Lessons Learned at a Virginia Apartment Building Fire

Anatomy of a Virginia Apartment Fire with Rescues and a Mayday

FIRE FOCUS ❘ By MICHAEL J. BARAKEY

On April 13, 2022, Suffolk (VA) Fire & Rescue (SFR) was presented with a fast-moving fire in an occupied residential apartment building that challenged firefighters.

• Tactical Supervision for Known Rescues
• Civilian Rescue: The Reason We Exist
• Search Mission Prep: Size-Up, Methods, and Tools

At 1:22 p.m., SFR’s Battalion 1; Engines 1, 2, 3, and 4; Ladders 3 and 6; Rescue 1; EMS 1; Safety 1; and Medic 1 were dispatched for a reported apartment on fire with children trapped at 509 Smith Street. Battalion 1, with a battalion aide, arrived at 1:27 p.m., reported smoke and flames showing from the C side of the structure, and declared a “working fire” (photo 1). Battalion 1’s aide set up the command post on the A side of the building and Battalion 1 met two Suffolk Police Department (SPD) officers at the front of the building who were searching for two missing children reported to be trapped inside the building.

Preplanning and the Building’s History

The two-story apartment building was built in 1950 with four apartments (two on the bottom floor and two on the second floor) totaling 6,084 square feet. The exterior walls are concrete block with a hip roof covered by tin. The main access to the four apartments was on the front of the building—the A side—with a common entry foyer for two apartments on the first floor and the two apartments on the second floor, accessible through a common stairwell that ascended from the common foyer. On the rear of the structure—the C side—all the apartments had entry/exit points with a wood porch and stairs for the apartments on the second floor (photo 2).

Operations

Initial search for the missing children. Immediately following Battalion 1’s size-up, Battalion 1’s aide set up the command post on the A side of the structure. Battalion 1, who arrived prior to an engine, ladder, or rescue, met the two SPD officers who were calling out for the missing children from the exterior of the structure. With bystanders and SPD officers reporting children were definitely trapped on the second floor, Battalion 1 requested two additional advanced life support (ALS) ambulances (medics) to respond.

With fire suppression apparatus not yet on the scene, Battalion 1 and the two SPD officers entered the common front door and into the foyer to execute a search for the children. Battalion 1 and the officers, wearing no personal protective equipment, located a three-year-old child standing midway up the stairs, with heavy smoke conditions in the stairwell. Battalion 1 handed the child to one of the officers, who took the child to Medic 1 for treatment and transportation. The other child, a nine-year-old who was reported trapped, had already exited the upstairs apartment and was also treated and transported by Medic 1.

From the time of Battalion 1’s arrival until the children were out of the common stairwell, 1 minute, 48 seconds had elapsed. With the two children out of the building and suppression units arriving, Battalion 1 repositioned at the command post and assigned Ladder 3 and Rescue 1 to conduct a primary search of the second floor. Rescue 1 [based on personal accountability report (PAR) 4] and Ladder 3 (based on PAR 2) entered the A side of the building to perform a primary search of the second floor.

VEIS/Mayday. As Rescue 1 and Ladder 3 were initiating a search by entering the A side, Engine 2’s crew initiated vent-enter-isolate-search (VEIS) directly into the second-floor B-side apartment by ground ladder (photo 3). The officer chose to access a second-floor window midway down the apartment.

Heavy fire was venting from the first-floor B/C-side room, and Engine 1 was assigned fire attack as VEIS was being performed. Knowing multiple crews were entering the building with a well-advanced fire and the charged smoke conditions on the second floor, command requested a second alarm, and Ladder 3’s operator threw multiple ground ladders around the building for a secondary means of egress. Soon after entering the window, Engine 2’s crew met Engine 1’s crew, who was attacking the fire with a 1¾-inch handline. The heat and smoke conditions then changed dramatically.

Soon thereafter, Engine 1’s officer called a Mayday and reported they were on the second floor, unable to find their way out of the structure. Command acknowledged the Mayday and immediately requested a third alarm. Rescue 1’s crew, searching on the second floor, was directed to locate and remove Engine 1’s crew from the building. Rescue 1 then located Engine 1’s and 2’s crews and directed both out of the building. With the Mayday, command ordered all interior crews from the building and initiated a PAR check of all crews on the fireground, including those involved in the Mayday. On completion of the PAR check, all crews were accounted for. Once that Mayday was cleared and all fireground crews accounted for, operations resumed.

Operations after the Mayday. Conditions were not improving, and the fire had traveled to the attic and was progressing on the first and second floors. Command expanded the incident command system (ICS) by assigning a Division C. Ladder 6’s crew was assigned to perform vertical ventilation of the roof; this was accomplished by the aerial ladder tip of Ladder 3 (photo 4). Because of significantly changing smoke and fire conditions, command removed crews from the building as vertical ventilation was occurring. Additional PAR checks were completed, and all personnel were accounted for when the transition to a defensive operation occurred.

