IGNITED GASOLINE VAPORS SNAKE THROUGH SEWER SYSTEM
FIRE REPORTS
The uniformity of training and the use of standard operating procedures for structural fire fighting and backup command showed their importance during this two-county incident that touched off 14 house fires before being brought under control.
Two thousand gallons of gasoline, accidently unloaded into a sewer cleanout, traveled 5 miles through two Maryland counties before emptying into the Anacostia River and set into play a chain of events that took two days to bring to an end
Fuel delivered to Sickler Service, a plumbing contracting firm that operates a fleet of trucks in the Takoma Park section of Montgomery County, was mistakenly discharged into an unmarked sewer cleanout at the rear of the Sickler building.
During the height of the fire activity, which covered 1 ½ miles, fire fighters responded to 14 structural fire calls in Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties.
Minutes after the fuel was unloaded at 10:15 a m, last Dec. 16, the Takoma Park Volunteer Fire Department received a call from city police, reporting an explosion in the basement of 6909 Westmoreland Ave., two blocks from the unloading point
Upon arrival, fire fighters found a working fire in the basement across the street from 6909 Westmoreland Shortly after, additional house fires were reported along Westmoreland and adjacent Allegheny and Cockerille Ave.
In 2 1/2 hours, the ignited gasoline vapors traveled through Montgomery County, touching off nine house fires, and into Prince Georges County, causing five additional incidents.
Unit officers handled house fires in a routine manner, and mobile command officers established a command post midway between the Takoma Park fires, sectoring the incident.
Officials from the city, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Washington Gas Light, several state agencies, as well as the Montgomery County Department of Fire and Rescue Services and the Prince Georges and District of Columbia Fire Departments were brought to the command post to help coordinate the various command activities.
After command personnel were assigned to each of the two sectors in Takoma Park and a command coordinator appointed, all administrative personnel were moved from the command post to a fire/ police command bus set up about three blocks north of the incident.
At the command bus, telephone lines were stretched and tapped into existing residential properties to provide hard line communications for command personnel. In addition, mobile telephones were supplied by Chief Warren Isman and Lieutenant Ray Muhall of the Montgomery County Department of Fire and Rescue Services, and ham radio communications were provided by the county’s ham radio organization.
As the incident began moving toward Prince Georges County, Battalion Chief Frank Colea advised that county’s operating center to establish a command post as soon as possible. A command post was set up about 1 ½ miles south of the incident with Chief M. H. Estepp in command. Several task forces of two engines, a ladder truck, an ambulance and an officer were also established.
The rapidity of fires in the Takoma Park portion precluded the use of the task force concept in Montgomery County, which would have reduced radio traffic and provided for a specific complement of response.
As more fires broke out, Montgomery County’s Emergency Operations Center dispatched additional house fire assignments. Some personnel simply pulled lines from the earlier arriving units to handle the additional incidents.
Staging areas were set up north and east of the initial explosion.
Evacuation
As it became evident that the incident was escalating into major proportions, an evacuation was ordered for the 15square-block area of Takoma Park and an 8-square-block area of Prince Georges County.
Considering the time of day the incident occurred, many of the city’s 2500 residents were at work. It was primarily the elderly and very young who were affected by the evacuation. County school buses were used.
Shelters were set up at Takoma Park’s city hall and junior high school. Fire Station 44 served as the shelter for Prince Georges County.
Gasoline detected
An all-out effort had been launched by the Montgomery County Fire Marshal’s Office to locate the source of the still unknown flammable product. Fire fighters in the area were checking basements of the , various properties along the affected streets for flammable vapors.
Lieutenant lames E. larboe, one of the unit officers, reported what appeared to be raw gasoline coming up in the basement sewer pipe of one of the affected properties.
Once it was believed that gasoline was involved, Montgomery County’s Hazardous Incident Response Team (HIRT) was called in.
