Hartford Circus Catastrophe
All Emergency Services Mobilize Quickly to Meet Connecticut’s Most Tragic Disaster
ONE hundred and sixty-seven persons, over three-quarters of them children are dead, more than 225 seriously injured —many of them scarred for lift—with total casualties reaching approximately 500, in Connecticut’s worst disaster in point of lives lost and personal injury, as a result of the destruction by fire of the huge 20 ton paraffin and gasolinetreated canvas tent of the Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey’s circus in Hartford, Conn., on the hot afternoon of July 6, 1944.
The fire broke out from what still remains an unknown cause, while the near-rapacity audience of 7.000 persons was applauding the end of Alfred Court’s animal act. On the high wire above the center ring the famous Wallenda aerial troupe was preparing to begin its deathdefying feats. Suddenly there was a flash of flame near the main entrance of the show. The fire was small at first —a circus employee testified it looked as if it could have been extinguished with a pail of water. Then, abruptly, the flames rose toward the top of the 520 x 220 foot tent.
The circus band, at the opposite end of the enclosure, struck up the “Disaster March,’’ traditional warning of trouble to the circus folk. People began to move from their red, wooden seats toward the exits. There was no panic at first, according to eye witnesses, but suddenly the flames were flashing overhead; there was a cry of “Fire!” and pandemonium broke loose, first at the runways where May Kovar was trying to herd the lions, pumas and tigers from the tent into their cages outside. Then it spread throughout the entire audience. It was these two steel three feet high runways that proved the worst barrier to the panicstricken crowds trying to escape. In their frenzy men tossed children over them and women attempting to clamber over the obstacles fell into the terrified mob. Seventy bodies, some burned beyond recognition, were later found massed at this point.
The huge big top of “the Greatest Show on Karth” was reduced to ashes in less than twenty-five minutes; the tinsel and sawdust and much of wooden seats were gone and in their place was stark, indescribable confusion and tragedy.
All this happened as the afternoon’s performance was but a few minutes old. At 2:44 P. M. Box 82 at Clark and Westland Streets was pulled, bringing Hartford Engine Companies 7, 2 and 16 and Truck Companies 3 and 4, Acting Deputy Chief Leon H. Crawford in command. The first arriving companies found Box 82 approximately one-half mile away from the fire and proceeded at once to Box 828 which is located in front of the circus lot.
One minute later, at 2:45 P. M., Box 828 at Barbour Street and Cleveland Avenue was sounded, with Engine Companies 14, 4 and 3 and Truck Company 1 assigned on a straight box alarm. The fire department records indicate that the two latter Engine Companies and Truck 1 operated at the fire. Deputy Chief Edward J. McNally arrived at this box and took command, until the arrival of Chief John C. King.
Several additional boxes were pulled but to only one, Box 836 Cleveland Avenue and Hampden Street, was response made. Engine Company 5 was dispatched to this signal. The final box alarm from Box 83, Main Street and Cleveland Avenue was received at 2:49 P. M. but no assignment responded.
Chief King Promptly at Scene of Fire
Chief King, riding in his car in another part of the city at the time the alarm was received, was notified over the car’s two-way radio system that it was the circus. Recounting the events of the tragedy to the correspondent of FIRE ENGINEERING, Chief King said: “As soon as I learned from headquarters that the fire was at the Ringling Brothers Circus I directed my driver to go at full speed to the grounds on Barbour Street. I was about three miles away at the time and reached the catastrophe on the fastest ride I ever had through the streets of Hartford.
“When I pulled up to the scene” said the Chief, “the huge canvas tent, fanned by a breeze from the zvest, zoos burning like tissue paper and all the water in the world couldn’t stop the progress of that blaze. My men worked like Trojans with hose tines until they almost dropped from exhaustion. Truck crewmen attempted to rescue the panic-stricken women and children that were caught in the path of the onrushing flames. Several ran toward us with their clothing ablaze and they were writhing in pain. One frantic zooman fought with firemen to allow her to go back into that blazing inferno to rescue her little son. The firemen kept her on the outside as it meant another life saved. If she had returned under the tent she would never come out alive.”
