 1940s-era management model, which predates the invention of any incident command system and does not meet any current benchmarks (NFPA 1561, FGC, FIRESCOPE, NATIONAL FIRE SERVICE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONSORTIUM, NIMS, OSHA, etc.) for incident management.
A common factor that is present in almost every NIOSH firefighter fatality report is the absence of or use of an effective incident command system. Poorly managed incidents will never be as safe as their well-managed counterparts.
The ultimate test for any system is if the incident commander (IC) can control the position and function of all assigned personnel and resources. The only way to do this is to have an IC in place from the onset of incident operations along with a system that describes how units get assigned when they arrive at the incident. This is accomplished when the first person/unit shows up at the incident scene and assumes command as part of the initial radio report. A good initial report takes only 15 to 20 seconds to verbalize, but it sets up the next critical five minutes of incident operations and puts the IC in a position where he can develop a plan and actually manage putting that plan in place.
Removing HUD windows
Daniel M. Troxell’s article “Tricks of the Trade: Removing HUD Window Covers” (July 2001) is one of the best in terms of practical information on ventilation. He presents practical choices to a fireground challengesealed structuresthat communities of all sizes face. This article combines operational options with firefighter safety, which will help firefighters across the nation.
Bill Shouldis
Deputy Chief
Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department
