By William Shouldis
A high-rise fire presentS a considerable challenge to any fire department. Nearly every jurisdiction has some kind of multilevel apartment building. Building codes vary in each community, and engineered fire protection systems differ in each structure. The post-9/11 world has focused on increased security. This has driven the management of many residential high-rise buildings to design barriers—such as walls, fences, and shrubs—around the perimeter of a property, making firefighting access extremely difficult. By definition, a high-rise building is at least 75 feet in height. Yet in reality, many five- or six-story buildings can be outside the reach of aerial equipment or have an excessive evacuation time. Some of these buildings are sprinklered in the common corridors and exit passageways, but there is no guarantee that individual rooms are protected.
Preincident planning and familiarization tours of each site are essential. History has shown that well-developed fires in these residential occupancies are resource-intensive and require a well-organized approach to scene management. Without a coordinated effort, even a small incident can easily overwhelm the capabilities of any emergency response force. All firefighters, company commanders, and chief officers must anticipate the unique fire control, ventilation, and evacuation difficulties associated with these multistory buildings. An early responder who understands the ramifications of prolonged reflex time in resource deployment will recognize the potential for extreme risk to occupants and firefighting personnel.
A major dilemma for the initial incident commander is how to obtain, manage, and process significant size-up, risk assessment, and decision-making information. A fire in a large apartment complex is not simply a matter of calling for a “surround and drown” mode of operation. High-rise occupancies need a systematic plan that can overcome logistical and operational problems.
First responders can obtain some general information through observation as they approach the scene and technical information by examining the annunciator panel or speaking to a knowledgeable building engineer prior to ascending to an upper floor. They must quickly incorporate all pertinent information into an Incident Action Plan (IAP). The challenge in the first few minutes is to take the mental ideas of the incident commander and translate them into physical action by all the responding units.
THE INCIDENT
The Monday morning tour on January 12, 2003, started at 0700 hours. Outside there were cold temperatures and a crisp wind. Within three minutes, a dispatch was broadcasted for Engine Co. 19. The call seemed relatively routine. The single-engine company was sent to begin the investigation of an automatic alarm at the Hathaway House, a residential high-rise building. The building’s night manager placed the 9-1-1 phone call after hearing the alarm bells ringing throughout the apartment building.
When the first company approached the front of the 50-foot 2 200-foot structure, nothing was showing. On entering the first-floor lobby, members heard the alarm bells sounding. The annunciator panel pinpointed problems on the upper floors. The manager informed personnel that a fire was reported in the residence of an elderly woman on the fifth floor. The 15-story building had 138 units, and only the common areas were sprinklered.
Immediately, personnel transmitted a brief initial report to the Dispatch Center describing the circumstances. The first-in officer established command and requested a full first-alarm assignment. Two battalion chiefs would be sent to control activities. Three additional fully staffed pumpers and two ladder companies were instructed to set up a base at an intersection approximately 200 feet from the building until the proper access points could be assessed for strict “point-of-entry” control.
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Engine Co. 19 knew its initial task was to proceed upward by way of a stair shaft and gather information. Determining the ex-act location and severity of the fire is always a priority in a structure fire. In a high-rise building, creating a staging area two floors below the incident is a “front-burner” issue. The crew entered the spacious lobby and recalled all elevators to the ground floor to reduce the chance of any occupants becoming trapped in a stalled elevator car. The first-in pumper supplied the dry standpipe siamese after connecting to a hydrant in the street outside the collapse zone. The company commander wisely followed a safe, sane, and predictable pattern for high-rise firefighting. The tactical priorities would focus on making an aggressive interior attack to confine the fire while locating and evacuating exposed occupants.
Lieutenant Ronald Frei, the crew supervisor, decided that Engine 19’s team would ascend the enclosed concrete/masonry South Tower to the fourth floor and connect to the standpipe outlet. Carrying a high-rise pack consisting of a nozzle, gated wye, and three lengths of 13/4-inch hose, personnel were met by many residents self-evacuating down the stairs. Dialog was exchanged. Coordination would be needed because the fleeing occupants stated that smoke was starting to contaminate the upper floors. Occupants had to be warned to stay out of the south stairwell because the firefighters were prepared to connect the hoselines together and create their own “lifeline for egress” as they stretched up the stairs to the fifth floor. When they reached the fire floor, the hoseline was pressurized. They encountered heavy smoke in the common hallway, and it was evident that the Fire Attack Sector could not move down the corridor until evacuation was reasonably restricted.
As more fire companies arrived, they were deployed to the upper floors to work in the Evacuation Sector and detour residents to the North Tower, which was clearly designated as the evacuation stairs. In the South Tower, a ladder company was designated Ventilation Sector and sent to the roof to open the bulkhead door so that the tower could be used for the dual purpose of suppression and ventilation.