The terse but graphic report of the operations of the nine fire companies that worked on the fire, as given FIRE ENGINEERING’S representative by Chief King is worth quoting:
Eng. Co. 7: Capt. John F. McDonald in charge. On arrival at Box S2 found that fire was approximately 34 mile away and proceeded to Box 82S which was in front of circus lot. Stretched 900 ft. 2 34″ hose, worked this line inside of tent for 3 hours and 17 minutes. This work consisted of wetting down.
Eng. Co. 2: Capt. William J. Kirhy in charge. Arrived at Box 82 and proceeded to Box 828. Used hydrant opposite circus grounds. Hydrant pressure was 90 lbs. Stretched 800 ft. 214″ hese, 134″ tip. Worked for 2 hours and 5 minutes. Stretched line to side of tent.
Eng. Co. 16: Capt. James J, Yacavone in charge. Arrived at Box 82 and proceeded to Box 828. Setretched 1000 feet of 2 1/2″ hose. Worked 2 hours and 46 minutes. Line was taken to front entrance of circus.
Truck Co. 3: Lieut. Edward M. Curtin in charge. Arrived at Box 82 and proceeded to Box 828. Stretched $09 feet of 2tjt” hose. 1″ tip. Connected to hydrant in front of circus lot. Worked 1 hour and 55 minutes. Worked overhauling and carrying bodies from circus grounds.
Truck Co. 4: Lieut William J. Conners in charge. Arrived at Box 82 and proceeded to Box 828. Work consisted of overhauling and carrying bodies out of debris. Worked 1 hour and 45 minutes.
SECOND ALARM
Eng. Co. 3: Actg. Capt. Edward M. D. Daley in charge. 4-way stream hydrant located at 132 Cleveland Avenue. Stretched 150 feet of 2 1/2″ hose. 1″ tip. Worked 2 hours and 23 minutes.
Eng. Co. 4: Lieut. Timothy F. Kelliher in charge. Connected to hydrant in front of circus lot. Stretched 800 feet of 2 1/2″ hose. 1″ tip. Worked 1 hour and 15 minutes.
Eng. Co. 5: Capt. James R. Griffin in charge. Connected to hydrant opposite 132 Cleveland Ave. Stretched 1350 feet 2 1/2″ hose. 1″ tip. Worked 2 hours and 27 minutes.
Truck Co. 1: Actg. Lieut. Paul J. Wychodil in charge. Work consisted of overhauling and carrying bodies. Worked 1 hour and 36 minutes.
Most of the tragic details of the fire have been published in the public press …the rapid spread of the fire…its unknown origin…the panic at the animal runways…the evident effort of youngsters to get out of the tent via the same openings through which they entered…the igniting of light summer dresses of women and girls by the flaming pieces of canvas which fell into the crowd…the dropping of heavy trapeze equipment and big poles used to support the tent onto the crowd when ropes ignited and burned…the trampling of children in the front seats, despite desperate efforts of men and circus attaches who shouted “Take it easy! Take it easy! Walk out quietly’’...the tragic efforts at locating missing ones and of identifying the victims. All these details need not be elaborated on here. What is of perhaps more interest to the fire service is the manner in which the emergency services, including civilian protection forces, went into action, supporting the fire and police services. Some idea of the mobilization of these disaster and emergency units and measures taken may be drawn from a broadcast by Governor Raymond E. Baldwin of Connecticut over radio station WTIC following the debacle.
According to the Governor, the machinery that went into action on that Thursday afternoon included the State War Council, the State Police, the American Red Cross, the State Guard …the Hartford War Council and its Citizens Defense Corps…local police, and Firemen, doctors, nurses, ambulance drivers, air raid wardens, telephone operators, Boy Scouts, messemgers, in fact all the help the City could use. The Governor stressed the point that the disaster justified the organization and training of civilian defense forces and the wisdom of maintaining them even though the danger of enemy attack is remote.
“In wartime,” said the Governor, “the normal protective forces of the community are necessarily weakened by loss of manpower. Hospitals are understaffed and there are fewer doctors. Police and fire fighting forces are below their peacetime strength. Volunteers must help, as they have done in Hartford, and to be ready for disaster the organization of volunteer forces in Civilian defense must be maintained.”
According to His Excellency, the Commissioner of State Police and State Fire Marshal, Colonel Edward J. Hickey, it so happened, was in the audience at the circus, sheparding nine of his nieces and nephews ranging from four to fourteen years of age. He tossed them all to safety from the top seats to the ground, outside the tent. He said he saw hundreds of other children saved the same way.
