Hazardous Incident Advice Confusing, Board Charges
features
Its investigation of a phosphorus trichloride spill “indicates that some of the advice and guidelines provided to emergency response personnel by DOT (United States Department of Transportation), carriers, and shippers continues to be inadequate, inconsistent, and confusing,” the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has charged.
This comment was contained in a letter from NTSB Chairman James B. King to DOT Secretary Andrew L. Lewis that reported the results of the NTSB investigation of the spill that occurred when a locomotive struck and punctured a tank car containing about 13,000 gallons of phosphorus trichloride in the Boston and Maine yards at Somerville, Mass., on April 3, 1980. (See October 1980 Fire Engineering.)
The NTSB declared “that the guidelines and other advice should be reviewed regularly on the basis of results obtained in actual emergencies, and the advice and information validated or revised as necessary to insure that the prescribed emergency response is appropriate.”
Phosphorus trichloride is a waterreactive corrosive liquid. When water was applied to the spill, a chemical mist developed and spread through two communities. During the incident, 23,000 persons were evacuated and over 400 were treated at hospitals.
Sought expert advice
Somerville Fire Department personnel turned to hazardous materials guidebooks and on-scene experts for advice on how to handle the material. The DOT is charged by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act to provide emergency response advice to local officials during an emergency.
At one point, the fire chief met with more than 30 safety representatives from various jurisdictions to discuss the operation and plan the next actions. The NTSB declared that “after more than 7 hours on the scene,” the technical advisers “had not reached agreement on how to handle the emergency.”
Guides published by the DOT, Bureau of Explosives and National Fire Protection Association were singled out by the NTSB for their “contradictory and ambiguous advice” about the application of water on the chemical spill. Fire fighters needed quick, reliable information because the material was flowing toward nearby sewers. Knowing no other alternative, fire fighters began pushing back the spill with hose streams.
A massive cloud of corrosive vapor formed and exposed many persons to the unexpected hazard. However, the use of water by the fire department was described by the NTSB as “a logical action, based on the information available to them at that time.”
Fire fighters injured
Fire fighters then attempted to use shovels to control the spill while wearing SCBA and standard protective clothing. It wasn’t enough protection against corrosive fumes, although the guides did not make that clear, the NTSB explained. Many fire fighters had to be taken to hospitals for treatment.
Nine hours after the emergency began, state, federal and industry advisers were suggesting three different approaches for final disposal of the residue. According to the NTSB, the advisers could not agree which was the best plan to follow.
The problems experienced at the Somerville incident concerned NTSB, especially when it found that a newly revised DOT “Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Guidebook” still does not warn about the particular type of chemical cloud formation seen at Somerville. The NTSB described the guidebook as “still ambiguous on the use of water” on phosphorus trichloride. NTSB also reiterated its 1976 recommendations to DOT for improvements after another incident.
Should review guides
In the letter to DOT, the NTSB asked DOT to investigate all emergency guides and other advice available to local officials. DOT should take “the necessary steps,” said the letter, to assure their usefulness to help control hazardous materials spills effectively.
“So long as knowledgeable technical advisers cannot agree on a recommended course of action … the Safety Board does not believe that local fire fighters will be provided with reliable, consistent advice for handling such emergencies.”
The NTSB went on to say that unless the advice is reliable, “local officials will be forced to continue to depend on trial-and-error procedures.”
Trial and error increases the risks both to the community and to the fire fighters, NTSB explained.
