BY ROBERT GOPLIN
It’s a fact we all know: While the number of fires continues to decrease, the number of firefighter line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) remains consistent. The number of fires may be going down, but the level of risk associated with an interior attack has never been higher. Our personal protective equipment (PPE), if worn properly, is getting better all the time. We go in faster and farther as a result. While not all firefighter LODDs are the results of interior fire attacks, too many are. How do we address this phenomenon?
Since the early 1970s, the fire service has been successful in drastically reducing the number of fires through aggressive fire prevention activities. The fire service understood that educating people, especially children, about fires was a way to move our society toward prevention instead of reaction. We sell the idea that if people can prevent fires themselves, they will never suffer the repercussions of a fire in their home or workplace.
Why do we not buy into this idea ourselves? We have all been on a fireground and witnessed the rapid intervention team (RIT) “doing its job.” Most often, this consists of several people gathered together watching the fire. Don’t get me wrong; they are prepared to go in; in fact, they are usually creating derogatory names for the incident commander (IC) who assigned them to a job that keeps them out of the building. But take a closer look at the fireground they are watching.
Has the structure been made “firefighter friendly”? Are secondary means of egress established? Are the exit paths readily identifiable to those inside? Is anyone watching a side other than side A? Is the structure waiting to disorient firefighters or trap them inside? If the answer to the first four questions is no, then the answer to the last question is yes. If you have answered yes to the last question, it’s because you have failed to prevent this from occurring.
To stop losing firefighters because they become disoriented or trapped in a structure, we need to change our culture. We need to start practicing “rapid preintervention.” Instead of allowing firefighters to become lost or trapped, we need to prevent this from occurring. Look at several of the LODD incidents around the country over the past 10 years, and you will see that many of them may have been avoided if we had prevented those inside from becoming lost or trapped. How do we do this? With the RIT.
PROACTION, NOT REACTION
In the past, we have practiced and drilled at being reactionary. When the Mayday was called, we sent the RIT into action. If we are going to save firefighters, we must be proactive. Why have a group of people with thousands of hours of training, decades of experience, and untold amounts of equipment simply gather their equipment and stand around? I don’t know of any departments, including large city departments, that have enough staff on hand to allow several firefighters to do nothing.
Use your RIT to prevent something terrible from happening. Assign the RIT to make the building safe. Have the RIT officer and one other member do a 360° survey of the structure. If doors are locked, they should force them. Two other members can address emergency egress from the upper floors. Throw ladders to windows on each side of the building, and then clear the window so a firefighter could escape. Don’t stop at the glass; take out the window sash to facilitate escaping while wearing an SCBA. While the officer and a firefighter confer with the IC to make a contingency plan in case the worst does happen, have the remaining two firefighters ensure that the exit paths are well lighted. This will direct a firefighter inside who may be trying to get out toward an exit. This lighting may simply be a halogen light from a rig; it might be an amber-colored blinking LED quickly secured to the frame of a door near the floor. It doesn’t matter as long as the people inside recognize it as an exit.
When these tasks are completed, don’t have the members all stand in one place. Use them! With the officer remaining nearest the IC, send one person to each corner of the building and have them keep an eye on conditions and safety concerns and report back when they need to. This is the same as doing a constant 360° survey. Obviously, these personnel should not get involved in any other fireground duties; this will take discipline. As for accountability, the officer should be able to see two of the three personnel at the corners, and those two should each be able to see the fourth. Visual contact and radio communications, when necessary, should allow for easy accountability.
This approach to RIT isn’t going to work in every situation, but it should be applicable to most single-family residences and many smaller commercial structures. Allowing your RIT to accomplish these tasks isn’t freelancing; it’s their assignment. If your theory on rapid intervention is that you have to keep the RIT personnel fresh so they will have the strength to go in and rescue someone, think again. Wouldn’t it stand to reason that it would take much less strength to prevent the need for a RIT deployment than it would to have to do the rescue?
The study the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department conducted after the tragic loss of Bret Tarver concluded that it would take a minimum of 12 firefighters to rescue one victim.1 Most RITs consist of four people; I have also heard of RITs with two or three members. Although these teams have accomplished some good rescues, it makes sense to use this limited number of personnel to accomplish tasks that will prevent the need for the RIT in the first place.
At a minimum, these tasks should be accomplished to allow the RIT to escape the building if necessary. Most situations involving RIT deployment are extremely dangerous. The RIT may need those ladders, forced doors, or lighted exit paths to rescue the person they went after, or to rescue themselves.
RITs have saved the lives of firefighters, and they are a necessary part of every fireground. “Rapid Preintervention” will also save the lives of firefighters and may eliminate the need for RIT deployment, further reducing the risk to our personnel. Prevention has worked to reduce the number of fires; let’s use it to decrease the number of LODDs from firefighters’ becoming lost or trapped.
Endnote
1. “Rapid Intervention Isn’t Rapid,” Steve Kreis, Fire Engineering, December 2003.
ROBERT GOPLIN is the assistant chief of operations and training for the Green Bay (WI) Fire Department and director of the Brown County Hazardous Materials Response Team. He has an A.A.S degree in fire science from Madison Area Technical College, is pursuing a B.S. degree in fire and emergency response management from the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, and is enrolled in the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program. He teaches firefighter and hazardous materials training through Northeast Wisconsin and Lakeshore Technical Colleges.