Once companies were in position, the fifth-floor metal fire door in the South Tower was opened. As expected, the toxic smoke poured into the attack/ventilation stair shaft. The exit door had to be wedged open for the charged hoselines to safely advance. It was obvious that the fire attack team was going to take considerable punishment in meeting the objective of advancing from the stairs down the long hallway to the entrance of the burning apartment. Once at the doorway of Apartment 507, a direct assault was initiated. It was time for forcible entry and fire containment. Controlling the occupants and limiting the spread of smoke were assignments that had to be delegated to other units.
On arrival, the first-due battalion chief was briefed on the fire and life safety issues over the portable radio. Command was transferred, and the fireground was divided. One battalion chief would handle the operational concerns of fire spread and ventilation while the second-due chief would handle logistical concerns of evacuation, capturing the elevators, refilling low-air cylinders, and establishing a backup communication network.
According to the IAP, three engine companies would be needed to fight the fire. Ladder companies would vent using the south stair shaft, exiting at a roof hatch, and begin detouring all evacuees to the smoke-free North Tower.
As the responding on-duty deputy commander, I acknowledged receipt of the alarm and was on my way. As I listened to the radio reports, I had a gut feeling that we would need more staffing because of the early morning hour. Experience has proven that most successful operations are a direct result of organized teamwork; without sufficient staffing, many strategic and tactical options must be eliminated. I knew that in the Philadelphia system, on confirmation of a working high-rise fire, additional units are automatically alerted to handle the lobby control function, perform the rapid intervention assignment, enhance air-replenishment capabilities, and staff on-site medical stations. I still clarified the need for an expanded Major Incident Response Assignment (MIRA). This provided more staffing. An additional engine and ladder company with a battalion chief were dispatched. At this incident, the total response force would be more than 60 members. In a short time, a clear organizational structure was needed. The IAP had to record all assignments and track every responder.
On arrival, I was informed that the fire appeared confined to the single apartment and that one occupant was found unconscious during the primary search. I could see from my 3607 walk-around of the perimeter that no other occupants were visible on the exterior open balconies. I imagined that the interior hallways were relatively clear of danger because of the solid building construction and compartmentation.
After getting confirmation that medium smoke was only on the sixth and seventh floors, I ordered a protect-in-place strategy to reduce the downward movement of occupants. An engine company was placed in the North Tower at the fire floor to ensure that the exit door was not opened. I had the rapid intervention team move closer to the high-hazard area. I also requested a 60-passenger bus from the transit company to provide immediate shelter, transportation, and a tangible place for a quick head count of evacuees.
 (3) A view of side C. Size-up factors include the structure’s dimensions, type of construction, number of occupants per floor, and built-in fire protection systems |
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 (4) Electric power lines, trees, and shrubs can limit access for aerial ladders and platforms. Exterior balconies may be difficult to reach for rescue. |
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Much of the critical communication was now being transmitted over the portable radio, even though Logistics was slowly connecting a cellular phone network between the Operations Section near the fire floor and the exterior command post in front of the apartment building.
Unfortunately, the rescued occupant, a 91-year-old female, was in cardiac arrest. She was moved out of the IDLH (immediately dangerous to life and health) atmosphere. Firefighters started CPR in the fourth-floor hallway. Knowing life safety issues dictate the concept of risk assessment, I made a difficult but timely decision to bring the elevator car close to the fire floor. I ordered Logistics to swiftly dispatch an elevator car to the fourth floor.
One firefighter from Lobby Control, using the “Firefighter Service” mode on the elevator car, having access to a portable radio, wearing all protective gear, and having checked the elevator shaft for smoke, rapidly delivered the elevator car to one floor below the fire. The elevator car would bring the victim to the triage area at the lobby level. As paramedics took over the performance of CPR and prepared to transport the victim, I was informed that she had no vital signs. Despite firefighters’ valiant efforts, another fire fatality would be added to this year’s statistics.
 (5) Supervisors must know which companies and crews are assigned to them. They must have the ability to quickly communicate with responders if an adverse event occurs. (Photo by Kimberly Hensel.) |
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 (6) Unenclosed elevators in the lobby. Responders must use the “Firefighter Service” to avoid erratic elevator malfunction. |
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Meanwhile, status reports from Operations indicated that conditions were improving because the roof bulkhead was fully open, allowing heat and smoke to escape from the South Tower. Smoke spread had decreased on the upper floors but was continuously monitored by companies searching for occupants and fire extension.
Based on status reports from the upper floors, it was decided that all further evacuations would be limited to alert and ambulatory occupants. The physically disabled, the blind, and those on life-support equipment would remain in their individual apartments assisted by radio-equipped firefighters.