Outside the tent was a radio car of the Hartford Police Department. When Colonel Hickey had made his way from the burning tent with the children who were in his charge, the alarm had been sent by radio to the Hirtford Police Headquarters and firemen and additional police had been called and with ambulances were on their way to the circus grounds. The State Police were at once notified.
Efficient Hospital Service
Chief Hallissey of the Hartford Police Department and the Colonel in a hasty conference at the radio car, determined that all civilian defense forces would be needed. The magnitude of the disaster was already apparent. Through the Hartford Police, the Hartford War Council was called into action. Emergency ambulances from department stores, factories and trucking companies were summoned, along with the emer gency medical servers of the city. Colonel Hickey called the Governor and told him the State Armory would be needed to receive bodies of the dead and that all civilian protection forces within reach of Hartford would be required. General Reginald B. DeLaeour called units of the State Guard and directed preparation of the Armory as a morgue. State War Administrator Henry B. Mosle and Edward N. Allen of the American Red Cross reached the scene and conferred with Colonel Hickey.
In the meantime, the injured were being rushed to hospitals as fast as ambulances could go back and forth. The Municipal Hospital, near the scene received the heaviest load. The first patients were admitted at 2:45 P. M. note that time and compare it with the schedule of fire alarms). Extra doctors, and nurses, with equipment and supplies were rushed to the hospital. Army trucks began the removal of bodies to the Armory, where General DeLacour’s staff and others, had made preparations for the melancholy task that lay ahead. When persons seeking lost members of their families reached the Armory there was little waiting and no confusion. They registered, giving their names and the name of the person they were seeking. Mimeographed forms had been run off for this purpose in the short time before the doors were opened. Girls were ready at tables and typewriters to record the information. Persons were admitted in small groups. A nurse’s aide and a policeman walked with each grieved relative and assisted in the search. When a person was identified, the medical examiner completed arrangements for a release. A record of all the information was kept by the State Wat Council.
Outside, a police sound truck assisted greatly in maintaining calm. Persons waiting in line were informed in many instances that their children or other relatives had been found safe and there was no need for them to stay. The rolling kitchen of the Hartford War Council served coffee and sandwiches. The Red Cross Canteen Unit fed the workers inside the building. Nurses helped those persons wdto were overcome, and there were rest rooms and cots for them.
Clergymen of all denominations came to the Armory to give what aid and comfort they could to the grief-stricken. The Salvation Army set up water coolers. Uninjured children, separated from their parents, were taken by the Hartford Police to Police Headquarters and to the Brown School. The State War Council sent a stenographer to the aid of a lone teacher trying to record the names and addresses of the children at the school and notify their parents. All of these children were recovered by their parents a few hours after the disaster.
In his talk the Governor brought out the fact that throughout the afternoon and evening hours, continuous assistance was received from the radio stations of Hartford, which broadcast information to the public telling people where to report the missing and identify the dead, reading lists of persons who were known casualties, and so on.
Ambulance Called by Radio
The first public call for ambulances, it was disclosed, went out by radio eight minutes after the first box alarm for fire apparatus had been sounded. A special radio appeal for donors of type O blood on Saturday brought 100 offers in a few hours.
Newspapers,, with special editions, greatly aided in bringing essential information speedily to the anxious people of the state.
At the time of the Governor’s message the work of identification had not been completed. Possibly it may never be. Of the 127 victims who were taken to the Armory, seven remained unidentified a: the time of his report. There were six persons listed by the State War Council as missing in the disaster. The list of missing persons at first was extremely long. War Administrator Mosle estimated that 10,000 calls were received at the State Armory during the twentyfour hours after the disaster and 2,700 prsons were reported missing. As they were found their names were removed from the list. Persons were located in many ways, through telephone calls, through the aid of local war councils in their home towns, by special visits of the police.
Three members of the Hartford Fire Department found the true meaning of the uncertain agony that comes to families of persons listed merely as “missing.”
Hartford Fire Department Hit
They are Lieutenant J. J. O’Connor and Firemen Joseph Viering and Vincent Barry, all of whom have at least one relative missing as a result of the soaring flames that swept the circus. Lieutenant O’Connor found his youngster in the hospital with a badly burned back, suffered when the child was trapped beneath the falling canvas. His joy over finding the baby was tempered, however, with the knowledge that his mother was killed in the fire.
