Lake Worth fire protest
Eric Vinson
Chief
Commerce (TX) Fire Department
After reading Francis L. Brannigan`s article (“The Lake Worth Tragedy,” The Ol` Professor, July 1999), I was angered beyond words.
Brannigan says that he obtained his information from news reports. How dare he attack a man and his department based on news reports? In this instance, he compromised both his journalistic professionalism and the trust of the Texas fire service.
I have read his articles for the past 25 years and agreed in principle with the majority of his positions. Yet, he has crossed the line in this instance.
I was honored to attend the funeral for my brothers, not because they died but because of what they stood for while they lived. Yet, the service left me empty, knowing that after all the respect that had been shown, experts, specialists, and even the self-proclaimed “Gods of Fire” would enter the arena and castigate those who, when the decision had to be made, did so to the best of their training. I do not know of one fire chief who intentionally wishes that his personnel be harmed. However, Brannigan implies that this is not only what did happen but that it will happen again.
How can one critique an incident without knowing the facts? Brannigan implies that inadequate training was a factor. Does he know anything about the training those men received? We attempt to provide training that is realistic yet as safe as possible. And yes, we equip our personnel in “protective armor.” We do so with the hope they will be protected from harm. He of all people should be aware that all departments are not equally equipped.
Francis L. Brannigan responds: Allow me to express my sincere condolences to Chief Vinson and all the family members and friends who lost loved ones. In retrospect, as I have learned more of the hazards of buildings, I realized that it was only luck that kept me from disasters in my time as fireground commander.
I can understand Chief Vinson`s attitude. Attempts to draw lessons from tragedies often upset those closely involved. But the incident commander was quoted in the paper to the effect that he had consulted with other chiefs and had determined that his actions were correct and he would do the same thing again. This quote was never denied. There was no mention in any of the extensive coverage about any preplan for this building.
I applaud the Granbury (TX) Fire Department for its pioneering use of a thermal imaging camera to detect fire overhead, thus preventing a disaster.
I am well aware of the equipment problems of many departments, but I also remember when the full turnouts and SCBA all the firefighters were wearing at the fatal fire were thought to be “too expensive” for small departments.
I can cite a sad result from failure to draw lessons from a tragedy. In 1938, I was at a stable fire when, 112 hours into the fire, a very experienced buff, noting a huge increase in the smoke volume, said, “This is going to blow.” In a minute, a violent backdraft explosion occurred, bringing down the two-story side wall, killing a lieutenant. The board of inquiry (which had not been at the fire) decided out of hand that there was no explosion but that a wall simply fell, the ordinary sort of thing that kills a firefighter.
Since it had been decided that there was no explosion, there was no inquiry into why the explosion had occurred so long into the fire when the building had been ventilated according to the then-standard teaching. This was typical of the reaction of all fire departments at that time. Some have moved beyond that point and are willing to admit to problems that have caused disasters–some have not.
The stable disaster was caused by CO that had accumulated in a cockloft that was not ventilated by the standard practice of removing the skylights. In 1947, at a multialarm fire in an old icehouse, a similar cockloft explosion occurred. It blew down the back wall, killing 37 onlookers on the fire escape of a nearby tenement. Possibly that disaster would have been prevented if the stable fire explosion had not been “swept under the rug.”
In 1948, I wrote a preplan for a truss roof warehouse. A fire officer of my time, I recognized no hazard in the trusses. But in 1966 when I started to study building construction to teach it at Montgomery College, I learned about trusses and the significance of connections in the building`s effort to beat the law of gravity. In the first edition of Building Construction for the Fire Service, I wrote “beware the truss.” It is a simple fact that the collapse time of a truss is totally unpredictable. Firefighters on or under burning truss structures are playing Russian roulette. There is no “good experience,” only “good luck.”
It is a fact that few firefighters lose their lives saving or attempting to save lives. Vincent Dunn, recently retired deputy chief of the Fire Department of New York, says simply, “No building is worth a firefighter`s life.” He speaks from 40 years of experience on the front lines.
I do hope that Chief Vinson and those he speaks for have identified the truss hazards and other death traps in their area and have instructed their firefighters accordingly. I hope they will press for the marvelous device that will let the firefighters “undress” the building and see the hidden death traps. I have heard that some fire departments in the area are procuring thermal imagers.
My first splendid funeral in 1932 was for six firefighters who died in the basement of an opulent hotel that had an unsprinklered paint room. Elaborate funerals and an annual memorial service at the National Fire Academy are simply not enough. We must learn from tragedies so that those who died will not have died in vain. This is my self-appointed mission for the benefit of those who will listen. I get no pleasure from describing disasters–I do take pleasure in letters that say, “You saved my life.”
