Field training officers
Most firefighters and officers fully understand the need for more and improved training. Numerous times in my 20-year career, I’ve witnessed the same scenario: Here comes a probie, fresh out of the academy with 500-plus hours of fire school, who thinks he knows everything about the fire service. Sure, some departments have a death camp, or three weeks of their SOP training, but after that probies are handed new bunker gear and put on a shift. The fire service needs to use its “salty” firefighters to ensure a probie’s safe transition to firefighter.
Most chiefs and city commissioners think that just because a firefighter has a certificate he is “good to go.” I don’t think so. Although most departments have some type of informal procedure in place, the procedure must be standardized before any more firefighters get hurt.
One idea is to create a new position at the nonline officer level: the field training officer, or FTO. The FTO acts as a mentor and can report to the company officer. Depending on department size, the number of FTOs can vary. For six months (or longer, if necessary), the FTO will accompany the probie on all fire calls to ensure safety. To identify the probies and FTOs at an incident, you can give the probies an orange helmet or shield and the FTO a white stripe or helmet shield. The hard part is getting funding for the program, but you must impress on the city officials that safety is a necessary cost of our profession.
After covering the cost of this extra shift, you still need to reward the FTO for extra work. If extra pay is not feasible, you can reward with pick of shift, pick of station, pick of days off, no kitchen duty, and so on.
Establishing the FTO position would help ensure firefighter safety and create a standard for the fire service.
Mark E. Conn
Captain
Lauderdale by the Sea (FL) Fire Department
Twenty and out
For the second time in my short 10-year year stint on a paid fire department, I heard a veteran captain say, “Hell, I’ve got 20 years in; I’m not going in any fires first” or “I’ve got my 20—I don’t take the nozzle anymore.” My reaction is one of disgust. Do these “leaders” truly think that their positions are supervisory alone? Then who is taking charge of an attack crew at an incident? And how are firefighters being trained at fire calls—from outside a window or over the radio?
I have read job descriptions, and the one for a line captain includes “leading the way.” “Doers,” not “pointers,” have traditionally held the line captain position. If we are going to embrace the idea of captains not taking the lead at fire calls, we will be opening Pandora’s box. Rather than directing from the sidelines, these captains should adhere to “20 and out.”
John (Jack) Van Etten
Driver/Operator
Michigan City (IN) Fire Department
Safety first?
As a 14-year veteran of the fire and EMS service, I couldn’t help but notice the safety issue on the July 2002 cover. The cover photo shows Sacramento City (CA) firefighters fighting a four-alarm fire in an apartment complex. It is obvious that the fire is well-involved and that this fire, as well as a simple trash fire, would necessitate the use of full turnout gear. The first three firefighters are advancing the initial attack line up the steps as two other firefighters prepare to back them up. The three on the initial attack line are wearing full upper body protection, but where are the bunker pants and boots? The personnel appear to be wearing regular stationwear pants and station shoes. The backups have on full turnout gear but appear to be wearing extrication or wildland firefighting pants. It is very noticeable on the firefighter bending over that the bottom of his left pant is blowing in the wind.
While I do not know the “standard” for interior firefighting in Sacramento City, I have concluded that the firefighters are not properly protected, are putting themselves in danger, and are setting an example of what not to wear while fighting a residential fire. How can this be acceptable to any chief, officer, or workers’ compensation carrier?
Tom M. Dunlap
Firefighter/Paramedic
Mahanoy City (PA) Fire Department
Leaders of tomorrow
I just finished rereading “Chief Officers: Learn to Lead, Not Just Manage” by Chase Sargent (July 2002). I was amazed at his ability to assess and analyze the leadership traits and skills of successful leaders, managers, and organizations. As the president of the Virginia Beach Professional Firefighters and a member of the Virginia Beach (VA) Fire Department, I am proud to have someone with his ability and skill in the department and our local association. If every fire chief and deputy chief would read and heed Sargent’s advice, the fire service leadership would benefit and move out of the dark ages into the 21st century. Until that time, we’ll all be left with the failing leaders who are poor managers, resulting in organizational failure. Read and heed, fire chiefs: The leaders of tomorrow are in your fire department today!
William P. Bailey, Sr.
President
VBPFF L-2924
Virginia Beach, Virginia
Weak staffing
“Weak Training + Weak Staffing = Disaster in Waiting: An Interview with William Goldfeder, battalion chief, Loveland-Symmes (OH) Fire Department” (Burning Is-sues, July 2002) restated many of the issues that have been discussed and disputed concerning staffing levels and the application of staffing and deployment standards in the fire service. I did not see anything new in the article. The position stated by Goldfeder is essentially the argument in favor of NFPA 1710. It is based on some assumptions that I would characterize as uninformed at the least.
