BY GREG JAKUBOWSKI
The Midway (PA) Volunteer Fire Company covers a large portion of Buckingham Township and a part of Solebury Township in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Some buildings date back to the 1700s. The community’s location, with easy access to the Philadelphia and North Jersey metropolitan areas, has sparked a recent building boom, with more than a thousand homes under construction or planned. This has created a diverse mix of hazards for which the fire company continually preplans. It is prepared to handle the small incidents but is also set up to combat heavy volumes of fire when such situations arise.
At 1716 hours on Thursday, March 7, 2002, the Midway and the Lingohocken Fire Companies responded to a reported garage fire on Durham Road in the vicinity of Upper Mountain Road in Buckingham Township. First-arriving chief officer Deputy Doug Stover of the Midway Volunteer Fire Company found a carport and two cars located between two single-family dwellings heavily involved in fire, more than he expected.
 (1) View of side A before fire department arrival. [Photos courtesy of Buckingham Township (PA) Police.] |
The dwellings, originally two-story structures, each included attics that had been converted into bedrooms, resulting in three-story homes. There was obvious extension into every floor of each of the adjoining houses, and the nearest hydrants were more than a mile away. Midway Chief Mike Taylor arrived shortly thereafter and established Durham Road Command.
GO WITH YOUR BIG GUNS
The first-arriving engine, Midway Engine 15, a 2,000-gpm Class A engine with a 1,000-gallon water tank, stretched handlines to prepare to enter the dwelling on the exposure B side. Despite the lack of hydrants, Command didn’t think small. Midway Engine 5, also a 2,000-gpm/1,000-gallon water tank Class A engine, from the main station was right behind Engine 15 and swung its prepiped deck gun into action. With 1,000 gpm flowing from the deck gun, the carport area fire quickly darkened down, as did the fire in the exposure D house. This allowed crews to initiate interior attacks to control the fires that had gained a foothold in both of the homes. Remember, it is the gallons per minute that beat BTUs, not just total gallons. Firefighters with limited water supplies should not conserve water using small lines at a big fire. It’s the amount of water that can be applied at the same time that makes a difference. For too many years, too many firefighters would pull a small line on a fire such as this to “conserve water.” They conserved the water, but the building burned to the ground.
Lingohocken’s Engine 95 crew and Tanker 35 arrived to back up Engine 15. Tanker 35 provided the 3,500-gallon water supply necessary to safely conduct interior operations and additional personnel for backup lines.
Midway’s 4,000-gallon Tanker 5 arrived shortly thereafter to provide a nurse water supply for Engine 5, which by then had stretched several handlines into the side D exposure.
 (2) Crews from the Midway and Lingohocken Fire Companies stretch lines to the exposure B house. |
New Hope’s Eagle Fire Company Tanker 46, Midway Rescue 5, and Lingohocken Engine 35 and Rescue 35 provided additional personnel to initiate search and ventilation operations.
The Doylestown Fire Company responded with two additional engines and the Warwick Fire Company responded with one engine to put up additional ground ladders and to provide backup and additional personnel for an informal initial rapid intervention crew that had been established.
INTERIOR OPERATIONS CHALLENGES
Crews operating inside of both dwellings were simultaneously fighting fires on all floors of the two homes, as additional crews worked on knocking down the carport area fire. A ladder company was not due on the initial assignment and was not requested since the homes could be accessed by ground ladders carried on the engines and the water supply operation would have limited any access to the fire buildings for an aerial apparatus.
 (3) Engine 5 brings its 1,000-gpm deck gun to bear, quickly darkening down the fire. This allowed crews to begin interior operations in both houses. |
Initially, an extension ladder belonging to one of the homeowners was extended to the exposure B second floor as a secondary means of egress. Additional arriving units raised more ground ladders to provide access for ventilation and other backup egress routes.
In the exposure B home, many of the windows had been painted over, reducing visibility and presenting further risk to the interior crews. Crews inside the same home discovered that once they had reached the second floor, fire had begun to regain a hold in the first floor, threatening the stairway, which was their primary means of escape. The crew retreated down to the first floor to regain control of the stairway until a backup line was in place.
GAS SERVICE FIRE
Another factor complicating the situation was that the exterior fire was so intense that it had melted one house’s gas service line, which had no street shutoff. Command had to wait 30 to 45 minutes for the utility company to arrive to dig up the service line in the lawn and crimp it. During this wait, the gas-fed fire continued to burn, requiring maintaining handlines on the first floor and in the basement to prevent that fire from extending farther into the house.
The crews made excellent stops in a single incident that was essentially three fires-the fire in the carport area between the two houses and the fires in each of the exposure homes. The incident was under control within 72 minutes of our arrival. This occurred despite the lack of an immediately accessible hydrant supply and resulted from effective coordination of 12 pieces of apparatus from five separate, all-volunteer fire companies.
CHALLENGES/LESSONS LEARNED
This incident presented a number of challenges and lessons learned/reinforced for the companies involved.
- Water supply. Even where hydrants aren’t available, set up apparatus to allow a fast, high-gpm fire attack. The first-alarm companies on this assignment brought more than 10,000 gallons of water with them, readily facilitating an aggressive operation despite the lack of hydrants.
- Strategic apparatus positioning. Engine 5 pulled up directly in front of the exposure D home. This allowed good access for the deck gun into exposure B but limited the application on the carport wall of exposure D. Although there were tactical advantages to putting the engine between the two homes, there were risks also. If a heating oil or propane tank were located between the homes, the volume of fire might have resulted in a boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), exposing any equipment in its path. Positioning in front of exposure D minimized the risk.
- Which fire to attack first. Simultaneous involvement of two houses forced Command initially to choose which house to protect first. This was a difficult decision, particularly with both homeowners on the scene and expressing concern about the fire spread into their homes.
- Maintaining means of egress. Until crews arrived to stretch backup lines, personnel on the initial handlines had to watch out for fire extending below them and cutting off their only means of egress. This was a problem particularly in the home with the gas-fed fire, since the fire could not be extinguished until the gas supply could be cut off.
- Additional resources. As the situation’s challenges arose, Command did not hesitate in requesting additional units early in the incident.
- Accountability. The simultaneous involvement of two homes also presented some unusual accountability issues. Most fire companies are set up to keep accountability of personnel operating in one building but not in two adjacent buildings at the same time. If a sudden, unexpected event had occurred, some time may have been lost identifying exactly where assistance might be needed.
- Incident command system (ICS). A strong command system was critical for a successful resolution of this incident. To be proficient in ICS on the “big ones,” you must practice it regularly on all other calls.
- Situation analysis and communications. Ongoing situation analysis and communications are essential to firefighter safety. The crew operating to contain the natural gas-fed fire in the exposure B basement observed the fire suddenly extinguish. They immediately surmised that there was a potential for gas buildup in the basement and quickly exited the building. Once outside, they found that the gas service had been crimped at the street, which extinguished the fire.
- Training counts. Gas emergency training helped Command make tactical decisions concerning the gas-fed fire. Command was asked if the gas fire could be extinguished, and Command wisely chose to let it burn. Despite the need to continually monitor the burning gas fire, it was a much safer option than risking a gas explosion.
As the above incident demonstrates, nothing beats a swift, aggressive blitz attack to quickly gain the upper hand on a rapidly advancing fire. Apparatus with large water tanks and prepiped, connected application devices allow companies to perform this type of attack successfully.
GREG JAKUBOWSKI is a registered fire protection engineer, a certified safety professional, a certified fire officer I, an instructor II, and an emergency medical technician with 23 years of fire service experience.