As the last of the fires was being overhauled, fire department, sanitation and utility company personnel removed manhole covers along the main tank line of the sewer system. They monitored the sewers for vapors, taking liquid samples for analysis and coordinating forced outward ventilation of the system with the utility’s exhaust devices.
Vapor readings remained at zero, and residents were permitted to return to their homes around 9 p.m.
Fire officials advised residents not to turn on lights, to check their basements for odors and to pour water into every drain for a vapor barrier. In the event odor was detected, residents were advised to report it to the nearest engine company. Fire engines were stationed at four intersections with HIRT and utility company personnel.
HIRT ceased monitoring operations at 11 p.m., with vapor readings still at zero.
Montgomery and Prince Georges County Fire Department and Washington Gas Light decided that gas-operated appliances would not be turned on until the next day, due to the fact that the source of the flammable liquid had not been determined.
Shortly after noon on Dec. 17, Lieutenant Dan Whetzel, lead investigator for Montgomery County, observed a fuel pump at the rear of Sickler Service and determined that the fuel drop had been made from this location.
With the source located, a second major activity took place, flushing the system to make sure that no residual product remained in the sewers. A command post was set up in the Sickler building and representatives of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Washington Gas Light and the city responded to assist.
Photos by Rick Fernandez. Prince Georges County Fire Department
After review of the sanitary commission’s sewer maps, it was decided that No-Flash, a flammable liquid emulsifier, would be placed in the system at two points, while smoke ejectors would be situated at eight manholes, exhausting out. Manhole covers were popped along the sewer line for natural ventilation.
Teams of two fire fighters each were established to check structures along the sewer line to ensure that water was in alltraps. An additional forcible entry team with a police officer was maintained to assist in entering locked properties.
With this activity underway, additional companies began placing smoke ejectors at strategic points along the sewer line. With all personnel in place and the streets secured, the No-Flash addition began.
This product is best used when educted at a 10 percent rate. Lacking an eductor of this configuration, HIRT personnel placed 10 gallons of No-Flash followed by about 100 gallons of water into the sewer cleanout at the rear of the Sickler property. A second HIRT unit was located at a manhole two blocks from Sickler, and when the No-Flash mixture was observed at this point, an additional 10 gallons of concentrate and 100 gallons of water were added.
Flammable vapor readings were taken at eight points in the Takoma Park area and one in Prince Georges County. Smoke ejectors from four fire units exhausted out of the system. Once the No-Flash was detected in Prince Georges County and no vapor readings were found, the order to cease operations was given at 7 p.m.
Critiques
- The relationship of the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services and the independent fire departments provided for a unique blend of fireground response; the fire departments provided for fire and rescue service in the field, and the county organization provided for support activities. This cooperation resulted in the coordination of a variety of local fire department units, the city, and agencies from both Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties to obtain a favorable outcome to a major incident.
- It is a must that command post facilities be provided at working fire situations and, where possible, an administrative command facility be set up to separate the coordination of attack crews from the administrative command.
- To provide the necessary information about the facility or area, personnel who hold key positions must tie identified Our ability to place those personnel at our side enabled dissemination of critical information.
- As with all incidents, there are problems, and this one was no exception. Obtaining clear communications with the Prince Georges County command post by land line was difficult at times. The use of residential phone line taps works well when no one attempts to call a number; however, at one residence the line was constantly ringing.
- When the liquid samples were taken and sent to a laboratory for analysis, the chain of evidence was broken due to a lack of understanding of the lab’s process. Getting rapid analysis was also difficult.
- From a strategic point, the concept of house fire assignments was used, a communications designation was put into operation, command post and staging areas were designated, and sectoring was done. In reviewing the incident, it was noted that sectoring should have been done sooner.
- Considering the extent of this incident, property damage was estimated to be held to a minimum, with figures being around $100,000.
- No casualties or injuries were sustained by residents or fire/rescue personnel from 15 engine companies, three ladder companies, two squads and five ambulances.
