Editor’s Opinion | By David Rhodes
We go to fires to search! Wait, what about size-up, water supply, fire attack, rapid intervention, safety, command, and the numerous other tasks that firefighters arrive eager to do? They are all important components to support the search. No matter how dialed in we get to the execution of our firefighting tactics and procedures, we still have a responsibility to the citizens we protect to operate with as much common sense as we can muster.
- Search Mission Prep: Size-Up, Methods, and Tools
- Making the Case for Search on the Modern Fireground
- Sizing Up the Search Effort
- Saving a Life in Seattle: Hoarder Home Rescue
I was taught early in my career to be careful not to fall into a standardized “training mode” when I arrived on the scene. These salty mentors knew that with little experience and context, going into “training mode” meant that I wasn’t thinking and that I was executing task and technique but not always when and where needed. We all fall into this trap in some form, and we need the old salts to yell and redirect our efforts where they are needed.
Let me explain with a short parable: Engine 1 arrives on the scene of a working fire with reported entrapment. The driver perfectly spots the apparatus. The officer exits and gives a textbook radio transmission describing the conditions, actions, and needs while establishing command. Now, following procedure, he begins the 360° walk-around (size-up) of the 3,000-square-foot house, noticing the light smoke at the open front door and a police officer on the porch in his patent leather shoes and 100% polyester uniform.
The officer negotiates a locked gate and makes it to the rear. There is moderate smoke issuing from a window in the back. He sees the gas meter and takes a couple of seconds to shut the valve. Simultaneously, the jump seat firefighter exits, grabs the hose load, and begins the stretch toward the front door as the police officer hears a faint cry for help and enters the structure. The police officer makes his way down the hall, noticing fire spreading across the ceiling of a bedroom; he quickly closes the door, holding the fire in check for at least a few minutes. The driver hand stretches to the hydrant and establishes a water supply. The engine officer makes it around the final corner and relays his update over the portable radio. The driver charges the line and the engine officer drops to his knees to mask up. The police officer emerges from inside the structure carrying an elderly invalid woman. He crouches, avoiding the moderate smoke now hovering at head level. Engine 2 reports on scene, and Engine 1’s officer (command), promptly following protocol, assigns them to stretch a backup line and establish rapid intervention.
Engine 1’s firefighter and his officer begin moving the hose up the porch toward the front door; now it’s 4½ minutes since arrival. They cross paths with the police officer carrying the rescued victim. They abandon their hose to assess the patient and initiate care. The engine officer runs back to the engine for the medical equipment. Engine 2 picks up the hose and makes it down the hall to see moderate smoke issuing from around a closed door. They open the door and blast the 10- × 12-foot room with 160 gallons per minute of water. The fire is out in less than 10 seconds! An ambulance arrives and promptly transports the victim, who is critical and in respiratory distress.
Before you start your critique of the crew’s actions in this scenario, don’t overlook the common sense used by the police officer. If the conditions were such that the police officer could enter in his patent leather shoes and 100% polyester uniform, shut the door, and find and carry out the victim, wouldn’t it seem that two highly trained firefighters wearing full protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus and carrying a thermal imaging camera and a tool of destruction could have done the same thing with a lot less risk?
Unfortunately, things like this are happening in our business, a result of training to procedure without context and a lack of development in critical decision making. A department must start by answering the question of why we respond to fires. No matter what your stance is on search practices, nozzle selection, and mobile or fixed command, everyone agrees that we go to save lives.
The data is in and confirms what I was taught in recruit school 38 years ago: TIME is against those trapped. Smoke and toxic gases were identified as the cause of death in fire victims more than 50 years ago, which has been reconfirmed by recent studies. Data now tells us that the victim’s chances of survival are 79% if removed within 2 minutes of arrival, 73% in 2-4 minutes, and 65% in 4-6 minutes. Again, the fire is not killing them; they are drowning in toxic gases, and the only thing that makes it better for them is to get them out. We need to execute with the same level of urgency we do when we find victims face down in the water. Get them out and get treatment started now!
In many cases, closing a door to confine a fire while you find and remove the victim is just as effective at protecting the rescuer and victim as anything else we can do. The majority of fire victims are still located in the bedrooms. Initiating search through the bedroom windows on any level is often the fastest way to the highest probable victim location and results in the highest number of successful rescues.
If your why is to save lives, then you and your department need to be consuming the latest UL FSRI search research and the constant data analysis from the Firefighter Rescue Survey. Then, you can start increasing the critical decision-making ability and talking about the tactical options of your initial-arriving crews.