Fireman Viering’s wife was a victim and Barry’s six year-old daughter lost her life. The three firemen were among the scores who made the rounds of cots at the State Armory.
The disaster and mutual aid plans, in effect throughout the state functioned to furnish aid from eastern and central Connecticut. Doctors and nurses came with hospital staffs from many cities; the State Personnel Department sent girls from State Government agencies. Police Departments of nearby towns sent men, and neighboring fire department of the injured and identification of nately were not needed. The Army, from its anti-aircraft units in Hartford and Bradley Field air base sent welcome help. The Navy rushed supplies and personnel from its New Haven and Hartford units. New York City sent equipment for the administration of blood plasma; four Boston doctors, all with experience in the Cocoanut Grove fire, spent a day in Hartford in consultation on the treatment of the injured and identification of the dead.
Identification of the bodies was made extremely difficult by the extent to which they were burned. Dr. Walter Weissenborn who, assisted by Dr. H. J. Onderonk of F.ast Hartford, officiated as medical examiner, said he had not seen one case of suffocation. In many cases the flesh was covered with blisters. Bodies were badly charred and in scores of instances hair was completely gone.
Although thus far the cause of the fire has not been determined, at least two theories have been advanced. One is that the blaze started in a canvasmen’s toilet erected outside the main tent, approximately 100 feet east of the main entrance, where a spectator may have tossed a match or lighted cigarette into some straw around the temporary toilet. Hal Oliver, press representative of the circus, denied this. “The fire,” he said, definitely started at the roof of the tent. We have a theory, but we’re not making it public now.” He said no credance was being given to any idea of incendiarism or sabotage, as first reported.
Another possible cause,’ was that the canvas may have become ignited by overheated electric spot-lights located at the juncture of side and roof sections of the tent.
Shortly after the fire Governor Baldwin, State Police Commissioner Hickey, Mayor William M. Mortensen, Fire Chief John C. King and City Fire Marshal Henry G. Thomas were commissioned as a group to make a thorough investigation of the disaster. Federal agencies are also conducting investigations. A number of circus officials were held on technical charges of manslaughter, arraigned in Hartford Police Court, and later released on bonds.
On July 14, Superior Court Judge John H. King of Hartford issued an order permitting the circus to leave the city nine days after the disaster, after security of $1,000,000 was posted by circus officials. It is said that all but $5,000 of the amount pledged will be held for claims arising from the fire and a small expense balance.
Following this action the circus returned to its winter quarters in Sarasota (Fla.) for refurbishing, leaving behind certain bits of evidence requested by State Police Commissioner Edward j. Hickey. This included samples of the grandstand and canvas, what remained of the w’arped steel lion cages and the runway used to move the animals in and out. The main tent pole was also left “as is.”
Early in August, the circus, minus the big top, arrived in Akron. Ohio, for the first scheduled appearance following the fire. This performance was held in the Rubber Bowl, and will be followed by other appearances elsewhere, using local stadiums and ball parks sail canvas tents.
Many Municipalities Are Revising Code
Tragic as was this disaster as in the case of the Cocoanut Grove and Triangle Shirt Waist fires, some good may eventuate. Already many municipalities have been overhauling their fire prevention codes to include inspection of circus, traveling show’s and the like, and insistence upon fire proofing of materials, and installation of fire protective measures. In Washington, Congress was asked. August first, to investigate the practicability of establishing health and safety rules applicable to circuses which travel from state to state. In the District of Columbia, the Commissioners raised the question of the “fire safeness” of canvas used in temporary housing, such as the Army huts and tents, abounding in that area.
Meanwhile on the old theory that tragedies never come singly, there has been more trouble reported in kindred fields. In Denver, the fatal fire at Elitch’s Gardens (described elsewhere in this issue); in Baltimore, the burning of the Oriole’s baseball park: in Detroit the incendiary fire at the State Fair Grounds Race Trace, with loss of one human life and 36 race horses and property loss of $25,000,000; mention of these fires is made elsewffiere in this issue.
As this issue goes to press, comes National Board of Fire Underwriters Bulletin No. 196, dated July 14, 1944 captioned “Circuses and Carnivals” which concludes: Safety at circuses and carnivals is largely a matter of fire prevention and of quick action to extinguish a small fire. The danger of panic is outstanding and ample exit-ways must be assured.