Briefly, Goldfeder concludes that every community must establish aggressive interior firefighting as the minimum acceptable standard of fire protection, that to do that work a simple calculation is needed to determine the number of personnel and the equipment needed to operate effectively and safely, and that if a community can’t provide the re-quired staffing and equipment, it can be obtained through automatic aid from adjacent jurisdictions. The other side of the dispute over staffing and deployment standards, and NFPA 1710 in particular, recognizes that none of these assumptions are universally true; and, as a result, the staffing and deployment decisions are most appropriately made at the local level, by those who must pay for the costs involved and live with the resulting service level.
Whenever a minimum standard is promulgated, it is understood to apply in all circumstances everywhere. When we are talking about how to install a safe gasoline storage tank, that standard works because the necessary features will be the same in New York City and in a tiny village in rural Maine. When we are talking about staffing and deployment for fire protection, a minimum standard does not work because the necessary features must correspond to the needs, expectations, and circumstances of the individual community.
As a simple example, a rural village may not have any neighboring communities close enough to arrive as part of the first-alarm assignment and may not be able to afford to hire the staff to ensure a first-alarm assignment within its own resources. It may have a strong fire code, required fire alarms and fire suppression systems, and very few fires. Its primary problem, the one that means the most lives at risk, may be medical emergencies and accidents. If it elected to staff one fire engine for exposure protection and medical services, it may meet its needs for more than 90 percent of the community’s emergencies. It will probably lose some structures to fire over the years—and perhaps some lives, if the alarms don’t get everyone out in time. If that is all the village can do, it still has a fire department; and the fire department should be respected for providing the services the community needs to the best of its abilities with the resources available.
A slightly larger community may be able to staff engines to provide initial interior attack on a small room-and-contents fire, but if the fire is larger or the members can’t extinguish it quickly, they need to back out and drown it from outside.
A still larger community may be able to provide a first-alarm assignment for residential fires but be unable to provide an adequate response to commercial or industrial buildings. In this case, the community can either restrict building size and height to within reasonable capabilities or require larger or more hazardous structures to es-sentially protect themselves with fire suppression equipment and systems.
Some communities may be able to mobilize the staffing necessary for any potential fire in their jurisdiction within their own resources. I have never seen that situation and suspect it does not exist. Everyone else makes some political, financial, and rational judgments about the fire suppression resources that are reasonable for their community; and they should be well aware that a fire risk still exists that is beyond the capabilities of those resources. When those fires happen, buildings and lives are lost. It is the job of fire officers to recognize those situations (their most important job, certainly) and get fire suppression personnel into defensive positions in time to save their lives.
Firefighters don’t die because not enough of them arrived at the emergency. They die because officers attempt to fight fires with insufficient resources available or to attack a fire, with any number of personnel, when it is unjustified. If not enough personnel arrive in time for a safe and effective direct attack, the job of the fire officer is to protect exposures and his personnel. It is not to charge in anyway, hope for the best, and blame politicians for insufficient resources when bad things happen.
NFPA 1710 is like the ISO in this respect: It is a tool to help identify what service improvements may be needed. Neither should be taken as the final word in how to manage the organization.
Dwight B. Van Zanen
Chief
Vista (CA) Fire Department
World Trade Center coverage: in-depth
The September and October 2002 issues of Fire Engineering were very well compiled and written. Fire Engineering historically has been the premier publication for educating and enlightening the fire service. It is a technical, very in-depth publication. No bells and whistles here—not just colorful photos and words on paper. Fire Engineering has always taken a significant event or issue, researched it, and reported it to the readership. The two-part September 11 editions were the most comprehensive report to date. From every possible angle, it took a year to retrieve the details, and Fire Engineering developed a wonderful report—an historical document, a tribute, better than the hardbound books that popped up over the past 12 months. A “good job” goes to the Fire Engineering staff and writers.
Martin C. Grube
Assistant Fire Marshal
Virginia Beach (VA) Fire Department
Cold storage lessons
I read the article “Cold Storage Warehouse Fire: Learning from Worcester” by Timothy J. Kearney (July 2002). The information is very interesting to me. I’m a German firefighter and the Web master for the site www.atemschutzunfaelle.de, which lists accidents involving firefighters around the world, including the Worcester tragedy with the loss of six firefighters. The article contains very good information about the fire. All firefighters from around the world can learn from this bad accident!
Björn Lüssenheide
