By John B. Tippett Jr.
The chaos that accompanies the fireground has a very distinct and relatively predictable timeline when events are analyzed. That timeline begins when the fire is discovered and reported and ends after the fire department arrives, goes into action and gets the fire under control or the building burns to the ground. To the untrained eye, the fire department response portion can appear to be a wild, uncoordinated flurry of blurred images flailing about without organization. In reality, there may be truth to those observations when the arriving crews are poorly organized, believe that they alone hold the key to extinguishment (aka, “freelancing”), lack a coordinated action plan, and do not have a strong, disciplined command structure. Those wild and uncoordinated scenes are neither desirable nor conducive to favorable outcomes. In the worst-case scenario, the property owner loses his most prized possessions, the fire department is deemed inept, and avoidable injuries and deaths are incurred. Simply put, there is no organization on the fireground without strong command and control. Fire service history is full of examples where the failure to establish command in a standard manner or to ensure a stable command system operating from a fixed position is in place has led to fireground tragedy.
There are hundreds of moving parts that feed into the fire control machine. The focus of this article is the command and control gears that make or break the machine’s efficiency from the perspective of the system employed by the Charleston (SC) Fire Department (CFD). This system, known as “command from the car,” has given the department a sound, standardized, proven, transferrable method of incident management that provides incident commanders (ICs) with a platform to organize and orchestrate the fire department response to structural fires and other incidents. In a nutshell, command from the car fuels the engine that
· rapidly puts activities in motion that place the fire under control,
· stops loss, and
· protects the lives of exposed civilians and firefighters.
The CFD is comprised of approximately 330 officers and firefighters. It staffs 15 stations that house16 engine companies, four truck companies, four battalion chiefs, a cross-staffed full service hazardous materials response team, a regional technical rescue team that is part of South Carolina’s urban search and rescue system, and a marine division comprised of two land-based engine companies that alternate cross-staffing a fire boat and a group of land-based firefighters trained in marine firefighting.
Tragedy
On June 18, 2007, the CFD experienced a significant tragedy that rippled through the American fire service. Nine firefighters were killed in a flashover and collapse at the Sofa Super Store. In the aftermath of the fire, Mayor Joseph P. Riley commissioned an external panel of well-known and respected fire service veterans to examine the fire and the department. The panel, led by noted fire service professional J. Gordon Routley, was charged with reporting back to the mayor with recommendations for preventing a reoccurrence. The mayor and the department adopted in total the panel’s recommendations, which formed the framework that put the CFD on a path of recovery and progression that is unparalleled in the American Fire Service.
Command and Control: Command from the Car
The panel examined command and control and determined that the incident command system in place at the time of the fire “…did not establish a fixed command post…” and identified a number of other shortcomings that included accountability and communication issues.
In response to the findings, CFD decided Command from the Car would be its command and control platform since CFD Chief Thomas W. Carr Jr. had success with the system in Montgomery County, Maryland. This model was adopted from the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department after studying and practicing a variety of other command styles that included command from the front door, command from the front yard, and command from the back of the buggy. Each of these systems had shortcomings that were not found with command from the car. Command from the Car wasn’t perfect, but it provided the best application of standard practices that all command officers and command teams could readily adapt to with adequate training and reinforcement.
The training process for implementing Command from the Car required patience, perseverance constant reinforcement, and course corrections during its earliest phases. Many of the chief officers in the CFD had grown up in a command system the Routley Report (2008) described as “…organizationally unprepared…to conduct an operation in a large commercial occupancy.” Although there were (and are) many exceptional command officers in the department, what was lacking was an organized, standardized, systematic approach to managing incidents all commanders would employ on every incident.
The initial approach employed a four-tier plan:
· “Try it; you’ll like it.” This worked well with some commanders but not with others.
· Weekly “in context” scenarios using computer simulation software (Digital Combustion’s Fire Studios).
· A senior advisor responding to all full responses. This step was taken to support ICs as they became more knowledgeable in the system and to ensure it was being used properly.
· Formation of a committee made up of a battalion chief from each shift to create user-friendly documents for the command functions and for the vehicle commanders to use as their platform for Command from the Car.