The Medical Branch was divided into three distinct sectors. Medics were assigned to the rehab and first-aid station in the fire building. An intermediary stop was the transit bus, which provided warmth and a temporary resting place for the elderly occupants being relocated. The Park Heights House, a nearby apartment building, was the occupants’ final destination, where medical monitoring and full accountability could be ascertained. More than 100 occupants were delivered to the evacuation site. Because of the excitement, one senior citizen suffered anxiety and chest discomfort and was transported to a local hospital for observation.
LOGISTICS KEY TO SUCCESS
Today, fire departments respond to a wide range of emergencies in multilevel buildings. Having a written guideline on scene assessment will reduce the chance of conflicting orders and duplication of efforts. An up-to-date procedure for effective command and control of all resources is vital to a safe operation.
It is widely known that the dangers to occupants are panic and direct exposure to the fire; yet, the gravest threat to both occupants and firefighters is exposure to smoke particles and toxic gases. Large-scale evacuation requires communication and coordination to avoid disorientation.
No single emergency response organization has all the resources to provide the total protection that modern high-rise responses demand. Some fire protection systems must be built in. Fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide even a basic level of protection without early notification and 100-percent sprinkler coverage.
This incident reinforced the need for proper planning, discipline, and training. It is paramount that “front-line” responders be familiar with the floor layout, exit configurations, and fire protection features of large buildings. Consider each property a target hazard with a unique set of problems in an emergency. All responders require an exceptionally high level of discipline because failure to follow any portion of an IAP can lead to a breakdown in the systematic approach to mitigating the problem. Respon-ders must “buy in” to the concept of tight accountability and, regardless of the circumstances, follow the department’s “check-in” policy at base, lobby, staging, and sectors.
 (7) Paramedics used this partitioned area in the lobby to provide victims with prehospital care. Responders used the area for rest and rehab later in the incident. |
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 (8) Understandable signage and clear voice communication will help a trained staff and prepared occupants to safely exit a building in an emergency. |
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Understanding the roles and responsibilities of responders working in the Logistics Section is the key to success. Logistics is a physically and mentally demanding job at a high-rise fire. It cannot be ignored or be put on a “back burner” during the initial alarm. This is the foundation for the necessary support and services of a sustained attack. Although the duties of the Logistics Section may seem “unglamorous,” they are vital to any high-rise operation.
- The Stairwell Support Unit will arrange for the movement of equipment and personnel while working in a nonair-conditioned and poorly illuminated space.
- Lobby Control is critical in directing civilians to designated holding areas and firefighters to the proper stairways.
- The System Unit will be drawn into monitoring the HVAC air-handling equipment.
- Base is the cornerstone as units arrive at the scene for initial tracking.
- A major high-rise fire requires a heavy commitment of personnel. Build a command, tactical, and support organization as soon as possible.
- Call for additional assistance before logistical problems hinder operational effectiveness.
- Establish critical sectors for water supply, air replenishment, base, staging, fire attack, ventilation, search, evacuation, and medical duties.
LESSONS LEARNED
 (9) Check the ceiling area plenum for fire spread before proceeding down a long, windowless hallway. |
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 (10) View from the sidewalk of a nearby apartment building used as a shelter. Weather, distance, and terrain made evacuation difficult for the elderly residents of the Hathaway House. |
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- Identify potential bottlenecks on the ground floor of the fire building, dangers in providing a safe passage away from the fire building, and a means of transportation to an evacuation site.
- Ensure firefighters pay attention to details. Risk assessment and size-up start with each individual. Accountability is started at base and continues in the lobby, at staging, and at each assignment.
- Control the “built-in” fire protection features such as standpipes, sprinklers, fire doors, HVAC, elevators, lighting, telephones, and the public address system.
To be successful at a high-rise apartment building fire, follow the basics. Determine the fire floor; then control occupants, monitor the systems, and confine the fire to the smallest area. We can learn much from the fire service’s history of operating in high-rise buildings. Fires will be complex because of the distance and time factors. The distance upward through the structure and the time to access the fire floor can greatly influence the fire’s growth. These elements will impact the scope of the situation and management of resources. As an emergency scene decision maker, don’t be fooled into thinking Logistics is not a crucial assignment for a portion of the initial alarm. Now is the time to think, train, and maybe change some traditional operational practices.
William Shouldis is a deputy chief and a 30-plus-year veteran of the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department. He is an adjunct instructor at the National Fire Academy and teaches courses on fireground operations, health and safety, and fire prevention. Shouldis has a bachelor’s degree in fire science administration and a master’s degree in public safety. He is a member of the Fire Engineering editorial advisory board and has spoken numerous times at the FDIC.