As the fire progressed, crews used multiple 1¾-inch handlines, a 2½-inch handline, and the master stream (with a prepiped tip) from Ladder 3 to attack the fire. Once the fire was knocked down, interior operations were reinitiated (photo 5). First-, second-, and third-alarm companies were rotated until fire extinguishment and overhaul were complete. Rehab, managed by Medic 6 and EMS 1, began reporting that some crew members were not able to return to work and would need to remain in rehab. The SFR fire marshal’s office, with the assistance of fire investigators from the Chesapeake (VA) and Newport News (VA) Fire Departments’ fire marshal offices, investigated the cause and origin of the fire.

Two civilians were treated and transported to the Children’s Hospital with injuries sustained from the fire. The three-year-old child had significant injuries and the nine-year-old had minor injuries. Two firefighters were transported to the hospital with heat-related injuries.

Lessons Learned

Following are the lessons learned resulting from this response:

• When a Mayday occurs, it is most often that crews already committed in the interior of the building will locate the crews who initiated the Mayday. For this incident, the Mayday occurred five minutes, 10 seconds from the arrival of Engine 1. The total time from when the Mayday was called until “all clear” was three minutes, 37 seconds. Engine 1 called a Mayday and reported they were on the second floor and could not find their way out; command asked if they could find their hoseline. Engine 1 replied that they could not. Engine 2 was low on air and in distress and came across Engine 1. Engine 2 could have called a Mayday as well, as they were in the same circumstances as Engine 1. Command acknowledged and directed Rescue 1 to locate the crew. Rescue 1 was able to locate both crews and lead them safely to the exterior of the building.
• Proper aerial apparatus and aerial ladder placement and reevaluation during rooftop operations and defensive operations are necessary. Ladder 3’s fly section sustained thermal burns to the tip of the aerial device to include electrical wiring, scene lights, nozzle controls, and the nozzle. The truck was removed from service after the fire and is still out of service for repairs. Always be aware, from the turntable, of the location of the tip with regard to the thermal column and heat from the ventilation hole (photo 6).

• Call for additional alarms early. Because of the size of the apartment building, the size of the fire, and the reports of children trapped, Battalion 1 requested second and third alarms. Fire in large apartment buildings requires many crews and apparatus. For this fire, 58 firefighters, officers, and paramedics from eight engine companies, three ladder companies, one heavy rescue company, four ALS medic units, rehab resources, 10 staff/command officers, and four fire investigators were required to control the incident and care for the injured.
• Learn the buildings in your district/area prior to the fire. Successful firefighting operations occur through preplanning and preparation by understanding and training on the actual buildings in a department’s response area or community. Although buildings are constructed using similar techniques and classified by common building types, the effects of fire on each building depend on the individual building’s structural integrity, the fuel load contained within, and the voids that exist because of construction and settling. Firefighters are expected to understand the anatomy of buildings while being able to predict fire travel based on not only commonalities of building type but also a prefire inspection of the unique features and circumstances each building presents—e.g., fire escape locations and so on.
• Battalion aides are responsible for accountability on the fireground. If a battalion aide is not available or part of the staffing in a department, assign an accountability officer early on in an incident. For this fire, 52 firefighters were operating on scene, and it is a difficult task for a command officer to be aware of the location and PARs of all fireground companies. When the Mayday occurred, the location of all companies cannot be left to question. The Mayday and VEIS occurred simultaneously, and accountability was paramount.
• Be prepared to enter the building and perform a search even if you are not on a suppression apparatus. All fire departments have supervisors who respond to building fires—e.g., battalion chiefs, command-level chiefs, emergency medical services supervisors, and safety officers. Train to act and perform as a single resource when on scene prior to suppression crews. What will a command officer or staff officer do to safely execute a rescue when presented with the same situation as Battalion 1 did at this incident?
• Expand the ICS. With a multiple-alarm fire and multiple rescues, the span of control for the incident commander (IC) quickly becomes overwhelming. Early in the incident, the IC should assign command and general staff incident command positions to allow the additional responding resources to be assigned to the correct division, group, or section chief.
• Deploy resources based on the target hazard. Through critical task analyses, deploy the effective fire force that meets the critical tasks that have to occur for unique or special hazard buildings. In this case, a 6,084-square-foot, nonprotected apartment building should receive more of an initial response than a standard commercial building fire. Through critical task analyses, tailor the initial response to specific address points so that all critical tasks can be performed by the initial responding alarm.

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MICHAEL J. BARAKEY, CFO, is a 30-year fire service veteran and the chief of Suffolk (VA) Fire & Rescue. He is also a hazmat specialist; an instructor III; a nationally registered paramedic; and a neonatal/pediatric critical care paramedic for the Children’s Hospital of the King’s Daughters in Norfolk, Virginia. Barakey is the participating agency representative and former task force leader for the VA-TF2 urban search and rescue team and an exercise design/controller for Spec Rescue International. He has a master’s degree in public administration from Old Dominion University and graduated from the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program in 2009. Barakey authored Critical Decision Making: Point-To-Point Leadership in Fire and Emergency Services (Fire Engineering), regularly contributes to Fire Engineering, and is an FDIC International preconference and classroom instructor.