As the program became the “new norm” for ICs and firefighters alike, the weekly training sessions were phased out and reinforcement/competency checks became more focused on incident scene performance critiques. Concepts discussed during the drills (standard language, command presence, risk assessment, benchmarks, personnel accountability reports, strategies, and decision making) became the critique format after each incident. These discussions were conducted in as informal a setting as possible to reinforce the best practices employed by the battalion chief and provide constructive criticism. As a last resort, disciplinary action was pursued when it was determined that a sufficient amount of time had passed and concepts should have been mastered were not being used. This last step was not used frequently, but with enough effect to get even the most recalcitrant member on track with the rest of the department.
The operational shift produced four significant improvements to incident operations for the CFD.
· Operational Environment. Commanding from inside the vehicle provides an area where the incident commander and other members of the command team are shielded from distracting stimuli and make decisions. In short, we found that removing commanders from the thick of the tornado that defines a roiling fireground promotes calmer, better decision making incident commanders.
· Radio Transmission Efficiency. Few radio transmissions are missed due to the reduction in background noise and interruptions that had been experienced with command from the front yard and from the back of the vehicle. This resulted in improved communications on the fireground.
· Command and Control. The quieter environment and better communication flow assisted ICs with keeping incident objectives clear, strategy and tactics understood and action plans on target. The interior of the BC designed platform provided a work place where tactical worksheets could be used comfortably and passport accountability was easier to maintain.
· Command Confidence. Commanding from the car gave CFD ICs confidence that while incident management is a stressful activity, it can be conducted in a standard method that results in standard outcomes. They developed greater confidence in their abilities through the command team concept as well as standardized documents and practices.
No change is without its lessons learned. From the after action perspective, there were things that went well, and other things that could have gone better.
· Work Ethic. Among the most significant lessons was the benefit of adopting a “patience and perseverance” posture. Laying out expectations, making clear the direction the department was heading, and staying on course were essential to having the concept become the norm.
· Play Well With Others. We spent an extended period of time refining our approach to mastering Command from the Car before expanding its use to our response partners. Once we started sharing the concept, there were repeated “déjà vu” moments as our partners got used to the concept.
· Knowing When to Say “Enough.” In some cases, we should have used discipline for noncompliance more quickly. It came to light that some commanders were not going to use the program until forced. This resistance was divisive and counterproductive to organizing the fireground. Eventually, all commanders came on board.
It took approximately 24 months (2009-2011) for CFD to transition from “Command from the Front Yard” to “Command from the Car.” A dedicated group of hard-working and determined-to-succeed chief officers were the backbone of the system’s success. In the ensuing three years (2011-2014), the same core group of battalion chiefs, a second generation of battalion chiefs who grew up in Command from the Car, CFD Fire Chief Karen Brack, and regional response partner chiefs who also use the concept every day, continue to refine the process so that it best serves incident management for the Charleston metro area.
References
Routley, JG, Chiaramonte, M, Crawford, B, Piringer, P, Roche, K, & Sendelbach, T. (2007,
October). City of Charleston post-incident assessment and review team phase 1 report.
Charleston, SC.
Routley, JG, Chiaramonte, MD, Crawford, BA, Piringer, PA, Roche, KM, &
Sendelbach, TE. (2008, May). Sofa Super Store firefighter fatality investigation report, City
of Charleston post-incident assessment and review team Phase II report. Charleston, SC.
BIO
John B. Tippett Jr., CFO, has been a member of the fire service since 2004 and has served in career and volunteer departments. He is deputy chief of operations for the Charleston (SC) Fire Department. He has a bachelor’s degree in fire science. He introduced Crew Resource Management to the fire service. He is an at-large board member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Safety, Health and Survival Section; is certified as a health and safety officer through the Fire Department Safety Officers Association; and was the International Society of Fire Service Instructors George D. Post Instructor of the Year in 2006. He is a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters, International Fire Engineers (US Branch), South Carolina State Association of Fire Chiefs, and the South Carolina Firefighters Association. He is actively involved in a number of Charleston area committees
